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Introduction and Legal Framework 
 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is under a lot of pressure these days. After years of romantic 
enthusiasm for international criminal justice,1 states and commentators are increasingly questioning 
whether the Court can live up to the promises of the Rome Statute.2 Calls for alternative forms of justice 
that may be delivered by local or regional justice mechanisms are becoming stronger.3 For now, the 
Court and the principles that are embedded in its legal mandate continue to enjoy the support of a large 
part of the international community. Yet, the ICC is facing a lot of criticism, which visibly constrains 
its ability to investigate and prosecute international crimes. 
 One of the most difficult challenges that confronts the ICC today is its war-like relationship with 
Africa. Many African leaders backed the Court’s establishment in 1998,4 and after the Rome Statute 
entered into force in 2002, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) brought the first 
cases to the ICC.5 In these and related ways, African states made a substantial contribution to the 
                                                          
1 Payam Akhavan, ‘The Rise, and Fall, and Rise, of International Criminal Justice’ (2013) 11 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 527-536. 
2 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, UN Treaty Series, volume 2187, and p. 3 (entered into 
force on 1 July 2002). 
3 For an overview of alternative local and regional justice mechanisms in Africa, see Kamari M. Clarke, Abel S. Knottnerus 
and Eefje de Volder (eds.), Africa and the ICC: Perceptions of Justice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 17-
22. 
4 African states were central participants in all stages of the drafting process of the Rome Statute, see Hassan Jalloh and Fatou 
Bensouda, ‘International Criminal Law in an African context’, in Max du Plessis (ed.), African Guide to International Criminal 
Justice (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2008), pp. 15-53; Phakiso Mochochoko, ‘Africa and the International Criminal 
Court’, in Evelyn A. Ankumah and Edward K. Kwakwa (eds.), African Perspectives on International Criminal Justice 
(Maastricht: Africa Legal Aid, 2005), pp. 241-258.  
5 Encouraged by the Prosecutor, Uganda and the DRC asked the Court to investigate crimes committed on their own territory. 
These ‘self-referrals’ were constructed under Article 14(1) of the Statute. By voluntarily submitting themselves to the 
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development of the Court. In the past decade, however, a sizeable group of African states has turned 
against the ICC. They have accused the Prosecutor of selectively targeting Africans, they have refused 
to cooperate with the Court in high-level cases and several African states have even threatened to 
withdraw from the Rome Statute.6 The protest of these and other African states has not been univocal 
and does not reflect the views of all African states, let alone all Africans.7 Still, it can hardly be denied 
that the ICC has an ‘Africa problem’. 
                                                          
jurisdiction of the ICC, Uganda and the DRC affirmed their commitment to the Court. Yet, as the investigations proceeded, it 
became increasingly clear that their cooperation also had a strong strategic character, in the sense that they were based on a 
convergence of interests between the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and the Governments of Uganda and the DRC. It remains 
unclear whether the OTP made any promises to President Museveni or President Kabila about the scope of its investigations, 
but the Court’s first cases did trigger perceptions of selectivity and raised questions about whether the Prosecutor should solicit 
governments to refer situations to the ICC in which they are (in)directly involved. See generally Clarke, Knottnerus and de 
Volder, ‘Africa and the ICC’, pp. 14-15. 
6 At the time of writing (August 2017), 34 African states are a party to the Rome Statute. In late 2016, three states (South 
Africa, Burundi and Gambia) notified the Secretary General of the UN of their decision to withdraw from the Rome Statute. 
As specified in Article 127, withdrawals take effect one year after the date of receipt of the notification of withdrawal and will 
not discharge the respective states from their obligations arising from the Rome Statute while it was a Party to the Statute. In 
February 2017, the Government of Gambia notified the Secretary General of its decision to rescind that notification of 
withdrawal with immediate effect. The same decision was taken by the Government of South Africa in March 2017, after the 
High Court of South Africa had declared its initial withdrawal decision unconstitutional. See UN Treaties Collection 
(C.N.786.2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10), Declaratory statement by the Republic of South Africa on the decision to withdraw 
from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 19 October 2016; UN Treaties Collection 
(C.N.805.2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10), Depository notification withdrawal by the Republic of Burundi, 27 October 2016; UN 
Treaties Collection (C.N.862.2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10), Depository notification by the Islamic Republic of the Gambia, 10 
November 2016; UN Treaties Collection (C.N.62.2017.TREATIES-XVIII.10), Depository notification by the Islamic Republic 
of Gambia, 10 February 2017; Democratic Alliance v. Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Judgment Gauteng 
Division of the High Court, 22 February 2017; UN Treaties Collection (C.N.121.2017.TREATIES-XVIII.10), Depository 
notification by the Republic of South Africa, 7 March 2017. For a complete overview of the signatures, ratifications and 
accessions of African states to the Rome Statute, see annex I. 
7 Some African states, such as Botswana, have publically distanced themselves from the African Union’s position on the ICC, 
and many civil society organizations, legal experts and victim communities in Africa continue to defend the Court’s work. As 
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 Here and elsewhere, the opposition of African states against the Court is understood to be a 
matter of regional concern. The reason for this is that the African Union (AU) plays a leading role in 
criticizing the ICC. Initially, the AU encouraged its member states to ratify the Rome Statute,8 and even 
entered into negotiations on a cooperation agreement with the Court.9 Yet, the AU’s policy on the ICC 
changed dramatically after 2008 when the Prosecutor asked the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) to issue a 
warrant for the arrest of President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan.10 This request was immediately opposed 
by the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC)11 as well as the AU Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AU Assembly).12 In its first reaction, the AUPSC asked the UN Security Council to defer 
al-Bashir’s prosecution in order to protect the peace process in Darfur.13 When the Council did not act 
                                                          
I have surveyed elsewhere, the Court has many different audiences in Africa and their perceptions of the ICC are far from 
uniform. Clarke, Knottnerus and de Volder, ‘Africa and the ICC’, pp. 6-10. 
8 This is in line with the AU’s ambitious human rights agenda. Article 3(H) of the AU Constitutive Act states that the AU shall 
‘promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and 
other relevant human rights instruments’; Article 4(H) provides that the AU has a right to intervene ‘in a Member State pursuant 
to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’; 
and Article 4(O) mentions the ‘condemnation and rejection of impunity’ as one of the principles of the AU. The Constitutive 
Act of the African Union, 11 July 2000, UN Treaty Series, Volume 2158, p. 3 (entered into 26 May 2001).  
9 AU Commission, Strategic Plan of the Commission of the AU - Volume 3 (2004-2007 Plan of Action), p. 65; AU Assembly, 
Decision on the Vision and Mission of the African Union and Strategic Plan, Programme and Budget of the Commission, 
Assembly/AU/Dec.33(III), 6-8 July 2004, para. 1. Note that the Organization of African Unity (the predecessor of the AU) also 
supported the ratification of the Rome Statute: OAU, Grand Bay (Mauritius) Declaration and Plan of Action, 16 April 1999, 
para. 13(m). 
10 OTP, ‘Prosecutor’s Statement on the Prosecutor’s Application for a warrant of Arrest under Article 58 Against Omar Hassan 
Ahmad AL BASHIR’, 14 July 2008; Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-3), Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant 
of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 3 March 2009. 
11 The AUPSC is composed of fifteen African states which are elected by the Assembly for a term of two years (ten states) or 
three years (five states).   
12 As stated in Article 6(1) of the AU Constitutive Act, the AU Assembly is composed of the Heads of State and Government 
of the 54 member states of the AU or their duly accredited representatives. 
13 AUPSC, Communiqué, PSC/MIN/Comm(CXLII), 21 July 2008, paras. 10-11. 
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on this request, the AU Assembly instructed its member states not to cooperate with the arrest of al-
Bashir.14 Looking back, these decisions mark the start of the AU’s ongoing campaign against the ICC.  
 In the course of the AU’s powerful opposition against the ICC,15 one of the most important 
reasons for African states to criticize the Court has been the prosecution and trial of sitting Heads of 
State and Government. Combined with accusations of selectivity and neo-imperialism, the opposition 
of the AU against the ICC has mainly been directed at the prosecution of sitting African presidents and 
at the negative effects that these proceedings allegedly have on fragile African states.  
 The AU’s first critical decisions on the ICC focussed on the case against al-Bashir. Since 2013, 
however, the AU has also strongly criticized the Court for continuing the trials of Uhuru Kenyatta and 
William Ruto. Kenyatta and Ruto were elected for a first term as President and Deputy President of 
Kenya in March 2013, despite facing trials at the ICC for their alleged role in the 2007-2008 Post-
Election Violence in Kenya.16 In the shadow of the cases against Kenyatta, Ruto and al-Bashir, the AU 
                                                          
14 AU Assembly, Decision on the Meeting of African states parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII), 1-3 July 2009, para. 10. Since 2010, President al-Bashir has travelled to eight different African 
states parties (Chad, Kenya, Djibouti, Malawi, Nigeria, the DRC, South Africa and Uganda). For references and further 
discussion on al-Bashir’s visits to states parties, see chapter 3.  
15 As I have argued elsewhere, the AU’s campaign against the ICC is ‘powerful’ in the sense that it undermines the Court’s 
perceived legitimacy. Legitimacy, in the sociological understanding of the word, refers to the perceptions that the different 
audiences of an institution have about the appropriateness of its norms and decisions. In this sense, an international court like 
the ICC possesses legitimacy to the extent that its rulings and broader normative framework are perceived by its audiences as 
‘appropriate, proper, and just’. Abel S. Knottnerus, ‘The AU, the ICC and the Prosecution of African Presidents’, in Kamari  
M. Clarke, Abel S. Knottnerus and Eefje de Volder (eds.), Africa and the ICC: Perceptions of Justice (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), pp. 152-153. This conception of sociological legitimacy builds on Tom Tyler, ‘Psychological 
Perspectives of Legitimacy and Legitimation’ (2006) 57 Annual Review of Psychology 375-400; Ian Hurd, After Anarchy - 
Legitimacy & Power in the United Nations Security Council (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 7-12, 30-45. 
On the relation between power and perceived legitimacy: Chris Reus-Smit, ‘International Crises of Legitimacy’ (2007) 44 
International Politics 160-165. More generally, on different conceptions of power: Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, 
‘Power in International Politics’ (2005) 59 International Organization 39-75. 
16 Note that Kenyatta and Ruto were elected for a second term as President and Deputy President of Kenya in August 2017.  
 5 
 
has portrayed the Court as a serious threat to the stability and sovereignty of African states and has 
searched for ways to protect them and other sitting African presidents from prosecution and trial by the 
ICC.17 Such efforts have been ‘successful’ in the sense that al-Bashir has not been arrested, whereas the 
Court has been forced to close the cases against Kenyatta and Ruto, amidst accusations of witness 
interference and non-cooperation by the Kenyan Government.18 
 An important point of reference in the AU’s ongoing campaign against the ICC, and against the 
prosecution and trial of sitting Heads of State in particular, is a decision of the AU Assembly from 
October 2013. In this decision, the assembled African leaders declared that ‘no charges shall be 
                                                          
17 A fourth case that has played a marginal role in the AU’s opposition against the prosecution and trial of sitting Heads of 
State is the case against the former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, who was prosecuted for crimes against humanity in 2011. 
At that time, Gaddafi’s prosecution sparked a powerful reaction from the AU, arguing that it complicated ‘the efforts aimed at 
finding a negotiated political solution to the crisis in Libya’. AU Assembly, Decision on the Implementation of the Assembly 
Decisions on the International Criminal Court, Assembly/AU/Dec.366(XVII), 30 June-1 July 2011, para. 6. Shortly after this 
decision, however, Gaddafi was killed. Later that year, when the AU recognized the National Transitional Council as the new 
legitimate representative of the Libyan people, the prosecution of Gaddafi and the investigation in Libya quickly disappeared 
from its political agenda. Recently, in June 2017, the investigation in Libya received renewed media coverage after the reported 
release of Gaddafi’s son Saif al-Islam by the Abu-Bakr al-Siddiq Brigade of Zintan in Libya. In response to these reports, the 
ICC has called for his immediate arrest and surrender. The Prosecutor has accused Saif al-Islam of the crimes against humanity 
of murder and persecution, allegedly committed in Libya in 2011. OTP, ICC Prosecutor calls for the immediate arrest and 
surrender of the suspects, Mssrs Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Al-Tuhamy Mohamed Khaled to the Court, 14 June 2017.  
18 At the time of writing (August2017), the cases against Kenyatta and Ruto are considered closed. Amidst accusations of 
witness interference and non-cooperation by the Kenyan Government, the Prosecutor withdrew the charges against Kenyatta 
in December 2014. This case is considered closed unless and until the Prosecutor submits new evidence. In April 2016, the 
Trial Chamber also vacated the charges against Ruto (and his co-accused Joshua Sang) after two of the three judges concluded 
that the evidence presented by the Prosecutor was too weak to continue the trial. OTP, Statement of the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on the withdrawal of charges against Mr. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, 5 December 
2014; Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-1005), Decision on the withdrawal of charges against Mr Kenyatta, 13 March 2015; OTP, 
Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, regarding Trial Chamber’s decision to vacate 
charges against Messrs William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang without prejudice to their prosecution in the future, 6 April 
2016; Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-2027-Red), Public redacted version of Decision on Defence Applications for 
Judgments of Acquittal, 4 April 2016. 
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commenced or continued before an International Court or Tribunal against any serving Head of State or 
Government or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity during their term(s) of office’.19 In 
follow-up to this decision, the AU adopted a plan to grant African leaders personal immunity before the 
future Criminal Chamber of the African Court,20 and called upon the ICC’s Assembly of States Parties 
(ASP) to amend the Rome Statute in such a way that sitting (deputy) presidents can be exempted from 
prosecution and trial at the Court.21 Most recently, in January 2017, the AU Assembly even agreed to 
adopt a ‘strategy’ for the collective withdrawal of African states from the Rome Statute.22 This strategy 
                                                          
19 AU Assembly, Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the ICC, Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1(Oct.2013), 11-12 October 2013, 
para. 10(i). 
20 Article 46Abis of the Malabo Protocol on the formation of a Criminal Chamber to the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights provides that: ‘no charges shall be commenced or continued before the Court against any serving African Union Head 
of State or Government, or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity, or other senior state officials based on their 
functions during their tenure of office’. Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights, 27 June 2014, available online at: <http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/treaties/7792-file-
protocol_statute_african_court_justice_and_human_rights.pdf>. At the time of writing (August 2017), nine states have signed 
the Protocol, but none of the required fifteen states has ratified it. On the planned Criminal Chamber, see generally Abel S. 
Knottnerus, and Eefje de Volder, ‘International Criminal Justice and the early formation of an African Criminal Court’, in 
Kamari M. Clarke, Abel S. Knottnerus and Eefje de Volder (eds.), Africa and the ICC: Perceptions of Justice (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 376-406. For a detailed analysis of Article 46Abis see Dire Tladi, ‘The Immunity 
Provision in the AU Amendment Protocol: Separating the (Doctrinal) Wheat from the (Normative) Chaff’ (2015) 13 Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 3-17.  
21 AU Assembly, Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation of the Decisions on the 
International Criminal Court, Assembly/AU/Dec.493 (XXII), 30-31 January 2014, para. 11. This proposal has formally been 
introduced to the ASP by Kenya. UN Treaties Collection (C.N.1026.2013.TREATIES-XVIII.10), Kenya: Proposal of 
Amendments, 14 March 2014. For an overview of the AU’s proposed amendments, see annex II.  
22 AU Assembly, AU Assembly, Decision on the International Criminal Court, Assembly/AU/Dec.622(XXVIII), 30-31 January 
2017, para. 8. AU, Draft Withdrawal Strategy Document, 12 January 2017 (on file with the author).  Note that Benin, Botswana, 
Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Tanzania, Tunisia and Zambia entered formal reservations to the decision. For a preliminary analysis of the AU’s decision on 
collective withdrawal, see Patryk I. Labuda, ‘The African Union’s Collective Withdrawal from the ICC: Does Bad Law make 
for Good Politics?’, EJIL Talk, 15 February 2017.  
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should be understood as the latest step in a series of threats intended to push the ASP and the Security 
Council to agree to a list of far-reaching demands, including that sitting Heads of State should receive 
protection from prosecution and trial at the ICC.23  
 
I. The Scope of this Study  
Against the backdrop of the ongoing tensions between the AU and the ICC, this study sets out to 
investigate how the Court and other relevant actors have responded to the AU’s concerns about the 
prosecution and trial of sitting Heads of State and Government. In light of the prosecution of al-Bashir 
and the trials of Kenyatta and Ruto, the AU has repeatedly warned (1) that the ICC undermines the 
promotion of peace in African states, (2) that sitting Heads of State enjoy immunity from arrest under 
international law and (3) that the ICC negatively affects the ability of African leaders to exercise their 
official responsibilities. This study examines how the Court, the Security Council and the ASP have 
addressed these concerns and assesses whether they have done so in accordance with the Rome Statute 
and international law more generally.  
 The overarching research question that this study seeks to answer is as follows: 
How have the Court, the Security Council and the Assembly of States Parties responded to the AU’s 
concerns about the prosecution and trial of sitting Heads of State and Government by the ICC, and to 
what extent are these responses based on a convincing interpretation of the Court’s legal framework 
and international law more generally?  
                                                          
23 AU, Draft Withdrawal Strategy Document, 12 January 2017 (on file with the author), p. 10. The AU’s position on the 
prosecution of sitting Heads of State is explicated in the Withdrawal Strategy in the following manner: ‘while being a Head of 
State or Government such will not exempt them from criminal liability for international crimes allegedly perpetuated, 
prosecution should not be instituted until the Head of State or Government or anyone entitled to act as such, has left office - in 
accordance with domestic and customary international law’ (emphasis added). See also AU Assembly, Decision on the 
International Criminal Court, Assembly/AU/Dec.590(XXVI), 30-31 January 2016, para. 10(IV); AU Assembly, Decision on 
the International Criminal Court, Assembly/AU/Dec.616 (XXVII), 17-18 July 2016, para. 5.  
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 The first part of the research question highlights that this study is concerned with one particular 
aspect of the ICC’s Africa problem. Without denying the importance of other concerns that the AU and 
individual African states have voiced about the Court, this study focusses solely on the AU’s concerns 
about the prosecution and trial of sitting Heads of State. Most importantly perhaps, this study does not 
address the question of perceived selectivity, which has obtained a lot of attention in other 
contributions.24  
 The first part of the research question further confines the scope of this study to the formal 
responses of a specific groups of actors: the Court, the Security Council and the ASP. Only the official 
decisions and statements that have been adopted by these actors in response to the AU’s concerns are 
examined here. The reason for this is that the Court, the Security Council and the ASP are the only actors 
that have a legal authority under the Rome Statute to act on the AU’s concerns. This legal authority lies, 
first and foremost, with the different organs of the Court, which are tasked to interpret and apply its legal 
framework (Article 34), and especially with the Court’s judges and the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP).25 
In addition, the Security Council is authorized under the Statute to influence the Court’s decision-
making by referring situations for possible investigation to the Prosecutor (Article 13(b)) and by 
                                                          
24 The ICC has so far opened investigations in 10 situations of which 9 in Africa (Uganda, the DRC, the Central African 
Republic, Darfur, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Libya, Mali and a second one in the CAR). On 27 January 2016, PTC I authorized the 
Prosecutor to proceed with her first investigation outside of Africa, for crimes allegedly committed in Georgia. Note that the 
Prosecutor has also opened preliminary examinations in Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, Gabon, Guinea, Iraq/UK, Nigeria, 
Palestine, Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, and Ukraine, and has completed preliminary examinations 
in Honduras, Venezuela and the Republic of Korea. On the ICC’s alleged Africa bias, see for example, Kai Ambos, ‘Expanding 
the Focus of the ‘African Criminal Court’’, in William A. Schabas, Yvonne McDermott, and Niamh Hayes (eds.), Ashgate 
Research Companion to International Criminal Law: Critical perspectives (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012), pp. 499-530; Margaret 
M. deGuzman, ‘Is the ICC Targeting Africa Inappropriately?: A Moral, Legal and Sociological Assessment’, in Richard H. 
Steinberg (eds.), Contemporary Issues Facing the International Criminal Court (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2016), pp. 333-337; 
Dire Tladi, ‘The African Union and the International Criminal Court: The Battle for the Soul of International Law’ (2009) 34 
South African Yearbook of International Law 57-69.   
25 Article 34 determines that ‘the Court shall be composed of the following organs: (a) The Presidency; (b) An Appeals Division, 
a Trial Division and a Pre-Trial Division; (c) The Office of the Prosecutor; (d) The Registry’. 
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deferring an investigation or prosecution for a renewable period of twelve months (Article 16). Finally, 
the Assembly of States Parties, which is created by the Statute as a body separate from the Court (Article 
112 and Article 34), possesses various powers, of which the right to initiate amendments to the Statute 
is the most far-reaching one (Article 121).  
 The second part of the research question specifies the main objective of this study, which is to 
assess whether the official responses to the AU’s concerns are based on a convincing interpretation of 
the ICC’s legal framework.26 This study does not chart the forces and interests that shape the AU’s 
decision-making, nor does it seek to review the moral implications of the AU’s objections against the 
ICC. Instead, it focusses on the legal questions that the AU’s campaign has brought up about the 
prosecution and trial of sitting Heads of State. These questions, which are introduced below, require 
detailed analysis because they play an important role in the ongoing debate on the ICC’s relationship 
with Africa in particular and in the study of international law more generally. An additional reason why 
the decisions and statements that have been adopted in response to the AU’s concerns demand the 
interest of scholars, policymakers and legal professionals is that they have significant implications for 
future decision-making on legally complex and politically sensitive issues like the immunity of sitting 
Heads of State and the coordination between the interests of peace and prosecution.  
 In light of the objectives of this study, three sets of legal questions particularly require attention. 
Firstly, the AU’s peace concerns and repeated requests to the Security Council to defer the prosecution 
of African presidents have raised questions about the exercise (and non-exercise) of the Council’s power 
to defer the Court’s proceedings under Article 16 of the Rome Statute. Under what conditions can the 
Security Council suspend an investigation or prosecution? Is this only allowed when the Court’s 
involvement in a situation amounts to a threat to the peace in the meaning of Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter,27 or can the Council also issue a deferral in reference to other developments like an ongoing 
peace process or a terrorist attack? Furthermore, are there other ways within the legal framework of the 
                                                          
26 The question of what makes some interpretations more convincing than others is discussed in part III of this chapter.  
27 The Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, UN Treaty Series, 59 Stat. 1031, Treaty Series 993, p. 1153 (entered into 
force 24 October 1945).  
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Court to mediate the interests of peace and prosecution? Can the Prosecutor or perhaps the UN General 
Assembly play a role in this regard? These questions are particularly relevant in light of the AU’s 
pending proposal to amend the Rome Statute in such a way that the UN General Assembly will be able 
to defer an investigation or prosecution when the Security Council fails to decide on a deferral request 
within six months of its receipt.28 
 Secondly, the immunity of sitting Heads of State and in particular al-Bashir’s immunity from 
arrest demands attention. Article 27(2) of the Statute provides that immunities ‘shall not bar the Court 
from exercising its jurisdiction over a person’. With this provision, the parties to the Statute authorized 
the Court to deviate from the prevailing rule in international law that sitting Heads of State enjoy 
personal immunity from criminal prosecution outside of their own country. According to the AU, 
however, al-Bashir still possesses immunity from arrest, because Sudan is not a party to the Statute and 
al-Bashir is only subject to the Court’s jurisdiction on the basis of a Security Council referral.29 In 
support, the AU has pointed to Article 98(1) of the Statute, which stresses that the Court ‘may not 
proceed with a request for surrender or assistance’ when this requires a state to violate its international 
obligations to accord state or diplomatic immunities to the officials of other states. These and connected 
arguments have raised intricate questions about the nature and scope of immunities and about the 
different ways in which immunities can be waived or removed. The significance of these questions lies 
in the pending proceedings on al-Bashir’s immunity, and more generally in the fact that the immunity 
of state officials remains one of the most hotly contested topics in international law today.30  
 Finally, the unprecedented situation of having a sitting Head and a Deputy Head of State on trial 
in the Kenyan cases has brought up difficult questions about balancing the requirement of the accused 
                                                          
28 UN Treaties Collection (C.N.851.2009.TREATIES-10), South Africa: Proposal of Amendment, 18 November 2009. 
29 UNSC, Resolution 1593, 31 March 2005. 
30 Note that the topic of ‘immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction’ has been on the agenda of the 
International Law Commission (ILC) since 2007. For an overview of the ILC’s consideration of this topic, see ILC Special 
Rapporteur Hernández, Fourth report on the immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, A/CN.4/686, 29 
May 2015, paras. 1-14.  
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to be present at trial with the official responsibilities of state leaders. As part of its opposition against 
the trials of Kenyatta and Ruto, the AU urged the Court back in 2013 to allow the Kenyan President and 
Deputy President to choose which sessions of their trials they wished to attend. These ‘excusal requests’ 
prompted questions about whether the Trial Chamber has any discretion to waive the obligation of the 
accused to be present at trial. Is the Trial Chamber permitted to excuse an accused from having to attend 
trial hearings, and if so, under what conditions can an excusal be granted? The special treatment that the 
AU demanded for Kenyatta and Ruto also sparked questions about the first sub-paragraph of Article 
27(1) of the Statute, which stipulates that the Statute ‘shall apply equally to all persons without any 
distinction based on official capacity’.31 If the Trial Chamber enjoys a certain level of discretion to waive 
the duty of the accused to be present at trial, can the accused also be excused because of his or her 
demanding functions as (Deputy) Head of State? In other words, is there a legal basis for treating sitting 
Heads of State differently than another accused? These questions demand attention seeing that the ICC 
may be confronted with them again in future cases and especially because they touch on the heart of the 
AU’s problems with the ICC.  
 The remainder of this introductory chapter explains how the relevant questions about the 
prosecution and trial of sitting Heads of State are examined in this study. In order to clarify the premises, 
or ‘legal method’, upon which this research builds, I will explain my views on (1) the structure of the 
ICC’s legal framework and (2) the applicable rules of interpretation for the Rome Statute.32 Firstly, part 
                                                          
31 The equal treatment principle is also embedded in Article 21(3). The relevant part of this provision states that the 
interpretation and application of the Court’s applicable law must be ‘without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such 
as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, 
ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status’.  
32 For present purposes, a legal method is understood to mean the consistent application of a conceptual apparatus to a certain 
sets of legal questions. On different ‘methods’ in international law, see the various contributions to the following symposium 
on methods in international law, and especially the introductory and concluding remarks of its conveners: Steven R. Ratner and 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Appraising the Methods of International Law: A Prospectus for Readers’ (1999) 93 American Journal 
of International Law 291-302; Anne-Marie Slaughter and Steven R. Ratner, ‘The Method is the Message’ (1999) 93 American 
Journal of International Law 410-423.  
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I will discuss the role and hierarchy of the different sources of applicable law that are embedded in 
Article 21 of the Statute. What are the sources of law that the Court and other relevant actors are 
supposed to apply and to what extent is there an order of precedence between these sources? Secondly, 
part II will turn attention to the interpretation of the Rome Statute, and will discuss what makes some 
interpretations, and in most cases one particular interpretation, more convincing than others in view of 
the rules of interpretation that are provided in the Rome Statute and in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention or VCLT).33 What are the applicable rules of interpretation and 
how should these rules be interpreted? Finally, part III will explain the organization of this study and 
will provide a short overview of what is to be expected in the following chapters.  
 
II. The ICC’s Legal Framework  
The Rome Statute includes a detailed list of sources of applicable law. This list is laid down in Article 
21 and forms the core of the ICC’s legal framework. All legal arguments that are presented by 
participants before the Court and all official decisions, statements and policies that are adopted by the 
Court’s organs should be based on the sources that are enumerated in this provision:  
1. The Court shall apply: 
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence; 
b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of 
international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict; 
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal 
systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally 
                                                          
33 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, UN Treaty Series, Volume 1155, p. 33 (entered into force on 
27 January 1980).  
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exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this  Statute 
and with international law and internationally recognized norms and standards. 
2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions. 
3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally 
recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender as 
defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, 
national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status. 
In a historical sense, Article 21 forms the first codification of the sources of international criminal law.34 
None of the statutes of the preceding international criminal tribunals contained a provision specifying 
applicable law. The judges of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, as well as the ad hoc Tribunals for 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda did not receive detailed instructions on the sources that they would have to 
apply, and the relative weight that they would have to attach to them.35 With the inclusion of Article 21, 
the drafters of the Rome Statute intended to limit this judicial discretion in order to increase legal 
certainty.36  
                                                          
34 Margaret deGuzman, ‘Article 21 - Applicable Law’, in Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008, 2nd edition), p. 703.  
35 For a comparison between Article 21 of the Rome Statute and the statutes of other international criminal tribunals, see Gilbert 
Bitti, ‘Article 21 and the Hierarchy of Sources of Law before the ICC’, in Carsten Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the 
International Criminal Court (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 411-413.  
36 On the drafting history of Article 21, see Ida Caracciolo, ‘Applicable Law’, in Flavia Lattanzi and William A. Schabas (eds.), 
Essays on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome: Editrice il Sirente, 2000), pp. 212-224; William A. 
Schabas, A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 383-385. Some commentators have 
argued that the inclusion of the specific list of sources in Article 21 is an ‘improvement of international criminal law’, which 
helps to provide ‘procedural certainty to the parties and participants’. See, for example, Bitti, ‘Article 21’, p. 413. Other 
commentators have argued that there are also downsides to this limitation of judicial discretion. See, for example, Alain Pellet, 
‘Applicable Law’, in in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John R.W.D. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 1051-1084. More generally, on the alleged 
mistrust by states in international judges, in the context of the Rome Statute, see David Hunt, ‘The International Criminal Court 
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 In some ways, Article 21 resembles Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ).37 Apart from academic writings, which are not mentioned in Article 21, the Rome Statute 
includes the same sources of law as the ICJ Statute. Both refer, although in different terms, to 
international treaties, international custom, judicial decisions and general principles of law recognized 
by civilized nations. They differ fundamentally, however, in the sense that Article 21 defines an order 
of precedence between these sources, while Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute places them on an equal 
footing.38  
 There are three levels of hierarchy within the ICC’s legal framework.39 First of all, Article 21(1) 
draws a distinction between the ‘internal sources of law’ that are mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) which 
the Court shall apply ‘in the first place’ and the ‘external sources of law’ that are specified in sub-
paragraphs (b) and (c), to which the Court shall only resort if the internal sources fail to yield a solution. 
Secondly, among the internal sources of law, there exists a hierarchical relationship between the Statute, 
                                                          
- High Hopes, ‘Creative Ambiguity’ and an Unfortunate Mistrust in International Judges’ (2004) 2 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 56-70; Antonio Cassese, ‘The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections’ 
(1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 163.  
37 Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute provides that ‘the Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law 
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the 
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of 
law’.  
38 The only exception under Article 38(1) concerns academic writings and judicial decisions, which sub-paragraph (d) defines 
‘as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law’.   
39 The existence of a hierarchy of sources in Article 21 is widely accepted in the literature, see for example Bitti, ‘Article 21’, 
p. 411; deGuzman, ‘Article 21’, p. 702; Gudrun Hochmayr, ‘Applicable Law in Practice and Theory - Interpreting Article 21 
of the ICC Statute’ (2014) 12 Journal of International Criminal Justice 655; Pellet, ‘Applicable law’, p. 1076; Schabas, 
‘Commentary’, p. 385.  
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the Elements of Crimes and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Rules or RPE).40 This relationship 
does not follow from the text of Article 21(1)(a) itself, but derives from other provisions in the Statute.41 
Finally, Article 21(3) includes a standard of review which calls for an interpretation and application of 
the ICC’s legal framework which is consistent with ‘internationally recognized human rights’. This 
standard makes these rights in a certain sense superior to all the other sources of law that are listed in 
Article 21.42  
 In the following sections, I introduce these three hierarchical levels and explain how I 
understand the relative weight of the sources of law that together form the ICC’s legal framework. This 
brief evaluation of the applicable sources of law forms the first pillar of the legal method that this study 
employs in analysing the different responses to the AU’s concerns about the prosecution and trial of 
sitting Heads of State. To clarify my position on the applicable law of the ICC, I follow the distinction 
and order that Article 21 draws between: (A) internal sources of law, (B) external sources of law, (C) 
the Court’s jurisprudence and (D) internationally recognized human rights.  
A. Internal sources of law: Article 21(1)(a)  
Under general international law, the Rome Statute can be understood as a multilateral treaty of a 
‘particular type’ with certain ‘special legal characteristics’.43 It forms a conventional agreement between 
its parties, but at the same time it also has a constitutive character in the sense that the Statute serves to 
create a new subject of international law with its own legal personality (Article 4(1)).44 One of the 
                                                          
40 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Elements of Crimes were adopted during the first session of the ASP, see 
Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, First session, New 
York, 3-10 September 2002 (ICC-ASP/1/3 and Corr.1), parts II.A and II.B. 
41 See the discussion below at II.  
42 Pellet, ‘Applicable law’, p. 1077.  
43 Legality of the use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, [1996] ICJ Rep 66, para. 19; Certain 
Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, [1962] ICJ Rep 151, at 157.  
44 Ibid.  
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consequences of this constitutive character is that the Statute takes priority within the Court’s own legal 
order over all other (internal and external) sources of applicable law.  
 The constitutive instruments of some international organisations seek to entrench precedence 
over other treaties. For example, Article 103 of the UN Charter provides that ‘in the event of a conflict 
between the obligations of the Members of the [UN] under the present Charter and their obligations 
under any other international agreement their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail’.45 The 
Rome Statute does not include such a provision and does not prohibit its states parties to conclude other 
and possibly incompatible treaties in the field of international criminal justice.46 Still, the Statute does 
oblige the Court to give priority to the Statute over all other internal and external sources of law in the 
exercise of the Court’s own jurisdiction. As stated in Article 21(1), the Court shall apply ‘in the first 
place’ the Statute and other internal sources of law, and ‘in the second place’ and ‘where appropriate’ 
treaties and the principles and rules of international law, and ‘failing that’ general principles of law.  
                                                          
45 The majority view in the academic discourse is that Article 103 covers treaty and customary international law, and that the 
Council is, under certain conditions, authorized to derogate from treaty and customary international law when acting under 
Chapter VII. See generally Andreas Paulus and Johann Leiβ, ‘Article 103’, in Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, George 
Nolte and Andreas Paulus (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations - A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 
Third Edition), pp. 2132-2133. For further discussion and references on Article 103, see chapter 3, part V(B) in this study. 
46 Some scholars have questioned the legality of the Amendment Protocol on the establishment of a criminal chamber of the 
African Court by arguing that the Rome Statute does ‘not expressly allow or even imply that regional courts … [can] be 
conferred with jurisdiction to try international crimes that are under the jurisdiction of the ICC’. See for example Chacha 
Murungu, ‘Towards a Criminal Chamber in the African Court of Justice and Human Rights’ (2011) 9 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, 1081. This argument is unconvincing, because there is no requirement under general international law for a 
court created by a multilateral treaty (the African Court on the basis of the AU Constitutive Act) to obtain the approval of 
another multilateral treaty (the Rome Statute) to justify its own existence. Neither the Rome Statute nor any other treaty has an 
‘exclusionary character in terms of having totally occupied the field for purposes of treaty-making’. See Vincent O. Nmehielle, 
‘‘“Saddling” the New African Regional Human Rights Court with International Criminal Jurisdiction: Innovative, Obstructive, 




 Apart from the Statute, Article 21(1), sub-paragraph (a) mentions two other instruments of 
internal law: the Elements of Crimes and the Rules.47 The text of sub-paragraph (a) suggests that the 
Statute and these other instruments are of equal importance. Yet, other provisions in the Statute create 
a hierarchical relationship in favour of the Statute. Firstly, Article 9(1) specifies that the function of the 
Elements is to assist the Court in ‘the interpretation and application’ of the crimes that are listed in 
Articles 5-8, and Article 9(3) adds that the Elements ‘shall be consistent with this Statute’. It remains 
controversial whether the Elements are binding for the Court’s judges, but it is clear that the Statute 
takes priority over the Elements.48 This means that the Court may in certain situations have to deviate 
from the Elements in the interpretation and application of the crimes. Secondly, Article 51(4) dictates 
that the Rules and amendments thereto ‘shall be consistent’ with the Statute, and Article 51(5) further 
determines that in ‘the event of conflict … the Statute shall prevail’.49 As the ASP stated in its 
                                                          
47 Note that the Statute also creates other legal instruments of an internal nature which are not specifically listed in Article 21, 
in particular the Regulations of the Court (Article 52). As created by the Statute, the Regulations are part of the internal law of 
the Court, and must be applied in the ‘first place’ (in the meaning of Article 21(1)(a)). Note that Article 52(1) specifies that the 
Regulations should be compatible with both the Statute and the RPE, creating a hierarchical relationship between the Statute 
and the RPE on the one hand and the Regulations on the other. The relationship between the Regulations and other internal 
instruments has not been regulated in the Statute. This means that in the event of conflict judges will have to find solutions 
based on general principles of law such as lex specialis derogate legi generali and lex posterior derogat priori. As observed 
by Schabas, ‘Commentary’, p. 387. The Regulations of the Court were adopted by the judges of the Court on 26 May 2004, 
Official documents of the International Criminal Court (ICC-BD/01-01-04).  
48 The majority of PTC I ruled in the al-Bashir case that ‘the Elements of Crimes ... must be applied unless the competent 
Chamber finds an irreconcilable contradiction between these documents on the one hand and the Statute on the other’. Al-
Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-3), Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad 
Al Bashir, 3 March 2009, paras. 128-131. Most commentators agree that the formulation of Article 9(1) shows that the Elements 
of Crimes do not have a binding character. For further discussion, see Leena Grover, ‘A Call to Arms: Fundamental Dilemmas 
Confronting the Interpretation of Crimes in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (2010) 21 European Journal 
of International Law 563-579; Hochmayr, ‘Applicable law’, pp. 657-658; Pellet, ‘Applicable law’, pp. 1059-1062  
49 As stated by PTC I: ‘it follows that a provision of the Rules cannot be interpreted in such a way as to narrow the scope of an 
article of the Statute’. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ICC-01/04-101), Decision on the Applications for 
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explanatory note to the RPE, the Rules and the amendments thereto ‘are an instrument for the application 
of the Rome Statute … to which they are subordinate in all cases’.50   
B. External sources of law: Article 21(1)(b) and (c) 
In addition to internal sources of law, Article 21(1) refers in sub-paragraph (b) to applicable treaties and 
principles and rules of international law and in sub-paragraph (c) to general principles of law. The 
wording of these provisions has sparked debate among commentators, especially on the definition of 
applicable treaties,51 and on the possibility to derive general principles of law ‘as appropriate’ from ‘the 
national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime’.52 For present purposes 
it is not necessary to engage with these discussions.53 What should be emphasized, however, is that 
customary international law and other external norms are subsidiary sources of law in the sense that they 
can only be applied if the Court’s internal law cannot provide a solution.  
 The Court’s judges have ruled that the application of Article 21(1)(b) and (c) is subject to the 
condition that there exists a ‘gap’ in the internal law of the Court. As stated most clearly by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber in its decision on the arrest warrant for al-Bashir:  
                                                          
Participation in the Proceedings of VRS 1, VRS 2, VRS 3, VRS 4, VRS5 and VRS 6, 17 January 2006, para. 47. For further 
discussion on the relation between the Rules and the Statute, see chapter 4, part IV(C) in this study.  
50 The background of the explanatory note and ‘the very strong stance of the ASP in favour of the Statute’s supremacy’ is that 
the ASP was unwilling ‘to allow the United States to use the Rules as a tool to increase the scope of Article 98(2) ... to prevent 
any American citizens from being surrendered to the Court’. See Bitti, ‘Article 21’, p. 416.  
51 Compare for example Hochmayr, ‘Applicable law’, pp. 666-667 (arguing that the Court may apply all treaties relevant for 
‘the domain in question’, including the VCLT and the UN Charter) and Pellet, ‘Applicable law’, p. 1088 (arguing that ‘it is 
difficult to imagine … a situation in which the Court would have to apply a treaty other than its Statute, unless two or more 
States agreed to accord to some specific jurisdiction or require the application of particular principles’).  
52 For a detailed analysis of the way in which Article 21(1)(c) sets out to derive general principles of law, see Pellet, ‘Applicable 
law’, pp. 1073-1075.  
53 For an overview, see Hochmayr, ‘Applicable law’, pp. 661-672. 
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‘[T]hose other sources of law provided for in [sub-]paragraphs 1(b) and 1(c) of article 21 of the Statute, 
can only be applied when the following two conditions are met: (i) there is a lacuna in the written law 
contained in the Statute, the Elements of Crimes and the Rules; and (ii) such lacuna cannot be filled by 
the application of criteria provided for in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties and article 21(3) of the Statute’.54 
Until now, the Court’s judges have not found many gaps in its internal law and have therefore rarely 
applied external sources of law in the meaning of Article 21.55 Applicable treaties, rules of customary 
international law and general principles of law do play a significant role, however, in the interpretation 
of the Statute.56 This ‘interpretative methodology, under which the application of external law is 
restricted to the function of filling gaps’ is convincing in light of the hierarchy that Article 21 creates 
between internal and external sources of law.57  
                                                          
54 Al-Bashir Arrest Warrant Decision (March 2009), para. 126. As cited in Schabas, ‘Commentary’, p. 385; Hochmayr, 
‘Applicable Law’, p. 661. See also Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ICC-01/04-168), Judgment on the 
Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary Review of the Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision Denying Leave to 
Appeal, 13 July 2006, para. 39. On the question whether there exists a gap in the written law of the Court because the Statute 
does not provide for the possibility to appeal a decision of a Pre-Trial or Trial Chamber denying leave to appeal, the Appeals 
Chamber concluded that ‘the Statute defines exhaustively the right to appeal against decision of first instance courts, namely 
decisions of the Pre-Trial or Trial Chambers … the lacuna postulated by the Prosecutor is inexistent’.  
55 For a discussion of the relevant jurisprudence see Bitti, ‘Article 21’, pp. 425-428;  Hochmayr, ‘Applicable Law’, pp. 662-
663.  
56 External sources can form part of the ‘context’ in which the Rome Statute should be interpreted in accordance with Articles 
31(1) and 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. Furthermore, there are a number of provisions in the Statute which refer explicitly to 
international treaties or rules of customary international law, such as Article 13(b), Article 16 or Article 98(1). The 
interpretation of these provisions requires an analysis of the relevant sources of external law, and these provisions therefore 
indirectly require the application of the relevant sources of external law as primary rather than subsidiary sources of law in the 
meaning of Article 21(1).  
57 Hochmayr, ‘Applicable Law’, p. 662. As noted above, at fn. 38, the existence of this hierarchy of sources is generally 
accepted in the literature. 
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 In the existing case law of the ICC, the Court has been hesitant to specify what a gap entails and 
scholars have taken different positions on how to define this legal concept. According to one 
commentator, a gap in the internal law of the Court can be described as ‘an objective which could be 
inferred from the context or the object and purpose of the Statute, an objective which would not be given 
effect by the express provisions of the Statute or the Rules, thus obliging the judge to resort to the second 
or third source of law - in that order - to give effect to that objective’.58 This position is problematic, 
however, as it presumes that each and every objective in the Statute ought to be given effect. It ignores 
that certain gaps may have been intentionally included in the written law of the Court.  
 In my opinion, the better view is that the closing of gaps through the application of external law 
is only permissible when it can be shown that ‘the incompleteness of the norms’ was unintended.59 In 
making this determination, the Court has to employ the applicable rules of interpretation, which are 
further discussed below.60 The Court should only resort to applicable treaties, international custom or 
general principles of law, when it establishes that a certain objective should be given effect, because it 
otherwise leaves a gap in the application of the internal law of the Court that cannot be reconciled in 
good faith with the ordinary meaning that should be given to the terms of the relevant provisions when 
considered in their context and in the light of the Statute’s object and purpose.61   
C. The Court’s jurisprudence: Article 21(2) 
Pursuant to Article 21(2) the Court ‘may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous 
decisions’ (emphasis added). In contrast to the internal and external sources of law which the Court shall 
apply under Article 21(1), the permissive formulation of Article 21(2) indicates that the Court is not 
bound by its own jurisprudence. The Court is authorized to base its interpretations on earlier decisions, 
                                                          
58 Bitti, ‘Article 21’, p. 426; Grover, ‘A Call to Arms’, pp. 549-550. 
59 Hochmayr, ‘Applicable Law’, p. 663. 
60 For further discussion on the relevant rules of interpretation, see below at III.   
61An example is the absence of a standard of interpretation in the ICC’s legal framework, which has to be filled by Articles 31 
and 32 of the VCLT, as discussed below at III. For another possible example of a gap, in the context of the ICC’s immunity 
regime, see chapter 3.  
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but is not obliged to do so.62 The case law of the Court can in this sense be characterized as ‘extra-
hierarchical’ and constitutes an aid for interpretation rather than a binding source of law.63 As confirmed 
by the Court’s judges: ‘the usage of the verb "may" in Article 21(2) of the Statute provides the Chamber 
with the discretion as to whether to follow previous [rulings]. Consequently, the provision rejects the 
stare decisis doctrine’.64   
 As a subsidiary tool for the purposes of interpretation, Article 21(2) does not make a distinction 
between the jurisprudence of the Pre-Trial, Trial or Appeals Chamber of the Court. In the absence of a 
hierarchical formulation between the decisions of the different chambers, ‘the case law of the Appeals 
Chamber does not seem to be placed on a higher level than the case law of other Chambers of the 
Court’.65 Based on the text of Article 21(2) the Court’s judges appear free to deviate from the views of 
the Appeals Chamber and may adopt an interpretation of a Pre-Trial or Trial Chamber that has been 
rejected by the Appeals Chamber in an earlier and different case.66   
 The general rule that the jurisprudence of the different chambers is equally (un)important is 
subject, however, to one important condition. A Pre-Trial Chamber or Trial Chamber is bound by a 
ruling of the Appeals Chamber that is issued in the same case. This does not necessarily follow from the 
                                                          
62 Note that while text of Article 21(2) only applies to the case law of the ICC, it does not deprive the Court of the authority to 
consider principles and rules of law from the case law of other judicial bodies for the purposes of the application of the external 
sources of law that are mentioned in Article 21(1) and 21(3), or for the interpretation of the Court’s internal or external law. 
For a discussion of the use of other case law by the Court, see Schabas, ‘Commentary’, p. 396.  
63 Pellet, ‘Applicable law’, p. 1078.  
64 Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali (ICC-01/09-02/11-77) Decision on the ‘Prosecution’s Application for leave to Appeal the 
"Decision Setting the Regime for Evidence Disclosure and Other Related Matters" (ICC-01/09-02/11-48), 2 May 2011, para. 
23. As cited in Hochmayr, ‘Applicable law’, p. 673.  
65 Bitti, ‘Article 21’, p. 423.  
66 Note that in practice there is a tendency before the ICC, and other international criminal tribunals, to treat the ratio decidendi 
of rulings of the Appeals Chamber in earlier cases as binding. This tendency is partly the product of a desire to bring consistency 
and predictability to the interpretation and application of the relevant international legal frameworks. In the abstract, these 
objectives merit approval. However, it must be stressed that these objectives do not in any way bind judges to earlier decisions. 
For a discussion of the relevant jurisprudence, see Schabas, ‘Commentary’, p. 395. 
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text of Article 21, but can be inferred from the provisions that regulate the appeal proceedings. If a ruling 
of the Appeals Chamber could be rejected by the Pre-Trial or Trial Chamber in the same case, the 
Appeals Chamber’s power to reverse or amend decisions of these chambers, as envisioned in Articles 
81-85, would become ineffective.67 In order to give effect to these provisions, rulings of the Appeals 
Chamber can function as a binding source of law for the purposes of a specific case. 
D. Internationally recognized human rights: Article 21(3)  
The last and probably most controversial element of the ICC’s applicable law is the reference in Article 
21(3) to ‘internationally recognized human rights’. This provision introduces ‘a substantive hierarchy’ 
in the Court’s legal framework by ordering the Court to interpret and apply all internal and external law 
in consistency with an undefined category of human rights.68 While the preparatory works indicate that 
the drafters spent little or no thought to the relationship between applicable human rights law and the 
Rome Statute, the formulation of Article 21(3) leaves no doubt that this category forms a standard of 
review against which all applicable law, including the Statute, should be tested.69 This means that when 
there are several possible interpretations of the Statute, the Court must choose an interpretation that is 
consistent with the relevant human rights. Furthermore, the Court is prohibited to apply its internal or 
external law in a manner that is not in accordance with these rights.70 
 In a general sense, the Statute’s commitment to the protection of human rights is admirable. 
What makes Article 21(3) controversial, however, is that the Statute does not define the scope of this 
additional source of law. It remains uncertain what rights are covered by Article 21(3) and to what extent 
                                                          
67 Moreover, if an interpretation of the Appeals Chamber could be overturned in the same case, the Appeals Chamber would 
not be able to provide an ‘immediate solution’ in the meaning of Article 82(1)(d). 
68 Several commentators speak in this regard of a ‘super-legality’. As defined by Pellet, ‘Applicable law’, pp. 1080-1081.  
69 ‘In terms of hierarchy of applicable sources of law … little or no thought was given to the relationship between internationally 
recognized human rights and the Rome Statute. Ironically, the drafting of Article 21 was motivated by the principle of legality 
and the desire to limit judicial discretion in the interpretation and application of the Rome Statute’. As observed by Grover, ‘A 
Call to Arms’, p. 559. 
70 Hochmayr, ‘Applicable law’, pp. 673-674.  
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this provision can serve as a basis to create new procedural remedies or to overturn the Court’s internal 
law. These and related issues continue to spark considerable debate among commentators.71 It goes 
beyond the scope of this study to take a position in this debate. Yet, it is safe to say that there are limits 
to what Article 21(3) can be used for. Ultimately, the Statute remains the primary source of law under 
the Court’s legal framework. Moreover, most human rights are not absolute. It is widely accepted that 
their enjoyment can be limited when there is an ‘objective and reasonable justification’.72  
 
III. The Applicable Rules of Interpretation 
In analysing the AU’s campaign against the prosecution and trial of sitting Heads of State, the main 
objective of this study is to assess whether the responses of the Court, the Security Council and the ASP 
to the AU are based on a convincing interpretation of the ICC’s legal framework and international law 
more generally. The reason for speaking of a ‘convincing’ interpretation, rather than a ‘right’ or 
‘accurate’ one, is that the process of legal interpretation should, in my view, not be understood as ‘an 
act of cognition of a pre-existing truth’.73 Unlike classical legal positivism, I do not share the idea that 
there exists an objective process of interpretation that an interpreter can follow to arrive at the legally 
correct interpretation. Finding a single interpretation may well be the purpose of a ‘standard of 
interpretation’,74 but there does not exist a ‘neutral, external standpoint’ from which the meaning of a 
                                                          
71 Compare for example Bitti, ‘Article 21’, pp. 433-444; Grover, ‘A Call to Arms’, pp. 558-563; Hochmayr, ‘Applicable law’, 
pp. 673-678; and Schabas, ‘Commentary’, pp. 397-400.  
72 A similar argument with respect to non-discrimination can be found in Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1186), Reasons for 
the Decision on Excusal from Presence at Trial under Rule 134quater, 18 February 2014 para. 60. In this decision the Trial 
Chamber concluded, inter alia, that Rule 134quater does not violate the prohibition on adverse distinction that is included in 
Article 21(3), because there would be an ‘objective and reasonable justification’. For further discussion on this decision, see 
chapter 4, part IV(B) in this study. 
73 Jörg Kammerhofer and Jean D’Aspremont, International Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), p. 6.  
74 A standard of interpretation can be defined as a self-contained system of rules that directs the process of interpretation in a 
given context. The governing principles on interpretation that are embedded in the VCLT can be considered a standard of 
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legal text can be objectively determined.75 Interpretation always entails an act of will, or as Hans Kelsen 
put it, a ‘choice’.76  
 While sceptical of any claims of objectivity, I should immediately add that legal interpretation 
does not allow for an unlimited set of choices.77 There are limits to how interpretation can shape and 
construct the meaning of a particular legal text like the Rome Statute. These limits derive from the text 
itself and from applicable rules that guide the process of interpretation in a specific context, such as the 
interpretative rules that are embedded in the Vienna Convention. Based on these and other interpretative 
rules, there cannot be a right or accurate interpretation, because there is no way to interpret and apply 
such rules in an objective manner. In an epistemological sense, the application of a standard of 
interpretation does not enable an interpreter to step out of the hermeneutic circle: the meaning of a text 
as a whole can only be determined by reference to its individual parts, and one’s understanding of each 
individual part is constructed by reference to the whole. Yet, as a binding source of law, applicable rules 
of interpretation do form an external standard that can be used to scrutinize a chosen interpretation. At 
                                                          
interpretation for treaties concluded after the entry into force of the VCLT. Arguably, the purpose of Articles 31 and 32 of the 
VCLT is to establish ‘one meaning as the legally correct interpretation’. As explained by André de Hoogh, ‘although not 
specifically laid down in the text of articles 31-32, an inference may be made that ‘to confirm the meaning’ under article 32 is 
only possible if there is just the one’. André de Hoogh, ‘Toolbox, Straitjacket, or Normative Framework? - The Interpretation 
of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’, in Een kwestie van grensoverschrijding, Liber amicorum 
P.E.L. Janssen (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2009), p. 148. In reference to ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties 
with commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1966, vol. II, p. 219-220, para. 8. (hereafter: ILC 
Commentary 1966).  
75 Gleider I. Hernández, ‘Interpretation’, in Jörg Kammerhofer and Jean D’Aspremont, International Legal Positivism in a 
Post-Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 319.  
76 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 82-83. As cited by Hernandez, 
‘Interpretation’, p. 320.  
77 ‘Although the indeterminacy of legal language is in many respects presumed, it does not allow for unlimited choice in how 
interpretation shapes and constructs the meaning of a text. Within that indeterminacy comes a measure of determinacy’. Ibid., 
p. 321.  
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the end of the day, these rules make some interpretations and in most cases one particular interpretation 
more convincing than others. 
A. The identification of the applicable rules of interpretation 
Most commentators on the ICC confine their discussion of the applicable rules of interpretation by 
stating that the Rome Statute, as an international treaty, is subject to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties.78 In a similar vein, the Appeals Chamber has stated, without giving further explanation, 
that ‘the interpretation of treaties, and the Rome Statute is no exception, is governed by the Vienna 
Convention’. 79 There is, however, a problem with this statement. It is not necessarily true that an 
international treaty like the Rome Statute has to be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of the 
Vienna Convention. Articles 31 and 32 of the Convention are widely considered rules of customary 
international law, but they are not rules of jus cogens.80 Strictly speaking, the Vienna Convention ‘is 
nothing more than a multilateral treaty’ and is not hierarchically superior to other treaties.81 
                                                          
78 For example, Bitti argues that the Appeals Chamber ‘stated the obvious’ when it concluded that the Statute is a treaty and 
that its interpretation is governed by Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT. Bitti, ‘Applicable Law’, p. 426.  
79 Judgment on Extraordinary Review, para. 33. While the ICTY and ICTR Statutes are technically not treaties, both tribunals 
have held that the interpretative rules of the Vienna Convention are relevant and applicable to their work. See for example 
Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić (IT-94-1-AR72), Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 
October 1995, para. 18. For further discussion, see William A. Schabas, ‘Interpreting the Statutes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals’, in 
Lal Chand Vohrah et. all (ed.), Man’s Inhumanity to Man: Essays on International Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese (Leiden: 
Brill Nijhoff, 2003), pp. 847-888.   
80 See for example LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, [2001] ICJ Rep 466, paras. 99 and 101. Further 
note that an identical text on interpretation is included in Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organizations or between International Organizations, 21 March 1986, UN Yearbook (1986), p. 1006 (not yet 
entered into force).  
81 Hernandez, ‘Interpretation’, p. 325. In reference to Kammerhofer, Hernandez points out that Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention ‘were never intended to be the ‘source-law’ for all treaties to which they apply’. For further discussion see Jörg 




Consequently, the drafters of a treaty, like the Rome Statute, are free to opt for other means of 
interpretation than the rules that are embedded in the Vienna Convention.82  
 Within the Rome Statute there are at least two provisions that offer specific rules for the 
interpretation of the Court’s legal framework. Firstly, Article 21(3) directs the Court to interpret all 
internal and external legal instruments consistent with internationally recognized human rights. As 
discussed, this provision entails a standard of review that applies to the interpretation and application of 
every provision of the Statute, but without giving detailed instructions on how to realize this standard. 
Secondly, Article 22(2) obliges the Court to construe the crimes that are listed in Articles 5-8 in a strict 
manner and determines that in case of ambiguity the crimes have to be interpreted in favour of the 
suspect or accused (in dubio pro reo).83 Unlike Article 21(3), this rule of strict construction only applies 
to the interpretation of the crimes and not to other provisions.84 
 Given that Articles 21(3) and 22(2) are part of the Statute, the specific rules of interpretation 
that are included in these provisions should be applied ‘in the first place’ under Article 21(1). Articles 
21(3) and 22(2) do not, however, form a self-contained system of rules that guides the interpretation of 
all provisions of the Statute. In the absence of such a standard of interpretation, the Court must resort to 
the Vienna Convention, either as an applicable treaty or alternatively as rules of customary international 
law in the meaning of Article 21(1)(B).85 
                                                          
82 Yves Le Bouthillier, ‘Article 32 - Supplementary means of interpretation’, in Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein (eds.), The 
Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 846.   
83 Article 22(2) states that ‘the definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of 
ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted’.  
84 For further discussion on the interpretation of the crimes in relation to Article 22(2) as well as Article 21(3), see Grover, ‘A 
Call to Arms’, 552-563. 
85 Most commentators fail to explain how the Vienna Convention fits into the structure of the ICC’s legal framework that is 
embedded in Article 21 of the Statute. A notable exception is Hochmayr, who argues that the Vienna Convention is an 
applicable treaty in the meaning of Article 21(1)(b), while adding that these rules may also arise as rules of customary 
international law.  Hochmayr, ‘Applicable law’, p. 667. 
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 As a subsidiary source of law that fills an unintended gap in the Court’s internal law, the 
interpretative rules of the Vienna Convention bind the Court for the interpretation of the Statute.86 
Article 31 and 32 of the Convention do not, on the other hand, regulate the interpretation of other 
applicable sources of law that are part of the ICC’s legal framework, including the Rules and the 
Elements of Crimes.87 The interpretation of these and other legal instruments may be subject to similar 
rules of interpretation. Yet, the Vienna Convention does not apply to these sources, because the 
Convention clearly states in Article 2(1)(a) that the Convention only applies to the interpretation of 
                                                          
86 To be clear, this hierarchy does not imply that Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention should only be applied when a 
strict literal interpretation leaves doubt about the meaning of a certain provision. Under Article 22(2) there is a rule of strict 
construction for the interpretation of the crimes, but the Statute does not contain a similar rule for other provisions. According 
to Dov Jacobs, however, ‘the existence of the principle of legality justifies the non-application of the VCLT’ to the 
interpretation of the Rome Statute. Jacobs notes that there are two ways of arguing for this position. One is that the rules of 
interpretation contained in the Vienna Convention only come into play in the absence of specific rules of interpretation 
contained in the Rome Statute. A second and in his view ‘more innovative way of approaching the problem is through the 
functional duality of the statutes of international criminal tribunals’. Jacobs has argued that ‘when a judge applies the ICC 
Statute in criminal proceedings … he  is not applying it qua treaty, but … as the internal instrument for the functioning of the 
Court, which therefore does not automatically warrant, as usually claimed, the reference to the VCLT’. See Dov Jacobs, 
‘International Criminal Law’, in Jörg Kammerhofer and Jean D’Aspremont, International Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern 
World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 468-470. In a general sense, I agree with Jacobs’ first argument. 
The Vienna Convention only applies to the extent that the Statute does not provide specific rules of interpretation. Based on 
the text of Article 22(2), and in the absence of other special rules of interpretation, I disagree, however, that the VCLT does 
not apply as a subsidiary source of law in the interpretation of other provisions of the Statute. The Statute does not provide 
special rules of interpretation outside the context of Article 21(3) and the strict construction of the crimes. Moreover, the Statute 
does not support Jacobs’ proposed distinction between the two different functions of the Court. Unless it can be shown that 
there are special rules of interpretation for international criminal tribunals under customary international law there is no legal 
basis for Jacobs’ claim that the principle of legality, rather than the VCLT, functions as the standard of interpretation for the 
Rome Statute.  
87 The reason for this is that the Rules and the Elements of Crimes cannot be considered treaties in the meaning of Article 
2(1)(a) of the VCLT.  
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treaties, and thus not to internal regulations like the Rules and the Elements of Crimes.88 For present 
purposes, however, I shall not advert to examine the specific rules for the interpretation of other sources 
than the Statute. As most of the legal questions that are discussed in this study concern the interpretation 
of provisions of the Statute, I limit my analysis here to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention, 
which provide for the general rule of interpretation and supplementary means of interpretation.89  
B. The interpretation of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention 
Article 31 contains four paragraphs that together form the general rule for the interpretation of treaties 
that are subject to the Vienna Convention. The first paragraph of this provision establishes the starting 
point for the process of interpretation, which is to give priority to the text of the treaty by using good 
                                                          
88 For example, it has been argued that Resolutions of the UN Security Council are subject to the same rules of interpretation. 
On the interpretation of Security Council Resolutions, the ICJ has stated that the rules of the VCLT, ‘may provide guidance’, 
but that ‘differences between Security Council Resolutions and treaties mean that the interpretation of Security Council 
Resolutions also require that other factors be taken into account’. The ICJ has further noted that ‘the interpretation of Security 
Council Resolutions may require the Court to analyse statements by representatives of members of the Security Council made 
at the time of their adoption, other Resolutions of the Security Council on the same issue, as well as the subsequent practice of 
relevant United Nations organs and of States affected by those given Resolutions’. Accordance with International Law of the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, [2010] ICJ Rep 403, para. 94. For further 
discussion on the interpretation of Security Council Resolutions in the context of Article 13(b) of the Statute, see chapter 3, 
part V. 
89 Another provision that can be relevant for the interpretation of the Rome Statute is Article 33 of the Vienna Convention, 
which concerns the interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or more languages. Article 128 of the Rome Statute provides 
that the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish text are all equally authentic. In accordance with Article 33(3) 
VCLT, the terms of the Statute ‘are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text’. In this study I work on the 
basis of the same presumption and only refer to the English version (unless the literature or jurisprudence indicates that there 
may be a difference of meaning between the different versions). The presumption of Article 33(3) is rebutted when ‘a 
comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the application of Articles 31 and 32 does not 
remove’. Article 33(4) VCLT determines that if this happens, ‘the meaning which best reconciles the texts having regard to the 
object and purpose of the treaty shall be adopted’. 
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faith, the ordinary meaning of the terms, the context of the terms, and the treaty’s object and purpose.90 
The second paragraph specifies that ‘context’ includes the text of the treaty, the preamble and possible 
annexes, as well as agreements between the parties that were adopted at the time when the treaty was 
concluded (ex tunc).91 The third paragraph refers to subsequent agreements, subsequent practice and 
relevant rules of international law that apply between the parties at the moment of interpretation (ex 
nunc).92 They can together be qualified as the ‘external context’ of the treaty.93 Finally, the last paragraph 
of Article 31 states that if the parties so intended a term shall be given a special meaning.94  
 The four paragraphs of Article 31 are the product of a compromise between the supporters of 
different schools of interpretation, and in particular between the textual, historical and teleological 
methods of interpretation.95 The formulations that are used in Article 31 show that the different 
interpretative elements are of equal value in the sense that all means of interpretation that are enunciated 
in this provision ‘shall’ be applied as part of the general rule interpretation. There is no binding hierarchy 
                                                          
90 ‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose’ (Article 31, paragraph one). 
91 ‘The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble 
and annexes: (a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion 
of the treaty; (b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and 
accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty’ (Article 31, paragraph two). 
92 ‘There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding 
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty 
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable 
in the relations between the parties’ (Article 31, paragraph three).  
93 That is, if ‘the entire context were represented as concentric circles’. Jean-Marc Sorel and Valérie Boré Eveno, ‘Article 31 - 
General rule of interpretation’, in Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein (eds.), The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A 
Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 808. Note that the elements of Article 31(3) are not considered as 
part of the context of the terms under Article 31(1), which is specified in Article 31(2). This follows from the wording of Article 
31(3) which states that the relevant external elements shall be taken into account ‘together with the context’.  
94 ‘A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended’ (Article 31, paragraph four). 
95 On the drafting history of Article 31, see generally Sorel and Boré Eveno, ‘Article 31’, pp. 806-817.  
 30 
 
in Article 31.96 The application of the different means of interpretation is understood to be a ‘single 
combined operation’: all the elements as they are present in a given case are to be thrown ‘into the 
crucible’, and it is their ‘interaction’ that generates ‘the legally relevant interpretation’.97 
 While not creating a binding hierarchy, Article 31 does establish a ‘logical order’ for the 
application of the different means of interpretation.98 This order is based on the idea that ‘the text must 
be presumed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties’.99 In accordance with the first 
paragraph of Article 31, the first element that is to be considered in the process of interpretation is the 
ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty in their context. This textual interpretation is followed by a 
consideration of the treaty’s object and purpose, relevant external elements and the possibility of a 
special meaning.100 This particular order guides the interpretation of all treaties that are subject to the 
Vienna Convention, including the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute. 
i. The meaning and relative weight of the different elements in Article 31 
Article 31(1) requires the ordinary meaning ‘to be given’ to the terms of a treaty. The use of this specific 
formulation signals that ordinary meaning is a relative concept, and that the terms of a treaty may have 
                                                          
96 The ILC also agreed ‘that the article, when read as a whole, cannot properly be regarded as laying down a legal hierarchy of 
norms for the interpretation of treaties’. ILC Commentary 1966, p. 220, para.  9.  
97 Ibid., p. 219, para. 8 
98 Logic dictates that elements can only be taken up one at a time. On this point the ILC stated: ‘The elements of interpretation 
in the article have in the nature of things to be arranged in some order. But it was considerations of logic, not any obligatory 
legal hierarchy, which guided the Commission in arriving at the arrangement proposed in the article’. Ibid, p. 220, para.  9. 
99 Ibid., p. 220, para. 11. 
100 The ICJ has repeatedly confirmed that text should be the starting point of the interpretation process. Before the adoption of 
Article 31, it stated that ‘the first duty of a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply provisions of a treaty is to 
endeavour to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context of which they occur. If the relevant words 
in their natural and ordinary meaning make sense in their context that is an end of the matter’. Competence of the General 
Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, [1949] ICJ Rep 1950, at 8. For further 
discussion on the relevant jurisprudence of the ICJ, see Sorel and Boré Eveno, ‘Article 31’, pp. 818-819.  
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multiple original meanings (ex tunc).101 The task for an interpreter is to choose in ‘good faith’102 between 
these meanings at the time of the interpretation.103 The first tool that an interpreter should employ in 
choosing between the different meanings is the context of the specific terms.104 The legally relevant 
meaning of a certain provision of the Rome Statute or other treaty cannot be determined ‘in the abstract’, 
but requires a consideration of the entire text of the treaty and other elements that are specified in 
paragraph two.105 This is necessary in order to avoid inconsistencies between the terms of the relevant 
provision and its different surroundings.  
                                                          
101 This interpretation of ordinary meaning is confirmed by Article 31(4) which envisions the possibility that the drafters have 
given a ‘special meaning to a term’ beyond its ordinary meaning. The appropriate reference point for identifying possible 
ordinary meanings is the moment that the treaty was adopted (ex tunc). This follows from the different wording of Article 31(1) 
in comparison to Article 31(3) which explicitly allows for the consideration of later developments up to the moment of 
interpretation (ex nunc). 
102 Good faith or bona fides has been described by the ICJ as ‘one of the basic principles governing the creation and performance 
of legal obligations’. Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, [1974] ICJ Report 268, para. 46. This notion prevails 
through the whole process of interpretation, but has limited ‘normative quality’. Mark E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2009), p. 426. In this respect, the ICC’s Appeals Chamber 
stated that it shall not ‘advert to the definition of good faith, save to mention that it is linked to what follows and that is the 
wording of the Statute’. Judgment on Extraordinary Review, para. 33. 
103 As the ICJ stated in the Namibia Advisory Opinion: ‘an internal instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the 
framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation’ (emphasis added). Legal Consequences for 
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 
276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, [1971] ICJ Rep 16, para. 53.  
104 If the context is revised, through amendments to the treaty, the contemporary context applies, because amendments can be 
considered an ‘updated’ expression of the intentions of the parties.  
105 ILC Commentary 1966, p. 221, para. 12. In discussing the general rule of interpretation, the ICC’s Appeals Chamber has 
stated that ‘the context of a given legislative provision is … the particular sub-section of the law read as a whole in conjunction 
with the section of enactment in its entirety’. Judgment on Extraordinary Review, para. 33. In light of the logical order that is 
established by Article 31, the consideration of the immediate context of a provision may be sufficient before going to the 
treaty’s object and purpose. For the complete process of interpretation, however, the Appeals Chamber’s definition of context 
is too narrow. Article 31(2) makes clear that the context of the treaty’s terms not only includes their (sub-) section, but also 
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 The next step in the interpretative process is to examine the treaty’s object and purpose, which 
may be found, among other places, in the preamble of the treaty.106 Article 31 speaks of object and 
purpose in the singular, but a treaty often has more than one aim or intention. This holds true for the 
Rome Statute as well. In reference to the fourth,107 fifth108 and eleventh paragraph of the Preamble of 
the Statute,109 some commentators have claimed that the Statute’s object and purpose is limited to the 
prevention of the crimes that are part of the Court’s jurisdiction by ending impunity for these crimes.110 
Yet, the Preamble, other relevant provisions of the Statute and the treaty’s drafting history also mention 
other significant objectives such as ‘the peace, security and well-being of the world’,111 the 
                                                          
other parts of the treaty, the preamble, annexes and interpretative agreements that the parties adopted at the time that the treaty 
was concluded.  
106 In principle, all the different means of interpretation that are enunciated in Article 31 can be used to determine the treaty’s 
object and purpose. Subject to the conditions for the application of Article 32, the drafting history may be considered as well. 
The ICC’s Appeals Chamber has stated that the ‘objects [of a particular section] may be gathered from the chapter of the law 
in which the particular section is included and its purposes from the wider aims of the law as may be gathered from its preamble 
and general tenor of the treaty’. This suggests a distinction between the meaning of object and purpose, whereby the notion of 
an object is attached to a specific provision or particular section, and the notion of purpose to the treaty as a whole.  Judgment 
on Extraordinary Review, para. 33. This distinction finds no support in the wording or drafting history of Article 31(1) and is 
therefore not adopted in this study.  
107 ‘Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and 
that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international 
cooperation’ (Preamble, fourth paragraph).  
108 ‘Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such 
crimes’ (Preamble, fifth paragraph). 
109 ‘Resolved to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice’ (Preamble, eleventh paragraph).  
110 Luigi Condorelli and Santiago Villalpando argue, for example, that ‘from the clear words of the Preamble of the Statute, it 
seems that the goals of putting an end to the impunity for the perpetrators of [international] crimes is the main reason for the 
creation of the ICC’. Luigi Condorelli and Santiago Villalpando, ‘Referral and Deferral by the Security Council’, in Antonio 
Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 631. 
111 ‘Recognizing that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world’ (Preamble, third paragraph). 
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complementarity of national criminal jurisdictions,112 fair trial standards,113 the rights of victims114 and 
the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.115 It is ‘in the light of’ these different aims, which together 
form the Court’s object and purpose, that the terms of the Statute should be interpreted.116 The Court 
and other relevant actors have to do so without going beyond ‘the original intentions of the parties as 
expressed in the text’.117 The logical order of Article 31 implies that the treaty’s object and purpose is 
to be considered within the scope of the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty and their context.  
 As part of the external context of a treaty, sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article 31(3) determine 
that any subsequent agreement between the parties and relevant subsequent practice ‘shall be taken into 
account’ in the process of interpretation.118 These two ‘authentic means of interpretation’ are different 
from the contextual elements that are enumerated in paragraph 2, in the sense that they are external and 
                                                          
112 ‘Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to national 
criminal jurisdictions’ (Preamble, tenth paragraph).  
113 Fair trial standards are embedded in numerous provisions of the Statute, including in the general principles of criminal law 
(Articles 22-33), the rights of persons during an investigation (Article 55) and the rights of the accused (Article 67). 
114 ‘Mindful that during this century millions of children, women and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that 
deeply shock the conscience of humanity’ (Preamble, second paragraph). The rights of victims are embedded in numerous 
provisions, including provisions on the protection of victims and their participation in the proceedings (Article 68) and 
reparation (Article 75).  
115 ‘Reaffirming the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular that all States shall refrain 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’ (Preamble, seventh paragraph).  
116 Whereas the treaty shall be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty in their context, 
the treaty should (only) be interpreted in the light of its object and purpose. As noted by De Hoogh ‘for all intents and purposes 
the Commission could have quite easily stipulated that a treaty ought to be interpreted in accordance with  the ordinary meaning 
of terms in context and its object and purpose’. Arguably, the decision not to adopt this alternative formulation was deliberate 
and confirms the Commission’s choice for the primacy of the text as the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties. 
De Hoogh, ‘Interpretation Article 31’, p. 156.  
117 ILC Commentary 1966, p. 218, para. 2.  
118 One relevant subsequent agreement is the Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and the International 
Criminal Court. The complete text of this Agreement can be found in UNGA, A/58/874, 20 August 2004. 
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originate after the conclusion of the treaty.119 The conditions for the application of these extrinsic 
elements are complex and cannot be fully considered here.120 In a general sense, it should be stressed, 
however, that their application is subject to the logical order that is inscribed in the general rule of 
interpretation.121 This implies that a subsequent agreement or relevant subsequent practice are more 
likely used to confirm than to assert the legally relevant meaning of a treaty provision.122  
 In addition to subsequent agreements and subsequent practice, sub-paragraph (c) of Article 
31(3) calls for the consideration of ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties’.123 This provision envisages the process of interpretation against the whole 
background of international law, including other applicable treaties, customary international law and 
general principles of law. In light of the logical order of the general rule of interpretation, Article 31(3)(c) 
does not, however, require an interpretation that is in conformity with international law. As one of the 
ICC’s Trial Chambers has explained: ‘Article 31(3)(c) does not say that a treaty must be given a 
subservient standing relative to broader international law’.124 It only obliges ‘the interpreter to keep 
                                                          
119 Ibid., p. 222, para. 15.  
120 Note that the topic of ‘subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to interpretation of treaties’ has been on 
the agenda of the ILC since 2013. For the outline of the ILC’s consideration of this topic, see ILC Special Rapporteur Nolte, 
First report on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to treaty interpretation, A/CN.4/660, 19 March 2013.  
121 Indeed, there is no obligation under Article 31(3) to make sure that the chosen interpretation is in accordance with subsequent 
agreements and relevant subsequent practice, as the provision only states that these additional means of interpretation shall be 
‘taken into account’.  
122 Sorel and Boré Eveno, ‘Article 31’, pp. 825-826 (‘subsequent interpretative agreements [and] subsequent practice … seem 
more in the order of confirmation rather than assertion’). Further note that subsequent agreements and subsequent practice 
cannot be used to circumvent established procedures in the treaty on the amendment of its provisions.  
123 For a detailed analysis of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, see Panos Merkouris, Article 31(3)(c) VCLT and the 
principle of systemic integration: normative shadows in Plato’s cave (Leiden: Brill Nijhof, 2015).  
124 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-777), Decision on Mr Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial, 18 
June 2013, para. 102.  
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broader international law in view’ in order to assess whether the parties truly intended ‘to displace 
broader international law in a particular respect’.125 
 Finally, Article 31(4) recognizes that the parties may have intended to give ‘a special meaning’ 
to a certain term. The word ‘special’ implies that this provision goes beyond the apparent ordinary 
meaning of a term under Article 31(1). As the last element of the general rule of interpretation, Article 
31(4) functions as a default mechanism and only becomes relevant when the other means of 
interpretation lead to an outcome that contradicts the intended special meaning of a term.126 This should 
be understood as part of the compromise that Article 31 forms between the textual, historical and 
teleological methods of interpretation. Whereas the general rule of interpretation as a whole clearly 
prioritizes textual interpretation, the last paragraph of Article 31 and subsequently Article 32 reintegrate 
the original intentions of the parties in the process of interpretation.127 
ii. The supplementary means of interpretation in Article 32  
Along with the primary means of interpretation in Article 31, the Vienna Convention allows for the use 
of ‘supplementary means of interpretation’ under Article 32.128 As explained by the ILC’s commentary, 
Article 32 does not ‘provide for alternative, autonomous, means of interpretation but only for means to 
                                                          
125 Ibid. 
126 In most cases, a special meaning can be established through the other means of interpretation. For example, a special 
meaning can be derived from a particular provision on the use of terms (as part of context under paragraph 2) or on the basis 
of a subsequent interpretive agreement (paragraph 3). The Rome Statute contains one specific provision on the use of terms: 
Article 102 defines the meaning of the terms surrender and assistance for the purpose of the Statute. In addition, specific 
definitions of terms are included, inter alia, in Articles 5-8 (the crimes), Article 1 of the Rules and in numerous provisions of 
the Elements of Crimes. The existence of a provision on the use of terms does not necessarily provide for a burden of proof for 
the use of Article 31(4) VCLT. For further discussion see Sorel and Boré Eveno, ‘Article 31’, pp. 829-830. 
127 Ibid., p. 829.  
128 Article 32 VCLT reads that: ‘recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work 
of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 
31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; 
or (b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable’. 
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aid an interpretation governed by the principles contained’ in Article 31.129 For the purpose of the 
interpretation of the Rome Statute, supplementary means especially include the preparatory works of 
the Statute. These can be found in the official records of the Rome Conference and in the official reports 
on other stages of the drafting process, such as the meetings of the ILC, the Ad Hoc Committee and the 
Preparatory Committee.130  
 In a general sense, the usefulness of supplementary means of interpretation depends on the 
outcome of the first stage of the interpretation process which is guided by Article 31. If the primary 
means of interpretation firmly establish the meaning of a treaty provision, the supplementary means can 
only be used to confirm this meaning. Alternatively, sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article 32 recognize 
that supplementary means may also be used to determine the meaning of a provision, but only when the 
primary means of interpretation leave its meaning ‘ambiguous or obscure’ or lead to ‘a result which is 
manifestly absurd or unreasonable’. In effect, Article 32 is based on the same presumption as Article 
31, namely that the text reflects the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties and that it is only 
in exceptional cases that an interpreter should resort to other sources than the text to identify the intended 
meaning of a provision. 
  
IV. Organization of this Study 
This study takes a thematic approach in analysing the responses to the AU’s concerns about the 
prosecution and trial of sitting Heads of State. In addition to the introduction and the conclusion, it 
                                                          
129  ILC Commentary 1996, p. 223, paras. 19-20. Note that Article 32 does not provide an exhaustive list of supplementary 
means and does not try to define the scope of preparatory works. On the drafting history of Article 32, see generally Le 
Bouthillier, ‘Article 32’, pp. 842-842. 
130 See in particular ILC, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session (2 May-22 July 
1994), A/49/10, Supplement No. 10; Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 
in UNGA, A/50/PV.22,1995, 6 September 1995; Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, UN.Doc. A/CONF.183/2, 14 April 1998; Rome Conference, Official Records, A/CONF.183/13 (Vol.2), 15 
June-17 July 1998. 
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consists of three core chapters. Each of these chapters addresses one of the three sets of concerns that 
the AU has voiced about the prosecution of al-Bashir and the trials of Kenyatta and Ruto. In analysing 
the responses to these concerns, the overarching goal of this study is to assess whether the relevant 
decisions and statements of the Court, the Security Council and the ASP are based on a convincing 
interpretation of the ICC’s legal framework and international law more generally. As explained above, 
this assessment is made in view of the different sources of law that are embedded in Article 21 of the 
Statute and the applicable rules of interpretation. 
 Chapter 2 explores the responses of the Security Council, the Prosecutor and the ASP to the 
AU’s claim that the prosecution and trial of sitting Heads of State undermines the interests of peace. 
The first half of the chapter examines the legal scope of the Security Council’s power to defer under 
Article 16 and analyses the Council’s decision-making on the AU’s deferral bids for al-Bashir, Kenyatta 
and Ruto. The second half of the chapter considers the responses of the Prosecutor and the ASP to the 
AU’s peace concerns. Several states and commentators have suggested that the Prosecutor holds the 
discretion under Article 53 to cease an investigation or prosecution when the Court’s continued 
involvement obstructs the interests of peace. In addition, the AU has argued that the ASP should amend 
Article 16 and empower the UN General Assembly to defer an investigation or prosecution when the 
Security Council fails to act upon a deferral request within six months of its receipt. How have the 
Prosecutor and the ASP responded to these suggestions and is there a legal basis for these ‘alternative 
deferral mechanisms’ under the Court’s current legal framework and international law more generally?  
 Chapter 3 focusses on the AU’s claim that al-Bashir continues to enjoy immunity from arrest as 
sitting Head of State. In response to al-Bashir’s visits to African states that are a party to the Rome 
Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber has ruled that states parties cannot invoke Article 98(1) to refuse 
cooperation with his arrest. The chapter examines the different arguments that the Court’s judges have 
made in this regard and assesses whether they interpreted the relevant provisions of the Statute and other 
rules of international law in a convincing manner. Based on a detailed review of the Court’s 
jurisprudence and the doctrinal debate on the immunities of sitting Heads of State, the chapter questions 
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whether the Court’s judges have adequately explained why states parties cannot rely on Article 98(1) in 
the case of al-Bashir.  
 Chapter 4 turns to the requests of Kenya and the AU to excuse Kenyatta and Ruto from 
continuous presence at trial because of their official responsibilities as sitting Head and Deputy Head of 
State. In first instance these requests were mainly a concern for the Court’s judges. Yet, after the Appeals 
Chamber ordered the Trial Chamber to limit excusals to a minimum, presence at trial also became a 
subject on the political agenda of the ASP. During the ASP’s annual meeting in late 2013, the AU 
successfully pressured states parties to develop a special excusal regime for sitting (deputy) Heads of 
State by amending the rules on presence at trial. This chapter examines the relevant decisions of the 
Court’s judges and the ASP. How did they respond to the AU’s concerns about Kenyatta’s and Ruto’s 
required presence at trial and are their decisions based on a convincing interpretation of the Court’s legal 
framework?  
 Finally, by way of conclusion, chapter 5 highlights the most controversial legal aspects of the 
responses of the Court, the Security Council and the ASP to the AU’s concerns about the prosecution 
and trial of sitting Heads of State. In answering the overarching research question, this chapter 
emphasizes that the ongoing tension between the AU and the ICC is not just a matter of power politics 
and self-interested leaders, but that there are complex legal issues at play between the AU and the ICC. 
These issues will continue to require attention from commentators, and in some cases demand 





Peace, Prosecution and Deferral1 
 
The prosecution of international crimes is often evaluated on the basis of its perceived effects on peace, 
stability and the rule of law.2 In contrast to the idea that there exists a moral duty or a legal obligation to 
prosecute the alleged perpetrators of international crimes, states and commentators generally focus on 
the consequences and instrumental purposes of prosecution when they defend or criticize the pursuit of 
international criminal justice. On the one hand, those who argue in favour of the prosecution of 
international crimes portray judicial interventions as an essential tool for peace-building, deterrence and 
the promotion of democracy. On the other hand, those who are critical of international criminal 
prosecution caution that the involvement of an international court like the ICC can also have a negative 
impact on peace negotiations or post-conflict reconstruction. 
 In the course of its campaign against the ICC, the African Union has repeatedly made use of this 
second set of arguments in warning that the prosecution and trial of sitting Heads of State undermines 
the promotion of peace. This warning is a notable example of an effect-based assessment of international 
criminal prosecution. According to the AU, the Court has frustrated peace negotiations in Sudan by 
prosecuting President Omar al-Bashir and has undermined post-conflict reconstruction in Kenya by 
                                                          
1 Parts of this chapter draw on Abel S. Knottnerus, ‘The Security Council and the International Criminal Court: The Unsolved 
Puzzle of Article 16’ (2014) 61 Netherlands International Law Review 195-224; Abel S. Knottnerus, ‘The Growing Rift 
between Africa and the International Criminal Court: The Curious (Im)possibility of a Security Council Deferral’ (2013) 26 
Hague Yearbook of International Law 34-56; Abel S. Knottnerus, ‘The AU, the ICC and the Prosecution of African Presidents’, 
in Kamari M. Clarke, Abel S. Knottnerus and Eefje de Volder (eds.), Africa and the ICC: Perceptions of Justice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 152-184.  
2 See generally Leslie Vinjamuri, ‘The ICC and the Politics of Peace and Justice’, in Carsten Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice 
of the International Criminal Court (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 13-29; Leslie Vinjamuri, ‘Deterrence, 
Democracy, and the Pursuit of International Justice during Conflict’ (2010) 24 Ethics & International Affairs 191-211. 
Vinjamuri observed that the establishment of the ICTY ‘unleashed a discussion about the effects of justice on peace’ and that 
in this discussion an ‘unofficial consensus’ emerged that ‘justice could be legitimately evaluated on the basis of its effects’. 
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continuing the trials against Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto after their election as President and 
Deputy President of Kenya. More specifically, the AU has contended that the Prosecutor’s decision to 
indict al-Bashir complicated the peace process in Darfur,3 and that the cases against Kenyatta and Ruto 
endangered the fragile stability of Kenya after the post-election violence of 2007.4 Based on these ‘peace 
concerns’, the AU has repeatedly asked the UN Security Council to defer the prosecution of al-Bashir 
and to suspend the cases against Kenyatta and Ruto under Article 16 of the Rome Statute.5  
 From a legal point of view, the AU’s peace concerns and related deferral requests have raised 
questions about the scope of the Security Council’s power to defer the Court’s proceedings. Under what 
conditions can the Council suspend an investigation or prosecution? Is this only allowed when the 
Court’s involvement in a situation amounts to a threat to the peace in the meaning of Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, or can the Council also issue a deferral in reference to other developments like an ongoing 
peace process or a terrorist attack? Furthermore, are there any alternative ways within the legal 
                                                          
3 For the initial response to the Prosecutor’s application for an arrest warrant against al-Bashir, see AUPSC, Communiqué, 
PSC/MIN/Comm(CXLII), 21 July 2008, para. 9. The High-Level Panel on Darfur which the AUPSC established to examine 
the situation explained that the AU’s concerns about the prosecution of al-Bashir also stretched beyond Darfur, including the 
‘broader political process in Sudan, the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement [concluded in 2005], the 
holding of general elections [scheduled for April 2010], as well as the Referendum on self-determination for Southern Sudan 
scheduled for January 2011’. AU, Report of the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur, PSC/AHG/2(CCVII), 29 October 
2009, para. 241. 
4 The strongest expression of these concerns is found in AU Assembly, Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the ICC, 
Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1(Oct.2013), 11-12 October 2013, paras. 6 and 7. The Assembly argued in this decision that the trials 
of Kenyatta and Ruto ‘will distract and prevent them from fulfilling their constitutional responsibilities, including national and 
regional security affairs’, and expressed the concern ‘that the ongoing process before the ICC may pose a threat to the full 
implementation of the National Accord of 2008 and prevent the process of addressing the challenges leading to the Post-
Election Violence’.  
5 Note that in July 2011, the AU also requested a deferral for the prosecution of Colonel Gaddafi, because his prosecution 
seriously complicated ‘the efforts aimed at finding a negotiated political solution to the crisis in Libya’. See AU Assembly, 
Decision on the Implementation of the Assembly Decisions on the International Criminal Court, Assembly/AU/Dec.366(XVII), 
30 June-1 July 2011, para. 6. This request was never formally debated by the Council and is therefore not further considered 
in this chapter.  
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framework of the Court to mediate the interests of peace and prosecution? Can the Prosecutor or the UN 
General Assembly play a role in this regard, or does the Council have an exclusive power to defer an 
investigation or prosecution in the interests of peace?  
 This chapter examines these questions in relation to the responses of the Security Council, the 
Prosecutor and the Assembly of States Parties to the AU’s peace concerns. Part I reconstructs the 
drafting process of Article 16 and investigates the legal scope of the Council’s power to defer under the 
Rome Statute. Why was this provision included in the Statute and under what conditions is the Council 
allowed to issue a deferral? Part II discusses the responses of the Council to the AU’s deferral requests 
for al-Bashir, Kenyatta and Ruto. How did the members of the Council decide on these requests and to 
what extent are their views based on a convincing interpretation of Article 16? Parts III and IV analyse 
the responses of the Prosecutor and the ASP to the AU’s peace concerns. Several commentators and 
state actors have suggested that the Prosecutor holds the discretion to cease an investigation or 
prosecution when the Court’s continued involvement obstructs the interests of peace. In addition, the 
AU has argued that the ASP should amend Article 16 and empower the UN General Assembly to defer 
an investigation or prosecution when the Security Council fails to act upon a deferral request within six 
months of its receipt. How have the Prosecutor and the ASP responded to these suggestions and is there 
a legal basis for these ‘alternative deferral mechanisms’ under the Court’s legal framework and 
international law more generally? Finally, part V summarizes the different responses to the AU’s peace 
concerns and concludes this chapter with a brief discussion on the current functioning of the ICC’s 
deferral regime. 
 
I. The Deferral Power of the Security Council  
During the negotiations on the Rome Statute, the relationship between the Security Council and the ICC 
was one of the most controversial issues. Many delegations agreed that the Council could help to enforce 
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the Court’s decisions,6 and should have the power to extend the Court’s jurisdiction to non-parties.7 The 
drafters held strongly different views, however, on how to deal with potential conflicts between the 
judicial functions of the ICC and the Council’s primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security under the UN Charter (Article 24).8 Some states, including the five 
permanent members of the Council (P5), envisioned the ICC as an instrument that the Council could 
employ to address a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression in the sense of Article 
39 of the Charter.9 Yet, many other delegations countered this idea and argued that the ICC required 
institutional autonomy and that its decision-making should be independent from the Council’s political 
considerations.10 
                                                          
6 The idea that the Council can help to enforce the Court’s decisions is reflected in Article 87(5)(b) and especially Article 87(7) 
of the Statute. Article 87(7) provides that ‘where a State Party fails to comply with a request to cooperate by the Court contrary 
to the provisions of this Statute, thereby preventing the Court from exercising its functions and powers under this Statute, the 
Court may make a finding to that effect and refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or, where the Security Council 
referred the matter to the Court, to the Security Council’ (emphasis added). The Council’s envisaged role in enforcing the 
Court’s decisions is thus limited under the Rome Statute to situations which were referred by the Security Council under Article 
13(b) of the Statute. Note that any power that the Council has to help enforce the Court’s decisions does not derive from the 
Rome Statute, but from the UN Charter. This power is not limited to Security Council referrals. The Council can take measures 
against states or individuals under the UN Charter with the aim to help enforce any decision of the Court.   
7 The ‘positive’ power to refer a situation to the ICC is included in Article 13(b) of the Statute. For further discussion, see part 
V(C) in chapter 3.  
8 ‘In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this 
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf’ (Article 24(1) of the UN Charter).  
9 ‘The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and 
shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or 
restore international peace and security’ (Article 39 of the UN Charter). 
10 Based on these different views, Deborah Verduzco observed that states envisioned at least three different ‘methods of 
interaction’ between the Security Council and the ICC: ‘a ‘functionalist’ logic portraying the ICC as a ‘tool’ of the Council; a 
contrasting vision, stressing judicial independence and the need for institutional autonomy; and one envisaging the Council as 
executive enforcement organ for the ICC, thereby supporting the functionality of the Rome Statute’. Deborah Ruiz Verduzco, 
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A. The drafting process of Article 16  
In one of the first drafts of the ICC’s statute, the International Law Commission (ILC) proposed to 
resolve this matter in the same way as Article 12(1) of the Charter prioritizes the agenda of the Council 
over the responsibilities of the UN General Assembly.11 Under this proposal, no prosecution could be 
commenced when the Council would be dealing with a situation as a threat to the peace under Chapter 
VII of the Charter, unless the Council would decide otherwise.12 According to the ILC, this construction 
would carefully safeguard the impartiality of the Court’s judicial proceedings, because it would not give 
a simple veto to the Council over the initiation of prosecutions, but would require concrete actions on 
its behalf.13 Moreover, prosecutions could be commenced as soon as the Council would have ended its 
actions under Chapter VII.14 
 During the negotiations on the draft statute in the Ad Hoc Committee (1995), the ILC’s proposal 
was warmly welcomed by the P5.15 Other states, however, proved more critical. A first group of states 
concurred with the P5 that the draft provision rightfully recognized the Council’s primary responsibility 
                                                          
‘The Relationship between the ICC and the United Nations Security Council’, in Carsten Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of 
the International Criminal Court (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 31-35.  
11 The commentary to Article 23(3) of the ILC Draft Statute stated that it ‘prevents a prosecution from being commenced, 
except in accordance with a decision of the Security Council, in relation to a situation with respect to which action under 
Chapter VII … is actually being taken by the Council. It is an acknowledgement of the priority given by Article 12 of the 
Charter, as well as for the need for coordination between the Court and the Council in such cases’. ILC, Report of the 
International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session (2 May-22 July 1994), A/49/10, Supplement No. 10, p. 
45, para. 12. Article 12(1) of the UN Charter provides that: ‘while the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute 
or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with 
regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests’. 
12 Note that Article 23(3) of the ILC Draft Statute only spoke of ‘prosecution’ and not, like the current formulation of Article 
16, about ‘investigation or prosecution’.  
13 ILC Report 1994, p. 45, at 12.  
14 Ibid.  
15 Morten Bergsmo and Jelena Pejić, ‘Article 16 - Deferral of Investigation or Prosecution’, in Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary 
on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008, 2nd edition), p. 596. 
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for the maintenance of international peace and security, but warned that its wording was too vague. 
These states called for criteria to determine when a situation was ‘being dealt with’ by the Council, for 
further specification of what a threat to the peace means in this context and to ‘expressly limit the 
application of the paragraph to situations in which the Council has taken action with respect to a 
particular situation’.16 A second and quite large group of states took a more principled position and 
declined the ILC’s proposal for the reason that ‘the judicial functions of the Court should not be 
subordinated to the action of a political body’ and because this provision would enable the Council to 
paralyze the Court by keeping a situation on its agenda.17  
 After several proposals failed to bring the different views closer together,18 a breakthrough came 
into sight when Singapore suggested ‘to stand the concept on its head’ by allowing the Council to defer 
prosecutions after adopting an affirmative Resolution to that effect.19 In addition to what later became 
known as the ‘Singapore compromise’, Canada spearheaded the idea to include a twelve month 
renewable deferral period in the provision and Costa Rica proposed that deferral requests would have to 
                                                          
16 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court in UNGA, A/50/PV.22,1995, para. 
126.  
17 Ibid., para. 125. This concern was also noted in the ILC Report 1994, p. 45, at 13 (stating that ‘several members of the 
Commission took the view that [Article 23(3)] was undesirable, on the basis that the processes of the statute should not be 
prevented from operating through political decisions taken in other forums’). These states further challenged ‘the necessity of 
the provision’ in light of the fact that the Council has no similar priority under Article 12(1) of the UN Charter with respect to 
judicial decisions rendered by the ICJ. Report Ad Hoc Committee 1995, paras. 125-126. 
18 On these proposals, see Luigi Condorelli and Santiago Villalpando, ‘Referral and Deferral by the Security Council’, in 
Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 645. 
19 William A. Schabas, A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 326. The Singapore 
proposal read that ‘no investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute where the Security 
Council has, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the [UN], given a direction to that effect’. Singapore delegation at the 
Preparatory Committee of the ICC, Non-Paper/WG.3/No.16, 8 August 1997.  
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be made by a ‘formal and specific decision’.20 Momentum grew for a deferral provision along these 
lines, when the United Kingdom presented its own, but almost identical, proposal in March 1998.21  
 Later that year, during the opening of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, many delegations, 
including most African states,22 were still reluctant to support the inclusion of a deferral provision, 
because it would allow the Council to interfere with the judicial independence of the Court.23 Yet, when 
France joined the UK in supporting what would become Article 16, there was really no turning back.24 
On the last day of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, the drafters agreed to include the nucleus of the 
Singapore compromise in the Statute to secure the establishment of the ICC.25 There was no agreement 
on when or how Article 16 would have to be invoked, nor did the drafters properly discuss the practical 
                                                          
20 Bergsmo and Pejić, ´Article 16 - Deferral of investigation or prosecution’, p. 597. 
21 Ibid.  
22 See Dakar declaration on the establishment of the International Criminal Court, 6 February 1998 (stating that the ICC ‘shall 
operate without being prejudiced by actions of the Security Council’). Note that most African states accepted the authority of 
the Council to refer situations to the Court, but argued that the Council should ‘not be able to exercise any veto or unilaterally 
cause indeterminate delays to the Court’s proceedings’ (Sierra Leone, p. 86). See also the statements of Angola (p. 117), Benin 
(p. 128), Botswana (p. 118), Burkina Faso (p. 84), DRC (p.112), Gabon (p. 102), Ivory Coast (p. 74), Kenya (p. 77), Madagascar 
(p. 108), Morocco (p. 103), Namibia (p. 87), Niger (p. 110), Nigeria (p. 111), Senegal (p. 83), Swaziland (p. 108), Sudan (p. 
126), Tanzania (p. 74), Uganda (p. 118) and Zambia (p. 93) in Rome Conference, Official Records, A/CONF.183/13 (Vol.2), 
15 June-17 July 1998. 
23 Note that during the final days of the Rome Conference, a number of amendments on Article 16 were introduced and rejected. 
For a discussion of these amendments, see Pietro Gargiulo, ‘The Controversial Relationship Between the International Criminal 
Court and the Security Council’, in Flavia Lattanzi and William A. Schabas (eds.), Essays on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Rome: Editrice il Sirente, 2000), pp. 89-90; Bergsmo and Pejić, ‘Article 16 - Deferral of 
investigation or prosecution’, p. 598.  
24 Schabas, ‘Commentary’, p. 327.  
25 Ibid., p. 328; Bergsmo and Pejić, ´ Article 16 - Deferral of investigation or prosecution’, p. 595. As reconstructed by Verduzco, 
five states abstained on the adoption of the Statute (partly) because of their opposition to Article 16: Cuba, India, Mexico, 
Pakistan and Sudan on behalf of the Group of Arab States. Verduzco, ‘ICC and Security Council’, p. 57, fn. 163.  
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implications of an actual deferral of the Court’s proceedings.26 To the extent that there was a common 
political rationale of the drafters behind this provision, it was to make sure that the negotiations on the 
Council’s role would not obstruct the adoption of the Statute and that the Council would have a limited 
power to defer an investigation or prosecution.27 
B. The legal scope of Article 16 
Since the adoption of the Rome Statute, the Council’s relationship with the ICC has continued to be a 
very controversial matter.28 This holds true for the Council’s referral power, but especially for the 
Council’s power to defer the Court’s proceedings. In the context of different deferral requests, including 
                                                          
26 On the practical implications of an actual Security Council deferral, see Knottnerus, ‘The Security Council and the ICC’, 
199-203 (especially on evidence, victims and detained indictees). 
27 In a conceptual (neo-institutionalist) sense, Article 16 can be understood as a ‘collision rule’, which is a rule that seeks ‘a 
solution for the issues caused by overlapping normative regimes. As a collision rule, the aim of Article 16 is to ‘couple the 
highly judicialized area of competence of the ICC with the political rationality of the Security Council, while also tying the 
politically motivated Security Council to the logic of law enforcement by prosecution’. See Kerstin Blome and Nora Markard, 
‘ ‘Contested Collisions’: Conditions for a Successful Collision Management - The Example of Article 16 of the Rome Statute’ 
(2016) 29 Leiden Journal of International Law 562. Another and more critical perspective understands Article 16 as an example 
of the ‘maintenance of a particular legal democratic order’, which is ‘shaped by the play of power’. See Kamari M. Clarke and 
Sarah-Jane Koulen, ‘The Legal Politics of the Article 16 Decision: The International Criminal Court, the UN Security Council 
and Ontologies of a Contemporary Compromise’ (2014) 7 African Journal of Legal Studies 297-319.  
28 See generally Verduzco, ‘ICC and Security Council’, pp. 30-64; Jennifer Trahan, ‘The Relationship Between the 
International Criminal Court and the U.N. Security Council: Parameters and Best Practices’ (2013) 24 Criminal Law Forum 
417-473. The controversial character of this relationship is illustrated by the numerous initiatives to improve the coordination 
and cooperation between the Council and the ICC, including: International Peace Institute, ‘The Relationship Between the ICC 
and the Security Council: Challenges and Opportunities’, March 2013; Hemy Mistry and Deborah Verduzco (rapporteurs), 
‘Chatham House - International Law Meeting Summary, with Parliamentarians for Global Action - The UN Security Council 
and the International Criminal Court’, 16 March 2012; David Kaye, ‘The Council and the Court Improving Security Council 
Support of the International Criminal Court’, 13 May 2013;  Blome and Markard, ‘Contested Collisions’, 19-25. See also the 
thematic debate on the Council on its relationship with the ICC: UNSC, S/PV.6849, 17 October 2012. This issue was also 
addressed during the Council’s debate on working methods: UNSC, S/PV.7285, 23 October 2014. For a discussion of some of 
the proposals on Article 16, see Knottnerus, ‘The Security Council and the ICC’, 220-224.  
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those of the AU, states and commentators have spent considerable time debating Article 16. From a 
legal point of view, the most relevant issue that has come up in this debate is the set of conditions under 
which the Council can issue a deferral. These conditions are important for the Council and the Court, 
because if a deferral request of the Council fails to respect conditions that are embedded in Article 16, 
the Court is not bound by this request under the Statute and may refuse to implement it.  
 While the Statute and the Rules do not expressly address this scenario, the Court has the 
authority to examine the validity of a deferral under the Statute. This authority follows from the general 
principle of compétence de la compétence and from Article 119(1) of the Statute which provides that 
‘any dispute concerning the judicial functions of the Court shall be settled by the decision of the Court’. 
Depending on the stage of the proceedings, the Prosecutor or the Court’s judges have the power to 
review whether a deferral falls within the legal scope of Article 16.  
 What is the legal scope of Article 16? The starting point for answering this question is the text 
of the provision itself, which states that:  
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 
12 months after the Security Council, in a Resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under 
the same conditions.29 
                                                          
29 Note that there is no reference to Article 16 in any other provision of the Statute. There are also no related procedural 
provisions in the RPE. Further note that the text of Article 16 does not expressly address the practical implications of a deferral. 
When the Council issues a deferral it falls upon the Prosecutor and the Court’s judges to answer questions about the preservation 
of evidence, the protection of witnesses and victims, and the continued detention of accused persons. Their answers to these 
questions will have to be based on the Statute, and not on the Council’s Resolution. Whereas some rough guidelines for their 
decisions can be given with reference to the relevant provisions of the Statute and the RPE, this remains an untrodden area, 
which makes it difficult to predict what the practical implications of a deferral will be. Some commentators have therefore 
called for a detailed regulation on the practical implications of a deferral. For further discussion, see Knottnerus, ‘The Security 
Council and the ICC’, 199-203; Condorelli and Villalpando, ‘Referral and Deferral by the Security Council’, pp. 652-654. 
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Based on the applicable rules of interpretation, and especially Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention, 
four conditions for the use of Article 16 can be identified in the wording and direct context of this 
provision. 
 The first condition is that a deferral should be limited to a ‘period of 12 months’. The Council 
may decide for a shorter but not for a longer deferral period. The final sentence of Article 16 stipulates 
that a deferral may be extended ‘under the same conditions’, but this does not mean that a deferral 
decision continues to be effective until it is revoked by the Council. Nor does it imply that a deferral can 
be extended automatically. The fact that the drafters included a specific time limit in Article 16 reflects 
the idea that a deferral is a provisional measure rather than a permanent solution.30 The Council therefore 
has to adopt a new Resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter (i.e., ‘under the same conditions’) if it 
wants to continue to defer certain proceedings.31  
 Secondly, on the basis of the ordinary meaning of the term ‘request’, it is clear that the Council 
has to make an explicit ‘request’ to the Court not to commence or proceed with an investigation or 
prosecution.32 As specified in the Relationship Agreement that was concluded between the UN and the 
Court in 2004, this request needs to be transmitted immediately by the Secretary-General to the President 
                                                          
30 Note that under Chapter VII of the Charter a deferral can either be understood as a provisional measure in the meaning of 
Article 40 or as a measure not involving the use of armed force under Article 41. For further discussion, see the following 
section.  
31 Note that Article 16 does not contain a limitation on the number of times a deferral may be renewed. Further note, that it is 
not entirely clear whether the Council can allow a deferral to expire and then ‘resubmit it after a certain period of time, during 
which the Court has resumed proceedings’. See Bergsmo and Pejić, ‘Article 16 - Deferral of investigation or prosecution’, p. 
604.  
32 This interpretation is also confirmed by the drafting history of Article 16. As noted above, many states objected to the ILC’s 
initial proposal on the Court’s relationship with the Council, because it allowed the Council to block the Court’s prosecutions 
by keeping situations on its agenda. The Singapore compromise was a response to this objection. The fact that the drafters 
included the nucleus of this proposal in the Statute confirms that they wanted the Council to take a specific decision to request 
a deferral, rather than keeping the situation on its agenda.  
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and to the Prosecutor of the ICC.33 This condition is important, because it precludes states from claiming 
that the Council has implicitly deferred certain proceedings. Citing Article 16 in a Security Council 
Resolution, or copying the language of this provision, does not by itself constitute a valid deferral under 
the Statute.34 The Council has to transmit an explicit request to the Court before an investigation or 
prosecution can be considered deferred.35  
                                                          
33 Article 17(2) of the Relationship Agreement states that ‘when the Security Council adopts under Chapter VII of the Charter 
a Resolution requesting the Court, pursuant to article 16 of the Statute, not to commence or proceed with an investigation or 
prosecution, this request shall immediately be transmitted by the Secretary-General to the President of the Court and the 
Prosecutor. The Court shall inform the Security Council through the Secretary-General of its receipt of the above request and, 
as appropriate, inform the Security Council through the Secretary-General of actions, if any, taken by the Court in this regard’. 
The complete text of the Agreement can be found in UNGA, A/58/874, 20 August 2004. For the purposes of interpretation, the 
Relationship Agreement functions as a subsequent agreement on the application of the treaty in the sense of Article 31(3)(a) of 
the VCLT. 
34 In Resolutions 1593 (Darfur referral) and 1970 (Libya referral), the Council ‘recalled’ Article 16 in a preambular paragraph. 
This reference has been interpreted by some commentators as a legal justification for the ‘exemption clause’ that was also 
included in these Resolutions. This clause excludes ‘nationals, current or former officials or personnel’ of non-parties from the 
Court’s jurisdiction for acts committed while participating in operations ‘established or authorized’ by the Council. See, for 
example, Chris Gallavin, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion within the ICC: Under the Pressure of Justice’ (2006) 17 Criminal Law 
Forum 49; Luigi Condorelli and Annalisa Ciampi, ‘Comments of the Security Council Referral of the Situation in Darfur to 
the ICC’ (2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 596. As I have argued elsewhere, such a ‘disguised deferral’ raises 
the problem that the text of the Resolution does not resemble the language of Article 16. The absence of a temporal limitation 
in the exemption clause suggests that the Council intended to suspend the Court’s jurisdiction permanently. It is therefore hard 
to imagine how the exemptions were ever meant to be consistent with the temporal institution of the deferral power of the 
Council. Moreover, because Article 16 demands that the Council makes an explicit request to the Court not to commence or 
proceed with an investigation or prosecution, any disguised deferral is invalid under the Statute. See Knottnerus, ‘The Security 
Council and the ICC’, 208-210. See also Dapo Akande, ‘The Effect of Security Council Resolutions and Domestic Proceedings 
on State Obligations to Cooperate with the ICC’ (2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 308; Robert Cryer, ‘Sudan, 
Resolution 1593, and International Criminal Justice’ (2006) 19 Leiden Journal of International Law 208-214.  
35 Because of this requirement, the established deferral period does not commence from the day that the Council adopted the 
relevant Resolution, but from the day that it is received by the Court. See also Bergsmo and Pejić, ‘Article 16 - Deferral of 
investigation or prosecution’, p. 603.  
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 Thirdly, the Council can only issue a deferral through ‘a Resolution adopted under Chapter VII’. 
This condition connects the Council’s deferral power under the Statute to the Council’s primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the UN Charter.36 Although 
this was hardly discussed by the drafters,37 the explicit reference to Chapter VII makes the lawfulness 
of a deferral dependent on the legal conditions that are embedded in the Charter for the adoption of a 
Resolution under Chapter VII. In particular, it requires the Council to determine that there is a threat to 
the peace in the sense of Article 39, because the Council may only act under Chapter VII if it has 
determined that such a threat exists. What this condition precisely entails is further discussed in the 
following section.  
 Finally, the last condition for the use of Article 16 is that the Council has to exercise its deferral 
power on a case-by-case basis.38 This condition establishes two concrete limits to the scope of Article 
16. First of all, the Council can only defer (the initiation of) an investigation into existing and specific 
events. The Council may not suspend preliminary examinations or investigations into future crimes (i.e., 
with regard to events that have not yet taken place) and may not preclude the ICC from investigating 
complete categories of crimes (like torture) or categories of persons (like soldiers or sitting Heads of 
                                                          
36 While under Article 21(1)(b) and (c) of the Statute the Council should only apply external law if there exists a gap in the 
internal law of the Court (as discussed in chapter 1), the explicit reference to the UN Charter in Article 16 requires the Court 
to apply the UN Charter when it interprets Article 16 as a primary rather than a subsidiary source of law in the meaning of 
Article 21(1). 
37 The preparatory works of the Statute suggest that the inclusion of this requirement ‘was to ensure that the Council take a 
formal vote on a deferral in keeping with Article 27 of the UN Charter’. See Bergsmo and Pejić, ‘Article 16 - Deferral of 
investigation or prosecution’, p. 603.  
38 See Robert Cryer, ‘The Security Council, Article 16 and Darfur’ (2008) Oxford Transitional Justice Working Paper Series; 
Carsten Stahn, ‘The Ambiguities of Security Council Resolution 1422’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law 89-
91; Condorelli and Villalpando, ‘Referral and Deferral by the Security Council’, pp. 646-647; Zsuzsanna Deen-Racsmány, 
‘The ICC, Peacekeepers and Resolution 1422: Will the Court Defer to the Council?’ (2002) 49 Netherlands International Law 
Review 364-366; Blome and Markard, ‘Contested Collisions’, 20. 
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State). Secondly, when suspending prosecutions, the Council has to specify which individuals will 
benefit from the deferral.39   
 This case-by-case approach derives from the wording and the direct context of Article 16. 
Article 16 speaks of ‘investigation or prosecution’ in singular and does not use a more general term like 
‘proceedings’.40 This signals that the Council may only defer individual cases that are already under 
consideration by the Court as an investigation or prosecution. By their legal nature, the ICC’s 
investigations are always related to existing and specific events, whereas its prosecutions are necessarily 
directed to identifiable persons. A second clue is the difference in wording between Article 16, which 
speaks of an ‘investigation or prosecution’ that can be deferred by the Council, and Article 13(b), which 
stipulates that the Council can refer ‘a situation’ to the Court. This difference is ‘not accidental’, as 
pointed out by Robert Cryer.41 It signals that while the Council cannot refer individual cases, but only 
situations, a deferral has to relate to individual cases and cannot cover complete situations.42  
                                                          
39 Although some commentators have argued, especially with regard to the requested deferral for al-Bashir, that Article 16 
cannot be invoked to suspend individual prosecutions, the case-by-case approach suggests that the Council is actually required 
to identify the concerned individuals. For a different reasoning, see Annalisa Ciampi, ‘The Proceedings against President Al 
Bashir and the Prospects of their Suspension under Article 16 ICC Statute’ (2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 
889. According to Ciampi, Article 16 ‘should be read as providing for the power of the Security Council to defer ‘a situation’, 
not ‘cases’ pending before the Court [because otherwise] cases brought by the ICC would undergo a sort of political scrutiny 
by the Security Council’. For the above-given reasons, I find this interpretation unconvincing.  
40 Condorelli and Villalpando, ‘Referral and Deferral by the Security Council’, p. 647. William A. Schabas, An Introduction to 
the International Criminal Court (New York Cambridge University Press, 2011, fourth edition), p. 185. Note that because 
Article 16 specifically talks about an ‘investigation or prosecution’, the Prosecutor may continue to take actions that precede 
the initiation of a formal investigation or prosecution after the Council has issued a deferral. The OTP can, for example, analyse 
available information, seek additional information from relevant entities and receive written or oral testimonies at the seat of 
the Court. See Knottnerus, ‘The Security Council and the ICC’, 200-201.  
41 Cryer, ‘The Security Council, Article 16 and Darfur’. 
42 Further support can be found in the references that the Secretary-General and several states have made to the purported 
meaning of Article 16. See especially the statements of Mexico and New Zealand in UNSC, S/PV.4568, 10 July 2002; and the 
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 In total, four conditions for a valid deferral can be derived from the wording and direct context 
of Article 16. A deferral has to be (1) limited to a (renewable) period of twelve months, (2) should 
materialize in an explicit request from the Council to the Court, (3) has to be adopted in accordance with 
Chapter VII of the Charter and (4) has to relate to one or more identifiable cases. What stands out about 
these four conditions is that they all have a strong procedural character. Article 16 gives the Council the 
discretion to intervene in a specific investigation or prosecution of the Court, but the wording and direct 
context of Article 16 do not give much guidance on the kind of circumstances that could justify a 
deferral.  
 In search for more substantive criteria for the use of Article 16, reference can perhaps be made 
to the Statute’s object and purpose. It may, for example, be argued that a deferral has to advance the 
prevention of crimes, the peace, security and well-being of the world, and/or the purposes and principles 
of the UN Charter.43 From a legal point of view, however, the Statute’s differing aims do not limit the 
Council’s discretion under Article 16. For that, these aims are too general and too far apart.  
 Subsequent practice of states parties does also not give any further indication on how Article 16 
should be interpreted. The analysis of the Council’s responses to the AU’s deferral requests in the 
following sections shows that states parties have expressed very different views on the application of 
Article 16.44  
 The inability of these and the other primary means of interpretation leaves room for the use of 
the supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, and especially 
for the preparatory works of the Statute.45 In my opinion, the drafting history of Article 16 confirms the 
                                                          
statements of Jordan, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, the Secretary-General, Switzerland and Trinidad 
and Tobago (2003) in UNSC, S/PV.4772, 12 June 2003. 
43 As discussed in part III(B) of chapter 1, these and several other aims are part of Statute’s object and purpose. 
44 See part II(C) in this chapter. Note that for the purpose of interpretation, the views of non-parties are irrelevant under Article 
31(3)(b) of the VCLT 
45 With respect to other primary means of interpretation, the Relationship Agreement between the UN and the ICC qualifies as 
a subsequent agreement on the application of the treaty in the sense of Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention. However, 
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literal and partially contextual interpretation of this provision to the extent that the drafters did not intend 
to specify when the Council should use its deferral power. The drafters agreed that the Council would 
have this power to defer under a number of procedural conditions, but they did not discuss, let alone 
agree, when a deferral would be an appropriate measure. They left these kind of decisions to the 
Council’s political deliberations, without including substantive criteria.  
C. When is there a threat to the peace?  
With respect to the legal scope of Article 16, there has been debate on the extent to which the Council’s 
deferral power is limited by the reference in this provision to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This debate 
has revolved around two questions: (1) what are the requirements of the Council’s obligation to 
determine that a certain situation constitutes a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or an act of 
aggression in the sense of Article 39 of the Charter before taking any action under Chapter VII and (2) 
to what extent do these requirements limit the scope of the Council’s deferral power under the Article 
16 of the Statute?   
 These questions first came up together in relation to Security Council Resolutions 1422 and 
1487, which were adopted under strong pressure from the United States in 2002 and 2003.46 The Bush 
Administration was afraid that the Court would start investigating the actions of American soldiers on 
the territory of states parties, and therefore pushed the Council into asking the Court not to investigate 
or prosecute cases involving officials or personnel from non-parties to the Rome Statute with respect to 
operations established or authorized by the UN.47 The adopted Resolutions claimed to be ‘consistent 
                                                          
the Agreement does not give any indication on how the Council should use its deferral power. Furthermore, I do not see how 
the consideration of ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ in the meaning of 
Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT is of relevance here. 
46 The US threatened to cast a veto over all UN peacekeeping operations unless the Council would protect its military personnel 
from prosecution by the Court. Initially, the Council refused to endorse the American ‘request’, which led the US to veto a 
draft Resolution on the UN Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For reactions, see UNSC, S/PV.4563, 30 June 2002. 
47 UNSC, Resolution 1422, 12 July 2002, para. 1; UNSC, Resolution 1487, 12 June 2003, para. 1. The first Resolution was 
adopted unanimously, despite the vocal opposition of more than a hundred states. Twelve months later, this ‘deferral’ was 
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with the provisions of Article 16’. Yet, they clearly went beyond the Council’s deferral power under the 
Statute by trying to suspend future cases, instead of an actual investigation or prosecution (which the 
Court had not opened).48 The ‘deferral requests’ in these Resolutions thereby failed to respect the case-
to-case requirement of Article 16, and were therefore invalid under the Statute.  
 According to some commentators, Resolutions 1422 and 1487 were not just incompatible with 
the Statute, but also with the UN Charter. In their view, the deferral requests in these Resolutions were 
invalid under both the Statute and the Charter, because the Council did not expressly invoke Article 
39,49 and acted in response to an abstract and hypothetical scenario rather than to an imminent threat to 
the peace.50  They claimed that an explicit determination of a threat to the peace and the existence of an 
                                                          
renewed by Resolution 1487, but now with abstentions from France, Germany and Syria. UNSC, S/PV.4568, 10 July 2002; 
UNSC, S/PV.4572, 12 July 2002; UNSC, S/PV.4772, 12 June 2003. In 2004, the US withdrew a new deferral request, because 
it was unable to obtain the necessary support and was embarrassed by reports of torture committed in prisons in Iraq and 
Guantanamo Bay. See ‘US war crimes immunity bid fails’, BBC News, 24 June 2004. Hereafter the US took a different strategy. 
First, in Resolution 1497 (2004), on the deployment of peacekeeping forces in Liberia, and subsequently in Resolutions 1593 
and 1970, referring the situations in Darfur and Libya to the Prosecutor, the US pressured the Council to include an exemption 
clause. As discussed in footnote 34, this clause should not be understood as a deferral under Article 16 or under the Charter. A 
more convincing interpretation is that this clause establishes a form of ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ for non-parties, taking the Charter 
rather than the Statute as a legal basis. See Schabas, ‘Commentary’, p. 330.  
48 See the statements of Germany, Malaysia and Samoa during the public session on Resolution 1422: UNSC, S/PV.4568, 10 
July 2002. See also the statement of the Canadian Ambassador to the UN (Paul Heinbecker) after the adoption of Resolution 
1422 in ‘Anger at War Crimes Court Deal’, BBC News, 13 July 2002. See also the statements of Greece (on behalf of the EU), 
New Zealand, the Secretary-General and Switzerland during the public session on Resolution 1487 in UNSC, S/PV.4772, 12 
June 2003.  
49 See, for example, Robert Cryer and Nigel White, ‘The Security Council and the International Criminal Court: Who’s Feeling 
Threatened?’ (2002) 8 Yearbook of International Peace Operations 169; Roberto Lavalle, ‘A Vicious Storm in a Teacup: The 
Action by the United Nations Security Council to narrow the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court’ (2003) 14 
Criminal Law Forum 209.  
50 See, for example, Lavalle, ‘A Vicious Storm in a Teacup’, 211; Mohamed El Zeidy, ‘The United States Dropped the Atomic 
Bomb of Article 16 on the ICC Statute: Security Council Power of Deferrals and Resolution 1422’ (2002) 35 VanderBilt 
Journal of Transitional Law 1532. 
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imminent threat are conditions for the use of the Council’s powers under Chapter VII, including the 
power to defer the Court’s proceedings. By failing to fulfil these conditions, Resolutions 1422 and 1487 
would be ultra vires under the Statute and the Charter.51  
 Other commentators argued, however, that the Council did stay within its competence under the 
Charter when adopting Resolutions 1422 and 1487.52 In their view, the Council’s determination of a 
threat to the peace does not have to be explicit. The Council would enjoy ‘an almost absolute discretion’ 
to determine what constitutes a threat to the peace, and this could well include a ‘general phenomenon’, 
rather than a specific or imminent threat to the peace.53  
 More recently, states and commentators have also debated another aspect of the alleged 
requirements of Article 39 for a valid deferral, namely the relation between the Court’s proceedings and 
the required determination of a threat to the peace by the Council. On this specific issue, Antonio Cassese 
wrote, already before the entry into force of the Statute, that the Council could only issue a deferral 
under Article 16, if it ‘explicitly decides that continuation of [an] investigation or prosecution may 
                                                          
51 Note that the conditions of Article 16 are only relevant to evaluate the validity of a deferral under the Statute, but not to 
determine the validity of a deferral under the Charter. The Council is arguably empowered under the Charter to oblige its 
member states to consider a certain investigation or prosecution deferred. Such a Charter-based deferral does not bind the Court 
if the Council does not respect the conditions of Article 16, but the obligations of UN member states under the Charter do 
prevail in the event of a conflict with the obligations of states under the Rome Statute to cooperate with the respective 
investigation or prosecution (in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter). This could potentially lead to a bizarre situation 
in which the Court has to ignore a Charter-based deferral (for violating the conditions of Article 16), while its states parties, 
including the host state, are not allowed to cooperate with the Court on these proceedings under the UN Charter. For further 
discussion, see Knottnerus, ‘The Security Council and the ICC’, 207-208. See also Dan Sarooshi, ‘The Peace and Justice 
Paradox: The International Criminal Court and the UN Security Council’, in Dominic McGoldrick, Peter J. Rowe, Eric 
Donnelly, The Permanent International Criminal Court: legal and policy issues (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), pp. 108-109. 
52 Stahn, ‘The Ambiguities of Security Council Resolution 1422’, 98. See also Deen-Racsmány, ‘The ICC, Peacekeepers and 
Resolution 1422’, 378-380. 
53 Deen-Racsmány, ‘The ICC, Peacekeepers and Resolution 1422’, 380.  
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amount to a threat to the peace’ within the meaning of Article 39.54 In his view, Article 16 and the UN 
Charter demand that the identified threat derives from the Court’s proceedings.  
 Several states have adopted this interpretation as well.55 During the Council’s deliberations on 
the proposed suspension of the trials of Kenyatta and Ruto in November 2013, Luxembourg stated, for 
example, that Article 16 was not applicable, because ‘the reference to Chapter VII means that the 
Security Council must assume the existence of a threat to the peace due to the very fact of the 
proceedings under way in the ICC’ (emphasis added).56  In a similar vein, the UK stressed that the key 
question about the AU’s deferral request was ‘whether or not continuing with the ICC proceedings 
[constitutes] in itself a threat to international peace and security’ (emphasis added).57   
 These and other views on the interpretation of Article 16 concern the requirements of Chapter 
VII and in particular Article 39 of the Charter for the application of the Council’s deferral power under 
the Statute.58 The starting point for establishing the legal scope of these requirements is Chapter VII of 
                                                          
54 Antonio Cassese, ‘The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections’ (1999) 10 European 
Journal of International Law 163-164.  
55 See also Trahan, ‘ICC and the Security Council´, 449; Solomon Dersso, ‘The AU’s Extraordinary Summit decisions on 
Africa-ICC Relationship’, EJIL Talk, 28 October 2013 (arguing that the Council ‘can exercise its authority under Article 16 
only after determining that continuing with the prosecution constitutes a threat to international peace and security within the 
framework of Chapter VII of the UN Charter’); Charles Jalloh, ‘Reflections on the Indictment of Sitting Heads of State and 
Government and Its Consequences for Peace and Stability and Reconciliation in Africa’ (2014) 7 African Journal of Legal 
Studies, 54 (noting that the decision to reject the AU’s deferral request was arguably ‘the correct one, especially given that 
deferrals can only legally be authorized where there is an explicit trigger of a threat to the maintenance of international peace 
and security under Chapter VII’).  
56 Statement of Luxembourg in UNSC, S/PV.7060, 15 November 2013. 
57 Ibid., statement of the UK. See also the statements of Argentina (speaking of a ‘strict interpretation’ of Article 16) and 
Australia (‘Security Council action under Article 16 … should be taken only in exceptional circumstances when the proceedings 
themselves threaten international peace and security and alternative options have been exhausted’). 
58 Note that the Council also has a deferral power under the Charter. See Knottnerus, ‘The Security Council and the ICC’, 203-
208 (arguing that while one may challenge the appropriateness of a deferral outside the context of Article 16, the legality of 
such a measure under the UN Charter seems beyond questioning). For a different take on this matter, see Oette, ‘Peace and 
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the Charter as a whole, because Article 16 speaks of a ‘Resolution adopted under Chapter VII’ and does 
not explicitly refer to Article 39. It must be noted that under Chapter VII, a deferral can either be adopted 
as a provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter,59 or as a measure not involving the use of 
armed force under Article 41.60 The legal nature of a deferral may perhaps best be reconciled with the 
notion of a provisional measure under Article 40, because a deferral will like most provisional measures 
be intended to create a ‘stand still’ and a ‘cooling off effect’.61 Yet, the broad formulation of Article 16 
may also allow the Council to adopt a deferral as an enforcement measure under Article 41.  
 Regardless of whether a deferral is adopted under Article 40 or Article 41 of the Charter, a 
deferral is subject to the requirement of a prior determination of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace 
or an act of aggression in the meaning of Article 39.62 In considering whether a certain situation amounts 
                                                          
Justice, or Neither?’, 351-354; Neha Jain, ‘A Separate Law for Peacekeepers: The Clash between the Security Council and the 
International Criminal Court’ (2005) 16 European Journal of International Law 251.   
59 Article 40 of the Charter states that ‘in order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before 
making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to 
comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice 
to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply 
with such provisional measures’. 
60 Article 41 of the Charter stipulates that ‘The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed 
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such 
measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, 
radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations’. 
61 ICTY Tadić Decision, para. 33. In considering whether the establishment of an international criminal tribunal by the Security 
Council would qualify as a provisional measure, the Tribunal stated that provisional measures ‘as their denomination indicates, 
are intended to act as a "holding operation", producing a "stand-still" or a "cooling-off" effect, "without prejudice to the rights, 
claims or position of the parties concerned."  … They are akin to emergency police action rather than to the activity of a judicial 
organ dispensing justice according to law’. The interpretation of Article 16 as a provisional measure in the meaning of Article 
16 is also supported by the specific time limit in this provision.  
62 See Nico Krisch, ‘Article 40’, in Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, George Nolte and Andreas Paulus (eds.), The Charter 
of the United Nations - A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, Third Edition), pp. 1298-1300. Krisch observed 
that ‘the relationship between Arts. 39 and 40 is not entirely clear’, but concluded that ‘the systematic position of Art. 40 in 
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to a threat to the peace, the Council enjoys considerable discretion,63 and is more or less free to decide 
on the measures it deems appropriate to address this threat.64 Still, the powers of the Council are not 
unbound by law (legibus solutus).65 In accordance with the principle of attribution of powers, the 
Council possesses only those powers that have been conferred or implied by the UN Charter.66 It is on 
                                                          
Chapter VII … supports the view that provisional measures can only be adopted if the requirements of Art. 39 are met, thus if 
there exists at least a threat to the peace’. This interpretation would also be supported by most of the Council’s practice on 
Article 40.  
63 See Nico Krisch, ‘Article 39’, in Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, George Nolte and Andreas Paulus (eds.), The Charter 
of the United Nations - A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, Third Edition), pp. 1275-1276. Note that ‘both 
the history of the Charter and subsequent state practice show that the Security Council is under no obligation to make a 
determination under Article 39, even if it considers that a threat to or breach of the peace exists’.  
64 Nico Krisch, ‘Article 41’, in Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, George Nolte and Andreas Paulus (eds.), The Charter of 
the United Nations - A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, Third Edition), pp. 1305-1329.  
65 ICTY Tadić Decision, para. 28, 29, 31, 32 and 39, recalling the wide discretion under both Article 39 and 41 in relation to 
the appropriateness and the effectiveness of measures chosen. See also Prosecutor v. Salim Jamil Ayyash et.al (STL-11-
01IPT/AC/AR90.1), Decision on the Defence Appeals Against the Trial Chamber’s “Decision on the Defence Challenges to 
the Jurisdiction and Legality of the Tribunal’, 24 October 2012, paras. 37, 51-51.  
66 Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Art. 4 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, [1948] 
ICJ Rep 57, p. 64. Note that the Council is under certain conditions, also bound by the applicable rules of customary 
international law, general principles of law and rules of jus cogens. See generally Anne Peters, ‘Article 25’, in Bruno Simma, 
Daniel-Erasmus Khan, George Nolte and Andreas Paulus (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations - A Commentary (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016, Third Edition), pp. 807-855. As I have discussed in more detail elsewhere, none of these rules 
pose meaningful limits on the kind of circumstances under which the Council may use its deferral power, because they do not 
prohibit or restrict a temporary ban on a particular investigation or prosecution. One possible limitation that might come to 
mind is the obligation to prosecute international crimes, which might have obtained the status of customary international law. 
However, if there is a customary duty or even a jus cogens norm obligating states to prosecute certain international crimes, 
then a deferral within or outside Article 16 is not prohibited by such an obligation. When the Council suspends (future) 
proceedings before the ICC it does not affect the domestic jurisdiction of states, which might still be able (and are perhaps even 
obliged) to prosecute the crimes concerned. Moreover, a deferral is not a permanent measure but only a temporary bar to the 
Court’s investigations and prosecutions. See Knottnerus, ‘The Security Council and the ICC, 203-208.  
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the basis of these internal limits to the Council’s powers under Chapter VII that specific questions about 
the legal scope of the Council’s deferral power in relation to Article 39 should be answered. 
 Firstly, does the Charter require the Council to make an explicit determination of a threat to the 
peace? Article 39 singles out the determination of a threat to the peace (or a breach of the peace or an 
act of aggression) as a procedural condition for the use of the Council’s powers under Chapter VII.67 
Although the text of Article 39 does not define the ‘conditions for action’ in great clarity, its formulation 
and especially the word ‘shall’ insists that the Council should reach agreement on a determination before 
adopting any measures under Chapter VII, and that this determination should be reflected in the 
Resolution.68 While using different formulations, the Council has generally observed this requirement 
in its practice.69 Most Chapter VII Resolutions include a clause in which the Council finds that a certain 
situation poses a threat to the peace or in which the Council makes a reference to a previous Resolution 
that included such a determination.70  
 Given that Article 39 does not mention provisional measures under Article 40, it is not entirely 
clear whether the Council should also expressly determine the existence of a threat to the peace when 
adopting a deferral as a provisional measure rather than as an enforcement measure under Article 41. It 
might perhaps be argued that a provisional measure does not require an explicit determination but ‘only 
an implicit finding’ by the Council.71 If this interpretation is accepted then the Council would not have 
                                                          
67 Article 39 of the Charter states that ‘the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with 
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security’. 
68 Krisch, ‘Article 39’, pp. 1294-1295. Note that the Council is obliged to determine the existence of a threat to the peace, but 
that it does not need to ‘expressly refer’ to Article 39 or to Chapter VII in general. 
69 Ibid.  
70 Ibid. Only in a very small number of cases did the Council not make such a determination.  
71 For further discussion see Krisch, ‘Article 40’, p. 1299. See also Peter Kooijmans, ‘Provisional Measures of the UN Security 
Council’, in Erik Denters and Nico Schrijvers (eds.), Reflections on International Law from the Low Countries: in Honour of 
Paul de Waart (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), pp. 289-300.  
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to make an explicit determination on what constitutes a threat to the peace when issuing a deferral as a 
provisional measure under Article 40.  
 Secondly, can the Council act under Chapter VII in response to a general phenomenon or an 
entirely abstract or hypothetical threat? In a general sense, the concept of a threat ‘implies preventive 
action well beyond imminent attacks’.72 Yet, the extent to which this includes measures of conflict 
prevention and action of generalized threats is a matter of dispute. For what it is worth, the Council’s 
practice has been far from uniform in this respect. The notion of a threat to the peace has undergone 
considerable change and has been expanded over the past three decades, especially with respect to arms 
control measures, internal situations and humanitarian considerations.73 In light of these developments, 
the notion of a threat to the peace has not become limitless. That being said, depending on the ‘unique’ 
and ‘exceptional’ character of a certain situation the Council may very well permitted to issue a deferral 
in response to a general phenomenon, such as the opposition of a single state or a group of states against 
a particular investigation or prosecution.74   
 Thirdly, does the reference in Article 16 to Chapter VII somehow limit the Council’s deferral 
power to the extent that the Council can only issue a deferral when the continuation of an investigation 
or prosecution poses by itself a threat to the peace in the sense of Article 39? In my view, the legal basis 
for such a limitation cannot be Chapter VII itself, because under the Charter there is no reason to limit 
the use of certain measures under Article 40 or Article 41 to a specific threat to the peace. If the Council 
were to determine that a certain situation constitutes a threat to the peace, then the Council is more or 
less free to choose the appropriate measures, including the possibility of a deferral of an investigation 
or prosecution that is related to this situation. The argument that a certain measure is only called for in 
particular situations, cannot be reconciled with the Council’s broad discretion under Chapter VII to 
                                                          
72 Krisch, ‘Article 39’, p. 1279.  
73 Ibid., p. 1291.  
74 Ibid.  
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determine the existence of a threat to the peace and to decide upon the appropriate measures to address 
this threat.  
  The only possible legal basis for such a limitation to the Council’s deferral power is Article 16 
itself. However, the text of Article 16 does not support the requirement of a direct link between the 
continuation of an investigation or prosecution and the existence of a threat to the peace either. Article 
16 requires a Resolution under Chapter VII, and neither the text nor the drafting history of this provision 
give any indication that the Council’s discretion to adopt such a Resolution is somehow limited to a 
specific threat to the peace. From a policy-oriented perspective, it may be appropriate to limit the 
substantive scope of the Council’s deferral power to situations in which the continuation of an 
investigation or prosecution poses by itself a threat to the peace. Yet, legally speaking, this alleged 
limitation to the Council’s deferral power is unconvincing, because neither Article 16 nor Chapter VII 
specify how a threat to the peace should relate to a possible deferral of an investigation or prosecution. 
 In short, there is, from a legal point of view, no reason why the Council cannot adopt a deferral 
under Article 16 in reference to ‘a larger factual or political background’. A deferral can be issued in 
response to a peace process, a terrorist attack or even the ICC’s fragile relationship with certain states.75 
It can be disputed whether the Council has to make an explicit determination under Article 39. Yet, there 
clearly does not have to be a direct link between the Court’s investigation or prosecution and the 
(implicit) determination of a threat to the peace under the UN Charter that leads the Council to issue a 
deferral for these proceedings. Calls for a ‘strict interpretation’ of Article 16 that follow Cassese’s 
argumentation in this respect are unconvincing.76 They seek to limit the scope of the Council’s deferral 
power beyond the conditions that can be derived from the reference to Chapter VII in Article 16. The 
main question for the Council is whether a deferral can help to prevent an aggravation of the situation 
(if adopted under Article 40) and/or contribute to the maintenance or restoration of international peace 
                                                          
75 Condorelli and Villalpando, ‘Referral and Deferral by the Security Council’, p. 647. See also Chris Gallavin, ‘The Security 
Council and the ICC: Delineating the Scope of the Security Council Referrals and Deferrals’ (2005) 5 New Zealand Armed 
Forces Law Review 32-33.   
76 Statement of Argentina in UNSC, S/PV.7060, 15 November 2013. 
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and security (if adopted under Article 41). This is first and foremost a question of political beliefs and 
reasonable expectations, rather than legal interpretation. 
 
II. The Deferral Practice of the Security Council  
In the course of its campaign against the prosecution and trial of sitting Heads of State, the AU has 
repeatedly asked the Security Council to make use of its discretionary power under Article 16. Two of 
these deferral requests stand out. First of all, in July 2008, the AU Peace and Security Council urged the 
members of the UN Security Council to suspend the prosecution of Omar al-Bashir before the PTC 
would take a decision on the Prosecutor’s application for an arrest warrant. Secondly, in October 2013, 
an extraordinary meeting of the AU Assembly called upon the Council to defer the trials of Uhuru 
Kenyatta and William Ruto, and to keep renewing this deferral until the end of their presidential terms.  
How did the different members of the Council respond to these requests and to what extent are their 
respective positions based on a convincing interpretation of Article 16? 
A. The deferral request for al-Bashir (2008-2017)  
The first time that the AU asked for a deferral was just a few days after the Prosecutor requested the 
Pre-Trial Chamber to issue an arrest warrant for al-Bashir in July 2008.77 In response to the Prosecutor’s 
application, the AU Peace and Security Council issued a communiqué stating that the proceedings 
against the President of Sudan had to be suspended, because an actual warrant could ‘seriously 
                                                          
77 AUPSC, Communiqué July 2008, para. 9. Note that the AUPSC also responded to the Prosecutor’s application by inviting 
the AU Commission to establish ‘an independent High-Level Panel … to examine the situation in depth and submit 
recommendations to the Council on how best the issues of accountability and combating impunity, on the one hand, and 
reconciliation and healing, on the other, could be effectively and comprehensively addressed, including through the 
establishment of truth and/or reconciliation Commissions’ (para. 11, ii). This Panel, led by former South African President 
Thabo Mbeki, published its recommendations in October 2009. It did not take a position on the deferral request but did note 
the arguments of both the supporters and opponents of a deferral. AU, Report High-Level Panel on Darfur (October 2009), 
paras. 242-243.  
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undermine the ongoing efforts aimed at facilitating the early Resolution of the conflict in Darfur and the 
promotion of long-lasting peace and reconciliation in the Sudan as a whole’.78   
 The AU’s proposal to defer al-Bashir’s prosecution was introduced to the Council a few weeks 
later. In the margin of a previously scheduled meeting on the joint peacekeeping mission of the UN and 
the AU in Darfur (UNAMID),79 South Africa and Libya pushed the deferral request on the Council’s 
agenda by making its consideration a condition for their continued support to the mission.80 In this 
respect, they followed the earlier example of the US, which had pressured the Council to adopt 
Resolutions 1422 and 1487 by threatening to veto all UN peacekeeping operations unless the Council 
would protect its military personnel from prosecution by the Court.81  
 In the build-up to the Council’s meeting, the three African states in the Council (Burkina Faso, 
Libya and South Africa) received support from the League of Arab States,82 the Organization of the 
                                                          
78 At the time, nine of the fifteen members of the AUPSC were a party to the Rome Statute: Burundi, Chad, Uganda, Zambia, 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Gabon and Nigeria. The other members of the AUPSC were Tunisia, Swaziland, Rwanda, Ethiopia, 
Algeria and Angola. See AU Executive Council, Decision on Election of Five (5) Members of the Peace and Security Council 
of the African Union, Doc. EX.CL/326 (X), 29-30 January 2007; AU Executive Council, Decision on the Election of Ten (10) 
Members of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Doc. EX.CL/402 (XII), 25-29 January 2008. 
79 This hybrid operation was established in UNSC, Resolution 1769, 31 July 2007.  
80 Security Council Report, ‘Update Report No. 4: Sudan’, 28 July 2008. Note that the AUPSC had already decided to extend 
the mandate of UNAMID and had requested the Security Council to do the same. AUPSC, Communiqué July 2008, para. 12.  
81 After the Council’s meeting several members emphasized that something as controversial as a deferral should be addressed 
on a ‘different occasion’ and that peacekeeping missions should not be held hostage to a deferral request. See the statements 
of Belgium, Costa Rica and the UK in UNSC, S/PV.5947, 31 July 2008. 
82 See the letter from the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the UN addressed to the President of the Security 
Council: UNSC, S/2008/505, 30 July 2008 (stating that the League was ‘perturbed by the grave impact on the current peace 
process in the Sudan’). See also ‘Arab League criticizes ICC charges against Sudan’, Reuters, 16 July 2008; UNSC, S/2008/656, 
17 October 2008 (a copy of the Resolution adopted by the Special Session of the Council of Arab Ministers of Justice, held in 
Cairo on 12 October 2008).  
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Islamic Conference,83 and the Non-Aligned Movement.84 Moreover, within the Council, several states 
expressed support for a deferral as well, including China and Russia. China argued that the prosecution 
of al-Bashir was an ‘inappropriate decision taken at an inappropriate time’ and stated that this decision 
could ‘seriously undermine the atmosphere of mutual political trust and cooperation between the [UN] 
and the Sudanese Government, fuel the arrogance of the rebel groups … and harm the fragile and 
turbulent security situation in Darfur’.85 Russia added that there was broad support for a deferral and 
warned that the ‘resistance by a number of Security Council members’ to the AU’s request could have 
‘negative consequences’ for the peace negotiations in Darfur.86 
 The resistance that Russia referred to came especially from the UK, France and the US, as well 
as from the non-permanent European members (Belgium, Croatia and Italy) and the Latin American 
members of the Council (Costa Rica and Panama). Some of these states denounced the possibility of a 
deferral completely. Croatia stated, for example, that there should not be ‘any impediment … to the free 
and independent work’ of the Court, and Belgium ‘refute[d] the arguments of those who are calling upon 
the Council to react in advance to developments that we cannot foresee at this stage’.87 The strongest 
statement against a deferral came, however, from the US which argued that even the suggestion of a 
deferral sent ‘the wrong signal’ to al-Bashir and ‘undermined efforts to bring him and others to justice’.88 
                                                          
83 See the letter from the Permanent Representative of Uganda to the UN addressed to the President of the Security Council: 
UNSC, S/2008/483, 23 July 2008 (‘to indict President Bashir will adversely affect the ongoing peace initiatives … and 
complicate the stabilization efforts in Darfur and also the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Southern 
Sudan’). See also the letter from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the UN addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, which includes the final communiqué of the expanded ministerial meeting of the Executive Committee of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference on the latest developments in the Sudan (dated 4 August 2008): UNSC, S/2008/525, 6 
August 2008. 
84 On the position of the Non-Aligned Movement, see the letter from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the UN: UNSC, 
S/2009/99, 19 February 2009.  
85 Statement of China in UNSC, S/PV.5947, 31 July 2008.  
86 Ibid. statement of Russia. See also the statements of Indonesia and Vietnam during the same meeting. 
87 Ibid. statements of Croatia and Belgium.  
88 Ibid. statement of the US.  
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A few weeks later, US Ambassador Richard Williamson stated that ‘if forced to vote today—the United 
States, even if it was 191 countries against one, would veto an Article 16 [Resolution]’.89 
 Despite the strong disagreement on the AU’s proposal, the members of the Council managed to 
craft a deal on the extension of UNAMID and the full deployment of 10,000 troops to Darfur. With the 
exception of the US, which abstained from voting, the Council agreed to recall the communiqué of the 
AUPSC and to take note of the intention of ‘some’ members to further consider ‘concerns raised … 
regarding potential developments’ caused by the Prosecutor’s application for an arrest warrant against 
al-Bashir.90 As explained by the representative of the UK, which prepared the Resolution and functioned 
as its informal coordinator, this language was included to reflect the idea that the AU’s deferral request 
could ‘be addressed on another day’, but that for the time being the Council had not taken a position ‘on 
the question of whether to take any action in the light of the [Prosecutor’s application]’.91 
                                                          
89 See Daniel van Oudenaren, ‘US Will Veto Attempts to Defer ICC Move against Sudan President’, Sudan Tribune, 24 
September 2008. Note that in response to the AU’s deferral request for al-Bashir, David Scheffer, the Head of the US delegation 
to the Rome Conference, argued that such a deferral is invalid under the Statute because the drafters envisioned Article 16 as 
a ‘brake on premature State party or Prosecutor referrals’ and not as a check on Security Council referrals. There is, however, 
no support in the Statute for excluding the possibility that the Council exercises its deferral power in relation to a referral by 
the Security Council itself. Furthermore, during the Council’s debate, not a single state (not even the US) questioned whether 
the Council has the power under the Statute to issue a deferral in relation to referral-based cases. David Scheffer, ‘The Security 
Council’s Struggle over Darfur and International Justice’, Jurist, 20 August 2008. For a similar argument as Scheffer, see 
Lawrence Moss, ‘The UN Security Council and the International Criminal Court - Towards a More Principled Relationship’, 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, March 2012, p. 7. For a more detailed reply to Scheffer’s argument see Oette, ‘Peace and Justice, or 
Neither?’, 350-351; Cryer, ‘The Security Council, Article 16 and Darfur’; Knottnerus, ‘The Security Council and the ICC’, 
209-210. 
90 This reference was included in the preamble of UNSC, Resolution 1828, 31 July 2008. Note that the US abstained on the 
Resolution, because of the reference to the possibility of a deferral. Statement of the US in UNSC, S/PV.5947, 31 July 2008. 
91 Ibid., statement of the UK. Note that the UK, as President of the Council, clarified in its comments to the media that no 
formal deferral request had been introduced. Informal comments to the Media by the Permanent Representative of the United 
Kingdom, H.E. Sir John Sawers, on the situation in Sudan, UN Webcast, 31 July 2008.  
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 Following the Council’s meeting, the debate on the AU’s deferral request continued during 
informal consultations.92 Unfortunately, there are no publically available reports of these meetings. Yet, 
unofficial sources note that low level discussions took place ‘on what, hypothetically, could be contained 
in an Article 16 deferral Resolution for Bashir’.93 Furthermore, the representatives of the UK and France 
hinted on several public occasions in the second half of 2008 that they would be willing to consider a 
deferral in exchange for Sudan’s full cooperation with UNAMID and with the ICC on the outstanding 
warrants for Ahmed Harun (then Sudan’s minister of state for humanitarian affairs, now Governor of 
North Kordofan), and for Ali Kushayb (a senior commander of the Janjaweed militia).94  It is not clear 
whether such a proposal was ever offered to the Sudanese Government. 
                                                          
92 Note, for example, that on 12 February 2009, the Council held an informal interactive discussion with a joint delegation from 
the AU and the League of Arab States, in order to have a preliminary exchange of views on the possible decision by the ICC 
against al-Bashir. See the Assessment of the work of the Security Council during the presidency of Japan (February 2009): 
UNSC, S/2009/138, 10 March 2009. 
93 For an informal summary of these discussions, see Dire Tladi, ‘When Elephants Collide it is the Grass that Suffers: 
Cooperation and the Security Council in the Context of the AU/ICC Dynamic’ (2014) 7 African Journal of Legal Studies 396.  
According to Tladi (who was involved as legal counsellor at the Permanent Mission of South Africa to the UN), these 
discussions focussed on (1) the kind of conditions that have to be included to ensure that a deferral would not be a ‘blank 
cheque’; (2) on whether these conditions would have to be met before the deferral would enter into force; (3) and on whether 
the deferral would be renewed indefinitely or whether, at some point, it would be lifted notwithstanding Sudan’s cooperation. 
See also ‘Sudan/ICC: UK Strategy with Potential Bashir ICC Indictment’, Daily Telegraph, 15 July 2011. One of the cited 
cables that were made public by WikiLeaks suggested that the UK Government considered that Article 16 was a ‘card not to 
sell cheaply’, but that it was an option that had to remain on the table. One cable also stated that ‘although [her Majesty’s 
Government] will not acknowledge it publicly, the UK is doing everything it can to remain flexible on the ICC and to use 
Bashir’s potential indictment as a lever to change the dynamic on the Darfur political process’. 
94 Statement of the UK in UNSC, S/PV.5947, 31 July 2008. See also the statement of France in UNGA, ‘Press Conference 
following the statement of H.E. Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy, President of France’, 23 September 2008 (‘If the Sudanese authorities 
do change, totally change their policy, then France would not be opposed to using Article 16’). For further discussion, see 
David Bosco, Rough Justice - The International Criminal Court in a World of Power Politics (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), pp. 144-148.  
 67 
 
 In any case, the informal consultations in the Council did not bring about any meaningful shifts 
in the debate on the AU’s deferral bid.95 Especially after the brief window between the Prosecutor’s 
announcement (July 2008) and the PTC’s decision on an arrest warrant for al-Bashir (March 2009) had 
passed, the Council proved unable to agree on any official response to the AU’s request.96 The Council 
did not convene a formal debate, and did not decide on a presidential statement, let alone on a Resolution 
that endorsed or denounced the proposed deferral. Instead, it was reported in March 2011 that the 
Council’s rotating membership had ‘little appetite’ to continue debating this contentious issue.97 The 
available sources suggest that the deferral request has not been on the Council’s official agenda ever 
since, even though the AU Assembly has continued to call upon the Council to consider this proposal.98 
 The limited response of the Council to the deferral request for al-Bashir has disappointed the 
AU strongly.99 In July 2009, one year after the Prosecutor’s application for an arrest warrant against al-
                                                          
95 This is confirmed by the official statements that were made in response to the Prosecutor’s updates to the Council on his 
investigation in Darfur (in December 2008 and December 2009). See UNSC, S/PV.6028, 3 December 2008; UNSC, S/PV.6230, 
4 December 2009. Note that in 2010 and 2011 the Prosecutor’s updates were followed by a closed consultation instead of a 
public debate among the members of the Council. Likewise, the Council’s first session on Sudan after the prosecution of al-
Bashir took place behind closed doors. See UNSC, S/PV.6136, 5 June 2009; UNSC, S/PV.6337, 11 June 2010; UNSC, 
S/PV.6441, 9 December 2010; UNSC, S/PV.6549, 8 June 2011; UNSC, S/PV.6689, 15 December 2011. 
96 Note that the AUPSC responded to the PTC’s decision by arguing that it came ‘at a critical juncture in the process to promote 
lasting peace, reconciliation and democratic governance in the Sudan’ and by expressing its deep regret that the Council had 
‘failed to consider’ the deferral request ‘with the required attention’. AUPSC, Communiqué, PSC/PR/Comm. (CLXXV), 5 
March 2009, paras. 2 and 5.  
97 Security Council Report, ‘Sudan - March 2011 Monthly Forecast’, 28 February 2011. 
98 Most recently, the AU recalled this request in AU Assembly, Decision on the International Criminal Court, 
Assembly/AU/Dec.622(XXVIII), 30-31 January 2017, para. 2(ii).  
99 Note that the Council’s ‘failure to meaningfully engage’ with the AU’s deferral request may also have been the result of 
various other factors, including that the African states did not use ‘all the means at their disposal to ensure that the Council 
actively considered the matter’. See Charles Jalloh, Dapo Akande and Max du Plessis, ‘Assessing the African Union Concerns 
about Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (2011) 4 African Journal of Legal Studies 21-22 
(noting that various African states holding a seat in the Council were not prepared to take the lead in authoring and sponsoring 
a deferral request).  
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Bashir, the AU Assembly decided that because its deferral request had ‘neither been heard nor acted 
upon’, its member states would not cooperate with the Court on his arrest and surrender.100 According 
to the AU Commission, this decision bore ‘testimony to the glaring reality that the situation in Darfur is 
too serious and complex to be resolved without recourse to a harmonized approach to justice and 
peace’.101 The AU Assembly invoked the Council’s refusal to issue a deferral as a political justification 
for its decision to suspend the cooperation with the Court on the prosecution of al-Bashir.102 Moreover, 
African states have repeatedly stated in the UN General Assembly, the Security Council and the ASP 
that one of the main reasons for the ongoing tensions between the AU and the ICC is that the Council 
did not consider the deferral request for al-Bashir in a serious manner.103 
                                                          
100 AU Assembly, Decision on the Meeting of African states parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII), 1-3 July 2009, para. 9. Note that as a legal justification for its decision, the AU referred to Article 
98(1) of the Statute. This is further discussed in chapter 3. See also UNSC, S/2009/117, 25 February 2009 (Identical letters 
from the representatives of Cuba, Oman, Senegal and Uganda to the UN on deferral request al-Bashir); UNSC, S/2009/148, 18 
March 2009 (Letter from the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the UN expressing ‘its profound regret at the 
inability of the Security Council to invoke Article 16 ... in order to defer the actions that have been taken by the Court’). 
101 AU Commission, Press Release - Decision on the Meeting of African states parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC, 14 July 
2009. The Commission further stressed that the Assembly’s decision ‘should be received as a significant pronouncement by 
the supreme AU decision-making body and a balanced expression of willingness to promote both peace and justice in Darfur’.  
102 Note that the report of the AU High-level Panel on Darfur appeared a few months later (October 2009). This report did not 
take a position on the matter of the proposed deferral, or the Court’s involvement more generally, but in its communiqué on 
the report, the AUPSC did urge the Council ‘once again … to heed the AU’s call for the deferral of the process initiated 
[against al-Bashir] in the interest of peace, justice and reconciliation’. AUPSC, Communiqué, PSC/AHG/COMM.1(CCVII), 
29 October 2009.  
103 See the statements of Ethiopia (on behalf of the AU) in ASP, General Debate of the Fourteen Session, 18-19 November 
2015; Lesotho (on behalf of the African states parties, stating that ‘concern has mounted that the Security Council has 
disrespected the AU by failing to respond either positively or negatively to its deferral request’), Namibia and Tanzania in ASP, 
General Debate of the Thirteenth Session, 8-17 December 2014; Namibia in ASP, General Debate of the Tenth Session, 14-15 
December 2011; the DRC (on behalf of the African states parties) in ASP, General Debate of the Ninth Session, 6, 7 and 9 
December 2010; the AU (by Ben Kioko, Legal Counsel of the AU Commission on behalf of the AU Commission) in ASP, 
General Debate ICC Review Conference, 31 May and 1 June 2010; Angola and Chad in UNSC, S/PV.7582, 15 December 
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B. The deferral requests for Kenyatta and Ruto (2011-2013) 
In January 2011, the AU submitted a second deferral request to the Security Council asking the Council 
to suspend the Court’s investigation and prosecution in relation to the 2007-2008 Post-Election Violence 
in Kenya (PEV).104 This request followed upon the decision of the Prosecutor to indict six Kenyans for 
crimes against humanity, including Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, who were by that time still 
members of rival political parties.105 According to the AU and the Kenyan Government, then led by 
President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga, the Security Council had to invoke Article 16 
in order ‘to prevent the resumption of conflict and violence’ in Kenya, and to allow a ‘National 
Mechanism’ to investigate the PEV.106  
 The Council briefly discussed this proposal in an informal dialogue and in two consultations 
with representatives of the Kenyan Government.107 However, the Council proved unable to reach 
                                                          
2015; Angola in UNSC, S/PV.7478, 29 June 2015; Rwanda in UNSC, S/PV.7337, 12 December 2014; Rwanda and Egypt in 
UNSC, S/PV.7285, 23 October 2014; Rwanda in UNSC, S/PV.7199, 17 June 2014; Morocco and Rwanda in UNSC, 
S/PV.7080, 11 December 2013; Tanzania in UNSC, S/PV.6849, 17 October 2012; Burkina Faso and Libya in UNSC, 
S/PV.6230, 4 December 2009; Algeria in UNGA, A/69/PV.35, 31 October 2014; Eritrea and Namibia in UNGA, A/68/PV.42, 
31 October 2013; Egypt in UNGA, A/66/PV.44, 26 October 2011; Zambia (on behalf of the African states parties, stating that 
‘Resolution of this issue is the only way to facilitate cooperation between the African Union and the ICC’) in UNGA, 
A/65/PV.39, 28 October 2010; and South Africa, UNGA, A/64/PV.29, 29 October 2009. Note that several commentators have 
expressed similar concerns about the Council’s response to the AU’s deferral request for al-Bashir. See, for example, Jalloh, 
‘Reflections on the Indictment of Sitting Heads of State’, 54 (arguing that ‘from a distant observer perspective, it would appear 
that the Sudan Situation deferral requests… should have received greater attention in the Council’); Tladi, ‘When Elephants 
Collide it is the Grass that Suffers’, 396-397; Jalloh, Akande and Du Plessis, ‘AU Concerns about Article 16’, 8.  
104 AU Assembly, Decision on the Implementation of the Decisions on the International Criminal Court, 
Assembly/AU/Dec.334(XVI), 30-31 January 2011, para. 6. 
105 On the domestic political dynamics behind Kenya’s initial deferral request, see Sara Kendall, ‘‘UhuRuto’ and Other 
Leviathans: the International Criminal Court and the Kenyan Political Order’ (2014) 7 African Journal of Legal Studies 408-
409, 414. 
106 AU Assembly, Decision January 2011, para. 6.  
107 On 23 March 2011, Kenya sent a letter (S/2011/201) to the President of the Council, requesting an open debate on its deferral 
request. Before sending this letter, the possibility of a deferral was discussed during an informal interactive dialogue with 
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consensus on the matter.108 The main problem was that most members of the Council, even those 
sympathetic to Kenya and the AU, felt that the proposal did not fall within ‘the parameters of Article 
16’.109 In their opinion, the concerns of Kenya and the AU were not about a perceived conflict between 
the requirements of peace and prosecution, but concerned the scope of the complementarity principle. 
The key argument that Kenya and the AU advanced in support of a deferral was that Kenya should be 
allowed to conduct its own investigation. According to the majority of the Council, however, the 
feasibility of this argument should be assessed by the Court in the context of an admissibility application 
under Article 19 of the Statute and not by the Council under Article 16.110  
                                                          
representatives of Kenya and the AU on 18 March 2011 (which followed upon an earlier letter of Kenya dated 4 March 2011, 
S/2011/116). In response to the second letter, the Council met in consultations on 8 April 2011, see Security Council Report, 
‘May 2011 Monthly Forecast - Status Update’, 29 April 2011.  
108 After the informal consultations, the President of the Council, Mr. Néstor Osorio from Colombia, stated that ‘after full 
consideration, the members of the Security Council did not agree on the matter’. See UNSC, Informal comments to the media, 
8 April 2011. 
109 Tladi, ‘When Elephants Collide it is the Grass that Suffers’, 397. He noted that ‘of the fifteen members of the Security 
Council only one member supported the request of Kenya for an Article 16 deferral’. 
110 Note that the Government’s admissibility challenge was dismissed by the PTC in May 2011 because the evidence did not 
demonstrate that the Kenyan Government had taken any concrete steps to investigate the respective suspects. This decision 
was confirmed by the Appeals Chamber in August 2011 (with Judge Usacka dissenting). Ruto, Kosgey and Sang (ICC-01/09-
01/11-101), Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to 
Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute, 30 May 2011; Ruto, Kosgey and Sang (ICC-01/09-02/11-274), Judgment on the appeal of the 
Republic of Kenya against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled ‘Decision on the Application by the 
Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute", 31 August 2011. 
For further discussion, see generally Carsten Stahn, ‘Admissibility Challenges before the ICC - From Quasi-Primacy to 
Qualified Deference?’, in Carsten Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), pp. 228-259. Note that despite the Council’s rejection, the AU reiterated the proposed deferral in July 
2011 (stressing ‘the need to pursue all efforts in ensuring that the request by the AU to the UN Security Council to defer the 
investigations and prosecutions in relation to the 2008 post-election violence in Kenya under Article 16 of the Rome Statute be 
acted upon’) as well as in January and July 2012. AU Assembly, Decision July 2011, para. 4; AU Assembly, Decision on the 
Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation of the Assembly Decisions on the International Criminal Court, 
Assembly/AU/Dec.397(XVIII), 29-30 January 2012, para. 4; AU Assembly, Decision on the implementation of the Decisions 
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 Another deferral request was introduced by Kenya and the AU following the election of 
Kenyatta and Ruto as President and Deputy President of Kenya in March 2013.111 Upon their surprising 
victory, the new Kenyan Government immediately took several steps aimed at interrupting the trials of 
Kenyatta and Ruto, which were scheduled to begin shortly.112 Firstly, Kenya sent a note verbale to the 
Security Council requesting a termination of the trials based on Article 41 of the Charter. When several 
states questioned whether a termination of the cases by the Council would legally even be possible under 
the UN Charter and/or the Rome Statute, Kenya quickly transformed its termination request into a 
deferral request under Article 16.113 Secondly, the Kenyan Government and its regional allies in East 
Africa, especially Uganda, convinced the AU to intensify its campaign against the ICC. This led the AU 
Assembly to express its concerns in May 2013 over the prosecution of Kenyatta and Ruto, because their 
trials could jeopardize ‘the on-going efforts in the promotion of peace, national healing and 
reconciliation, as well as the rule of law and stability, not only in Kenya, but also in the Region’.114 More 
concretely, the assembled African Heads of State endorsed the request of Kenya ‘for a referral of the 
ICC investigations and prosecutions in relation to the Post-Election Violence in Kenya, in line with the 
principle of complementarity, to allow for a National Mechanism to investigate and prosecute the cases 
under a reformed Judiciary’.115  
                                                          
on the International Criminal Court, Assembly/AU/Dec.419(XIX), 15-16 July 2012, para. 4. There was no formal response of 
the Council to these requests. 
111 On the role of the ICC in bringing Kenyatta and Ruto together, see Kendall, ‘UhuRuto and Other Leviathans’, 406-412.  
112 Note that Kenya and the AU also pressured the Court’s judges to excuse Kenyatta and Ruto from continuous presence at 
trial. This is discussed in chapter 4.  
113 On 2 May 2013, Kenya sent a note verbale to the Council requesting a termination of their trials based on Article 41 of the 
Charter. On 13 May 2013, Kenya sent another letter to the Council requesting an informal interactive dialogue, which took 
place on 23 May 2013. During this meeting, Kenya proposed a deferral under Article 16. 
114 AU Assembly, Decision on International Jurisdiction, Justice and the International Criminal Court, 
Assembly/AU/Dec.482(XXI), 27-28 May 2013, para. 5.   
115 Ibid. para. 7.  
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 In first instance, the output of these different diplomatic initiatives was very limited. The 
Council discussed the termination/deferral request during an informal dialogue on 23 May, but did not 
take a decision on the matter.116 Meanwhile, the proposal to refer the cases to a new national judicial 
mechanism was dismissed by the Court’s judges. It was brought to the attention of the Presidency of the 
Court through two subsequent letters signed by the Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemarian Desalegm (as 
Chairperson of the AU) and by Nokoazana Dlamini-Zuma (as Chairperson of the AU Commission).117 
Yet, the President of the Court, Judge Song, and later the Court’s second Vice-President, Judge 
Tarfusser, refused to assess this proposal on its merits as it would not ‘constitute a request to the Court 
in accordance with the Court’s legal framework’.118 
 This course of events motivated the Kenyan Government and its regional allies to convene an 
extraordinary summit of the AU Assembly to discuss Africa’s relationship with the ICC.119 During this 
meeting, which took place on 11 and 12 October 2013, the assembled African leaders agreed that the 
trials of Kenyatta and Ruto ‘should be suspended until they complete their terms of office’ and that ‘no 
                                                          
116 Security Council Report, ‘Informal Interactive Dialogue with Kenya on ICC Issue’, 22 May 2013. 
117 AU, Letter to the ICC, BC/U/1657.09.13, 10 September 2013. These letters also included the request to allow Kenyatta and 
Ruto to choose the sessions they wished to attend. This is further discussed in chapter 4.  
118 See ICC Presidency, Letter from Judge Cuno Tarfusser to the AU, 2013/PRES/00295-4/VPT/MH, 13 September 2013. For 
a brief discussion of this letter, see Kendall, ‘UhuRuto and Other Leviathans’, 415. She characterized the Court’s response as 
‘a telling instance of what Kamari Clarke has termed ‘legal encapsulation’’. See also ASP, Letter from ASP President Tiina 
Intelmann, ASP/NY/2013/027, 20 September 2013.  
119 Note that Kenya also asked the ASP to convene a special session in accordance with Article 112(6) of the Statute and Rule 
8 of the Rules of Procedure of the ASP (stating that ‘Special sessions of the Assembly may also be convened by the Bureau on 
its own initiative or at the request of one third of the States Parties in accordance with paragraph 6 of article 112 of the Statute). 
This special session would have to address, inter alia, ‘the situation in which the State of Kenya finds itself … with its President 
and the [Deputy] President indicted by the [ICC]’. The proposal was introduced to the Bureau by Macharia Kamau on 17 June 
2013. ASP, Bureau of the ASP - sixth meeting, 17 June 2013 and deliberated by the members of the Bureau during several 
(informal) meetings. The Bureau could not, however, reach consensus on this proposal, and it was eventually decided that the 
Bureau could ‘consider this issue again’, but only if new information was submitted or if new circumstances arose’. See ASP, 
Bureau of the ASP - seventh meeting, 8 July 2013; ASP, Bureau of the ASP - eighth meeting, 19 July 2013.  
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charges shall be commenced or continued before any International Court or Tribunal against any serving 
AU Head of State or Government’.120 In order to give effect to this decision, the Assembly called for 
amendments to the Statute,121 and established a Contact Group of five states with the task to get feedback 
from the Security Council on a possible deferral before the scheduled start of Kenyatta’s trial on 12 
November 2013.122 The Assembly warned that Kenyatta would not attend his trial ‘until such time as 
the concerns raised by the AU … [would] have been adequately addressed’.123  
 In the following weeks, this ‘upgraded’ deferral request for Kenyatta and Ruto gained 
momentum. The request was formally transmitted to the Council by Kenya’s Ambassador to the UN, 
Macharia Kamau, and by the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Dlamini-Zuma.124 In their respective 
letters, they portrayed Kenyatta and Ruto as the ‘democratically elected’ leaders of a ‘frontline state’ in 
the fight against terrorism in East Africa.125 Their main argument for a deferral of their cases was that 
the Court’s trials obstructed Kenyatta and Ruto in the exercise of their ‘constitutional responsibilities’, 
especially in the wake of the terrorist attacks that took place at Nairobi’s Westgate Shopping Mall in the 
third week of September.126  
 In response to the two letters, the Security Council invited the foreign minister of Kenya, Amina 
Mohamed, and the AU’s Contact Group (composed of the (deputy) foreign ministers of Burundi, 
                                                          
120 AU Assembly, Decision October 2013, para. 10.  
121 The proposed amendments are discussed in part IV of this chapter (on Article 16) and in chapter 4 (on Articles 27 and 63). 
For a general overview of all the proposed amendments by the AU, see annex II.  
122 Ibid. Note that the African leaders also decided that the thirty-four African states parties to the Court would inscribe the 
issue of indicting sitting Heads of State and Government on the agenda of the ASP. This is further discussed in part V of this 
chapter as well as in chapter 4. Note that the decision also spoke about a deferral for President al-Bashir, but that the AU did 
not take any further action on this request. 
123 Ibid., para. 10(xi) 
124 UNSC, S/2013/624, 12 October 2013 (letters from the AU and the Permanent Representative of Kenya to the UN on deferral 





Ethiopia, Mauritania, Namibia and Uganda) for an interactive dialogue on 31 October. During this 
informal consultation, the Council proved divided, however, along the same lines as with the deferral 
request for al-Bashir.127 Some states, including China and Russia, expressed their support for a deferral, 
but the Court’s states parties and especially the US opposed such a measure in strong terms.  
 Following the informal consultations, the three African members of the Council (Morocco, 
Rwanda and Togo) decided to put the AU’s deferral request to a vote on 15 November.128 Diplomatically 
speaking this was a bold move. Yet, the AU wanted an official decision on its deferral request before 
the annual meeting of the ASP, which would start only a few days later. After last-minute attempts to 
bring the different views together, the Council voted on the proposal and rejected it with seven votes in 
favour and eight abstentions. Azerbaijan, China, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, Rwanda and Togo (none 
of whom are party to the Rome Statute) supported the draft Resolution. Argentina, Australia, France, 
Guatemala, Luxembourg, the Republic of Korea and the UK (all states parties) as well as the US 
abstained from voting. 
 The statements that the members of the Council made after casting their votes show that the 
debate in the Council focussed on the applicability of Article 16 and on the necessity of a deferral. For 
the states that supported the AU’s deferral request, the ‘functionality of the offices of the elected 
President and [Deputy] President of Kenya’ was the most important argument.129 In their view, the trials 
had to be suspended because they could otherwise ‘create serious obstacles to the normal functioning of 
State institutions in Kenya and thereby pose a threat to the ongoing efforts to ensure and promote peace 
                                                          
127 Security Council Report, ‘AU Request for ICC Deferral of Kenyan Situation’, 13 November 2013. For an unofficial report 
on what happened during the interactive dialogue, see AU, Draft Report of Mission AU Contact Group on ICC, 12 November 
2013. 
128 See draft Resolution, UNSC, S/2013/660, 15 November 2013 (formally introduced by Azerbaijan, Burundi, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo and Uganda).  
129 Statement of Pakistan in UNSC, S/PV.7060, 15 November 2013. See also the statements of Azerbaijan, China, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Morocco, Russia, Rwanda and Togo. 
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and stability in the region’.130 Opponents of the proposed deferral, challenged the applicability of Article 
16.131 While recognizing that Kenyatta and Ruto faced ‘a serious challenge trying to meet their trial 
obligations at the same time as devoting their attention to tackling threats in their country and the region’, 
they argued that Article 16 should only be invoked ‘in exceptional circumstances when the proceedings 
themselves threaten international peace and security’.132 Based on a ‘strict interpretation of Article 16’ 
these states maintained that ‘the reference to Chapter VII [in Article 16] means that the [Council] must 
assume the existence of a threat to the peace due to the very fact of the proceedings under way in the 
ICC’ (emphasis added).133 According to their assessment, the security situation in Kenya and East Africa 
was ‘volatile and precarious’, but the continued prosecution of Kenyatta and Ruto did not constitute ‘in 
itself a threat to international peace and security’ in the sense of Article 39 of the Charter.134 
 Additionally, a number of states questioned the necessity of a deferral. They noted that the Trial 
Chamber had already been very flexible in the proceedings against Kenyatta and Ruto, especially by 
adjourning Ruto’s trial after the Westgate Mall Attack,135 and by postponing the opening of Kenyatta’s 
trial until 5 February 2014.136 All this would ensure that ‘at any time either the President or the [Deputy] 
President [would] be fully available to manage the affairs of Kenya’.137 Moreover, any remaining 
concerns about the proceedings against Kenyatta and Ruto could be addressed by the ASP. Several states 
suggested in reference to the upcoming meeting of the ASP that the Court’s Rules could be amended so 
                                                          
130 Ibid., statement of Russia.    
131 Ibid., statements of Argentina, Australia, Luxembourg and the UK.  
132 Ibid., statement of Australia. 
133 Ibid., statements of Argentina and Luxembourg.  
134 Ibid., statements of Australia and the UK. 
135 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09/-01/11-T-37-Red-ENG), Trial Hearing - Proceedings, 23 September 2013, p. 8. 
136 Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-847), Decision adjourning the commencement of trial, 31 October 2013. Note that this decision 
was not really motivated by concerns of flexibility. The Chamber decided to adjourn the opening of the trial because the parties 
agreed that this would ‘give the Prosecution additional time to investigate … factual allegations raised by the Defence’ (para. 
5).  
137 Statement of Luxembourg in UNSC, S/PV.7060, 15 November 2013. See also the statement of Australia.  
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that Kenyatta and Ruto would not have to ‘choose between mounting a vigorous legal defence, on the 
one hand, and continuing their jobs on the other’.138 
 Finally, apart from questions about the applicability of Article 16 and the necessity of a deferral, 
several states opposed the proposed deferral for setting a ‘dangerous precedent’.139 In their view, a 
suspension of the trials of Kenyatta and Ruto would ‘promote the law of the jungle’ and encourage other 
sitting Heads of States (i.e., al-Bashir) and warlords (i.e., Joseph Kony) to demand a deferral for their 
prosecutions.140 Argentina, Guatemala and South Korea warned, for example, that a deferral could have 
negative consequences in the long run and hinted in their statements that Article 16 should preferably 
never be invoked by the Council.141 
 For the AU as well as the Kenyan Government, the Council’s vote was another serious 
disappointment. In their first reactions, several African states proclaimed that Article 16 was apparently 
‘never meant to be used by an African state’,142 and in an official statement the AU even went so far as 
to say that the Council’s rejection made Article 16 ‘redundant’ and that ‘the irresistible conclusion’ had 
to be that the ICC is ‘no longer a Court for all, but only to deal with Africans in the most rigid way’.143 
These and other reactions reflected the high level of frustration among African leaders about the 
                                                          
138 Ibid., statement of the US. See also the statements of Argentina, France, Luxembourg and the UK. 
139 These are the words of Richard Dicker, Director of the International Justice Program of Human Rights Watch, as quoted in 
Margaret Besheer, ‘AU Presses Kenyatta ICC Deferral Request’, Voice of America, 31 October 2013. See also the statement 
of South Korea in UNSC, S/PV.7060, 15 November 2013 (‘[i]t is desirable not to set a precedent of the Security Council’s 
involvement in the ICC’s legal process’). 
140 Ibid. statement of Argentina.  
141 In a similar vein, several NGOs argued that a deferral for the Kenyan leaders would delay justice for the victims and would 
impose further hardship on witnesses. See, for example, ‘A Memorandum from Kenyan Civil Society Organizations to UNSC 
against Deferral of Kenya cases before the ICC’, 23 October 2013. 
142 Statement of Rwanda in UNSC, S/PV.7060, 15 November 2013. See also the statements of Ethiopia (as representative of 
the Chairperson of the AU), Kenya, Morocco and Togo. 
143 Statement of Uganda on behalf of the AU as well as the statements of Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, South Africa and 
Tanzania in ASP, General Debate 2013. 
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Council’s decision-making on the AU’s deferral requests for Kenyatta and Ruto and earlier for al-
Bashir.144 As expressed by the AU Assembly in its decision of early 2014, the predominant feeling 
among African states was that the Council should have reserved a more ‘timely and appropriate 
response’ to these requests in order to avoid ‘the sense of lack of consideration of a whole continent’.145 
C. Different positions on the interpretation and application of Article 16  
The reconstruction of the responses to the AU’s deferral requests for al-Bashir, Kenyatta and Ruto is 
necessarily based on a limited set of sources. Generally speaking it is difficult to obtain information 
about the Council’s decision-making process, especially when proposals are not brought to a vote and 
when there are only a few official records available. A lack of sources forms a complicating factor with 
respect to the Council’s negotiations on the AU’s deferral requests as well. The proposed deferral for 
al-Bashir was never voted upon and there are hardly any reports on the informal meetings of the Council 
on the requested deferrals for the Kenyan cases. That being said, from the official statements that were 
made about these requests it can be concluded that there was no agreement among the members of the 
Council on when or how Article 16 should be employed. In fact, it appears that states have taken at least 
four different positions on the interpretation and application of Article 16.146 
 A first group of states, including members of the AU, have argued that the Council can invoke 
Article 16 to prevent that the Court’s proceedings have negative effects on matters related to 
                                                          
144 Other relevant statements of a later date include the statements of Ethiopia (on behalf of the AU) in ASP, General Debate 
2015; Lesotho (on behalf of the African states parties), Namibia and Tanzania in ASP, General Debate 2014; Angola in UNSC, 
S/PV.7478, 29 June 2014; Rwanda and Egypt in UNSC, S/PV.7285, 23 October 2014; and Algeria in UNGA, A/69/PV.35, 31 
October 2014. 
145 AU Assembly, Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation of the Decisions on the 
International Criminal Court, Assembly/AU/Dec.493 (XXII), 30-31 January 2014, para. 8.  
146 Note that for the purpose of interpretation, one should be careful to consider the positions taken by states parties, whereas 
the views of non-parties are irrelevant under Article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT. This section studies the positions that both states 
parties and non-parties have taken on the interpretation and application of Article 16 to get a better understanding of the 




international peace and security. In their view, the Council can suspend an investigation or prosecution 
when this is deemed necessary in light of a complex security situation or a fragile political climate. The 
Court’s involvement does not by itself have to constitute a threat to the peace in the sense of Article 39. 
They consider the possibility that these proceedings have undesirable consequences on peace-building 
or reconciliation efforts a sufficient justification for what may be labelled as a preventive or 
precautionary deferral.  
 This is the type of deferral that the AU proposed for al-Bashir in July 2008. During the Council’s 
debate on UNAMID, the states supporting a deferral, including China, Russia and South Africa, argued 
that if the PTC would issue a warrant, this could lead to a ‘possible negative development of events’ in 
Darfur, Sudan and the wider region.147 They did not say that the Prosecutor’s move already harmed the 
peace negotiations. They argued for a precautionary suspension of al-Bashir’s prosecution in order to 
prevent a possible escalation of the situation in the future.  
 Similar arguments were made with regard to the trials of Kenyatta and Ruto in 2013. In support 
of a deferral of their prosecution, several states parties and non-parties claimed that these trials should 
be postponed to ensure that President and Deputy President of Kenya would not be constrained in the 
exercise of their constitutional responsibilities and as such in their ability to fight terrorism in the 
region.148  
                                                          
147 See the statement of Vietnam, as well as the statements of China, Indonesia, Libya and Russia in UNSC, S/PV/5947, 31 
July 2008. See also the statements of Algeria and Syria in UNGA, A/63/PV.13, 27 September 2008; Yemen in UNGA, 
A/63/PV.15, 29 September 2008; Ethiopia and Mauritania in UNGA, A/63/PV.16, 29 September 2008; China in UNGA, 
A/63/PV.20, 6 October 2008; Nigeria in UNGA, A/63/PV.35, 31 October 2008. Furthermore, Burkina Faso, China, Indonesia, 
Libya, Russia, South Africa and Vietnam made statements in support of a ‘preventive deferral’ in UNSC, S/PV/6028, 3 
December 2008. Note that South Africa emphasized that Article 16 ‘can best be applied prior to issuing a warrant of arrest, so 
as to avoid interference with the judicial process’. 
148 See AU Assembly, Decision October 2013, para. 10, as well as the statements of Ethiopia, in UNGA, A/68/PV.8, 25 
September 2013; of Tanzania in UNGA, A/68/PV.16, 27 September 2013; Azerbaijan, China, Ethiopia (as representative of 
the Chairperson of the AU), Kenya, Morocco, Pakistan, Russian, Rwanda and Togo in UNSC, S/PV.7060, 15 November 2013; 
Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Russia, Seychelles, Tanzania, Uganda (on behalf of the AU) in ASP, General Debate 2013.  
 79 
 
 A second position that some members of the Council have adopted on the interpretation and 
application of Article 16 is that the Council may issue a deferral whenever an investigation or 
prosecution of the ICC has an actual negative impact on matters related to international peace and 
security. According to this position, the effects of the Court’s proceedings do not necessarily have to 
amount to a threat to the peace in the sense of Article 39. Yet, unlike a preventive deferral, the Court’s 
involvement should already problematize the situation on the ground. The idea of such a responsive 
deferral is that the Council uses its deferral power to address the negative implications of the Court’s 
proceedings, for example, when an indictment complicates the conclusion of a peace agreement.  
 This second view on the use of Article 16 can be found in some of the statements that were 
made in support of the AU’s deferral request for al-Bashir after the PTC issued an arrest warrant in 
March 2009.149 Upon the decision of the PTC, the AU and several members of the Council, including 
China and Russia, claimed that the prosecution of al-Bashir had ‘negative effects for the political 
process, the deployment of [UNAMID] and [the provision of] humanitarian assistance’.150 To address 
this negative impact of the ICC’s involvement, the Council would have to delay al-Bashir’s prosecution 
for a renewable period of twelve months.151 
                                                          
149 See the statements of China, Libya and Russia in UNSC, S/PV/6170, 24 July 2009; Burkina Faso in UNSC, S/PV/6230, 4 
December 2009; Mauritania and Yemen in UNGA, A/64/PV.12, 28 September 2009. AU Assembly, Decision July 2009, para. 
3. Note that the AU Assembly also proposed a responsive deferral for Muammar Gadhafi, because his prosecution would have 
‘seriously complicate[d] the efforts aimed at finding a negotiated political solution to the crisis in Libya’. See AU Assembly, 
Decision July 2011, para. 11. 
150 Statement of China in UNSC, S/PV/6170, 24 July 2009. Note that after the PTC issued the arrest warrant for al-Bashir, the 
Sudanese Government expelled several humanitarian aid organizations from Darfur.  
151 See the statement of the AU in ASP, General Debate Review Conference 2010 (noting that ‘as a direct consequence of the 
indictment, the political talks convened in Doha, Qatar, at the time between the Government of the Sudan and the Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM) were suspended as the latter put additional conditions for their continuation’). 
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 A third position is that the Council’s decision-making on Article 16 should be guided by the 
potential of a deferral to realize ‘concrete actions for peace’.152 According to this view, the Council 
should not exercise its deferral power to prevent certain events from happening or to address the negative 
effects of the Court’s proceedings. A much better purpose for Article 16 is to use a deferral as a stick 
and/or carrot to promote the interests of peace, stability and the rule of law. This idea of an instrumental 
deferral builds on what Leslie Vinjamuri has described as the ‘logic of engagement’.153 It assumes that 
the possibility of a deferral engages indicted persons in peace negotiations, by giving them a strong 
incentive to negotiate a peaceful solution. 
 The possibility of an instrumental deferral has been explored, on more than one occasion, by the 
UK and France. Several reports indicate that in the autumn of 2008, London and Paris considered 
offering President al-Bashir a twelve-month deferral in exchange for Sudan’s cooperation on other 
outstanding warrants of the ICC in the Sudan situation and full support for UNAMID.154 Furthermore, 
in relation to a possible deferral for the former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, which was tabled by 
the AU in 2011, representatives of the UK and France insinuated that a deferral could be part of a peace 
agreement in which Gaddafi relinquished power and left the country.155 From the available sources, it 
cannot be verified, however, whether a deferral-for-peace deal was ever actually offered, either to al-
Bashir or to Gaddafi. 
                                                          
152 Statement of the UK in UNSC, S/PV/6028, 3 December 2008. See also the statement of the UK in UNSC, S/PV/6170, 24 
July 2009.  
153 Vinjamuri, ‘The ICC and the Politics of Peace and Justice’, p. 16.  
154 With respect to the deferral request for al-Bashir, David Bosco has noted that ‘French diplomats reportedly circulated a 
working paper to Sudanese officials outlining the possible deal’, but that ‘London and Paris [never] decided to support a deferral 
Resolution’. He quoted Mark Malloch Brow, the UK’s point person on Africa at the time as saying that ‘any discussions were 
highly tentative - I wasn’t in a position to offer it and the Sudanese weren’t sure they want to accept it’. Bosco, Rough Justice, 
pp. 144-148. 
155 See Richard Norton-Taylor and Chris Stephen, ‘Gaddafi can’t be left in Libya, says international criminal court’, The 
Guardian, 26 July 2011; Mark S. Ellis, ‘Peace for All or Justice for One?’, The New York Times, 11 August 2011. 
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 Finally, the last and certainly most conservative position on the interpretation and the application 
of Article 16 is that the Council should only use its deferral power as a measure of last resort, in cases 
of extreme threat.156 According to some states, the possibility of a deferral should solely be considered 
when the continuation of the Court’s proceedings poses by itself a threat to the peace in the sense of 
Article 39 and even then, only when there are no alternative measures to accommodate this threat. This 
is the position that several states parties, including Belgium, the UK and Italy, have taken in response 
to the proposed deferral for al-Bashir, and especially in the debate on the deferral requests for Kenyatta 
and Ruto.157 In their view, these requests could not be endorsed because they did not fulfil the (legal) 
requirements of Article 16, because there would not be a threat to the peace and because not all 
alternatives would have been exhausted.158   
                                                          
156 Verduzco argued on the basis of interviews that one of the reasons why certain states accepted the inclusion of Article 16 
in the Statute was that a leading negotiator sketched a scenario during the drafting process ‘in which an unyielding prosecutor 
was ready to proceed with an arrest warrant against [a rebel leader who has taken control over] a nuclear plant who [has] left 
instructions to his subordinates to activate a nuclear bomb in case he [is] indicted by the ICC’. Verduzco, ‘ICC and Security 
Council’, p. 58.  
157 On the proposed deferral for al-Bashir, see the statements of Belgium, Costa Rica and Croatia in UNSC, S/PV.5947, 31 July 
2008. See also the statements of Costa Rica in UNGA, A/63/PV.8, 24 September 2008; of Belgium in UNGA, A/63/PV.13, 27 
September 2008; of Botswana in UNGA, A/63/PV.15, 29 September 2008; of Australia and Switzerland in UNGA, 
A/64/PV.35, 31 October 2008; and of Belgium, Costa Rica, Croatia and Italy in UNSC, S/PV/6028, 3 December 2008. On the 
proposed deferral for Kenyatta and Ruto, see the statements of Argentina, Australia, Guatemala, Luxembourg, South Korea 
and the UK in UNSC, S/PV.7060, 15 November 2013.  
158 Ibid. Some states have even gone a step further than the idea of a deferral as a measure of last resort. They have cautioned 
in response to the AU’s deferral requests that any deferral sets a dangerous precedent and poses a direct threat to the Court’s 
independence. By proclaiming that ‘there can be no lasting peace without justice’ and that the Council should not pose any 
‘impediment to the free and independent work of the Court’, these states have suggested that Article 16 should never be 
invoked. See, for example, the statements of Argentina, Guatemala and South Korea in UNSC, S/PV.7060, 15 November 2013. 
See also Amnesty International, ‘Statement and recommendations on the Open Debate of the Security Council on Peace and 




D. A convincing interpretation of Article 16?   
There are different ways to assess the Council’s decision-making on the AU’s deferral requests. One 
way is to fall back on the idea that the prosecution of international crimes should be assessed on the 
basis of the expected or actual effects of prosecution on the interests of peace and stability. The responses 
of the Council to the AU’s peace concerns could be evaluated by looking at the Council’s appraisal of 
the situation at the moment of its decision-making (ex tunc), or on what later turned out to be the impact 
of the Court’s proceedings on peace negotiations or post-conflict reconstruction (ex post facto). For 
example, it may be asked whether there was, in retrospect, a significant risk in July 2008 that the 
continuation of al-Bashir’s prosecution could undermine the peace process in Darfur or it may be 
questioned whether the Court’s decision to issue a warrant for his arrest did actually jeopardize the 
interests of peace.  
 From a legal point of view, however, the perceived or actual effects of prosecution are irrelevant. 
As explained above, Article 16 does not provide much guidance on the kind of circumstances that justify 
a deferral. The text of Article 16 includes four procedural conditions, but does not entail any substantive 
criteria for the use of this provision. The Statute’s preparatory work confirms that Article 16 gives the 
Council a discretionary power and that it is for the Council to decide if and when to invoke this power. 
Under the Statute or the Charter, there is no obligation for the Council to issue a deferral in a given 
situation. Article 16 requires the Council to adopt a Resolution in accordance with Chapter VII, which 
implies that the Council has to determine the existence of a threat to the peace before deciding on a 
deferral. Yet, the Council is under no obligation to make a determination under Article 39, and when 
making such a determination the Council is more or less free to decide on the appropriate measures.  
 In the absence of an obligation to issue a deferral, a refusal of the Council to adopt a deferral 
cannot be challenged on legal grounds. Even if it could be proven that the prosecution of al-Bashir 
undermined the interest of peace in Darfur, the Council acted in accordance with the Statute and the 
Charter when it remained silent on the AU’s deferral request. In a similar vein, the Council’s negative 
decision on the proposed deferral for Kenyatta and Ruto may be criticized on political grounds, but this 
decision is, legally speaking, beyond questioning.  
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 That said, the ‘legal’ arguments that some states parties have advanced in opposing the AU’s 
deferral requests can be scrutinized. Ideas of a preventive, responsive or instrumental deferral fall within 
the scope of Article 16, because they recognize the Council’s discretion to decide whether the existence 
of a threat to the peace calls for a deferral. Yet, the idea of some states parties that a deferral can only 
be issued as a measure of last resort is based on a questionable interpretation of the Council’s power to 
defer.  
 The underlying claim of the respective states is that Article 16 is only applicable if the 
continuation of an investigation or prosecution poses by itself a threat to the peace in the sense of Article 
39. As explained above, however, the reference in Article 16 to Chapter VII does not limit the Council’s 
deferral power to this extent. Under the Charter, the Council has a wide discretion to choose the 
appropriate measure when it has determined that a certain situation constitutes a threat to the peace under 
Article 39. The Statute does not limit the Council’s power to choose a deferral as one of these measures. 
Neither the text nor the drafting history of Article 16 gives any indication that the Council’s discretion 
to adopt a deferral under the Statute is somehow limited to a specific threat to the peace. From a policy-
oriented perspective, it is an open question whether it is appropriate to limit the Council’s deferral power 
to situations in which the continuation of an investigation or prosecution poses by itself a threat to the 
peace. Yet, legally speaking, there is no reason why the Council cannot adopt a deferral in reference to 
a larger factual or political background than the Court’s investigation or prosecution.  
 In sum, the Council was certainly allowed to reject the AU’s deferral requests under Article 16. 
The Council has no obligation to issue a deferral in any situation and the refusal of states to support the 
proposed deferral can therefore not be questioned on legal grounds. However, the argument of some 
states parties that Article 16 could not be invoked in the case of Kenyatta and Ruto because the 
continuation of their prosecution did not by itself constitute a threat to the peace should be rejected. The 
underlying interpretation of Article 16 is unconvincing because this provision does not specify the 
circumstances under which the Council should suspend an investigation or prosecution, or how a certain 




III. The Potential Deferral Power of the Prosecutor 
Under the Rome Statute, the Security Council is the primary forum to address concerns about the 
negative effects of the Court’s proceedings on the interests of peace. The Council’s limited response to 
the AU’s deferral requests has raised the question, however, whether other actors could also play a role 
in mediating the interests of peace and prosecution. In the literature, and in the political arena of the 
ASP, two proposals for an alternative deferral mechanism have been introduced to complement the 
Council’s deferral power under Article 16. First of all, it has been suggested that the Prosecutor could 
use her wide discretion under Article 53 of the Statute to defer the Court’s proceedings whenever the 
initiation or continuation with an investigation or prosecution frustrates the interests of peace.159 Second 
of all, the AU has asked the ASP to amend Article 16. In search of a more accessible deferral mechanism, 
the AU itself has argued that the General Assembly should receive the power to defer an investigation 
or prosecution in case the Council fails to respond to a deferral request within six months of its receipt. 
 The discussions on the first proposal for an alternative deferral mechanism concentrate on the 
interpretation and application of Article 53, and specifically paragraphs 1(c), 2(c) and 3(b), which state 
that:   
1. The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made available to him or her, initiate an 
investigation unless he or she determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed under this Statute. 
In deciding whether to initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor shall consider whether:  
… 
                                                          
159 For example, in his address to the ASP in 2013, Charles Jalloh stated that ‘if [he would be] a Court official like the 
Prosecutor, [he] would prefer to act using [his] statutorily conferred power over transferring the discretionary decision to a 
quintessentially body such as the UNSC’. Jalloh, Reflections on the Indictment of Sitting Heads of State, 54-55. On at least 
one occasion, AU member states have also argued that the Prosecutor should ‘include factors of promoting peace’ in her 
decision-making under Article 53. AU Executive Council, Report on the Ministerial Meeting on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, EX.CL/568 (XVI), 25-29 January 2010. According to this report, four African states parties 
(Burkina Faso, Namibia, Senegal and South Africa) spoke out in favour of including the promotion of peace in the prosecutorial 
guidelines on Article 53 during the 2009 meeting of the ASP.  
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 (c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are nonetheless 
substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice. 
If the Prosecutor determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed and his or her  determination 
is based solely on subparagraph (c) above, he or she shall inform the Pre-Trial  Chamber.  
2. If, upon investigation, the Prosecutor concludes that there is not a sufficient basis for a prosecution 
because:  
… 
(c) A prosecution is not in the interests of justice, taking into account all the circumstances, 
including the gravity of the crime, the interests of victims and the age or infirmity of the alleged 
perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime; the Prosecutor shall inform the Pre-Trial 
Chamber and the State making a referral under article 14 or the Security Council in a case under  article 
13, paragraph (b), of his or her conclusion and the reasons for the conclusion.  
… 
3. (b) In addition, the Pre-Trial Chamber may, on its own initiative, review a decision of the Prosecutor 
not to proceed if it is based solely on paragraph 1 (c) or 2 (c). In such a case, the decision of the Prosecutor 
shall be effective only if confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber. 
Under these three paragraphs, the Prosecutor has a great latitude not to initiate or proceed160 with an 
investigation or prosecution when this is not in ‘the interests of justice’.161 Like with Article 16, the 
                                                          
160 Note that both Article 53(1)(c) and Article 53(2)(c) only speak of the decision not to initiate an investigation or prosecution. 
These paragraphs should, however, be read in line with Article 53(4), which states that the ‘the Prosecutor may, at any time, 
reconsider a decision whether to initiate an investigation or prosecution based on new facts or information’. This provision 
makes clear that if there are new facts or information the Prosecutor also has the discretion not to continue with an investigation 
or prosecution when this would not be in the ‘interests of justice’.  
161 Note that this is considered a ‘countervailing consideration that might produce a reason not to proceed’ even where positive 
determinations have been made on both jurisdiction and admissibility. OTP, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, September 
2007, pp. 2-3. In this regard, the OTP has argued that ‘there is a strong presumption that investigations and prosecutions will 
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drafters did not specify the kind of circumstances under which the Prosecutor should defer the Court’s 
proceedings.162 They agreed that the Prosecutor should not pursuit criminal justice in an ‘idyllic meta-
political sphere’ and that there should be some form of prosecutorial discretion in the Statute.163 Yet, 
according to the available reports, they held ‘sharply clashing views’ on the kind of circumstances under 
which the Prosecutor should defer an investigation or prosecution.164 For this reason, the drafters left it 
to the Prosecutor and potentially the Court’s judges to define the substantive scope of Article 53.165 
                                                          
be in the interests of justice and [that] a decision not to proceed on the grounds of the interests of justice would be highly 
exceptional’. OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013.  
162 The UK introduced the interests of justice element in a discussion paper during the preparation track of the Rome 
Conference. This paper called for a provision reflecting a ‘wide discretion on the part of the prosecution to decide not to 
investigate or prosecute’ when this would not serve the ‘interests of justice’. See UK Delegation at the Preparatory Committee 
of the ICC, Discussion Paper, 29 March 1996, para. 30. The discussion paper mentioned the example of a very old or ill 
suspected offender and in a more general sense about ‘otherwise good reasons to conclude that a prosecution would be counter-
productive’. For further discussion on the drafting history of Article 53, see Schabas, ‘Commentary’, pp. 655-671. 
163 Payam Akhavan, ‘Are international criminal tribunals a disincentive to peace?: Reconciling judicial romanticism with 
political realism’ (2009) 31 Human Rights Quarterly 629. 
164 Darryl Robinson, ‘Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International Criminal Court’ 
(2003) 14 European Journal of International Law 483.  
165 Article 53(1)(c) makes clear that the Prosecutor should be informed about a decision of the Prosecutor not to open an 
investigation which is solely based on the interests of justice must be informed to the PTC (which is not required in relation to 
a decision not to open an investigation on the basis of matters under Article 53(1)(a) or (b)). By contrast, any decision not to 
proceed to a prosecution must be notified to the PTC. The PTC only has the power to review proprio motu in matters where a 
decision not to investigate or to proceed to a prosecution is solely made in relation to the interests of justice, as provided under 
Article 53(3)(b). If the PTC decides to review, then the Prosecutor’s decision shall only be effective once it is confirmed by the 
PTC. Arguably, the PTC could develop a substantive threshold for the Prosecutor’s consideration of the interests of justice at 
different stages of the proceedings. Until now, however, the judges have not identified any substantive limits in their rulings. 
This possibility is, for example, considered in Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, ‘Justice without politics? Prosecutorial discretion 
and the International Criminal Court’ (2007) 39 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 658-659.  
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A. The Prosecutor’s initial interpretation of Article 53 
Upon the entry into force of the Statute in 2002, Article 53 immediately gained a lot of attention and 
commentators began to discuss when the Court’s involvement would not be in the interests of justice. 
One of the main questions that caught attention was whether Article 53 allowed the Prosecutor to stop 
an investigation or prosecution in order to accommodate amnesties or an alternative justice mechanism, 
like a truth commission or a traditional reconciliation ceremony.166 Moreover, it was asked whether 
Article 53 would enable the Prosecutor to consider, more broadly, the interests of peace, stability and 
the rule of law. In addressing these questions, some commentators argued that the Prosecutor could 
decide not to initiate or continue with an investigation or prosecution in light of ‘threats to the security 
of a fragile transitional state’ or the existence of a peace treaty.167 Yet, others strongly challenged the  
                                                          
166 See, for example, Richard Goldstone and Nicole Fritz, ‘‘In the Interests of Justice’ and Independent Referral: The ICC 
Prosecutor’s Unprecedented Powers’ (2000) 13 Leiden Journal of International Law 660-662 (noting ‘that amnesties, which 
adhere to internationally accepted guidelines are consistent with the interests of justice’ and ‘the prosecutor may … defer to 
domestically enacted amnesty processes’); Robinson, ‘Serving the Interests of Justice’, 481 (arguing that ‘it is at least 
conceivable that the ICC could conclude that it would not be in the ‘interests of justice’ to interfere with a democratically 
adopted, good faith alternative programme that creatively advanced accountability objectives’); John Dugard, ‘Possible 
Conflicts of Jurisdiction with Truth Commissions’, in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.702 (arguing that ‘a genuine 
amnesty may be protected by prosecutorial discretion’ under Article 53). 
167 See, for example, Avril McDonald and Roelof Haveman, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion - Some Thoughts on ‘Objectifying’ the 
Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion by the Prosecutor of the ICC’, 15 April 2003 (arguing in the context of Article 53 that ‘the 
Prosecutor might for example consider … security issues ... threats to the security of a fragile transitional state ... political 
issues, including the existence of a peace treaty, amnesties … and a TRC’); Matthew R. Brubacher, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion 
within the International Criminal Court’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 81 (concluding that the interests of 
justice element ‘requires the Prosecutor to take account of the broader interests of the international community, including the 
potential political ramifications of an investigation on the political environment of the state over which he is exercising 
jurisdiction’ and noting that ‘this consideration will be similar to that made by the Security Council in determining whether a 
situation is a threat to international peace and security’); Kai Ambos, ‘The legal framework of Transitional Justice: A 
Systematic Study with a Special Focus on the Role of the ICC’, in Kai Ambos, Judith Large and Marieke Wierda (eds.), 
Building a Future on Peace and Justice (Berlin: Springer, 2009), p. 70 (noting that ‘whether one likes it or not … justice 
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idea that Article 53 provides a plausible avenue to address the interests of peace. 168 
 Amidst these different ideas, the OTP initially took a ‘peace-including interpretation’ of Article 
53. In its first Draft Regulations (June 2003), the OTP stated that the interests of justice element requires 
the Prosecutor to determine whether the start of an investigation could destabilize a conflict situation or 
might otherwise seriously endanger the successful completion of a peace process.169 Upon circulating 
the draft Regulations, however, this peace-including interpretation of Article 53 was strongly criticized 
by NGOs like Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International.170 HRW claimed that ‘a 
                                                          
interests cannot be limited to the interests of a criminal prosecution excluding a limine their possible interests in peace, 
traditional reconciliation etc.’); Philippa Webb, ‘The ICC Prosecutor’s Discretion Not to Proceed in the “Interests of Justice”‘ 
(2005) 50 Criminal Law Quarterly 338 (arguing that ‘assessing how international peace and security concerns impact on 
‘interests of justice’ will be a vital, yet sensitive aspect of the Prosecutor’s decision-making process’). 
168 See, for example, Carsten Stahn, ‘Complementarity, Amnesties and Alternative Forms of Justice: Some Interpretative 
Guidelines for the International Criminal Court’ (2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 719 (arguing that Article 
53 is often incorrectly considered relevant ‘for recognition of amnesties as alternative forms of justice’); Kenneth A. Rodman, 
‘Is Peace in the Interests of Justice? The Case for Broad Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court’ (2009) 
22 Leiden Journal of International Law 122 (warning that ‘Article 53 is unlikely to be the vehicle for exercising such discretion, 
because it could subject the Court ‘to political controversy and compromise its appearance of impartiality’).   
169 Note that according to this first draft, the interests of justice element is not a countervailing factor, but an element on which 
the Prosecutor has to make a positive determination before proceeding with an investigation. During the first public hearing of 
the OTP (also in June 2003), the Draft Regulations were discussed by 120 international criminal law experts, who recommended 
on Article 53 that the OTP should develop ‘clear criteria’ for deferring proceedings in the interests of justice. Subsequently, 
the OTP drafted an internal memorandum on the scope of Article 53. The available reports confirm in this memorandum the 
Prosecutor partly equated the interests of justice with the impact ‘on the stability and security of the country concerned’ (as 
quoted from Mireille Delmas-Marty, p.9). See OTP, Summary of recommendations received during the first Public Hearing of 
the Office of the Prosecutor, convened from 17-18 June 2003 at The Hague; Mireille Delmas-Marty, ‘Interactions between 
National and International Criminal Law in the Preliminary Phase of Trial at the ICC’ (2006) 4 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 9.  
170 HRW, ‘Policy Paper: the meaning of the ‘interests of justice’ in article 53 of the Rome Statute’, 1 June 2005; Amnesty 
International, ‘Open letter to the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court: Comments on the concept of the interests 
of justice’, 17 June 2005. In response to a request from the OTP to comment on the meaning of the interests of justice element 
during the OTP’s biannual consultation with NGOs in December 2004, Amnesty International, HRW and the FIDH strongly 
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construction that permits consideration of a domestic amnesty, domestic truth commission or peace 
process … would be in principle at odds with the object and purpose of the Rome Statute, as set forth in 
its preamble’.171 Moreover, both HRW and Amnesty International expressed concerns that the proposed 
approach would politicize the OTP and thereby ‘undermine the legitimacy of the Court’.172 In their view, 
the interests of peace would fall outside the scope of Article 53.  
 Despite the opposition of these prominent supporters of the Court, the OTP apparently followed 
a peace-including interpretation of Article 53 during the earlier stages of the Court’s investigations in 
Northern Uganda and Darfur. In fact, between 2003 and early 2006, the OTP repeatedly suggested that 
it considered the interests of peace a central element of its decision-making on the initiation and 
continuation of the Court’s proceedings. For example, when civil society groups and traditional leaders 
from Northern Uganda proclaimed in 2005 that the Court’s investigation into the Lord Resistance Army 
(LRA) of Joseph Kony should be suspended ‘until peace is achieved’,173 OTP officials foretold that if 
there would indeed be genuine peace negotiations, the Court’s proceedings could perhaps be delayed to 
give these negotiations a better chance.174 Furthermore, in the OTP’s first report to the Security Council 
                                                          
criticized this reading of Article 53. However, the American NGO Coalition argued that ‘Article 53 empowers the prosecution 
quite widely to hold back on a prosecution for reasons of non-interference in a peace settlement’. In addition, two Congolese 
NGOs stressed the inseparability of peace and justice. See;  FIDH, ‘Reflexions sur la notion intérêts de ja justice au terme de 
l’article 53 du Statut de Rome’, 1 June 2005; American NGO Coalition for the ICC, ‘Interests of Justice Proposals’, 1 May 
2005; Action Sociale pour la Paix et le Développement, ‘Commentaires sur l’intérêt de la Justice’, 1 May 2005; Democratie et 
Civisme pour le Développment Intégration, ‘Consultation sur l’intérêt de la justice - interpretation de l’Article 53 du Statut de 
Rome’, 1 May 2005. 
171 HRW, 6. 
172 Ibid., 14.  
173 International Crisis Group, ‘Shock Therapy for Northern Uganda’s Peace Process’, 11 April 2005, pp. 5-6. 
174 See, for example, OTP, Statements by ICC Chief Prosecutor and the visiting Delegation of Acholi leaders from Northern 
Uganda, 18 March 2005 (speaking of a ‘common goal to end violence’); International Crisis Group, ‘Shock Therapy for 
Northern Uganda’s Peace Process’, p. 6-7 (referring to interviews with ICC officials who ‘pointed out that even after warrants 
are issued, the peace process can continue. They note that the investigation could still be suspended at any time in the interests 
of justice’); Yves Sorokobi, as quoted in ‘Uganda: ICC could suspend northern investigations - spokesman’, IRIN News, 18 
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on its investigation into Darfur, Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo devoted an entire section to Article 
53 and emphasized that his Office had ‘carefully considered the over-all context in which investigations 
will take place and [had gathered] information … on efforts to restore peace and security [in] Darfur’.175 
In this way, Ocampo indicated that his Office stood ready to use its discretion under Article 53 to balance 
the interests of peace and prosecution. 
B. The Prosecutor’s revised interpretation of Article 53 
In the course of 2006-2007, the Prosecutor revised his interpretation of Article 53 and Ocampo distanced 
himself from his earlier statements by stressing that the undefined interests of peace fall outside the 
scope of Article 53. This shift in the Prosecutor’s rhetoric followed upon new accusations that the OTP 
jeopardized the chances of bringing peace and reconciliation to Northern Uganda by prosecuting the 
LRA leadership.  
 During high-level negotiations with the LRA in the summer of 2006, the Ugandan Government 
offered a conditional amnesty to the LRA commanders in exchange for their disarmament.176 In reaction 
                                                          
April 2005 (ICC spokesman Sorokobi reportedly stated that ‘if it is in the interests of justice to proceed with a peace agreement, 
the ICC is ready to suspend its investigations’); OTP, Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Informal meeting of Legal Advisors 
of Ministries of Foreign Affairs, 24 October 2005, p. 5 (‘I believe that by working together [the OTP and local communities] 
we will help bring justice, peace and security for the people of Northern Uganda’). Note that these references to peace and 
security provoked the PTC to ask the Prosecutor in December 2005 if the OTP was considering a formal suspension of the 
proceedings under Article 53. In response, the Prosecutor stated that the OTP had not made any decisions regarding this 
provision. See Situation in Uganda (ICC-02/04-01/05-68), Decision to convene a status conference on the investigation in the 
situation in Uganda in relation to the application of article 53, 2 December 2005; Situation in Uganda (ICC-02/04-01/05-76), 
OTP Submission Providing Information On Status of the Investigation In Anticipation of the Status Conference To Be Held on 
13 January 2006, 11 January 2006.  
175 OTP, Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, to the Security Council 
pursuant to UNSCR 1593, 26 June 2005, p. 6. 
176 Emma Mutaizibwa, ‘Govt happy Kony is for amnesty’, Daily Monitor, 9 July 2006; ‘Uganda rebel chief backs amnesty’, 
BBC News, 9 July 2006.f 
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to this offer, the Prosecutor argued that he could not drop the warrants that the PTC had issued.177 This 
would go beyond his legal mandate. In a public speech in June 2007, the Prosecutor explained that even 
though ‘we can hear voices … asking the Prosecution to use its discretionary powers to adjust to 
situations on the ground … supposedly in the name of peace, ... these proposals are not consistent with 
the Rome Statute’.178  
 In September 2007, the OTP specified its revised and peace-excluding interpretation of Article 
53 in a Policy Paper on the interests of justice.179 In this non-binding paper, the OTP reasoned that while 
the Statute recognizes that the Security Council can address peace concerns in relation to the ICC 
(Article 16), the Statute does not allow the Prosecutor to address the interests of peace.180 Based on the 
Statute’s Preamble, the OTP contended that the interpretation of Article 53 should be guided by the 
objectives of the Court to put an end to impunity, to ensure that the most serious crimes of concern to 
the international community do not go unpunished and to guarantee a lasting respect for international 
justice.181 Furthermore, the OTP referred to Article 16 as a relevant contextual factor. Together with the 
treaty’s proclaimed object and purpose, this provision would show ‘that there is a difference between 
the concepts of the interests of justice and the interests of peace and that the latter falls within the 
mandate of institutions other than the [OTP]’.182 While the Prosecutor could consider ‘issues of crime 
                                                          
177 See, for example, Uganda: Kony will eventually face trial, says ICC prosecutor’, IRIN News, 7 July 2006. 
178 OTP, Address by Luis Moreno-Ocampo at the International Conference ‘Building a Future on Peace and Justice’ in 
Nuremberg, 25 June 2007.  
179 OTP, Policy Paper 2007, p. 1. 
180 As stated in the Policy Paper, it ‘does not give rise to rights in litigation and is subject to revision based on experience and 
in the light of legal determination by the Chambers of the Court’. The Paper only reflects the OTP’s ‘understanding of the 
conception of the interests of justice as mentioned in Article 53’ and offers ‘clarification in the abstract’ (p. 1).  
181 Ibid., p. 4. 
182 Ibid. p. 1.  
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prevention and security under the interests of justice … the broader matter of international peace and 
security [would not be] the responsibility of the Prosecutor’.183  
C. A convincing interpretation of Article 53?  
To what extent is this peace-excluding interpretation of the interests of justice element in Article 53 
convincing? In my opinion, there are at least three reasons to question the Prosecutor’s revised 
interpretation of Article 53. Most importantly, the Policy Papier (1) ignores several elements that are 
part of the direct context of the Prosecutor’s discretion under Article 53 not to initiate or proceed with 
an investigation when this is not in the interests of justice. Furthermore, the peace-excluding 
interpretation of Article 53 (2) is based on a one-sided reading of the object and purpose of the Statute 
and (3) it overestimates the scope of the Council’s deferral power under Article 16.  
 First of all, the Prosecutor’s Policy Paper failed to consider the linkage to specific purposes of 
criminal prosecution in Article 53. In Article 53(1)(c), concerning the initiation of an investigation, the 
interests of justice element is placed in juxtaposition to ‘traditional criminal justice considerations’ like 
the gravity of the crimes and the interests of victims.184 This signals that the interests of justice element 
cannot be limited to the traditional administration of justice, but should be interpreted in a broader 
manner. So much can be concluded for Article 53(2)(c) as well, which emphasizes that the Prosecutor 
should take ‘all the circumstances’ into account when determining whether the initiation or continuation 
of a prosecution is in the interests of justice (emphasis added). This contextual element strongly suggests 
that broader considerations, such as the undefined interests of peace, could be part of the Prosecutor’s 
decision-making on the interests of justice.  
                                                          
183 Ibid., p. 9. With respect to ‘other justice mechanisms’ the OTP stressed ‘the need to integrate different approaches’ and 
stated that ‘the pursuit of criminal justice provides [only] one part of the necessary response to serious crimes of international 
concern’ (p. 7).  
184 Robinson, ‘Serving the Interests of Justice’, 488. See also Drazan Dukic, ‘Transitional Justice and the International Criminal 
Court: in ‘the interests of justice’?’ (2007) 89 International Review of the Red Cross 699.  
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 A second reason to question the Prosecutor’s peace-excluding interpretation of Article 53 is that 
the OTP’s analysis of the object and purpose of the Statute is incomplete. While the Policy Paper 
emphasizes the importance of prosecution to end impunity in reference to paragraphs four and eleven 
of the Preamble, the Paper ignores the third paragraph of the Preamble, which states that international 
crimes ‘threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world’.185 This paragraph indicates that the 
promotion of peace forms an important part of the object and purpose of the Statute as well.186 Moreover, 
and more to the point, even if the prosecution of international crimes to end impunity were to be taken 
as the guiding object and purpose of the Statute, this goal does not necessarily support the conclusion 
that Article 53 should be interpreted in a peace-excluding manner. A temporal ban on the initiation or 
continuation of an investigation or prosecution in the interests of justice and/or peace does not mean that 
the relevant case will never again be taken up by the ICC or by another court.187 While justice will 
(generally) not be achieved in a conflict situation or in a politically unstable or failing state, a delay in 
justice to ensure peace can prevent the creation of new victims and offer the possibility for justice further 
along the way.  
 Finally, contrary to what is claimed in the Policy Paper, Article 16 does not bar the Prosecutor 
from addressing the interests of peace. Article 16 gives a discretionary power to the Council, but does 
not preclude other institutions, such as the Prosecutor, the General Assembly or the ASP, from dealing 
                                                          
185 Furthermore, in defining the object and purpose of the Rome Statute one should take into account the seventh paragraph of 
the Preamble, which reaffirms ‘the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations’. Article 1(1) of the UN Charter 
makes clear that the maintenance of international peace and security is one of these purposes. Arguably, the implication is that 
the ICC should also seek to support this purpose.  
186 See also Schabas, ‘Commentary’, pp. 42-43. He argued in reference to the third and seventh paragraph of the Preamble, 
‘that there is much to be said for the view that the rationale for the Court is to promote peace … the claim that justice is 
necessary for a lasting peace does not seem to constitute a universal truth … The preambular references can provide a useful 
corrective, recalling that peace and justice go hand in hand. Both objectives are best promoted by an approach that seeks to 
deliver as much of each as possible in the circumstances of a particular conflict’. Contra Condorelli and Villalpando, ‘Referral 
and Deferral by the Security Council’, p. 631.  
187 Moreover, ‘ending impunity’ does not necessarily require retributive justice in the form of criminal prosecution. For further 
discussion on this matter, see the references in footnote 166 of this chapter.  
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with the interests of peace. Under the UN Charter, the Security Council has a primary, but not an 
exclusive responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.188 Article 16 recognizes 
this primary responsibility. Yet, neither the text nor the drafting history of Article 16 indicates that the 
Council’s deferral power somehow prohibits the Prosecutor to address the interests of peace.   
 All of these additional considerations should be taken into account for the interpretation of 
Article 53. They suggest that the Policy Paper has defined the scope of the Prosecutor’s discretion under 
this provision in a too limited manner.189 As a starting point, it should be acknowledged that the text of 
Article 53, and especially the interests of justice element, is far from clear and has different possible 
meanings.190 The task for an interpreter is to choose in good faith between these meanings and the first 
tool that should be used under Article 31 of the VCLT is the direct context of the specific terms. In my 
opinion, the direct context of the interests of justice element in Article 53(1)(c) and 53(2)(c) speaks 
strongly in favour of a broad interpretation of the interests of justice, which leaves it to the Prosecutor 
to decide what the interests of justice are in a particular situation. This especially holds true for a decision 
on the initiation or continuation of a prosecution, because Article 53(2)(c) requires the Prosecutor to 
address ‘all the circumstances’. Depending on the unique and exceptional character of a situation, this 
may also require the Prosecutor to address the undefined interests of peace.  
                                                          
188 See Article 12(1) and Article 24 of the UN Charter. For further discussion and references, see part IV in this chapter.  
189 In this regard, I agree with William Schabas that the OTP has tried ‘to impose a literal approach on an expression that was 
intended to leave the exercise of prosecutorial discretion unfettered’. Indeed, as he and others have highlighted some legal 
concepts are not to be codified, ‘but require the exercise of common sense and good judgment by responsible professionals’. 
William A. Schabas, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Criminal Court’ (2008) 6 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 749.  
190 Note that the term ‘justice’ and the phrase the ‘interests of justice’ is also used in different ways in other provisions of the 
Statute. In some instance, justice is used with a punitive connotation. For example, Article 17(2)(b) speaks of ‘an intent to bring 
the person concerned to justice’. In other instances, the use of the phrase the interests of justice refers to the good administration 
of justice. For example, Article 55(2)(1) provides that a person can be assigned legal assistance ‘in any case where the interests 
of justice so require’.  
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 A broad and peace-including interpretation of the interests of justice element in Article 53 is 
confirmed by the drafting history of this provision. The drafters agreed that the Prosecutor should enjoy 
a form of prosecutorial discretion. As with Article 16, however, they did not agree on the kind of 
circumstances that could justify a deferral of an investigation or prosecution in the interests of justice. 
The open-character of the interests of element in Article 53 should be understood as an expression of 
the desire of the drafters to leave it to the Prosecutor and potentially the Court’s judges to define the 
substantive scope of this discretion. In other words, it seems that the Prosecutor does have the power to 
consider the undefined interests of peace in its decision-making on whether the initiation or continuation 
of a particular investigation or prosecution is in the interests of justice. 
D. The ‘a-political’ response of the Prosecutor to the AU’s peace concerns 
The Prosecutor’s own peace-excluding interpretation of Article 53 should perhaps not just be understood 
as a product of doctrinal analysis.191 The Policy Paper on the interests of justice may be seen as part of 
a broader legitimization strategy, whereby the OTP seeks to depict its decision-making process as ‘a-
political’.192 By emphasizing the responsibility of the Security Council under Article 16, and by 
interpreting Article 53 in such a way that the Prosecutor has no legal mandate to address peace concerns, 
the OTP has tried to distance itself from any form of deferral politics. The underlying logic behind this 
strategy is that if the Prosecutor were to acknowledge any potential involvement with negotiations on 
the suspension of the Court’s proceedings, this could expose the OTP to the critique that its decisions 
                                                          
191 The OTP’s peace-excluding interpretation of Article 53 has been confirmed in OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary 
Examinations, November 2013, paras. 67-71. This paper stated in relation to Article 53 that ‘the interests of justice provision 
should not be considered a conflict management tool requiring the Prosecutor to assume the role of a mediator in political 
negotiations: such an outcome would run contrary to the explicit judicial functions of the Office and the Court as a whole’.  
192 On the OTP’s strategy to portray its decision-making as a-political, see generally Michael Struett, ‘Why the International 
Criminal Court Must Pretend to Ignore Politics’ (2012) 26 Ethics & International Affairs 83-92; James A. Goldston, ‘More 
Candour about Criteria: The Exercise of Discretion by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court’ (2010) 8 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 383-406.  
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are politically motivated.193 To protect the legitimacy of the Court from these kind of accusations, the 
OTP has stated many times that the Prosecutor’s duty is ‘to apply the law without bowing to political 
considerations’.194   
 It is along these lines that the Court’s first two chief prosecutors have responded to the AU’s 
peace concerns about the ICC. To give an example, in the context of a public address in October 2012 
titled ‘Setting the record straight: The ICC’s new Prosecutor responds to African concerns’, Fatou 
Bensouda argued that the Court’s involvement in Africa has never ‘precluded or put an end to’ peace 
negotiations, but has rather proven to be ‘a spur to action’.195 She added that even if the Court’s 
                                                          
193 This strategy reflects the much debated idea that international criminal investigations and prosecutions must be dictated ‘by 
pure legal standards’ free from political influences. Note that various scholars have contended that this is a purely ‘theoretical 
construction’, which contrasts strongly with the inherent political elements in the decision-making process of the Prosecutor 
and the Court as a whole. See, for example, Kendall, ‘UhuRuto and Other Leviathans’ 401-405; Goldston, ‘More Candour 
about Criteria’, 1-5; Clarke and Koulen, ‘The Legal Politics of the Article 16 Decision’ 297-303; Sarah M.H. Nouwen and 
Wouter Werner, ‘Doing Justice to the Political: The International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan’ (2011) 21 European 
Journal of International Law 942-946. 
194 Luis Moreno-Ocampo, ‘The International Criminal Court: Seeking Global Justice’ (2007) 40 Case Western Reserve Journal 
of International Law 224 (‘The Prosecutor’s duty is to apply the law without bowing to political considerations, and I will not 
adjust my practices to political considerations. It is time for political actors to adjust to the law. We have no police and no army, 
but we have legitimacy. We will prevail’). See also the statement of Phakiso Mochochocko on behalf of the OTP to the Security 
Council in UNSC, S/PV.6849, 17 October 2012 (‘Efforts to interfere with the independent exercise  of  the  Office’s  mandate  
would  only  serve to  undermine  the  legitimacy  and  credibility of  the judicial process, thus giving credence to allegations 
of politicization of the process’); OTP, Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo during informal meeting of the [ASP] on the 
occasion of the commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the adoption of the Rome Statute of the ICC, 17 July 2008; OTP, 
Keynote address Mrs. Fatou Bensouda - Setting the record straight the ICC’s new Prosecutor responds to African concerns, 10 
October 2012, p. 4; OTP, Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo - ‘Working with Africa: the view from the ICC Prosecutor’s 
Office’, 9 November 2009, p. 5; OTP, Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo to the [ASP], 14 November 2008;  OTP, Statement 
by Luis Moreno-Ocampo to the [ASP], 6 December 2010 (‘politics have no place and will play no part in the decisions I take’); 
OTP, Statement by Fatou Bensouda to the [ASP], 20 November 2013 (‘politics have no place and will play no part’). 
195 OTP, Prosecutor responds to African concerns, p. 7. See also OTP, Key note address Mrs. Fatou Bensouda - New power 
balances: actors for the future and challenges ahead, 23 May 2013, p. 6.  
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investigations or prosecutions would at some point jeopardize the interests of peace, the OTP could not 
‘participate in peace initiatives’.196 In support, she recalled the 2007 Policy Paper and stressed that the 
interests of justice element in Article 53 should ‘not be confused with the interests of peace and security, 
which falls within the mandate of other institutions, notably the UN Security Council’.197 The Prosecutor 
would ‘solely [be] responsible for doing justice’.198 
 In addition to these kind of general observations on the role of the OTP in balancing the interests 
of peace and prosecution, Ocampo and Bensouda have on several occasions responded to the AU’s 
deferral requests under Article 16. Both have noted that ‘the reasons for which these powers may be 
exercised are clearly a matter for the Security Council members themselves and are not issues with 
which the Court and the [OTP] can or should be involved’.199 At the same time, Ocampo has warned the 
Council, in relation to the deferral request for al-Bashir that the Sudanese President has tried to 
‘blackmail’ the international community with the ‘false option’ of peace or justice.200 In a similar vein, 
Bensouda has noted that ‘there can be obvious perverse side-effects for deferring judicial proceedings 
in the name of peace and security’, and that a deferral may ‘send out a message to perpetrators that arrest 
warrants can be stayed, if only they commit more crimes or threaten regional peace and security’.201  
 With these kind of statements on the AU’s deferral requests, the OTP has not only sought to 
distance its own decision-making from deferral politics, but has also discouraged the Council from using 
Article 16. The OTP has manifested itself in this respect as a political actor and as an advocate of the 
                                                          
196 OTP, Prosecutor responds to African concerns, p. 5.  
197 Ibid.  
198 Ibid. 
199 See, for example, OTP, Prosecutor responds to African concerns, 5.  
200 OTP, Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo to the [ASP], 12 December 2011. See also his statement in UNSC, S/PV.6028, 3 
December 2008 (‘President al-Bashir is trying to convince organizations and the Security Council that they have to protect 
him. The international community cannot be part of such a cover-up … Enough appeasement: the time has passed for continuing 
to accommodate evil’).  
201 OTP, New Power Balances, p. 7; OTP, Prosecutor responds to African concerns, p. 6 (‘a deferral is not an amnesty, nor an 
offer of immunity from prosecution - it buys time perhaps, but it does not buy a way out for alleged war criminals’).  
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unconditional pursuit of criminal justice. In the context of the AU’s peace concerns, Ocampo and 
Bensouda have both stressed that the interests of peace are not part of the responsibility of the Prosecutor 
and that an investigation or prosecution should not be deferred because of political considerations. 
 In sum, several states and commentators have suggested that the Prosecutor could use her wide 
discretion under Article 53 of the Statute to defer the Court’s proceedings whenever an investigation or 
prosecution jeopardizes the interests of peace. The OTP has, however, rejected this alternative deferral 
mechanism, because the interests of peace would fall outside the scope of Article 53. From a legal point 
of view, the underlying interpretation of the interests of justice element in this provision is not 
convincing. Based on the applicable rules of interpretation, it seems that Article 53 gives the Prosecutor 
a broad discretion to consider all possible circumstances, including the interests of peace. That being 
said, the OTP’s Policy Paper on the interests of justice and the Prosecutor’s a-political responses to the 
AU’s peace concerns make it very unlikely that the Prosecutor will use its potential deferral power any 
time soon.    
 
IV. The Potential Deferral Power of the UN General Assembly 
In search for an alternative deferral mechanism, states and commentators have not only looked inside, 
but also outside of the Court’s current legal framework (de lege ferenda). Obtaining the most attention 
in this respect is the AU’s proposal to amend Article 16 and to give the UN General Assembly the power 
to defer an investigation or prosecution whenever the Council fails to respond to a deferral request within 
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six months of its receipt. This proposal, which was first adopted by a ministerial meeting of the AU in 
November 2009,202 and introduced by South Africa in the ASP a few weeks later,203 reads as follows:  
i) No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a 
period of 12 months after the Security Council in a Resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed 
by the Council under the same conditions;  
ii) A state with jurisdiction over a situation before the Court may request the UN Security Council 
to defer a matter before the Court as provided for in (i) above;  
iii) Where the UN Security Council fails to decide on the request by the state concerned within six 
(6) months of receipt of the request, the requesting Party may request the UN General Assembly 
to assume the Security Council’s responsibility under para. 1 consistent with Resolution 377(V) 
of the UN General Assembly. 
                                                          
202 AU Executive Council, Report January 2010, p. 12. The ministerial meeting (6 November 2009) also adopted six other 
recommendations that would have to guide the position of the African states parties to the ICC at the next meeting of the ASP 
and the Review Conference in 2010. These recommendations concerned the Prosecutor’s discretion under Article 53 (discussed 
in the previous section), the referral power of the Security Council under Article 13(b) (arguing that these powers should be 
retained as is), the relation between Articles 27 and 98(1) (discussed in chapter 3), and proposals regarding the crimes of 
aggression (which was the main item on the agenda of the Review Conference). The AU Assembly endorsed the proposed 
amendment to Article 16 in early 2010. AU Assembly, Decision on the Report of the Second Meeting of States parties to the 
Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court, Assembly/AU/Dec.270(XIV), 2 February 2010, paras. 2, 5 and 7. 
203 The proposal was formally submitted by South Africa to the Secretary-General on 18 November 2009. Note that this 
amendment could not be formally considered by the ASP during its annual meeting in 2009, because it was not submitted three 
months prior to this session, as is required under Article 121(2) of the Statute. UN Treaties Collection 
(C.N.851.2009.TREATIES-10), South Africa: Proposal of Amendment, 18 November 2009. The intention of the AU seems to 
have been to introduce the amendment during the 2009 meeting of the ASP so that this proposal could be formally addressed 
by the ASP during the Review Conference in 2010. As was decided by the ASP in 2008, amendments to be considered by the 
Review Conference first had to be discussed during the 2009 meeting of the ASP ‘with a view of promoting consensus and a 
well prepared Review Conference’. ASP, Resolution ICC-ASP/7/Res.3, 21 November 2008. 
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The AU’s motivation to seek this amendment came, first of all, from the Council’s disappointing 
response to the requested deferral for al-Bashir. However, it should not only be seen as an expression of 
frustration about this unsuccessful deferral bid. More than that, the amendment is a product of the strong 
perception among African leaders that the Security Council is an undemocratic and unrepresentative 
body, because African and other developing states have insufficient influence on its decision-making 
process.204 
A. The legal basis of the AU’s proposal in the UN Charter 
From a legal point of view, the main issue with the AU’s proposal is the division of competence(s) 
between the General Assembly and the Security Council. Under the UN Charter, the Council has the 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in order to ensure ‘prompt 
and effective action’ by the UN (Article 24). At the same time, the Charter makes it ‘abundantly clear’ 
that the General Assembly can also be concerned with questions relating to the maintenance of 
international peace and security.205 To coordinate the respective functions of the General Assembly (as 
listed in Chapter IV) and the Security Council (as listed in Chapter VII), Article 12(1) of the Charter 
gives priority to the Council. This provision stipulates that when the Council ‘is exercising’ its functions, 
the General Assembly ‘shall not make any recommendation with regard to’ the relevant dispute or 
situation unless the Security Council requests the General Assembly to do so. This does not mean that 
the General Assembly cannot act with respect to a situation that is also on the agenda of the Council (or 
                                                          
204 Note that the AU has repeatedly argued that the UN Charter should be amended in order to ensure a more equal composition 
of the Security Council. In March 2005, an extraordinary meeting of the Executive Council of the AU adopted the Ezulwini 
consensus, which argued that African states should have at least two permanent seats (including veto) and five non-permanent 
seats on the Security Council. It further specified that the AU should get to decide which African states should fulfil those seats. 
AU Executive Council, The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: The Ezulwini 
Consensus, Ext/EX.CL/2 (VII), 7-8 March 2005.  
205 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, [1962] ICJ Rep 151, at 163. 
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on which the Council has acted in the past).206 Yet, according to the ICJ’s jurisprudence on this matter, 
Article 12(1) does prohibit the General Assembly from issuing a recommendation on a matter that is 
actively being considered by the Council at the same time.207   
 In considering the AU’s proposal, it must be acknowledged that the General Assembly cannot 
act beyond those powers that are attributed to it by the Charter. If the proposed amendment to Article 
16 would create a new power for the General Assembly, which it does not have under the Charter, the 
adoption of this amendment under the Statute would require an additional amendment to the Charter in 
accordance with the established procedure of Chapter XVIII of the Charter. However, it seems that the 
proposed amendment to Article 16 would not grant a new power to the Generally Assembly under the 
Charter. In light of its own practice, it appears that the General Assembly is able to make a request to 
the ICC or another international court under Chapter IV of the Charter.208 The ‘only’ thing that the 
proposed amendment would do, is to create a legal effect for such a request within the legal framework 
                                                          
206 See generally Eckhart Klein and Stefanie Schmahl, ‘Article 12’, in Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, George Nolte and 
Andreas Paulus (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations - A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, Third 
Edition), pp. 509-516.  
207 The ICJ has noted that ‘both the General Assembly and the Security Council initially interpreted and applied Article 12 to 
the effect that the Assembly could not make a recommendation on a question concerning the maintenance of international peace 
and security while the matter remained on the Council’s agenda [but] that this interpretation of Article 12 has evolved 
subsequently’. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 
[2004] ICJ Rep 136, para. 27. This position has been confirmed in Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, [2010] ICJ Rep 403, paras. 41-42.  
208 According to the wording of Article 10 of the Charter, the General Assembly can only direct recommendations to the 
members of the UN, to the Security Council, or to both, whereas under Article 11(2) the General Assembly can also address 
recommendations to non-members. In practice, however, the General Assembly ‘has not restricted itself to those named in 
Article 10 [or in Article 11(2)]’. Recommendations have, for example, been directed to ‘special authorities’, ‘non-governmental 
organizations’, ‘individual persons’ and specific international organizations. See Eckhart Klein and Stefanie Schmahl, ‘Article 
10’, in Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, George Nolte and Andreas Paulus (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations - A 
Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, Third Edition), p. 478. In light of this practice, the General Assembly 




of the Court.209 If the proposed amendment to Article 16 would be adopted, a request of the General 
Assembly to defer a certain investigation or prosecution would become a valid request under the Rome 
Statute and would create a legal basis upon which an investigation or prosecution could be suspended. 
 Because of Article 12(1) of the Charter, the General Assembly would not be able to issue a 
deferral request when the Council is still actively considering the matter.210  In an attempt to circumvent 
this limitation, the AU’s amendment refers to the ‘Uniting for Peace Resolution’.211 The first paragraph 
of this Resolution ‘resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent 
members fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making 
                                                          
209 Note that a deferral request by the General Assembly does not require ‘action’ in the meaning of Article 11(2). This provision 
stipulates that when a question concerning the maintenance of international peace and security requires ‘action’, the General 
Assembly shall refer this question to the Council. On ‘action’ in the meaning of Article 11(2), the ICJ has stated that this must 
refer to action ‘which is solely within the province of the Security Council’, because if the word ‘action’ would be ‘interpreted 
to mean that the General Assembly could make recommendations only of a general character affecting peace and security in 
the abstract, and not in relation to specific cases, [Article 11(2)] would not have provided that the General Assembly may make 
recommendations on questions brought before it by States or by the Security Council’. According to the ICJ, the last sentence 
of Article 11, paragraph 2, has ‘no application where the necessary action is not enforcement action’. Certain Expenses of the 
United Nations, Advisory Opinion, [1962] ICJ Rep 151, at 164-165. A request to defer an investigation or prosecution does 
not fall within the scope of enforcement action. The consideration of a deferral request by the General Assembly does therefore 
not raise any problems under Article 11(2).  
210 The argument that the General Assembly cannot issue a deferral request when the Council is dealing with the underlying 
situation, rather than the deferral itself, is unconvincing. It runs counter to the accepted practice of the General Assembly, 
which has been confirmed by the ICJ. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, [2004] ICJ Rep 136, para. 28 (noting that ‘there has been an increasing tendency over time for 
the General Assembly and the Security Council to deal in parallel with the same matter concerning the maintenance of 
international peace and security’). In the concerned case, the Security Council was still dealing with the conflict between Israel 
and Palestine, but not with the more specific issue of the construction of the Wall, which was the subject of the request for an 
advisory opinion to the ICJ. See also Klein and Schmahl, ‘Article 12’, p. 511.  
211 UNGA, Resolution 377(V), 3 November 1950, para. 1. 
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appropriate recommendations’.212 According to the ICJ’s jurisprudence, the procedure provided for by 
this resolution is premised on the conditions (1) that the Council has failed to exercise its primary 
responsibility ‘as a result of a negative vote of one or more permanent members’, and (2) that the 
situation is one ‘in which there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression’.213 If these conditions are fulfilled, the General Assembly would be allowed to make a 
recommendation even if the Council is still actively considering the matter.214  
 At first sight, the reference to this Resolution in the proposed amendment looks like a smart 
move. It seems to allow the General Assembly to issue a deferral when the Council is still actively 
considering the situation. Yet, there is at least one difficulty with the reference to the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution. As pointed out by Charles Jalloh, Dapo Akande and Max du Plessis, this reference may 
                                                          
212 Ibid., para. 1.  
213 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, [2004] ICJ 
Rep 136, para. 30. See also Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, [2010] ICJ Rep 403, para. 42 (speaking of ‘lack of unanimity’, rather than ‘a negative vote of one 
or more of the permanent members of the Security Council’). According to Klein and Schmahl (p. 512), the General Assembly 
determined the Uniting for Peace Resolution ‘that if a veto cast by a permanent member prevent the Council from taking a 
decision, the Security Council will not be exercising its functions within the meaning of Article 12(1), and consequently the 
General Assembly will not be banned from making recommendations’. Note, however, that the Resolution itself does not speak 
of one or more negative votes, but more generally of a ‘lack of unanimity of the permanent members’. 
214 Several commentators have noted that this interpretation is problematic because the Article 27(3) expressly grants the 
permanent members veto power and the exercise of this power ‘is not necessarily aimed at paralyzing the security mechanism 
of the UN’. It may well be based on the conviction that there is no threat to the peace or that a State is wrongly accused of 
having committed an act of aggression (Art. 39). In such a case, the blocking of coercive measures against a (member) State 
can just be a reasonable exercise of the functions assigned to the Security Council. Moreover, this interpretation does not 
correspond with the text of the Resolution itself which speaks of a ‘lack of unanimity of the permanent members’. The key 
question is whether ‘the rejection of a resolution due to a veto is to be considered an exercise of SC functions’ or whether the 
rejection of a resolution is the result of lack of unanimity of the permanent members. This question should probably be 
‘answered according to the judgment of the majority of the SC members’. See Klein and Schmahl, ‘Article 12’, pp. 512-513.  
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severely limit the potential deferral power of the General Assembly.215 As interpreted by the ICJ, the 
Uniting for Peace Resolution only applies to situations where the Council has failed to take a decision 
because of a negative vote of one or more of the permanent members of the Security Council.216 If this 
interpretation were to be accepted, it means that if the amendment to Article 16 would be adopted with 
the reference to the Uniting for Peace Resolution, deferral requests like those for al-Bashir (no actual 
vote in the Council) or for Kenyatta and Ruto (failed because of abstentions, rather than a negative vote 
from one or more permanent members) might fall outside of its scope. After all, these deferral requests 
did not fail because of a negative vote of one of the permanent members (i.e., a veto). They failed 
because the Council as a whole, including non-permanent members, could not agree on the use of Article 
16.217  
 All things considered, the AU’s proposal to amend Article 16 is probably compatible with the 
UN Charter. Yet, if the amendment would be accepted (in accordance with the established procedure of 
Article 121 of the Statute) the General Assembly would only be able to use this provision under very 
                                                          
215 Note that according to Jalloh, Akande and Du Plessis argued that ‘the constitutional validity of [this] Resolution is 
questionable’, because it assumes ‘that the fact that the Council is unable to pass a Resolution through the lack of unanimity of 
the permanent members means that the UNSC is no longer exercising its functions with regard to a particular matter’ in the 
meaning of Article 12(1), while ‘it is possible, and in fact happens, that [when] the Council at first fails to pass a Resolution it 
is later able to do so’. Jalloh, Akande and Du Plessis, AU Concerns about Article 16, 34.  
216 Ibid., 35 (arguing for this reason that ‘the proposal would be more legally palatable if reference to the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution were omitted altogether’). See also Christopher Gevers, ‘SA’s bold proposal shows up the flaws in the Rome 
compromise’, Business Day, 29 December 2009 (arguing that the reference to the Uniting for Peace Resolution ‘is probably 
the amendment’s death knell, as even sympathetic countries are unlikely to support employing the defunct Uniting for Peace 
Resolution in this legally questionable manner’).  
217 If the existence of a threat of a veto would qualify as a ‘lack of unanimity’ rather than an actual veto, the deferral request 
for al-Bashir could, arguably, have been considered within the scope of the proposed amendment. As noted in part II of this 
chapter, the US threatened to use its veto over a deferral request for al-Bashir. In September 2008, US Ambassador Richard 
Williamson stated that ‘if forced to vote today - the United States, even if it was 191 countries against one, would veto an 
Article 16 [Resolution]. See Daniel van Oudenaren, ‘US Will Veto Attempts to Defer ICC Move against Sudan President’, 
Sudan Tribune, 24 September 2008.  
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specific circumstances. In accordance with Article 12(1) of the Charter, the General Assembly would 
only be able to defer an investigation or prosecution when the Council is not actively considering the 
initial request, even after the envisioned period of six months has elapsed. Moreover, because of the 
reference to the Uniting for Peace Resolution, the deferral power of the General Assembly under the 
Statute would be limited to situations in which a deferral request has been rejected by the Council 
because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members.218 
B. The response of the ASP to the AU’s proposal 
Following the informal introduction of the AU’s amendment by South Africa during the annual meeting 
of the ASP in December 2009, the proposal was briefly debated by the Court’s members. Reportedly, 
two African states (Namibia and Senegal) took the floor to support the initiative, whereas thirteen non-
African states spoke out against a revision of Article 16.219 Among other reasons, the opposing states 
argued that ‘there was not enough time to assess the merit of the proposal and that discussion would be 
premature even at the Review Conference’ in 2010.220 Furthermore, concerns were expressed that the 
AU’s amendment would broaden ‘the scope for political interference with the activity of the Court’,221 
                                                          
218 Note that the General Assembly can also recommend a deferral without an amendment to the Statute. Within the accepted 
limits of Chapter IV of the Charter, including Article 12(1), such a recommendation will not bind the Court or UN member 
states. Under the legal framework of the Court, the Court’s judges or the ASP can also not rely on this recommendation to defer 
a certain investigation or prosecution, because they do not possess this power under the Statute. However, the Prosecution 
could use this recommendation to invoke its existing deferral power under Article 53 of the Statute.  
219 AU Executive Council, Report January 2010, p. 20. Note that after the ASP, the Secretary-General received a letter from 
the Permanent Representative of Namibia to the UN communicating to him the decision of the Government of Namibia to co-
sponsor the proposed amendment to Article 16. 
220 Ibid. p. 20-21, paras. 10-11.   
221 Ibid. Several commentators have expressed similar concerns. See, for example Kurt Mills, ‘Bashir is Dividing Us: Africa 
and the International Criminal Court’ (2012) 34 Human Rights Quarterly 429 (arguing that the amendment would likely 
politicize the ICC even more and make its actions even more uncertain’). Contra William A. Schabas, ‘African Union 
Amendment to Article 16 of Rome Statute Analysed’, Human Rights Doctorate, 31 October 2010 (‘I don’t see why making 
the politicisation of the Court more democratic by involving the General Assembly, aggravates a problem’); Schabas, 
‘Introduction’, p. 186; Gevers, ‘SA’s bold proposal shows up the flaws in the Rome compromise’.  
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and that Article 16 is ‘a unique solution designed to reflect the special role of the UN Security Council’ 
and that an ‘expansion of that ... carefully crafted negotiation ... would not serve the interests of the 
Court’.222  
 At the end of the ASP’s meeting, it was decided that the AU’s proposed amendment could be 
discussed after the Review Conference.223 During the next annual meeting of the ASP (in late 2010), 
there was, however, no debate on this matter.224 Instead, the ASP decided that it would first organize 
informal consultations to discuss this amendment, among others, in the context of a newly established 
working group on amendments.225 In response to this decision, the AU Assembly called in February 
2011 upon all African states parties to co-sponsor the amendment and to ensure that the AU’s proposal 
would be ‘properly addressed during the forthcoming negotiations’.226 From the available reports of the 
working group, it appears, however, that these negotiations did not take place. The 2011 report of the 
working group discussed the consideration of several other amendments, but did not contain any 
information on the AU’s proposal (apart from listing it in an annex).227 Later reports of the working 
group indicate that the proposal was also not addressed during its subsequent meetings in 2012 and 
2013.228 
                                                          
222 AU Executive Council, Report January 2010, paras. 10-11. Verduzco noted in this regard that the AU’s proposal associates 
the possibility of a deferral ‘with claims of legitimacy in decision-making’. In her opinion, this approach sits uneasily with the 
function of Article 16, which would not be to ‘judge the necessity of action by ‘democratic’ methods’, but to assess certain 
‘factual criteria, namely the existence of a threat to international peace’. Verduzco, ‘ICC and Security Council’, p. 58.  
223 ASP, Resolution ICC-ASP/8/Res.6, 26 November 2009, para. 4.   
224 Note that there was a stocktaking exercise during the Review Conference on peace and justice, but that the proposed 
amendment to Article 16 and the use of the Council’s deferral power was not considered there. See ASP, Stocktaking of 
international criminal justice - peace and justice (moderator’s summary), RC/11, annex V(b), 7 June 2010.  
225 See AU Assembly, Decision January 2011, para. 8. Note that this is not mentioned in the ASP’s general resolution: ASP, 
Resolution ICC-ASP/9/Res.1, 10 December 2010.   
226 AU Assembly, Decision January 2011, paras. 8-9.  
227 ASP, Report on the Working Group on Amendments, ICC-ASP/10/32, 9 December 2011.   
228 ASP, Report on the Working Group on Amendments, ICC-ASP/11/36, 13 November 2012; ASP, Report on the Working 
Group on Amendments, ICC-ASP/12/44, 24 October 2013.   
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 For a while, this seemed to be the end of the proposed amendment to Article 16.229 Yet, in late 
2013, the AU’s campaign against the trials of Kenyatta and Ruto, and especially the Council’s negative 
decision on the AU’s deferral request under Article 16 gave new momentum to the proposal. In response 
to threats of an African ‘mass withdrawal’ from the ICC,230 the ASP agreed to organise an interactive 
dialogue on the AU’s peace concerns under the title ‘Indictment of sitting Heads of State and 
Government and its consequences on peace and stability and reconciliation’.231 In the context of this 
special segment and the AU’s diplomatic efforts to seek a ‘solution’ for the trials of Kenyatta and Ruto, 
African states submitted a list of possible amendments to the Rome Statute and the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, including two possible amendments to Article 16.232  
 The first amendment was the same as the one formally submitted by South Africa in 2009, 
proposing to give the General Assembly the power to defer the Court’s proceedings for those situations 
in which the Council would fail to act on a deferral request. In addition, during the public debate of the 
2013 meeting of the ASP, Nigeria introduced a second possible amendment to Article 16. This proposal 
stipulates that the ASP itself could be vested with the power to grant a request for a deferral ‘especially 
where the circumstances prevalent in the concerned state are grave and serious but may fall short of the 
                                                          
229 Note that the AU and most of its member states remained silent on the amendment as well. The decisions of the AU 
Assembly in 2012 and 2013 did not refer explicitly to the proposed amendment, neither did the statements of African states on 
the ICC in the UNSC, the UNGA and the ASP. The only exception was the statement of Namibia in ASP, General Debate 
2012.  
230 Statement of New Zealand in ASP, General Debate 2013. See also the statements of Australia, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Jordan (also on behalf of Liechtenstein), Lithuania (on 
behalf of the EU), Luxembourg, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Trinidad & Tobago and the US.   
231 On the background and structure of the special segment, see ASP, Recommendation by the Bureau for the inclusion of an 
additional item in the agenda of the twelfth session of the [ASP], ICC-ASP/12/1/Add.2, 18 November 2013. See also ASP, 
Special segment as requested by the African Union: ‘Indictment of sitting Heads of State and Government and its consequences 
on peace and stability and reconciliation’ - Informal summary by the Moderator, ICC-ASP/12/61, 27 November 2013. 
232 See annex II.  
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threshold required by [the Council] to act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter’.233 This second proposal, 
which was not formally submitted to the Secretary-General, should be understood as a direct response 
to the Council’s debate on the deferral request for Kenyatta and Ruto, in which several states argued 
that the request did not fulfil the requirements of Article 16, because the Court’s involvement should by 
itself constitute a threat to the peace in the sense of Article 39 of the UN Charter. It is in those situations, 
according to Nigeria, that the ASP could play a role in balancing the interests of peace and 
prosecution.234  
 During its 2013 meeting, the ASP eventually decided to amend the rules on presence at trial to 
accommodate the AU’s concerns about the trials of Kenyatta and Ruto.235 Moreover, the ASP invited 
the working group on amendments ‘to continue its consideration of amendment proposals, including all 
proposed amendments submitted prior to the Review Conference and those submitted following the 
decision by the Extraordinary Summit of the [AU] held on 12 October 2013’.236  
 After the ASP’s meeting, the proposal on the potential deferral power of the General Assembly 
was indeed discussed by the working group on amendments.237 During the respective meetings, South 
Africa provided ‘further information’ on the proposal, and according to the 2014 report of the working 
group, there was agreement among its members that the amendment raised ‘numerous questions notably 
                                                          
233 Statement of Nigeria in ASP, General Debate 2013.  For a discussion of the feasibility of this proposal, see Dapo Akande, 
Max du Plessis and Charles Chernor Jalloh, ‘Position Paper - An African expert study on the African Union concerns about 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the ICC’, ISS Africa, 2010, pp. 17-18.  
234 Legally speaking such an amendment would be permissible if it would somehow acknowledge the Council’s primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  
235 The adopted amendments are discussed in chapter 4.  
236 ASP, ICC-ASP/12/Res.8, 27 November 2013, p. 66, para. 12.  
237 The amendment to Article 16, as initially introduced by South Africa was discussed by the working group in meetings on 
20 May 2014 and 5 November 2014. Note that the AU Assembly decided in January 2014 that ‘African States parties should 
comply with African Union Decisions on the ICC and continue to speak with one voice to ensure that the African proposals 
for amendments to Articles 16 and 27 of the Rome Statute of the ICC are considered by the ASP working Group on amendments 
as well as by the forthcoming sessions of the [ASP]’. AU Assembly, Decision January 2014, para. 12.  
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with regard to the relationship between the organs of the [UN] as well as on the relationship between 
the Court and the [UN] ... and that further discussions would be necessary’.238 However, the available 
reports indicate that no further discussions took place in the context of the working group in 2015 and 
2016.239 In the absence of political urgency, it appears that the Court’s states parties remain reluctant to 
debate let along adopt an amendment on the potential deferral power of the General Assembly.  
 In sum, the AU’s proposal to amend Article 16 might be feasible from a legal point of view, but 
it lacks the necessary support in the ASP. If the amendment were to be accepted the General Assembly 
would only be able to use this provision when the Council is not actively considering the initial deferral 
request and only if this request would be rejected by the Council because of lack of unanimity of the 
permanent members. For the time being, however, it seems very unlikely that the ASP will be able to 
agree on this amendment or on any other alternative deferral mechanism. Despite repeated calls of the 
AU and of African states parties to the ICC to amend Article 16,240 most other members of the ASP 
remain extremely reluctant to broaden the Court’s current deferral regime.241  
 
V. Conclusion: The ICC’s Dysfunctional Deferral Regime   
This chapter examined how the Security Council, the Prosecutor and the ASP have responded to the 
AU’s peace concerns about the prosecution and trial of sitting Heads of State. From the decisions of the 
AU and the statements of individual African states it is clear that these concerns have mainly been 
                                                          
238 ASP, Report of the Working Group on Amendments, ICC-ASP/13/31, 7 December 2014, para. 9.   
239 The 2015 and 2016 reports only state that ‘no further updates were provided by South Africa concerning its proposal during 
the inter-sessional period’. ASP, Report of the Working Group on Amendments, ICC-ASP/14/34, 16 November 2015, para. 
17; ASP, Report of the Working Group on Amendments, ICC-ASP/15/24, 8 November 2016, para. 19. 
240 The AU Assembly recalled its amendment proposal to Articles 16 and 27 in January 2015. Furthermore, the AU Assembly 
expressed ‘its concerns on the failure by the ASP to consider the concerns and proposals for amendments …during the 13th 
Session of the ASP held in ... December 2014’. See AU Assembly, Decision January 2015, paras. 10-11. See also the statements 
of Lesotho (on behalf of the African states parties to the ICC), Namibia and Uganda in ASP, General Debate 2014.   
241 With deferral ‘regime’, I refer to the rules on when or how the Court’s proceedings can be suspended.  
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directed at the Security Council. The AU and its member states asked the Council on numerous 
occasions to defer the prosecution of al-Bashir and to delay the cases against Kenyatta and Ruto. The 
Council so far refused to grant any of these requests. It did not take a decision on the proposed deferral 
for al-Bashir and voted down the deferral bid for Kenyatta and Ruto.  
 A first reason why the AU’s deferral requests failed to obtain support from the Council is that 
some of the Court’s states parties have tried to encapsulate the use of the Council’s deferral power. 
These states have argued that a deferral can only be considered when the continuation of the Court’s 
proceedings poses by itself a threat to the peace in the sense of Article 39 of the Charter, and even then, 
only when there are absolutely no alternatives to accommodate this threat.  
 In my opinion, such calls for a ‘strict interpretation’ of Article 16 are unconvincing in light of 
the text and drafting history of this provision.242 Neither the Statute nor the Charter specifies under what 
kind of circumstances the Council should suspend an investigation or prosecution. There is no legal 
requirement for the Council to issue a deferral and so the validity of the Council’s responses to the AU’s 
deferral requests cannot be contested. Still, the ‘legal’ arguments that some states have made against the 
use of Article 16 should be strongly rejected. Most importantly, it should be stressed that the reference 
in Article 16 to Chapter VII does not limit the Council’s deferral power to the extent that the Council 
can only issue a deferral when an investigation or prosecution poses by itself a threat to the peace. There 
is no legal basis for such a limitation to the Council’s wide discretion to determine that a certain situation 
constitutes a threat to the peace and to decide on the appropriate measures to address this threat.   
 A second reason why the AU’s deferral requests were opposed by the Council as a whole is that 
there is no agreement among its members on when or how Article 16 should be employed. The available 
statements demonstrate that the members of the Council have very different ideas not only on the 
interpretation but also on the application of this provision, especially when it comes to the kind of 
circumstances that could justify a deferral. To put it bluntly, perhaps except for a situation in which the 
US would pressure the Council to adopt a deferral (as in the case of Resolutions 1422 and 1487), no 
                                                          
242 See the statements of Argentina and Luxembourg in UNSC, S/PV.7060, 15 November 2013.  
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deferral request may ever succeed to convince a majority of the Council. The views among the 
permanent and non-permanent members of the Council on how to use Article 16 are so far apart that the 
Council will not likely be able to agree on any deferral request.  
 Because of the Council’s limited response to the AU’s deferral requests, several states and 
commentators have suggested that other actors within and outside the Court could play a role in 
mediating the interests of peace and prosecution. Firstly, it has been argued that the Prosecutor may 
consider to defer an investigation or prosecution in the interests of peace. The Prosecutor would always 
have this discretion under Article 53 of the Statute. Secondly, the AU has asked for an amendment to 
Article 16. As introduced by South Africa to the ASP in late 2009, this amendment would give the UN 
General Assembly the authority to suspend the Court’s proceedings when the Council fails to decide on 
a deferral request within six months of its submission. 
 Legally speaking, both proposals are defendable. The first proposal is in accordance with the 
current formulation of Article 53. Based on the text and especially the direct context of the interests of 
justice element, the most convincing interpretation is that Article 53 gives the Prosecutor a broad 
discretion to consider all possible circumstances, including the interests of peace. The second proposal 
requires an amendment to the Statute. This amendment is probably in accordance with the UN Charter 
and would allow the General Assembly to issue a deferral when the Council is not actively considering 
the initial deferral request and when this request has been rejected by the Council because of lack of 
unanimity of the permanent members.  
 For the time being, however, the Prosecutor and the ASP oppose both proposals for an 
alternative deferral mechanism. Like her predecessor, Fatou Bensouda has argued that her Office cannot 
address the demands of peace or any other political considerations. In her view, the interests of justice, 
as embedded in Article 53, should ‘not be confused with the interests of peace and security’, which falls 
within ‘the mandate of other institutions, such as the UN Security Council’.243  
                                                          
243 OTP, Key note address Mrs. Fatou Bensouda - International justice and diplomacy partnering for peace and international 
security, 20 March 2013, p. 3.  
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 In a related fashion, the ASP has long ignored the AU’s peace concerns and the proposed 
amendment to Article 16. Only in November 2013, when the possibility of a mass withdrawal of African 
states became a serious threat, the ASP decided to organize an interactive dialogue on the matter. 
Following this special segment, there have been some low-level discussions in the ASP’s working group 
on amendments about the proposed revision of Article 16. Yet, nothing concrete has emerged from these 
discussions so far. This has led the AU Assembly to express its frustration about the ‘failure’ of the ASP 
to debate ‘the concerns and proposals for amendments by the AU’.244 
 Taken together, the responses of the Prosecutor and the ASP highlight that under the existing 
deferral regime of the ICC, the Security Council forms the primary forum to address peace concerns. 
The Prosecutor (by explicitly saying so) and the ASP (by staying more or less silent on the matter) have 
outsourced the peace concerns of the AU to the Council. From a strategic point of view, this reluctance 
of the Prosecutor and the ASP to become involved with deferral politics is understandable. The 
Prosecutor seeks to legitimize the OTP by depoliticizing its decision-making as much as possible, and 
the majority of the ASP perceives formal changes to the ICC’s deferral regime as inexpedient, because 
this amounts to a revision of one of the most politically controversial aspects of the Court’s legal 
framework. 
 Yet, there are, from a legal point of view, good reasons to question the manner in which the 
Prosecutor and the ASP have responded to the AU’s peace concerns. What their responses ultimately 
foreshadow is that there is no realistic alternative when the Council fails to agree on a deferral request 
to the Security Council. Intentionally or not, the Council is now not just the primary, but also the only 
forum that can addresses matters of peace and security in relation to the ICC. This means that there 
might not be a follow-up to peace concerns when the Council is too divided to make a decision, as 
happened with the AU’s deferral request for al-Bashir, or when the Council rejects a deferral bid, as in 
the case of Kenyatta and Ruto.  
                                                          
244 AU Assembly, Decision January 2015, para. 9.  
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 Some will argue that this is for the best, because the Council should not intervene in the Court’s 
proceedings anyway or because the long-term interests of prosecution should always trump the short-
term demands of peace. From a legal point of view, however, it is important to emphasize, that the 
Statute recognizes that there might be situations in which prosecution does not serve the interests of 
justice (Article 53) or in which the Council has to intervene (Article 16). Cleary, the drafters of the 
Statute did not agree on the kind of circumstances that could justify a deferral either from the Council 
or from the Prosecutor, as is illustrated by the open character of the relevant provisions. Yet, they did 
envision that the Court would have a functioning deferral regime, thereby allowing for a certain level of 
flexibility and pragmatism in addressing the possible peace concerns of states parties. 
 In short, the responses of the Council, the Prosecutor and the ASP demonstrate that the Council 
is de facto the only actor with the power to defer an investigation or prosecution in the undefined 
interests of peace. The Prosecutor has refused to address any political considerations in her decision-
making, and the ASP has proven reluctant to debate, let alone adopt, the proposed amendment of Article 
16. Furthermore, the responses of the Council to the AU’s deferral requests indicate that there is no 
agreement on the interpretation and application of Article 16, and that it is unlikely that the Council will 
be able to agree on any deferral request in the foreseeable future. Taking all this into account, the ICC’s 
deferral regime can be qualified as ‘dysfunctional’. At this point in time, the interpretation and 
application of the rules on when or how the Court’s proceedings can be suspended are not characterized 
by flexibility and pragmatism, but by competing views on how the Council, the Court and its states 







Immunity from Arrest for Sitting Heads of State1 
 
One of the most debated questions in international law is whether Heads of State and other state officials 
can be held responsible for crimes committed in their official capacity.2 On the one hand, it is well-
established that states and their official representatives possess certain immunities from the jurisdiction 
of other states, including immunity from prosecution and arrest. These ‘old’ rules of international law 
are based on notions of state sovereignty and sovereign equality and seek to guarantee, inter alia, that 
states do not use their jurisdiction to interfere with the affairs of other states. On the other hand, states 
have authorized international courts to prosecute state officials for international crimes. The rules and 
principles of this relatively ‘new’ branch of international law are based on demands of human rights and 
seek to advance, inter alia, the rights of victims of gross human rights violations.3   
 In the debate on the criminal responsibility of Heads of State and other state officials, the ICC 
is generally seen as an example of the second branch of international law. One of the most heralded 
provisions of the Rome Statute is Article 27, which provides that the official capacity of a person shall 
not exempt this person from ‘criminal responsibility’ and that immunities ‘shall not bar the Court from 
exercising its jurisdiction’. The Statute also embeds rules, however, of the first branch of international 
                                                          
1 The initial version of this chapter was completed in May 2016. I have updated the chapter in August 2017 to include the 
decision of PTC II on al-Bashir’s visit to South Africa. Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-302), Decision under article 87(7) of the 
Rome Statute on the non-compliance by South Africa with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender of Omar Al-
Bashir, 6 July 2017; Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-302-Anx), Minority Opinion of Judge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, 6 July 
2017.  
2 See generally Hazel Fox and Philippa Webb, The Law of State Immunity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3d edition, 2013); 
Rosanne Van Alebeek, The Immunity of States and Their Officials in International Criminal Law and International Human 
Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Arthur Watts, ‘The legal position in international law of Heads of States, 
Heads of Governments and foreign ministers’ (1994) 247 Recueil des cours 9-130. 
3 As explained by Dapo Akande, ‘International Law Immunities and the International Criminal Court’ (2004) 98 American 
Journal of International Law 407. 
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law, which seeks to protect the demands of state sovereignty and sovereign equality. The Statute 
explicitly recognizes that rules of state and diplomatic immunity can sometimes limit the Court in the 
exercise of its legal powers. Most notably, Article 98(1) states that the Court ‘may not proceed with a 
request for surrender or assistance’ when this requires a state to violate its international obligations to 
accord state or diplomatic immunities to the officials of other states.4 Simply put, the ICC’s immunity 
regime is a product of both modern and more traditional rules of international law.   
 It is on the basis of the ‘older’ rules that are embedded in the ICC’s immunity regime that the 
AU and individual African states have claimed that President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan enjoys immunity 
from arrest as sitting Head of State. Following the warrant for his arrest issued by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber,5 the AU Assembly decided in July 2009 that its member states should not cooperate with the 
ICC on the arrest and surrender of al-Bashir.6 In this decision, the Assembly did not contest that the 
Court has jurisdiction to prosecute the Sudanese President. Although Sudan is not a party to the Statute, 
the AU (implicitly) accepted that by referring the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor the Court has 
obtained the power to prosecute President al-Bashir.7 What the AU did challenge, however, is that the 
Court has the power to oblige its states parties to cooperate with the arrest of al-Bashir. According to 
the Assembly’s decision, the Sudanese President still enjoys immunity from arrest under customary 
                                                          
4 Some commentators have questioned whether Article 98(1) covers the immunities of sitting Heads of State. This chapter 
departs from the assumption that the reference in Article 98(1) to ‘state immunity or diplomatic immunity of a person’ includes 
the immunities of sitting Heads of State. For further discussion on this issue, see part II(B) in this chapter.  
5 Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-3), Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir, 3 March 2009. Note that a second warrant was issued against al-Bashir for genocide in July 2010. Al-Bashir 
(ICC-02/05-01/09-94), Second Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, 12 July 2010.  
6 AU Assembly, Decision on the Meeting of African states parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII), 1-3 July 2009, para. 10. As discussed in chapter 2, the AU’s decision was also a reaction to the 
refusal of the Security Council to issue a deferral under Article 16 of the Statute. 
7 This was also acknowledged by South Africa and other states parties that welcomed al-Bashir on their territory. As noted in 
ICC South Africa Decision (2017), para. 69.  
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international law and Article 98(1) precludes the Court from obliging its states parties to violate his 
immunity as sitting Head of State.  
 The AU’s claim that al-Bashir possesses immunity from arrest became of particular relevance 
after 2010, when several African states parties ignored the ICC’s warrant for al-Bashir’s arrest by 
welcoming the Sudanese President on their territory.8 From a legal point of view, these state visits 
brought attention to ‘complex and delicate’ questions about the ICC’s immunity regime, and especially 
about the interpretation and application of Article 98(1).9 When and how can states parties invoke this 
provision? How should the Court treat the officials of a non-party who are subject to the Court’s 
jurisdiction through a Security Council referral? Are these immunities somehow removed by the 
Council’s referral or can states parties still invoke Article 98(1) to refuse cooperation with the arrest of 
a sitting Head of State like al-Bashir?   
 This chapter examines the different responses of the Court’s pre-trial chambers to the AU’s 
claim that al-Bashir enjoys immunity from arrest. The decisions of the Court’s judges on al-Bashir’s 
numerous visits to African states parties are analysed against the background of the debate among states 
and commentators on the criminal responsibility of sitting Heads of State under the ICC’s immunity 
regime and international law more generally. In the context of this debate, scholars have voiced very 
different opinions on whether al-Bashir possesses immunity from arrest.10 Some commentators have 
argued that there exists an exception under customary international law for the prosecution by an 
                                                          
8 Between 2010 and August 2017, al-Bashir visited nine different states parties (Chad, Kenya, Djibouti, Malawi, Nigeria, the 
DRC, South Africa, Uganda and most recently Jordan). For references, see parts III and IV of this chapter.  
9 As characterized by Manuel J. Ventura, ‘Escape from Johannesburg?: Sudanese President al-Bashir Visits South Africa, and 
the Implicit Removal of Head of State Immunity by the UN Security Council in light of Al-Jedda’ (2015) 13 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 1025.  
10 See generally Dov Jacobs, ‘The Frog that Wanted to be an Ox - The ICC’s Approach to Immunities and Cooperation’, in 




international court,11 or that the Security Council has somehow removed al-Bashir’s immunity.12 Others, 
however, have taken the position that Article 98(1) can still form an obstacle to the arrest and surrender 
of al-Bashir.13 In light of these competing views, this chapter seeks to assess whether the Court’s 
                                                          
11 This is the position taken by PTC I in the Chad and Malawi decisions (2011). For references, see parts II and III of this 
chapter. See generally Amnesty International, ‘Bringing Power to Justice - Absence of Immunity for Heads of State before the 
International Criminal Court’, 2010, 17-30. 
12 This chapter will explain that there are two different ways to argue that the Security Council has removed al-Bashir’s 
immunity. One approach, which I will call the Statute-based approach, argues that the Security Council’s referral has placed 
Sudan in a similar position as a state party. This first approach was recently adopted by PTC II in the South Africa decision 
(2017). The second approach, which I will call the Charter-based approach, argues that the Security Council has implicitly 
waived al-Bashir’s immunity by obliging Sudan under the UN Charter to cooperate fully with the Court. This second approach 
was followed by PTC II in the DRC decision (2014). See generally Dapo Akande, ‘The Legal Nature of Security Council 
Referrals to the ICC and its Impact on Al Bashir’s Immunities’ (2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice 333-352; 
Dapo Akande, ‘ICC Issues Detailed Decision on Bashir’s Immunity (…At long Last…) But Gets the Law Wrong’, EJIL Talk, 
15 December 2011;  Nerina Boschiero, ‘The ICC Judicial Finding on Non-cooperation Against the DRC and No Immunity for 
al-Bashir Based on UNSC Resolution 1593’ (2015) 13 Journal of International Criminal Justice 625-653; Liu Daqun, in 
Morten Bergsmo and Ling Yan (eds.), State Sovereignty and International Law (Beijing: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 
2012), pp. 55-74; Claus Kreβ, ‘The International Criminal Court and Immunities under International Law for States Not Party 
to the Court’s Statute’, in Bergsmo and Yan, State Sovereignty and International Law, pp. 223-265; Sophie Papillon, ‘Has the 
United Nations Security Council Implicitly Removed Al Bashir’s Immunity?’ (2010) 10 International Criminal Law Review 
275-288; Ventura, ‘Escape from Johannesburg?’, 995-1025; Erika de Wet, ‘The implications of President Al-Bashir’s Visit to 
South Africa for International and Domestic Law’ (2015) 13 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1049-1071; Lentner, 
Gabriel, ‘Why the ICC won’t get it right - The Legal Nature of UN Security Council Referrals and Al-Bashir Immunities’, 
EJIL Talk, 24 July 2017.  
13 See Paola Gaeta, ‘Does President Al Bashir Enjoy Immunity from Arrest?’ (2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice 
315-332; André de Hoogh and Abel S. Knottnerus, ‘ICC Issues New Decision on al-Bashir’s Immunities ‒ But Gets the Law 
Wrong … Again’, EJIL Talk, 18 April 2014; Paola Gaeta, ‘The ICC Changes Its Mind on the Immunity from Arrest of President 
Al Bashir, But It Is Wrong Again’, Opinio juris, 23 April 2014. See also Michiel Blommestijn and Cedric Ryngaert, ‘Exploring 
the Obligations for States to Act upon the ICC’s Arrest Warrant for Omar Al-Bashir - A Legal Conflict between the Duty to 
Arrest and the Customary Status of Head of State Immunity’ (2010) 6 Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 428-




decisions on al-Bashir’s immunity are based on a convincing interpretation of the Court’s legal 
framework and international law more generally.  
 Parts I and II provide an overview of the existing debate on the immunities of sitting Heads of 
State before international courts in general, and the ICC in particular. The purpose of this overview is 
to introduce the different positions in this debate, rather than to explain my own views on how the 
relevant rules and provisions should be interpreted. Parts III and IV summarize the Court’s jurisprudence 
on the immunity of al-Bashir, and underscore the differences between the Chamber’s various decisions. 
This summary will show that while the Court’s pre-trial chambers have consistently argued that the 
Sudanese President does not enjoy immunity from arrest, their decisions have provided different 
arguments for why Article 98(1) does not apply in the case of al-Bashir. Part V analyses the reasoning 
of the Chamber in its most recent decisions on al-Bashir’s visits to the DRC and South Africa.14 The 
purpose of this analysis is to assess the different approaches that the Court has employed in these 
decisions and to weigh the different arguments that scholars have advanced in support of the Chamber’s 
approaches. Finally, part VI questions whether the Court’s pre-trial chambers have left any ambiguity 
or uncertainty about the obligation of states parties to arrest al-Bashir, and considers ways for the Court 
and its states parties to clarify the ICC’s rules on immunity in general and the matter of al-Bashir’s 
immunity in particular.  
                                                          
14 On the decision of PTC II on South Africa’s non-cooperation (July 2017), see inter alia: Dov Jacobs, ‘Does South Africa 
have an obligation to arrest and surrender Bashir to the ICC? No’, Spreading the Jam, 14 June 2015; Jens Ohlin, ‘More thoughts 
on al-Bashir, Sudan, and South Africa, Opinio juris, 17 June 2015; Asad Kiyani, ‘Exploring Legal Rationales for South Africa’s 
Failure to Arrest al-Bashir’, Opinio juris, 18 June 2015; Dire Tladi, ‘The Duty on South Africa to Arrest al-Bashir under South 
African and International Law: A Perspective from International Law’ (2015) 13 Journal of International Criminal Justice 
1027-1047; Ventura, ‘Escape from Johannesburg?’, 995-1025; De Wet, ‘Implications of Al-Bashir’s Visit to South Africa’, 
1049-1071; Dapo Akande, ‘South African Withdrawal from the International Criminal Court - Does the ICC Statute Lead to 
Violations of Other International Obligations?’, EJIL Talk, 22 October 2016; Niko Pavlopoulos, ‘South Africa’s Withdrawal: 
A Lesson Learned?’, EJIL Talk, 6 December 2016;  Dov Jacobs, ‘The ICC and immunities, Round 326: ICC finds that South 
Africa had an obligation to arrest Bashir but no referral to the UNSC’, Spreading the Jam, 6 July 2017.  
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I. Immunities of Sitting Heads of State before International Courts  
In recent years, the status of immunities under international law has been at the heart of two judgments 
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ),15 and has been one of the main topics that the International 
Law Commission (ILC) has worked on (since 2007).16 The ICJ’s judgments and the discussions in the 
ILC have sparked a lot of debate on the scope of both civil and criminal immunities. From this debate, 
it is clear that much remains contested about the international law of immunities in general, and about 
the immunities of sitting Heads of State (and Government) in particular.  
 What most commentators agree upon, however, is that the immunities of sitting Heads of State 
are closely related to the rules of state immunity. It is well established that the immunities of sitting 
Heads of State are similar to state immunity, in the sense that they are both based on notions of the 
sovereign equality of states and that they are designed to assist states in maintaining their horizontal 
relations with other states.17 The immunities of sitting Heads of State may be understood as a sub-
category of state immunity. The scope of the immunities of sitting Heads of State differs from the scope 
of state immunity, but the first set of immunities is of necessity part of the second, because the 
immunities of sitting Heads of State belong to states and not to the person taking up an official position.   
                                                          
15 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), Judgment, [2012] ICJ Rep 99; Arrest Warrant 
of 11 April 2000 (DRC v. Belgium), Judgment, [2002] ICJ Rep 3. Note that the international law of immunities was also 
addressed in Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France), Judgment, [2008] ICJ Rep 422; 
Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (United States v. Iran), Judgment, [1981] ICJ Rep 
1981, p. 45. Further note that the international law of immunities will likely be addressed in two upcoming cases: ICJ, Press 
Release (No. 2016/38) - Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v. France), 7 December 2016; ICJ, Press 
Release (No. 2016/19) - Iran institutes proceedings against the United States with regard to a dispute concerning alleged 
violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, 15 June 2016. 
16 The topic of immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction has been on the agenda of the ILC since 2007. For 
an overview of the ILC’s consideration of this topic, see ILC Special Rapporteur Hernández, Fourth report on the immunity of 
State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, A/CN.4/686, 29 May 2015, paras. 1-14. 
17 Akande, ‘International Law Immunities and the ICC’, 415-416. 
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 It is also widely accepted that the immunities that state officials possess under international law 
have at least one of three purposes, that is: (A) to prevent states from using their civil and criminal 
jurisdiction to undermine the public acts of foreign states; (B) to protect individual office holders as 
representatives of their state; and/or (C) to ‘guarantee the proper functioning’ of international relations.18 
With respect to these three different purposes, scholars also commonly distinguish personal from 
functional immunities.  
 On the one hand, personal immunities (ratione personae) are attached to an official position and 
only apply for the period that a person fulfils that position. This type of immunities can solely be relied 
upon for incumbent officials, and has (C) the proper functioning of international relations as its primary 
objective.19 On the other hand, functional immunities (ratione materiae) are attached to official acts, 
and may be relied upon by both serving and former officials.20 These immunities are aimed (B) at 
protecting individual office holders from being held responsible for acts that were essentially those of 
their state and further have to ensure (A) that states cannot undermine the public acts of foreign states 
by circumventing the immunities of these states through the prosecution of persons who act(ed) on their 
behalf.  
A. Waiving and removing immunities  
Both personal and functional immunities are intended to protect states as well as the individuals through 
which states act. By their very nature, however, these immunities do not belong to individuals; they 
                                                          
18 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (DRC v. Belgium), Joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, 
[2002], ICJ Rep 75.   
19 Note that Akande and Shah also refer to ‘symbolic sovereignty’ and the ‘principle of non-intervention’ as further 
justifications for the existence of personal immunities. Dapo Akande and Sangeeta Shah, ‘Immunities of State Officials, 
International Crimes, and Foreign Domestic Courts’ (2010) 21 European Journal of International Law 824-825. 
20 See Van Alebeek, ‘The Immunity of States and Their Officials’, p. 2. 
 122 
 
belong to states. It is because of the state that an act or position becomes ‘official’. What follows from 
this legal ontology is that under international law a state possesses the authority to waive immunities.21  
 Theoretically speaking, a state can waive immunities in at least two ways. First of all, a state 
can voluntarily waive immunities on ‘a case-by-case basis’. A state can, for example, waive the 
immunities of a specific individual official to enable his or her prosecution by an international or a 
foreign domestic court. Alternatively, waivers can be given on a ‘permanent basis’. A state can reach an 
agreement which waives the immunities of its officials when they commit particular crimes. Article 27 
of the Statute has, for example, be interpreted as a permanent waiver by which states have derogated 
from the international law of immunities. This provision recognizes that immunities attached to the 
official capacity of a person under international or domestic law will not bar the ICC from exercising its 
jurisdiction over that person.22   
 Apart from having the authority to voluntarily waive immunities, a state may be subject to an 
obligation to waive certain immunities under international law and, in exceptional situations, immunities 
may even be removed by an international organisation. Three scenarios must be distinguished. First of 
all, a state may have a ‘legal obligation to waive its immunities’ (an obliged waiver). This is the case 
when there is a treaty provision or a rule of customary international law to that effect,23 or if an 
                                                          
21 As Special Rapporteur Kolodkin stated, ‘immunity does not belong to the individual official but to the official’s state. 
Consequently, only the state can legally invoke the immunity of its officials. The same logic applies to the waiver of immunity’. 
ILC Special Rapporteur Kolodkin, Third report on immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, A/CN.4/646, 
24 May 2011, para. 33. 
22 For references, see part II(A) of this chapter. It has also been argued that the Genocide Convention provides a permanent 
waiver of immunity for the prosecution of genocide charges. See Minority Opinion of Judge de Brichambaut, paras. 20-37.  
23 For example, Article 4 (section 14) of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations states that 
‘Privileges and immunities are accorded to the representatives of Members not for the personal benefit of the individuals 
themselves, but in order to safeguard the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the United Nations. 
Consequently a Member not only has the right but is under a duty to waive the immunity of its representative in any case where 
in the opinion of the Member the immunity would impede the course of justice, and it can be waived without prejudice to the 
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international organisation has the authority to oblige a state to waive these immunities.24 Second of all, 
an international organisation may have the power to actually waive the immunities of a state. This 
second situation can be described as a ‘removal of immunities’ (sometimes also called an imposed 
waiver). It is the international organisation that removes the immunities instead of the state itself. 
Finally, the rules on immunities under customary international law may develop in a new direction, 
leading to a ‘disappearance of immunities’. Theoretically speaking, immunities that exist today can 
disappear in the future, in the sense that they have no longer any legal relevance. Developments in state 
practice and opinio juris may change the scope of existing immunities or even their legal ontology, 
which may in turn also have implications for the different ways in which the relevant immunities can be 
waived or removed.25  
B. The ICJ’s obiter dictum in the Arrest Warrant Case  
This study focusses on the prosecution and trial of sitting Heads of State by the ICC, and as such on 
prosecution by an international court rather than a domestic one. Nonetheless, it should be noted that 
existing jurisprudence has hardly ever disputed that sitting Heads of State are entitled to personal 
immunities before the courts of foreign states.26 These immunities apply regardless of whether a Head 
of State is accused of international crimes. As the ICJ ruled in the Arrest Warrant case, the (personal) 
immunities of sitting Heads of State and certain other high-level officials cover all their official and 
private acts.27 Moreover, these immunities are not only violated if a foreign state arrests the concerned 
                                                          
purpose for which the immunity is accorded’ (emphasis added). The Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations, 13 February 1946, UN Treaty Series, Volume 1, p. 15. 
24 For example, it has been argued that the UN Security Council is in certain situations authorized to obliged states to waive 
immunities. For further discussion on this matter, see part V(B) in this chapter.   
25 This chapter applies the terminology of the waiver, removal and disappearance of immunities as consistently as possible. It 
should be noted, however, that in the literature and the relevant judicial decisions, these terms are sometimes used in a different 
manner. 
26 For a brief overview of the relevant jurisprudence, see Akande and Shah, ‘Immunities of State Officials’, 819-820. See 
generally Van Alebeek, ‘The Immunity of States and Their Officials’, pp. 159-199.  
27 DRC v. Belgium, paras. 55, 70-71. 
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officials, but also if a state issues and circulates a warrant of arrest or takes any other action ‘that would 
hinder [them] in the performance of [their] duties’.28 The scope of the personal immunities of Heads of 
State before foreign courts is thus effectively considered to be absolute.29  
 The reason why it is important to point this out, even though this study is not concerned with 
domestic prosecution, is that the same cannot be said about the prosecution of sitting Heads of State by 
an international court. Indeed, the ‘availability of immunity as a shield [is] more limited before an 
international court’.30 In its obiter dictum in the Arrest Warrant case, the ICJ acknowledged as much 
when it stated that ‘in certain circumstances’ the immunities of sitting Heads of State and other state 
officials ‘do not represent a bar to criminal jurisdiction’ and referred in support to ‘certain international 
criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction’.31 In this part of the ruling, the ICJ indicated that in 
contrast to their domestic counterparts, certain international courts are, at least ‘in certain 
circumstances’, authorized to prosecute sitting Heads of State.  
 However, the difficulty with the ICJ’s obiter dictum is that it can be interpreted in very different 
ways. The most progressive view is that the ICJ’s obiter dictum points to an exception under customary 
international law and that the immunities of Heads of State and other high-level officials are completely 
irrelevant before an international court like the ICC.32 Yet, there are reasons to question whether this is 
how the ICJ’s ruling should be understood.33  
                                                          
28 Ibid. para. 54. See also Djibouti v. France, para. 170. 
29 The scope of functional immunities for international crimes before national courts is less clear. See generally Van Alebeek, 
‘The Immunity of States and Their Officials’, pp. 103-157.    
30 As quoted from: Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (DRC v. Belgium), Joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans 
and Buergenthal, [2002], ICJ Rep 75.   
31 DRC v. Belgium, para. 61. See generally Van Alebeek, ‘The Immunity of States and Their Officials’, pp. 158-199.  
32 This is the position taken by PTC I in the Chad and Malawi decisions. For further references, see part III in this chapter.  
33 In the literature on the case against al-Bashir, see for example Gaeta, ‘Does President Al Bashir Enjoy Immunity from 
Arrest?’, 318-319; Jacobs, ‘The ICC’s Approach to Immunities and Cooperation’, pp. 287-289; Kreβ, ‘The ICC and 
Immunities’, pp. 244-245.  
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 First of all, the ICJ did not explain why immunities do not represent a bar to the jurisdiction of 
certain international courts. Did the ICJ hint at an exception under customary international law, or did 
it simply observe that some states have granted a permanent waiver for their immunities to certain 
courts? The ruling itself does not give a conclusive answer.34  
 Second of all, the ICJ did not explain whether immunities are completely irrelevant for the 
international courts concerned. If immunities do not represent a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction by a 
specific court, this does not necessarily mean that states do not commit an internationally wrongful act 
against another state when they arrest its sitting Head of State on behalf of this court. Apart from a 
substantive defence, immunities can pose a procedural bar to the exercise of jurisdiction by an 
international court (at a vertical level) or to the cooperation of states with such a court in relation to 
another state (at a horizontal level).35 By failing to distinguish the different ways in which immunities 
can form an obstacle to the effective prosecution by an international court, the Arrest Warrant case left 
it unclear what the scope of the alleged exception under customary international law is.  
 Despite the lack of clarity in the Arrest Warrant case, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (Special 
Court) has referred to the ICJ’s obiter dictum in concluding that there exists an exception under 
customary international law for the prosecution of sitting Heads of State by an international court. In 
this decision from 2004, concerning the immunities of former Liberian President Charles Taylor, the 
Appeals Chamber of the Special Court stated that ‘the principle seems now well established that the 
sovereign equality of states does not prevent a Head of State from being prosecuted before an 
international criminal tribunal or court’.36 Like the ICJ’s obiter dictum, this decision has sparked a lot 
                                                          
34 The decision itself is silent on this point, but it can be noted that the ICJ explicitly referred to Article 27(2) of the Rome 
Statute, but did not consider state practice and opinio juris for a possible exception under customary international law. 
35 See, for example, Gaeta, ‘Does President Al Bashir Enjoy Immunity from Arrest?’, 319. 
36 The Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor (SCSL-2003-01-I-Ar72(E)), Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, 31 May 
2004, paras 51-52. See generally Sarah M. H. Nouwen, ‘The Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Immunity of Taylor: The 
Arrest Warrant Case Continued’ (2005) 18 Leiden Journal of International Law 645-669. 
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of debate, in which some commentators have supported the conclusion of the Special Court, but many 
others have questioned its underlying reasoning.37  
 Regardless of one’s views on the scope of immunities of sitting Heads of State under customary 
international law, it is important to stress that an analysis of the (ir)relevance of immunities before a 
specific international court can never suffice with a discussion on the status of customary international 
law. At least two qualifications should be made to the alleged principle that immunity as a product of 
sovereignty cannot prevent prosecution before an international court.  
 Firstly, much depends on the statute of the relevant court. In a general sense, it cannot be ruled 
out that two or more states establish a court which precludes the prosecution of sitting Heads of State. 
Under international law, there is no reason why states cannot include such a limitation into the legal 
mandate of a court.38  
 Secondly, a treaty establishing a court like the ICC cannot, in principle, ‘create either rights or 
obligations for a third state without its consent’ (the pacta tertiis rule), as is stipulated in Article 34 of 
                                                          
37 See part IV(C) in this chapter.  
38 In fact, this is exactly what the recently adopted Amendment Protocol on the Criminal Chamber of the African Court does 
by giving sitting Heads of State and certain other high-level officials immunity from prosecution during their term(s) in office. 
On Article 46Abis of the Amendment Protocol, see Abel S. Knottnerus and Eefje de Volder, ‘International Criminal Justice 
and the early formation of an African Criminal Court’, in Kamari M. Clarke, Abel S. Knottnerus and Eefje de Volder (eds.), 
Africa and the ICC: Perceptions of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 386-387; Dire Tladi, ‘The 
Immunity Provision in the AU Amendment Protocol: Separating the (Doctrinal) Wheat from the (Normative) Chaff’ (2015) 13 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 3-17. See also SS ‘Wimbledon’ (United Kingdom and ors v Germany), Judgment, 
[1923] PCIJ Series A no 1, ICGJ 235, para. 35 (arguing that ‘the Court declines to see in the conclusion of any Treaty by which 
a State undertakes to perform or refrain from performing a particular act an abandonment of its sovereignty. No doubt any 
convention creating an obligation of this kind places a restriction upon the exercise of the sovereign rights of the State, in the 
sense that it requires them to be exercised in a certain way. But the right of entering into international engagements is an 
attribute of State sovereignty’). 
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the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).39 Obligations for a state not bound to a treaty 
can only be created by the third state itself, by an authorized international organization, or by a rule of 
customary international law. This means that the rights and obligations with respect to the immunities 
of sitting Heads of State may be different for the members of a court than for states that are not.  
 In short, even if one were to assume that there exists an exception under customary international 
law (as argued by the Special Court), one has to consider the rules of the specific court before coming 
to any conclusions about the (ir)relevance of immunities of sitting Heads of State before this court. With 
this in mind, the following part turns to the legal framework of the ICC and provides an overview of the 
relevant provisions of the Rome Statute.  
 
II. Immunities of Sitting Heads of State before the ICC 
For the ICC, Article 21 of the Statute makes clear that the Court has to rule on the basis of its Statute, 
and can only turn to customary international law, when there is a lacuna in the internal law of the Court 
itself which cannot be filled by the application of Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT.40 This means that the 
relevant provisions of the Statute, rather than the existing rules of state and diplomatic immunity are the 
starting point for answering questions about the (ir)relevance of immunities before the ICC.  
 The first provision in the Statute relevant to the immunities of sitting Heads of State is Article 
27(1), which states that:  
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In 
particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, 
an elected representative or a Government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal 
responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.  
                                                          
39 Article 34 of the Vienna Convention states that ‘a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without 
its consent’.  
40 As discussed in chapter 1, part I(B). 
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This provision is included in Part III of Statute on general principles of criminal law and makes clear 
that neither functional nor personal immunities can relieve a person from individual criminal 
responsibility before the ICC.41 Under the Rome Statute, a plea of official capacity by state officials is 
not accepted as a substantive defence.  
 However, the irrelevance of immunities on a substantive level does not necessarily mean that 
immunities cannot pose a bar to the application of the powers of an international court at a procedural 
level. Immunities could still form a procedural bar (A) to the exercise of the jurisdiction by an 
international court or (B) to the cooperation of states with that court.  
A. Immunities as a procedural bar to the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction 
The first way in which immunities can pose a procedural obstacle to the proceedings of an international 
court like the ICC is as a bar to the exercise of its jurisdiction. Immunities may in certain circumstances 
limit the investigatory and prosecutorial powers of an international court, including its power to issue 
and circulate arrest warrants.  
 With respect to the jurisdiction of the ICC, the second paragraph of Article 27 provides that:  
                                                          
41 Similar provisions were included in the agreements for the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, as well as the Statutes of the 
ICTY and the ICTR. It may be argued that Article 27(1) and similar provisions in previous agreements do not concern immunity 
at all, ‘since a statement that a person may be legally responsible does not address whether that person is subject to the 
jurisdiction of a particular forum, that is, whether that forum may determine that responsibility’. However, ‘questions of legal 
responsibility are not wholly separate from questions of immunity’. Regardless of any implications for the Court’s jurisdiction, 
Article 27(1) does have the effect of making immunities irrelevant on a substantive level, because sitting or former state officials 
will not be able to invoke immunities to justify their certain actions under this provision. For a more detailed discussion on the 
interpretation of Article 27(1), see Akande, ‘International Law Immunities and the ICC’, 419-420; William Schabas, A 
Commentary on The Rome Statute (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 447-449; Otto Triffterer, ‘Article 27 - 
Irrelevance of official capacity’, in Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008, 2nd edition), pp. 779-794.  
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2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether 
under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a 
person.  
This provision seems to be quite clear in stating that ‘immunities … shall not bar the Court from the 
exercise of jurisdiction’. This formulation leaves no doubt that the Court is able to investigate and 
prosecute the sitting Heads of State of all states that have ratified the Rome Statute. A more complicated 
question, however, is whether the Court can also exercise its jurisdiction with respect to the sitting Head 
of State of a state that has not ratified the Statute (a non-party), like Sudan, Russia or the United States. 
 In addressing this question, some commentators have argued that Article 27(2) ‘simply restates 
an already existing principle concerning the application of jurisdiction by any international criminal 
court’.42 According to Paola Gaeta, it is firmly established that an international court, like the ICC, is 
permitted to issue an arrest warrant against a representative of a non-party, regardless of the immunities 
that this person would normally enjoy from prosecution before a foreign domestic court. While a non-
party is not bound to the Statute, as stipulated by Article 34 of the VCLT, this state would still be bound 
by this principle of customary international law.43 The immunities of non-parties would therefore not 
pose any limits whatsoever to the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction. Whenever the Court’s jurisdiction 
is triggered the Court would be able to prosecute the sitting Head of State of an involved non-party. 
 Other commentators, however, have taken a different position on this question. In contrast to 
the idea that Article 27(2) reflects a principle of customary international law, Dapo Akande has argued 
that Article 27(2) is ‘new’ in the sense that it ‘constitutes a waiver by states parties of any immunity that 
their officials would otherwise possess vis-à-vis the ICC’.44 If he is right, then the question whether the 
Court is able to exercise jurisdiction over the sitting Head of State of a non-party is a tricky one. In the 
                                                          
42 Gaeta, ‘Does President Al Bashir Enjoy Immunity from Arrest?’, 322. See also Tladi, ‘Duty South Africa to Arrest al-Bashir’ 
1034-1035.  
43 For a response to Gaeta’s claim that Article 27(2) reflects customary international law, in relation to the Chad and Malawi 
decisions of the PTC, see Jacobs, ‘The ICC’s Approach to Immunities and Cooperation’, pp. 286-289. 
44 Akande, ‘International Law Immunities and the ICC’, 402.  
 130 
 
literature, two approaches have been considered in this regard. The first approach argues that the Court’s 
judges are required to apply Article 27(2) and have to ignore any immunities that would otherwise pose 
a procedural bar to the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction (i.e., direct application).45 The second 
approach distinguishes between the three different ways in which the Court can obtain jurisdiction 
ratione materiae over nationals of a non-party (i.e., differentiated application).  
 In advancing the first approach, Dov Jacobs has argued that since the Court’s judges are tasked 
with applying the Statute and because Article 27(2) does not distinguish between states parties and non-
parties, the judges are ‘statutorily bound ... to ignore any immunity that might be an obstacle to the 
exercise of jurisdiction’.46 While acknowledging that this could lead the ICC, as an international 
organisation, to commit an internationally wrongful act against a non-party by violating rules of state 
and diplomatic immunity, Jacobs has claimed that ‘it is certainly not the judges’ function to address 
[that] problem’.47 Their task would be to act as ‘the ‘domestic judges of the Statute’ and to apply the 
Statute in accordance with Article 21.48  
 The second approach does not depart from the idea that Article 27(2) should be applied directly, 
but looks at the different ways in which the Court can obtain jurisdiction over the nationals of a non-
party like Sudan.49 Under the Statute, this can happen in three different ways: (A) a non-party can issue 
a declaration under Article 12(3); (B) the Court can obtain jurisdiction because international crimes have 
allegedly been committed by nationals of a non-party on the territory of a state party in accordance with 
Article 12(2)(a); or (C) the Security Council can refer a situation involving nationals of a non-party to 
the Prosecutor under Article 13(b) and thereby trigger the Court’s jurisdiction. According to the second 
                                                          
45 Jacobs, ‘The ICC’s Approach to Immunities and Cooperation’, pp. 291-292. 
46 Jacobs further added in this regard that ‘Article 27 is not technically addressed at states’. Jacobs, ‘The ICC’s Approach to 
Immunities and Cooperation’, p. 292.  
47 Ibid.  
48 Ibid., p. 291.  
49 Implicitly, this approach departs from the assumption that the Court should not violate customary international law, and that 
the Court should accommodate the pacta tertiis rule of Article 34 of the VCLT.  
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approach, each of these three ways in which the Court can obtain jurisdiction over the nationals of a 
non-party affects the immunities of the respective non-party in a different manner. 
 In the first situation, immunities do not pose any limits to the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction 
over the nationals of the non-party that issued a declaration under Article 12(3). As stated in Article 
12(3), the respective non-party accepts ‘the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the 
crime in question’. This means that by adopting a declaration under Article 12(3), a non-party 
voluntarily waives the immunities of its officials in relation to the crimes over which it gives the Court 
jurisdiction.50  
 In the second situation, however, immunities might continue to pose a procedural bar to the 
exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction. According to the differentiated approach, if Article 27(2) does not 
reflect customary international law, the Court is not able to prosecute the sitting Head of State of a non-
party under Article 12(2)(a) without violating customary international law. Theoretically speaking, the 
ICC could therefore not indict the Russian President for the alleged commission of international crimes 
in one of the Court’s members (such as Georgia) or issue an arrest warrant against the Israeli Prime 
Minister for unlawful settlements on Palestinian territory, because Russia and Israel are not a party to 
the Statute.  
 The third situation that can be distinguished is the most difficult one. The implications of a 
Security Council referral for the immunities of the sitting Head of State of a non-party have been the 
topic of considerable debate, especially in relation to the prosecution of al-Bashir. If the Council refers 
a situation to the Court in accordance with Article 13(b), like the situation in Darfur, does this affect the 
immunities of non-parties? 
 From the literature, it is clear that there are different views on what could be the implications of 
a Security Council referral.51 One view is that a referral places a non-party in a position that is similar 
                                                          
50 Note that a declaration under Article 12(3) does not affect the immunities of other non-parties that might be involved with 
the referred situation.  
51 For references, see part V of this chapter.  
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to that of a state party. Akande has, for example, argued that a Security Council referral binds a non-
party ‘indirectly’ to (all) the provisions of the Statute, including Article 27(2).52 Another view is that the 
Council implicitly removes the immunities of a non-party, when it obliges that state to cooperate fully 
with the Court.53 What these two variants of the ‘Security Council avenue’ share is that the question 
whether the Court is able to prosecute the sitting Head of State of a non-party should not be answered 
in a general fashion, but in reference to the Security Council’s referral as being the specific way in which 
the Court has obtained jurisdiction over the nationals of a non-party.54 A final view, is that a Security 
Council referral does not affect the immunities of non-parties at all. The Security Council may oblige a 
state to waive certain immunities and may perhaps even remove immunities on its behalf, but on this 
alternative view, such actions are separate from Article 13(b) and only create obligations under the 
Charter, and not under the Statute.55  
B. Immunities as a procedural bar to cooperation with the Court 
If the immunities of sitting Heads of State do not form a substantive defence and do not somehow disable 
the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction, there is still one other way in which immunities can block the 
Court’s proceedings. When the Court is permitted to prosecute a sitting Head of State, personal 
immunities may in certain situations preclude the Court from requesting states parties to arrest and 
surrender this Head of State.  
 In general, a distinction can be drawn between the ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal level’ on which 
immunities apply. Immunities exist on a vertical level, that is, between an international court and states, 
to the extent that states can invoke immunities to oppose the prosecution of their officials. The legal 
power of a court to issue an arrest warrant does not imply, however, that immunities are also irrelevant 
                                                          
52 Akande, ‘The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals’, 340-341. A similar approach was recently adopted by PTC II in 
the South Africa decision (2017), para. 88. For further discussion and references, see part V(A) and V(C) of this chapter. 
53 De Wet, ‘Implications of Al-Bashir’s Visit to South Africa’, 1057-1063. A similar approach was adopted by PTC II in the 
DRC decision, para. 29. For further discussion and references, see part V(B) of this chapter.  
54 Kreβ, ‘ICC and Immunities’, p. 241.  
55 For further discussion and references, see part V(B) and V(C) of this chapter.  
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on a horizontal level, that is, by state A vis-à-vis state B. By arresting an official of state B (i.e., Sudan) 
on behalf of an international court, state A (i.e., Malawi, the DRC or South Africa) may still violate the 
immunities of state B, even when the court itself has acted within its powers by issuing an arrest warrant 
for the concerned official. 
 In the Rome Statute, Article 27(2) addresses the application of immunities on a vertical level, 
whereas Article 98(1) regulates the functioning of immunities on a horizontal level. This second 
provision foreshadows that immunities can preclude the Court from obliging states parties to arrest 
certain persons, even if the Court has jurisdiction to prosecute them. It provides that:  
1. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the requested 
State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or 
diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the 
cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity.  
This provision places a procedural duty on the Court to examine whether a request for surrender or 
assistance would require a state to violate certain specific obligations under international law. The Court 
has to check this for every specific cooperation request (so not for the whole case at once),56 and if the 
Court finds that cooperation with a certain request may indeed result in a violation of ‘the state or 
diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third state’, the Court cannot proceed with this request, 
unless it has first obtained ‘the cooperation of that third state for the waiver of the immunity’.  
 It is important to note that while Article 98(1) puts a procedural duty on the Court, this provision 
does not allow states parties to ignore a cooperation request whenever they feel that this request forces 
them to violate other obligations under international law.57 Article 97 and Rule 195(1) of the Rules of 
                                                          
56 This follows from the wording of the provision, which speaks of ‘a request’ and ‘the requested state’ in singular and not in 
broader terms about a general request to all states parties.  
57 See, for example, Claus Kreβ and Kimberly Prost, ‘Article 97 - Consultations’, in Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008, 2nd edition), pp. 1599-1600. See also ICC 
South Africa decision (2017), paras. 104-106.  
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Procedure and Evidence (RPE) make clear that this is a decision for the Court’s judges to make rather 
than for the states parties themselves. First of all, Article 97 requires the Court’s states parties ‘to consult 
with the Court without delay’, if they identify a problem which may impede or prevent the execution of 
a cooperation request.58 Second of all, and more to the point, Rule 195(1) stipulates that:  
1. When a requested State notifies the Court that a request for surrender or assistance raises a problem of 
execution in respect of article 98, the requested State shall provide any information relevant to assist the 
Court in the application of article 98. Any concerned third State or sending State may provide additional 
information to assist the Court.  
Together with Article 97, Rule 195(1) determines that a state party which believes that Article 98(1) 
applies, has to inform the Court about this. Eventually, it will not be the state party, but the Court that 
decides whether Article 98(1) relieves a state party from its obligation under Article 89(1) to cooperate 
with a request for the arrest of a person.59  
 Article 97 and Rule 195(1) signal a ‘cooperative approach’ to the resolution of problems of 
execution and presume ‘good faith efforts on the parts of the Court and the State’.60 Yet, when 
consultations do not lead to a solution, the Court can rely on its authority under Article 87(7) and Article 
                                                          
58 Article 97 of the Rome Statute states that ‘where a State Party receives a request under this Part in relation to which it 
identifies problems which may impede or prevent the execution of the request, that State shall consult with the Court without 
delay in order to resolve the matter. Such problems may include, inter alia: (a) Insufficient information to execute the request; 
(b) In the case of a request for surrender, the fact that despite best efforts, the person sought cannot be located or that the 
investigation conducted has determined that the person in the requested State is clearly not the person named in the warrant; or 
(c) The fact that execution of the request in its current form would require the requested State to breach a pre-existing treaty 
obligation undertaken with respect to another State’. 
59 Article 89(1) of the Rome Statute states that ‘the Court may transmit a request for the arrest and surrender of a person, 
together with the material supporting the request outlined in article 91, to any State on the territory of which that person may 
be found and shall request the cooperation of that State in the arrest and surrender of such a person. States Parties shall, in 
accordance with the provisions of this Part and the procedure under their national law, comply with requests for arrest and 
surrender’. 
60 Kreβ and Prost, ‘Article 97’, p. 1599.  
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119(1) to settle whether Article 98(1) applies.61 As the Prosecutor rightly stated in relation to the case 
against President al-Bashir: ‘reasonable minds, reasonable lawyers may differ in their interpretation of 
the Statute. However, what is clear and indisputable is which body determines with authority and finality 
the issue of whether or not immunity is attached to the individual in question in any specific case, and 
that is the Court and only the Court’.62  
 The real difficulty with Article 98(1), however, is its substantive scope.63 A first question that 
has attracted debate is whether the reference to ‘third state’ in Article 98(1) means any other state than 
                                                          
61 Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute states that ‘where a State Party fails to comply with a request to cooperate by the Court 
contrary to the provisions of this Statute, thereby preventing the Court from exercising its functions and powers under this 
Statute, the Court may make a finding to that effect and refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or, where the Security 
Council referred the matter to the Court, to the Security Council’. Article 119(1) of the Rome Statute provides that ‘any dispute 
concerning the judicial functions of the Court shall be settled by the decision of the Court’. 
62 Statement of the Prosecutor UNSC, S/PV.7710, 9 June 2016. The Prosecutor further added that ‘if a State chooses to join 
the Court and becomes a State party, then it is bound to accept and follow the provisions of the Rome Statute as they apply to 
States parties; this includes being bound by the decisions of the Court. So who decides the issue of the apparent tension between 
articles 27, on the irrelevance of official capacity, and article 98(1), on cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and 
consent to surrender? The answer is clear: it is not the States parties themselves; it is not the Security Council; it is not 
academics; it is the Court itself. … The Court is the only and sole authority to decide whether or not the immunity is generally 
attached to Mr. Al-Bashir, as sitting Head of State, where applicable in this particular case. The conclusion finds support in 
article 119(1) of the Statute, which provides that any dispute concerning the judicial functions of the Court shall be settled by 
the decision of the Court. This is a decision of the Court; therefore, simply put, it is binding on States parties that have joined 
the Court’. 
63 Do note, however, that the consultation procedure under Article 97 has recently proven to have controversial elements as 
well. South Africa argued during the yearly meeting of the ASP in 2015 that there is no clear procedure regarding the structuring 
of the consultations under Article 97. ASP, List of supplementary items requested for inclusion in the agenda of the fourteenth 
session of the Assembly, ICC-ASP/14/35, 27 October 2015. Following the plenary debate on the supplementary agenda item 
introduced by South Africa, the ASP expressed its willingness to consider, within the framework of the appropriate subsidiary 
body of the Assembly, proposals to develop procedures for the implementation of Article 97. For this purpose, the Bureau 
established a working group on the implementation of Article 97, which presented its first (explorative) rapport in late 2016: 
ASP, Report of the Chair of the working group of the Bureau on the implementation of Article 97 of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/15/35, 24 November 2016. See also the statements of Canada, Ghana, Portugal, South 
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the requested state, including other states parties, or whether it only covers non-parties? According to 
most commentators, Article 98(1) can, at least with respect to the immunities of state officials, only 
benefit non-parties.64 In support of this view, it has been argued that if Article 98(1) would allow states 
parties to rely on immunities in order to prevent the arrest of their officials, this would pose ‘an 
insurmountable obstacle’ to the prosecution of state officials, which would ‘clearly be incompatible with 
the object and purpose of Article 27(2)’.65 Based on this argument, most commentators have accepted 
that Article 27(2) does not only waive immunities for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court, but also 
for actions taken by states parties upon request of the Court.66 Consequently, it is assumed that Article 
                                                          
Africa and Uganda in ASP, General Debate of the Fifteenth Session, 16-17 November 2016. South Africa also expressed its 
concerns about Article 97 to the PTC. In its decision on the non-cooperation of South Africa (2017), the Chamber included a 
detailed discussion on this matter and more generally about the rationale of Article 97 (paras. 110-121). For further discussion 
and references, see part III(C) in this chapter.  
64 Akande, ‘International Law Immunities and the ICC’, 422-424; Akande, ‘The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals’, 
337-339. See also Schabas, ‘Commentary’, pp. 1040-1041; Gaeta, ‘Does President Al Bashir Enjoy Immunity from Arrest?’, 
328; Paola Gaeta, ‘Official Capacity and Immunities’, in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John R.W.D. Jones (eds.), The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 993-994; 
Manisuli Ssenyonjo, ‘The Rise of the African Union Opposition to the International Criminal Court’s Investigations and 
Prosecutions of African Leaders’ (2013) 13 International Criminal Law Review  407; De Wet, ‘Implications of Al-Bashir’s 
Visit to South Africa’, 1055-1056. See also ICC DRC decision, para. 27; ICC South Africa decision (2017), paras. 71-83; 
Minority Opinion of Judge de Brichambaut, paras. 41-47.  
65 As stated in ICC South Africa decision, para. 75. Note that the Chamber also made a textual argument and claimed that ‘the 
general exclusionary clause of Article 27(2)’ encompasses ‘in its plain meaning’ immunity from arrest. According to the 
Chamber ‘had the drafters of the Statute intended exclusion only of a narrow category of immunities, they would have expressed 
it in plain language’. The language used in Article 27(2) would convey ‘comprehensiveness’ and would not be ‘compatible 
with the proposition that the immunity from arrest of Heads of State is excluded from it’ (para. 74).  
66 The interpretation of the reference to third state in Article 98(1) as a non-party, at least for the purposes of the immunities of 
state officials, may also be supported by the doctrine of ‘effet utile’, according to which a provision must be interpreted in such 
a manner that it has practical effect. As argued by Judge de Brichambaut, ‘if the reference to “third state” … referred to another 
state party, this provision would lose its meaning, in light of the obligations of states parties under Article 27(2) and 86 of the 
Statute. An interpretation of “third state” as referring to a non-state party to the Statute is therefore the sole interpretation that 
ensures that effect is given to Article 98(1)’ (para. 45). 
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98(1) does not pose a procedural bar when the Court requests a state party to arrest its own sitting Head 
of State or the sitting Head of State of another state party.67  
 A second question that has been raised about the substantive scope of Article 98(1) is whether 
the reference to ‘state and diplomatic immunity’ covers the immunities of sitting Heads of State. Some 
commentators, such as Dire Tladi and Jens Iverson, have suggested that Article 98(1) was drafted with 
the intention to protect diplomatic missions only, and that the reference to state immunity in this 
provision cannot be interpreted as covering the immunities of sitting Heads of State.68 In their opinion, 
states parties are therefore not able to invoke Article 98(1) to oppose the demanded arrest of the sitting 
Head of State of a non-party.  
 However, the prevailing view among commentators is that this interpretation of Article 98(1) is 
too restrictive. As explained by Akande and others, the scope of the immunities of sitting Heads of State 
may differ from the scope of state immunity, but the first set of immunities is by necessity part of the 
second.69 The immunities of sitting Heads of State belong to states and not to the persons who fulfil this 
official capacity. They are created for the benefit of states and aim to guarantee the proper functioning 
of international relations. Consequently, it makes sense to assume that by referring to state immunity, 
                                                          
67 It should be stressed, however, that this interpretation does not necessarily imply that Article 98(1) is strictly confined to 
non-parties. If Article 27(2) waives the immunities of the sitting Heads of State and other officials of states parties, it does not 
waive other immunities that are covered by Article 98(1), in particular the immunities of the diplomatic premises of states 
parties. Notably, Article 98(1) refers not only to the ‘immunity of a person’, but also to the ‘property of a third State’. Since 
Article 27(2) leaves these immunities in place, the reference to third state in Article 98(1) probably concerns states parties as 
well. See Kreβ, Claus, and Kimberly Prost, ‘Article 98 - Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to 
surrender’, in Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2008, 2nd edition), p. 1606; Kreβ, ‘The ICC and Immunities’, p. 238. Note that this issue is not addressed in the 
Chamber’s decisions on al-Bashir’s visits to African states parties.  
68 Tladi, ‘The ICC Decisions on Chad and Malawi’, 215-216; Iverson, ‘Continuing Functions Article 98’, 144-145.  
69 Dapo Akande, ‘Head of State Immunity is Part of State Immunity: A Response to Jens Iverson’, EJIL Talk, 27 February 
2012. See also Kreβ, ‘The ICC and Immunities’, pp. 236-238.  
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Article 98(1) includes the immunities of sitting Heads of State, and not only the immunities of 
diplomatic missions.     
 Finally, the last and definitely the most controversial question about the substantive scope of 
Article 98(1) is how immunities that apply on a horizontal level can be waived or removed so that they 
do not pose a procedural bar to cooperation with the Court? This question is discussed extensively in 
parts IV and V with respect to the immunity of al-Bashir. At this point it suffices to note that there are, 
theoretically speaking, at least three ways in which immunities can stop to apply on a horizontal level. 
First of all, the relevant immunities can be waived by the concerned state itself. Apart from ratifying the 
Statute, a state can do this by accepting the Court’s jurisdiction under Article 12(3), by issuing an ad 
hoc waiver for a specific case (i.e., waiving the immunity of a state official for the purpose of a specific 
case) or by ratifying another treaty that incorporates a permanent waiver of immunities.70 Second of all, 
these immunities may no longer apply because an exception has developed under customary 
international law for the prosecution by an international court like the ICC.71 Lastly, immunities may be 
removed through a decision of the Security Council or by another competent international organization. 
In the opinion of some commentators, the Council could remove immunities and deactivate Article 98(1) 
by obligating a non-party to fully cooperate with the Court,72 or by binding that state to the Statute.73  
                                                          
70 Some commentators have argued that the Genocide Convention (which Sudan has ratified) includes such a waiver. See 
generally Akande, ‘The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals’, 348-351; Jacobs, ‘The ICC’s Approach to Immunities 
and Cooperation’, pp. 296-299; Matthew Gillet, ‘The Call of Justice: Obligations Under the Genocide Convention to Cooperate 
with the International Criminal Court’ (2012) 23 Criminal Law Forum 63-96; Göran Sluiter, ‘Using the Genocide Convention 
to Strengthen Cooperation with the ICC in the Al Bashir Case’ (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 365-382. 
See also ICC South Africa decision (2017), para. 109; Minority Opinion of Judge de Brichambaut, paras. 4-38.   
71 This is the position taken by PTC I in the Chad and Malawi decisions. The implication of an exception on a horizontal level 
is that all states, including non-parties, have a right to arrest persons who are prosecuted by the Court. See generally Akande: 
‘The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals’, 344-348. 
72 This is the position taken by PTC II in the DRC decision (2014). 
73 This is the position taken by PTC II in the South Africa decision (2017). 
 139 
 
 In sum, there are many competing views among commentators about whether sitting Heads of 
State enjoy immunities before the ICC. Article 27(1) makes clear that immunities do not relieve a person 
from criminal responsibility before the ICC. However, the fact that official capacity will not be accepted 
as a substantive defence does not imply that immunities cannot pose a procedural bar to the exercise of 
the Court’s jurisdiction (on a vertical level) or to the cooperation of states with the arrest of the 
individuals concerned (on a horizontal level). A combined reading of Articles 27(2) and 98(1) signals 
that there are important differences between the sitting Heads of State of states parties and of non-parties. 
Yet, what these differences precisely entail, and what their implications are for the rights and obligations 
of states parties and non-parties is subject to different opinions as to the interpretation of the relevant 
provisions of the Statute. These competing views are at the heart of the AU’s claim that al-Bashir enjoys 
immunity from arrest. With all of the above in mind, the following sections turn to the decisions taken 
by the Court on this particular matter.  
  
III. The Initial Response of Pre-Trial Chamber I  
In July 2009, the AU Assembly decided that its member states should not cooperate with the demanded 
arrest of President al-Bashir.74 In support, the assembled African leaders referred to Article 98(1). This 
decision forms the starting point for the ongoing debate about al-Bashir’s immunity. It followed upon 
the warrant that PTC I issued for al-Bashir in March 2009. In this ruling, the Court’s judges briefly 
touched on the implications of al-Bashir’s status as sitting Head of State of a non-party.75 Unfortunately, 
                                                          
74 AU Assembly, Decision July 2009, para. 10.  
75 ICC First Arrest Warrant al-Bashir, paras. 41-45. Note that the implications of al-Bashir’s official status were not addressed 
in the decision on his second arrest warrant. In the decision on the warrant for Muammar Gaddafi, the second - and to date the 
only other - sitting Head of State to be prosecuted by the Court, the PTC only recalled its conclusion on the immunity of al-
Bashir. Muammar Gaddafi (ICC-01/11-12), Decision on the "Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar 
Mohammed Abu Minyar GADDAFI, Saif Al-Islam GADDAFI and Abdullah ALSENUSSI", 27 June 2011, para. 9.  
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however, the Chamber did not address any of the questions that the Assembly’s decision was about to 
raise as to the interpretation and application of Article 98(1).  
A. Ruling on the arrest warrant for al-Bashir (2009)  
On the question whether al-Bashir’s immunity could pose a procedural bar to the exercise of the Court’s 
jurisdiction, Presiding Judge Kuenyehia and Judges Usacka and Steiner concluded in their ruling on the 
first arrest warrant for al-Bashir that ‘the current position’ of al-Bashir as Head of State ‘has no effect 
on the Court’s jurisdiction over the present case’.76 The Chamber reached this conclusion on the basis 
of four considerations:  
(A) Firstly, it noted that according to the Preamble of the Statute, one of the core goals of the Statute is 
to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole. 
(B) Secondly, it quoted Article 27(1) and (2) as providing a number of ‘core principles’ to achieve this 
goal, including that immunities attached to the official capacity of a person ‘shall not bar the Court from 
exercising its jurisdiction over such a person’.  
(C) Thirdly, it recalled that under Article 21 the Court can only resort to other sources of law when there 
is a lacuna in the written law of the Court and when such a lacuna cannot be filled by the application of 
the general rule of interpretation and Article 21(3) of the Statute. 
(D) And finally, it highlighted that by referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC, the Security Council 
‘accepted that the investigation into the said situation, as well as any prosecution arising therefrom, 
[would] take place in accordance with the whole Statute’.77  
In listing these four considerations, the Chamber left many questions about the possible implications of 
al-Bashir’s official status unaddressed. Remarkably, the Chamber did not explain how these 
considerations linked together and how they supported the conclusion that al-Bashir’s status would not 
                                                          
76 ICC First Arrest Warrant al-Bashir, para. 41.  
77 Ibid., paras. 42-45. 
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affect the Court’s jurisdiction. The Chamber did not consider whether al-Bashir enjoyed immunity under 
customary international law or whether the Security Council’s referral affected his position. While its 
general observations could be used to address questions about the Court’s ability to exercise jurisdiction 
over al-Bashir, the Chamber did not actually answer any of these questions.   
 Moreover, the Court’s judges did not discuss whether al-Bashir’s immunity could pose a 
procedural bar to cooperation with the Court. Article 98(1) places a procedural duty on the Court to 
examine whether a request for surrender would require the requested state to violate its obligations under 
international law. In its ruling of March 2009, the Chamber did not give any indication, however, that it 
had studied such obligations.78 The question whether states parties could evade their duty to execute this 
request by invoking Article 98(1) was simply not addressed. 
B. Rulings on al-Bashir’s visits to Chad, Kenya and Djibouti (2010-2011)  
Following the decision of the AU Assembly in July 2009, the question of the possible application of 
Article 98(1) became an urgent one when several African states parties welcomed al-Bashir on their 
territory. In the course of 2010, the President of Sudan first travelled to Chad, for a summit of the Sahel-
Saharan states,79 and then to Kenya to attend the festivities surrounding the adoption of the new Kenyan 
Constitution.80 In light of these two visits, it would have made sense for the Chamber to rule on the 
                                                          
78 The Chamber only noted that the Registrar would have to transmit a cooperation request to all states parties and the members 
of the Council in accordance with Article 89(1) and 91. Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-7), Request to all States parties to the 
Rome Statute for the Arrest and Surrender of Omar al Bashir, 6 March 2009; Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-8), Request to all 
United Nations Security Council Members that are not States parties to the Rome Statute for the Arrest and Surrender of Omar 
al Bashir, 6 March 2009.  
79 According to Chad’s Interior and Security Minister, Ahmad Bachir, the standing warrant for his arrest did not raise any 
problems, because Chad would not have an obligation to arrest al-Bashir, because of his official status. See ‘Bashir defies 
warrant on Chad trip’, Al Jazeera, 22 July 2010. 
80 Kenyan foreign minister, Moses Wetang’ula, explained that the Sudanese President attended the festivities in response to an 
invitation to all neighbouring states in the region and noted that ‘you do no harm or embarrass your guest ... that is not African’. 
Later that year, during a meeting with the President of the ASP, Wetang’ula further clarified that Kenya had not arrested al-
Bashir in view of ‘his country’s competing obligations towards the Court, the [AU] and regional peace and stability’. See 
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scope and application of Article 98(1). Yet, in its response, the Chamber decided to ignore this question. 
On 27 August, the day that al-Bashir travelled to Kenya, PTC I issued two decisions, in which it 
‘informed’ the Council and the ASP about al-Bashir’s recent presence in Chad and about his expected 
trip to Kenya, ‘in order for them to take any measure they may deem appropriate’.81 In response to the 
Chamber’s decisions, the Council and the ASP did not adopt any measures.82  
                                                          
Walter Menya, ‘Bashir surprise guest in Kenya’, Daily Nation, 27 August 2010; ASP, Press Release- President of the Assembly 
meets Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kenya, ICC-ASP-20100921-PR575, 21 September 2010; ‘Kenya pushes back over war 
crimes suspect’s visit’, CNN, 2 September 2010.  
81 Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-107), Decision informing the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the States 
parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al-Bashir’s presence in the territory of the Republic of Kenya, 27 August 2010; Al-
Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-109), Decision informing the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the States parties 
to the Rome Statute about Omar Al-Bashir’s recent visit to the Republic of Chad, 27 August 2010. In these decisions, the 
Chamber noted that Chad and Kenya had ‘a clear obligation to cooperate with the Court in relation to the enforcement of [the 
warrant for al-Bashir]’. This obligation would stem from Resolution 1593, in which the Council ‘urged all States and concerned 
regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully’, and from Article 87 of the Statute, to which Chad and Kenya 
are both a party.  
82  The Council could have issued a presidential statement or a Resolution calling upon the states concerned to cooperate with 
the Court (possibly with the threat of sanctions). The ASP’s powers in case of (potential) non-cooperation are less far-reaching 
than those of the Security Council. Article 112(2)(f) provides that the Assembly shall ‘consider pursuant to article 87, 
paragraphs 5 and 7, any question relating to non-cooperation’. Neither the Statute nor the rules of procedure of the ASP 
explicate the specific measures that the Assembly may take in response to non-cooperation. Note in this regard that al-Bashir’s 
visits to Chad and Kenya were discussed by the Bureau of the ASP, but that no further decisions were taken. See ASP, Bureau 
of the ASP - thirteenth meeting, 13 September 2010; ASP, Bureau of the ASP - fourteenth meeting, 5 October 2010 ASP, 
Bureau of the ASP - eighteenth meeting, 23 November 2010; ASP, Bureau of the ASP - twentieth meeting, 9 December 2010; 
ASP, Bureau of the ASP - first meeting, 11 January 2011 (during this meeting the delegation of Kenya highlighted Article 98 
and suggested that it might be necessary to amend the Statute ‘to allow for the postponement of the execution of requests for 
cooperation, for example, in cases where such requests might interfere with ongoing peace processes’). Furthermore, in reaction 
to reports that al-Bashir would also attend the meeting of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Kenya, 
the PTC requested Kenya to bring to its attention any problem which would impede or prevent Kenya from arresting al-Bashir 
(in accordance with Article 97). Eventually, however, the IGAD meeting was moved to Addis Ababa at a later date. See Al-
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 These decisions did, however, trigger a powerful reaction from the AU Commission.83 Through 
an official communiqué, the Commission expressed ‘its deep regret’ that these decisions ‘grossly’ 
ignored and made ‘no reference whatsoever to the obligations of the two countries to the [AU]’.84 Under 
Article 23(2) of the AU’s Constitutive Act, the Assembly’s decisions would be binding on Chad and 
Kenya, and according to the Commission it would be wrong ‘to coerce them to violate’ these 
obligations.85   
 Later that year, after al-Bashir attended the inauguration ceremony of Djibouti’s long-sitting 
President Ismail Omar Guelleh, the Chamber and the AU repeated this ‘exchange of views’. The 
Chamber argued that states parties, like Djibouti, have an obligation to cooperate with the Court, and 
encouraged the Council and the ASP to take action.86 In reply, the Council and the ASP did not sanction 
the respective states, whereas the AU Assembly stressed that Djibouti’s decision to welcome al-Bashir 
was fully in accordance with Article 98(1).87   
                                                          
Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-117), Decision requesting observations from the Republic of Kenya, 25 October 2010; Michael 
Onyiego, ‘IGAD Summit Postponed Amid Controversy Surrounding Bashir Attendance’, Voice of America, 27 October 2010.   
83 AU Commission, Press Release on the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC informing the UN Security Council and 
the Assembly of states parties to the Rome Statute about the presence of President Omar al-Bashir in Chad and Kenya, 
No/119/2010, 29 August 2010.  
84 Ibid.  
85 Ibid. In a similar vein, the AU Assembly stated in January 2011 that it also deeply regretted the Chamber’s rulings and 
decided that by receiving al-Bashir Chad and Kenya ‘were implementing various AU Assembly Decisions on the warrant of 
arrest issued by the ICC against President Bashir’. AU Assembly, Decision on the Implementation of the Decisions on the 
International Criminal Court, Assembly/AU/ Dec.334(XVI), 30-31 January 2011, para. 5. 
86 Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-129), Decision informing the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of States 
parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al-Bashir’s recent visit to Djibouti, 12 May 2011. Note that al-Bashir’s visit was also 
discussed by the Bureau of the ASP. During the respective meeting, the Permanent Representative of Djibouti declared that its 
state ‘would not make a routine of breaking obligations’. ASP, Bureau of the ASP - seventh meeting, 7 June 2011, pp. 3-4.  
87 AU Assembly, Decision on the Implementation of the Assembly Decisions on the International Criminal Court, 
Assembly/AU/Dec.366(XVII), 30 June-1 July 2011, para. 5. 
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C. Rulings on the non-cooperation of Chad and Malawi (2011) 
Strengthened by the support of the AU and in the absence of measures from the Council or the ASP, al-
Bashir travelled to two more African states parties in the second half of 2011. In August, he returned to 
Chad for the inauguration ceremony of Idriss Deby, who had been re-elected for a fifth term as President 
of Chad, and in October, he visited Malawi in order to participate in a summit of the Common Market 
for Eastern and Southern Africa. 
 This time, however, the Court’s judges did not simply inform the Council and the ASP about 
his presence on the territory of states parties. They decided to initiate formal proceedings against Chad 
and Malawi under Article 87(7) for failing to cooperate with the Court.88 While the Chamber’s decisions 
on these two visits did not address why the Court’s judges took a different approach in comparison to 
al-Bashir’s earlier visits, one can think of several reasons why they deviated from their initial attempts 
to pass the matter on to the Council and the ASP. Most likely, the Chamber hoped to trigger a more 
powerful reaction from the Council and the ASP by formally establishing that African states parties 
were failing to cooperate. Its earlier decisions had not resulted in any meaningful action from the Court’s 
supporters. The President of the ASP had met with the Kenyan Foreign Minister and the ASP had called 
upon all states parties ‘to comply with their obligations under the Rome Statute, in particular the 
obligation to cooperate’.89 Yet, neither the ASP, nor the Council had condemned or sanctioned the 
respective states. By formally condemning states for their non-cooperation, the Chamber presumably 
intended to increase pressure on the Council and the ASP to act.  
                                                          
88 Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-139), Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of 
Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar 
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 12 December 2011; Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-140-tENG), Decision pursuant to article 87(7) of 
the Rome Statute on the refusal of the Republic of Chad to comply with the cooperation requests issued by the Court with 
respect to the arrest and surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 13 December 2011. 
89 ASP, Resolution ICC-ASP/9/Res.3, 10 December 2010, para. 6.  
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 In line with Article 87(7) and Regulation 109(3) of the Regulations of the Court, the Chamber 
asked Chad and Malawi to explain why they had not complied with the demanded arrest of al-Bashir.90 
Chad’s reaction was extremely brief. It noted the AU’s ‘common position’ on the case of al-Bashir and 
argued that as an AU member state, Chad had not been able to accede to the Court’s request.91 Malawi 
came with a more elaborate response. It argued that the decision to grant al-Bashir immunity was ‘in 
line with the established principles of public international law, and in accordance with the Immunities 
and Privileges Act of Malawi’.92 In addition, Malawi claimed that Article 27 would not be applicable in 
this case because Sudan is not a party to Statute and stressed that it fully aligned itself with the AU’s 
position on the matter.93  
 In response to these observations, PTC I issued two separate, but essentially similar, decisions 
in December 2011. In these decisions, the Chamber started out by emphasizing the nature of the ICC’s 
cooperation regime.94 According to the Chamber, it would be for the Court and not for states parties to 
decide whether Article 98(1) would offer a valid ground to refuse cooperation with the Court. In 
reference to Article 119(1), which provides that ‘any dispute concerning the judicial functions of the 
Court shall be settled by the decision of the Court’, the Chamber stressed that if Chad and Malawi had 
believed that they could not arrest al-Bashir they should have immediately brought this problem to the 
attention of the Court’s judges. By not doing so, they failed to respect ‘the sole authority of [the] Court 
to decide whether immunities are applicable in a particular case’.95  
                                                          
90 Regulation 109(3) states that ‘before making a finding in accordance with article 87, paragraph 7, the Chamber shall hear 
from the requested State’. 
91 ICC Chad decision, para. 7.  
92 ICC Malawi decision, para. 8.  
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid., paras. 10-11; ICC Chad decision, para. 10. Since the PTC restated the relevant elements of the Malawi decision in 
para.13 of the Chad decision, I will hereafter only cite the Malawi decision. 
95 ICC Malawi decision, paras. 10-11. The Chamber could have stopped here to establish that Chad and Malawi had failed to 
comply with the Court’s cooperation requests, but decided ‘in light of the significance of the issues’ (para. 13) to address the 
question whether Chad and Malawi could, in theory, have relied on Article 98(1) for not arresting al-Bashir. Note that the PTC 
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 In the second part of its rulings, the Chamber considered, for the first time, whether a state party 
could potentially rely on Article 98(1) for refusing to arrest al-Bashir.96 Instead of examining the scope 
of this provision, however, the Chamber immediately turned to customary international law.97 In taking 
what has been described by Claus Kreß as a ‘modern positivist approach’ to the ascertainment of custom, 
the Chamber argued that ‘the principle in international law’ is that the immunities of sitting Heads of 
State cannot be invoked ‘to oppose a prosecution by an international court’, because the rationale for 
these immunities on a domestic level does not apply in relation to international courts.98  
 In reference to the work of the late Judge Antonio Cassese and the ICJ’s obiter dictum in the 
Arrest Warrant case, the Chamber observed that while ‘national courts might use prosecution to impede 
or limit a foreign state’s ability to engage in international action … this danger does not arise with 
international courts and tribunals’, which are ‘totally independent of states and subject to strict rules of 
impartiality’.99 Furthermore, the Chamber noted that the Special Court had explained in the Taylor 
decision that immunities of Heads of State have ‘no relevance to international criminal tribunals’, 
because they are ‘not organs of a state but derive their mandate from the international community’.100 
From these arguments about the exceptional nature of international courts and the legal authority of the 
                                                          
also rejected Malawi’s reference to internal law in order to justify its failure to comply with the Court’s cooperation request 
(paras. 20-21). This is in line with Article 27 of the VCLT which states that ‘a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal 
law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty’. 
96 ICC Malawi decision, para. 13.  
97 What the Chamber did note, however, is that ‘a waiver of immunity would not be necessary with respect to a third State 
which has ratified the Statute’, as the acceptance of Article 27(2) ‘implies waiver of immunities for the purposes of Article 
98(1)’. Ibid., para. 18.   
98 Ibid., para. 34. Kreβ, ‘The ICC and Immunities’, p. 254. As defined by Kreβ, a modern positivist approach to the 
ascertainment of customary international law assumes that general principles can point to the development of ‘modern custom’, 
which may come into existence rapidly and without a voluminous body of state practice and opinio juris.  
99 Ibid. The Chamber quoted: Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 
2008), p. 312. 
100 Special Court, decision on immunities of Taylor, paras. 51-52.  
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international community as a whole, the judges deduced the principle that immunities play no role with 
respect to international courts like the ICC.  
 As a second step in its ascertainment of custom, the Chamber sought to confirm its own 
deduction by making references to (A) historical precedents of rejecting immunities for Heads of State 
before international courts; (B) to the increase in the prosecution of Heads of State by international 
courts; (C) to the strong support of states for the ICC; (D) and finally to the alleged purpose of the 
Statute: 
(A) Historical precedents - The Chamber argued that since the First World War, Heads of State have been 
denied immunity before international courts; an argument which it based on the jurisprudence of the 
Nuremburg and Tokyo Tribunals, as well as on the provisions of the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR 
which removed immunities as a substantive defence.101 
(B) Case law - The Chamber observed that at the time of the ICJ’s ruling in the Arrest Warrant case only 
one international prosecution of a sitting Head of State had been initiated, namely for Milosevic, but that 
with the prosecutions of Taylor, Gaddafi, Gbagbo and al-Bashir the international prosecution of Heads of 
State had ‘gained widespread recognition as accepted practice’.102 
(C) Strong support for the ICC - The Chamber recalled, as prove of the support of states for the ICC, that 
120 states had ratified the Statute and that the Security Council, including non-parties, had referred two 
situations to the Court.103  
(D) Purpose of the Statute - Finally, the Chamber argued that if Article 98(1) would relieve a state party 
from its obligation to arrest al-Bashir, this would ‘disable the Court and international criminal justice in 
ways completely contrary to the purpose of the Statute’, which would be to exercise jurisdiction over 
persons for the most serious crimes of international concern.104 
                                                          
101 ICC Malawi decision, paras. 38, 23-32. 
102 Ibid., para. 39. 
103 Ibid., para. 40. 
104 Ibid., para. 41. 
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 In the opinion of the Chamber, these four references confirmed the asserted principle that ‘the 
international community’s commitment to rejecting immunity in circumstances where international 
courts seek arrest for international crimes has reached a critical mass’.105 The Chamber found that there 
exists ‘an exception’ under customary international law stipulating that sitting Heads of State do not 
enjoy immunity ‘in respect of proceedings before international courts’.106 Based on this exception, the 
Chamber concluded that there does not exist a ‘conflict’ between the obligations of Chad and Malawi 
towards the ICC and their obligations under customary international law. These states ‘and by extension’ 
the AU would not be ‘entitled to rely on Article 98(1) … to justify refusing to comply with’ the requests 
to arrest al-Bashir.107  
D. Criticism on the Chamber’s turn to customary international law       
The Chamber’s decisions did not lead the Council and the ASP to take any meaningful steps against 
Chad or Malawi.108 As with the Chamber’s previous decisions, the main result of establishing the non-
cooperation of Chad and Malawi was a strongly worded statement of the AU on al-Bashir’s immunity. 
The AU Commission expressed its ‘deep regret’ over the decisions.109 According to the Commission, 
the Court’s judges had purported to ‘change customary international law’, and rendered Article 98(1) 
                                                          
105 Ibid., para. 42.  
106 Ibid., paras. 43 and 22.  
107 Ibid., para. 37.  
108 Note that the Bureau of the ASP discussed al-Bashir’s visits to Chad and Malawi during several meetings: ASP, Bureau of 
the ASP - seventh meeting, 28 February 2012; ASP, Bureau of the ASP - eighth meeting, 1 March 2012 (meeting specifically 
devoted to these visits); ASP, Bureau of the ASP - tenth meeting, 10 April 2012; ASP, Bureau of the ASP - twelfth meeting, 
29 May 2012; ASP, Bureau of the ASP - thirteenth meeting, 15 June 2012 (highlighting different views within the Bureau on 
possible measures that could be adopted against Chad. Eventually, the Bureau only took note of the Chamber’s response which 
rejected the Chamber’s decisions); ASP, Bureau of the ASP - fourteenth meeting, 9 July 2012. 
109 AU Commission, Press Release on the Decisions of Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) Pursuant 
to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Alleged Failure by the Republic of Chad and the Republic of Malawi to Comply 
with the Cooperation Requests issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of President Omar Hassan al-
Bashir of the Republic of the Sudan, No/002/2012, 9 January 2012. 
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‘redundant, non-operational and meaningless’.110 In its view, Article 98(1) was included in the Statute 
‘out of recognition that the Statute is not capable of removing an immunity which international law 
grants to the officials of states that are not parties to the Rome Statute ... because immunities of state 
officials are rights of the state concerned and a treaty only binds parties to the treaty’.111 By ruling that 
immunities are irrelevant in relation to the ICC, the Chamber would have deprived Sudan and all other 
non-parties of these rights.112  
 Apart from the AU, the decisions of PTC I also received remarkably strong criticism from 
prominent commentators, especially for (1) the Chamber’s unconvincing analysis of customary 
international law and (2) for failing to explain the rationale of Article 98(1) in relation to Article 27(2). 
First of all, questions were posed about the Chamber’s modern positivist approach to the ascertainment 
of custom,113 the distinction that the Court’s judges had drawn between domestic and international 
                                                          
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid.  
112 In a similar vein, the AU Assembly stated in January 2012 that it understood that Article 98(1) confirmed that ‘the Statute 
is not capable of removing an immunity which international law grants to the officials’ of non-parties and that ‘by referring the 
situation in Darfur to the ICC, the UN Security Council intended that the Rome Statute would be applicable, including Article 
98’. In addition, the Assembly requested the AU Commission ‘to consider seeking an advisory opinion from the [ICJ] regarding 
the immunities of State Officials under international law’. In a follow-up to this request, the Assembly endorsed a proposal of 
the Ministers of Justice and Attorneys General of the AU member states in July 2012 to approach the ICJ, through the UN 
General Assembly, for an advisory opinion on ‘the question of immunities, under international law, of Heads of State and 
senior state officials from states that are not parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC’. However, this proposal never gained much 
momentum in the General Assembly. AU Assembly, Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the 
Implementation of the Assembly Decisions on the International Criminal Court, Assembly/AU/Dec.397(XVIII), 29-30 January 
2012, paras. 6 and 10; AU Assembly, Decision on the implementation of the Decisions on the International Criminal Court, 
Assembly/AU/Dec.419(XIX), 15-16 July 2012, para. 3. For a brief discussion and further references on the proposal of an ICJ 
Advisory Opinion, see section VI(C) in this chapter.  
113 Göran Sluiter argued, for example, that the Chamber’s determination of customary international law fell ‘out of the sky’ 
and did not make ‘any ‘serious analysis of state practice and opinio juris’. See Göran Sluiter, ‘ICC’s Decision on Malawi’s 
Failure to Arrest Al Bashir Damages the Authority of the Court and Relations with the African union’, IlawyerBlog, 6 March 
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courts,114 and especially about the precedents and traces of state practice that the Chamber invoked in 
support for the asserted exception under customary international law.115 For example, while Milosevic 
and Taylor were sitting Heads of State at the time of their indictment, they were no longer in office 
during the time of their arrest. Neither could the cases of Gbagbo and Gaddafi qualify as precedents. 
They were not only indicted after al-Bashir, but Gbagbo was transferred to the Court with the consent 
of his home state (at a time that he was no longer in office) and Gaddafi was never arrested. Moreover, 
the Chamber did not address any countervailing evidence. It did not take into account, for instance, that 
many states parties do distinguish in their national legislation between the immunities of states parties 
and non-parties to the ICC.116 
 Secondly, in addition to concerns about the Chamber’s analysis of customary international law, 
commentators emphasized that the Chamber failed to explain the rationale of Article 98(1) in relation 
to Article 27(2).117 Why would Article 98(1) be there at all, if the personal immunities of the officials of 
non-parties would be completely irrelevant before the ICC? The Chamber essentially pretended that 
Article 98(1) ‘was not included in the Statute’.118 This silence was deemed problematic not just because 
of the AU’s reference to Article 98(1), but also because Article 21 stipulates that the Court’s judges can 
only resort to customary international law, when there is a lacuna in the written law of the Court itself. 
                                                          
2012. See also Kress, ‘ICC and Immunities, pp. 250-258; Dov Jacobs, ‘A Sad Hommage to Antonio Cassese: The ICC’s 
confused pronouncements on State Compliance and Head of State Immunity’, Spreading the Jam, 15 December 2011.  
114 See Akande, ‘ICC Issues Detailed Decision on Bashir’s Immunity’. See also Kiyani, ‘Al-Bashir and the ICC’, 491-497; 
Ssenyonjo, ‘AU Opposition to ICC’, 410-411; Daqun, ‘ICC and Immunities’, p. 65. Kreβ, ‘ICC and Immunities’, pp. 246-250; 
Nouwen, ‘Immunity of Taylor’, 655-658. 
115 See Kiyani, ‘Al-Bashir and the ICC’, 487-489; Daqun, ‘ICC and Immunities’, p. 65; Akande, ‘ICC Issues Detailed Decision 
on Bashir’s Immunity’; Jacobs, The ICC’s Approach to Immunities and Cooperation’, pp. 286-289.  
116 As discussed in Akande, ‘ICC Issues Detailed Decision on Bashir’s Immunity’. For a detailed analysis of customary 
international law on this matter, see the Minority Opinion of Judge de Brichambaut, paras. 84-96. 
117 See, for example, Tladi, ‘The ICC Decisions on Chad and Malawi’, 207; Kiyani, ‘Al-Bashir and the ICC’, 490; Jacobs, The 
ICC’s Approach to Immunities and Cooperation’, pp. 293-294. Ssenyonjo, ‘AU Opposition to ICC’, 409; Akande, ‘ICC Issues 
Detailed Decision on Bashir’s Immunity.  
118 Tladi, ‘The ICC Decisions on Chad and Malawi’, 199.  
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At no point in the decision did the Chamber discuss why it had to rely on customary international law 
in the first place.  
 In short, after initially trying to pass the matter on to the Security Council and the ASP, PTC I 
firmly rejected the AU’s immunity claim, because there would be an exception under customary 
international law. The AU’s reference to Article 98(1) and the underlying juxtaposition between arrest 
and immunity would be an outdated one. The Court’s judges reached this conclusion, however, without 
explaining the purpose of Article 98(1). For this reason, as well as the unconvincing analysis of state 
practice and opinio juris, the Chamber’s initial response to the AU’s position on the immunity of al-
Bashir was widely criticized by commentators. This criticism on the Chamber’s turn customary 
international law marked the way for a revision of the Chamber’s response in its later decisions on the 
non-compliance of African states parties.     
  
IV. The Revised Responses of Pre-Trial Chamber II   
Shortly after PTC I issued its rulings on the non-cooperation of Chad and Malawi, the constitution of 
the Pre-Trial Chambers changed and the situation of Darfur, including the case against al-Bashir, was 
assigned to PTC II, composed of Presiding Judge Trendafilova and Judges Kaul and Tarfusser.119 In first 
instance, however, this new composition did not lead to a different position on the question of al-Bashir’s 
immunity, nor did PTC II take the first opportunity that came along to address the strong criticism that 
the rulings of PTC I had received. 
 In response to al-Bashir’s next trip to Chad in early 2013, the new Chamber limited itself to 
saying that Chad had again failed to respect its obligations under the Statute ‘by deliberately refusing to 
arrest him’.120 Later that year, after al-Bashir briefly attended a special summit of the AU in Abuja 
                                                          
119 ICC Presidency (ICC-02/05-241), Decision on the constitution of Pre-Trial Chambers and on the assignment of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Darfur, Sudan and Côte d’lvoire situations, 15 March 2012.   
120 Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-151), Decision on the Non-compliance of the Republic of Chad with the Cooperation Requests 
Issued by the Court Regarding the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, 27 March 2013. Note that in contrast 
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(Nigeria), the Chamber was satisfied with Nigeria’s explanation that the Sudanese President had left the 
country at a time that the Nigerian authorities ‘were considering the necessary steps to be taken … in 
line with Nigeria’s obligations’.121 While Nigeria did not say that it was under the obligation to arrest 
al-Bashir and even though Nigeria did not explain why it had not contacted the Court upon al-Bashir’s 
arrival,122 the Court’s judges decided, without giving any further reasons, ‘that it [was] not warrant[ed] 
in the present circumstances’ to refer Nigeria to the Council and/or the ASP.123 
 In both cases, the new Chamber could have addressed al-Bashir’s immunity, but did not really 
need to. Neither Chad (which did not reply to the Court at all) nor Nigeria made any claims in this 
                                                          
to its previous rulings, the Chamber did not refer to the Security Council referral as a source of Chad’s obligation to arrest al-
Bashir. This visit was repeatedly discussed by the Bureau of the ASP, which could - again - not agree on any measures. See 
ASP, Bureau of the ASP - first meeting, 12 February 2013; ASP, Bureau of the ASP - second meeting, 20 March 2013; ASP, 
Bureau of the ASP - third meeting, 27 April 2013.   
121 On Sunday 14 July 2013, the Sudanese President was received ‘with a full guard of honour’ in the Nigerian capital, Abuja, 
where he was intended to speak at the Special Summit of the AU. ‘Sudan’s President Bashir leaves AU summit in Nigeria’, 
BBC News, 16 July 2013. After making a brief appearance during the opening of the summit, however, al-Bashir left the country 
on Monday afternoon, without giving his scheduled speech. According to the observations of the Nigerian Attorney General 
and Minister of Justice, Mohammed Belo Adoke, this ‘sudden departure ... occurred at the time that officials of relevant bodies 
and agencies of the Federal Government of Nigeria were considering the necessary steps to be taken in respect of his visit in 
line with Nigeria’s international obligations’. Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-158-Anx4), Report of the Registry on al-Bashir’s 
visit to Nigeria - Public Annex 4, 14 August 2013.  
122 In this regard, it is noteworthy that several media sources reported more than two days before al-Bashir’s actual trip that he 
would attend the Summit. See ‘Sudanese president will "soon" travel to Nigeria: ambassador’, Sudan Tribune, 11 July 2013; 
‘Rights groups slam Sudanese president’s upcoming visit to Nigeria’, Sudan Tribune, 13 July 2013.  
123 Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-159), Decision on the Cooperation of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Regarding Omar al-
Bashir’s Arrest and Surrender to the Court, 5 September 2013, para. 13. Note that on 15 July, the PTC had issued a decision 
calling upon Nigeria to arrest al-Bashir. Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-157), Decision Regarding Omar Al-Bashir’s Visit to the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 15 July 2013. On the same day, the Nigerian Coalition of the ICC also filed a suit at the federal 
High Court of Abuja seeking a domestic arrest warrant for al-Bashir and the UK Foreign Minister expressed its disappointment 
over Nigeria’s decision to host al-Bashir. See Mark Simmonds (Foreign Office Minister UK), ‘FCO Minister comments on 
Sudanese President’s visit to Nigeria’, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 15 July 2013. Al-Bashir’s visit to Nigeria was briefly 
discussed in ASP, Bureau of the ASP - eighth meeting, 19 July 2013. 
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direction. Al-Bashir’s next visit, however, which went to the DRC, pushed the Court’s judges to 
reconsider the issue. Unlike Chad and Nigeria, the DRC specifically referred to Article 98(1) and to the 
decisions of the AU Assembly to justify its non-cooperation. In response to the DRC’s arguments, and 
perhaps implicitly to the strong criticism that the Chad and Malawi decisions had received, PTC II 
decided to take a different approach than PTC I. 
A. Ruling on the non-cooperation of the DRC (2014) 
From the late evening of 25 February until the early morning of 27 February 2014, the DRC hosted 
President al-Bashir for a summit of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
in Kinshasa. After al-Bashir had left the country, and when asked by the Court’s judges to explain why 
the DRC had not arrested the Sudanese President, Minister of Justice Wivine Mumba Matipa argued in 
her observations to the Chamber that this was the result of ‘time and legal constraints’.124 According to 
the Minister, al-Bashir’s presence had placed the DRC in a ‘delicate and unmanageable situation’ 
because the DRC is a party to the ICC as well as a member of the AU.125 Since the Government would 
only have known at a very late stage that al-Bashir had been invited by COMESA, and given that it had 
only received the Chamber’s decision on the 26th, the thirty-six hours of his visit would not have been 
sufficient to make a decision with such ‘legal, diplomatic and security implications’.126 The Minister 
stressed that without this time constraint the Government would certainly ‘have contacted the Court and 
presented [these] difficulties’.127   
 In specifying the legal constraints that the DRC had identified, the Minister recalled that under 
Articles 87 and 89 of the Statute the DRC was ‘under an international obligation to arrest’ al-Bashir. In 
the DRC’s view, however, these provisions would have to ‘be read in conjunction’ with Article 98(1).128 
                                                          
124 Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-190-AnxII-tENG), Report of the Registry on al-Bashir’s visits to the DRC - Public Annex 2, 
27 March 2014, p.5 (official Court translation). 
125 Ibid., p. 6, at d.  
126 Ibid., p. 6 at e 
127 Ibid., p. 6 at f.  
128 Ibid., p. 6 at 2. 
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According to its observations, ‘a parallel’ would have to be drawn between Article 98(1) and the decision 
of the AU Assembly from October 2013 that no AU Head of State should have to appear before an 
international court like the ICC, in the sense that ‘both instruments [would] recognise the notion of 
immunity and construe it as an international legal constraint’.129 Since the DRC would have to respect 
its obligations towards the AU, and given that the ‘Court did not comply with [the] requirement’ of 
Article 98(1) to the extent that it should first have obtained ‘a waiver of immunity from the third State, 
namely Sudan’, the Minister concluded that ‘the DRC could not act beyond what it [was] legally 
permitted to do’.130 
 In the first part of its response to these observations, the Chamber emphasized that ‘in the 
absence of proper and logical justification’, a standard that Nigeria apparently had fulfilled, it could not 
accept the DRC’s alleged time constraints.131 The Court’s judges concluded that the Congolese 
authorities should have consulted the Court ‘of the problem faced under Article 98(1) … instead of 
deciding itself on its applicability’.132 As in the decision of PTC I on the non-cooperation of Chad and 
Malawi, PTC II thus stressed the (vertical) nature of its cooperation regime (i.e., the Court decides) and 
found that the DRC had breached its obligations by not consulting the Court.   
 The Chamber then continued to discuss whether a state party could potentially rely on Article 
98(1) for refusing to arrest al-Bashir. In contrast to PTC I, the Court’s judges did not answer this question 
on the basis of customary international law. Instead, PTC II turned attention to the rationale of Article 
98(1) in relation to Article 27(2). The Chamber found that Article 27(2) provides an ‘exception’ to 
customary international law and that this exception ‘should, in principle be confined to those states 
parties who have accepted it’.133 This limitation to the scope of Article 27(2) would follow from the fact 
                                                          
129 Ibid., p.7.  
130 Ibid., pp. 7-8.  
131 Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-195), Decision on the Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Regarding Omar 
Al Bashir’s Arrest and Surrender to the Court, 9 April 2014, para. 17. See also paras. 13-16.  
132 Ibid., para. 22.  
133 Ibid., para. 26.  
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that the Statute ‘is a multilateral treaty … governed by the rules set out in the [VCLT]’, 134 including 
Article 34 which makes clear that a treaty cannot impose obligations on third states without their 
consent.135 
 The consequence of this would be that ‘when the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court entails 
the prosecution of a Head of State of a non-party, the question of personal immunities might validly 
arise’.136 According to the Chamber, the solution to resolve ‘such a conflict’ is to be found in Article 
98(1).137 This provision directs the Court to secure the cooperation of the non-party ‘for the waiver or 
lifting the immunity of its Head of State’.138 As argued by the AU, the Chamber found that Article 98(1) 
prevented a state party from being forced to act ‘inconsistently with its international obligations towards 
the non-party with respect to the immunities attached to the latter’s Head of State’.139  
 After having explained the rationale of Article 98(1) in relation to Article 27(2), and thus 
addressing one of the main points of critique about the decisions of PTC I, the Chamber questioned 
whether the DRC faced the situation of competing obligations that is foreseen in Article 98(1). In 
answering this question, the Chamber distinguished between (A) the DRC’s obligation to respect al-
                                                          
134 Ibid., para. 26.  
135 Ibid. The PTC acknowledged that there are two exceptions to this rule under the VCLT, as provided for under Articles 35 
and 38. Furthermore, the Chamber referred to a number of earlier rulings, including Al-Senussi (ICC-01/11-01/11-420), 
Decision on the request of the Defence of Abdullah al-Senussi to make a finding of non-cooperation by the Islamic Republic 
of Mauritania and refer the matter to the Security Council, 28 August 2013, para. 12 (citing Article 34 VCLT, while noting that 
‘this principle may be altered by the Security Council, which may, in accordance with the Charter of the [UN], impose an 
obligation to cooperate with the Court on those United Nations Member states that are not parties to the Statute’).  
136 Ibid., para. 27. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid. Note that the decision is not clear on whether Article 98(1) only applies to non-parties (which is especially relevant in 
relation to ‘the property of the third state’). The Chamber refers at some points to non-parties and at others more generally to 
third states. For further discussion and references, see part II(B) in this chapter.  
139 Ibid.  
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Bashir’s immunity from arrest under customary international law, and (B) its obligation to act in 
accordance with the binding decisions of the AU Assembly.140  
 As to the first obligation, the Chamber found that in the present case there would not be any 
inconsistency between the obligation to arrest al-Bashir and the obligation to respect his immunity, 
because the Security Council ‘implicitly waived [his] immunities under international law’.141 When the 
Council referred the situation in Darfur, it obliged Sudan ‘to cooperate fully with and provide any 
necessary assistance to the Court’ (para. 2 of Resolution 1593).142 According to the Chamber, this 
cooperation requirement ‘was meant to eliminate any impediment to the proceedings before the Court, 
including the lifting of immunities’, because any other interpretation would render Sudan’s obligation 
to cooperate fully ‘senseless’.143 On the basis of this argument, the Chamber concluded that al-Bashir 
no longer enjoyed any immunity under customary international law and that there does not exist any 
‘impediment at the horizontal level between the DRC and Sudan’ which could justify the DRC’s 
decision to refuse to arrest al-Bashir.144 
 As to the DRC’s obligation to respect the decisions of the AU Assembly, the Chamber noted 
that ‘the conflicting obligations which the DRC claims exist are not merely between the [AU] and the 
Court’.145 The actual ‘conflict’ would lie between the decisions of the AU Assembly to retain the 
                                                          
140 This points to another juxtaposition that the AU has advanced against the prosecution of al-Bashir, namely between the 
obligations that African states parties have under the Rome Statute and their obligations under the AU Constitutive Act. See 
Jacobs, ‘The ICC’s Approach to Immunities and Cooperation’, pp. 299-301.  
141 Ibid., para 29.  
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid. Note that the Chamber added that otherwise the immunity of al-Bashir would form ‘a procedural bar from prosecution 
before the Court’. In explaining the term ‘procedural bar’, the Chamber referred to ICJ, ‘Jurisdictional Immunities of the State’, 
para. 58 (relevant part: ‘as the Court has stated … the law of immunity is essentially procedural in nature …  it regulates the 
exercise of jurisdiction in respect of particular conduct and is thus entirely distinct from the substantive law which determines 
whether that conduct is lawful or unlawful’). 
144 Ibid., para. 29.  
145 Ibid., para. 30 
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immunity of al-Bashir and Resolution 1593 ‘which removed such immunity for the purpose of the 
proceedings before the Court’.146 In the opinion of the Court’s judges, this conflict would be ‘resolved 
by virtue of Articles 25 and 103 of the UN Charter’.147 In reference to the considerations of the ICJ in 
the Namibia Opinion and the Lockerbie case, the Chamber stressed that the DRC’s obligation to respect 
the decision of the Council prevails over ‘any other decision, including that of the [AU], providing for 
any obligation to the contrary’.148 By not arresting al-Bashir, the DRC would not only have disregarded 
its obligations under the Statute, but also its obligations under Resolution 1593 and as such the Charter.  
 In sum, in its decision on the non-cooperation of the DRC, PTC II overturned the rulings of PTC 
I on the non-cooperation of Chad and Malawi, but came to the same conclusion in the sense that Article 
98(1) would not enable states parties to evade their obligation to arrest al-Bashir.149 In the much 
criticized decisions of PTC I, the Court’s judges argued that there is an exception to customary 
international law. In the DRC decision, PTC II rejected this interpretation and found that the Council 
had implicitly removed al-Bashir’s immunity from arrest.  
                                                          
146 Ibid.  
147 Ibid.  
148 Ibid., para. 31. See Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising 
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, [1992] ICJ Rep 3, 
para. 37; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, [1971] ICJ Rep 16, para. 116. For further 
discussion on the Namibia Opinion, see part V(B) in this chapter.  
149 Note that several scholars have criticized the Chamber’s new ruling for not explicitly addressing the Chad and Malawi 
decisions. See for example Gaeta, ‘ICC Changes its Mind on Immunities Al-Bashir’. In response, de Wet has observed that 
this criticism ignores the fact that it is rare for chambers of international courts and tribunals to openly criticize a decision of a 
different chamber. This would be simply be ‘a reality of international adjudication’. De Wet, ‘Implications of Al-Bashir’s Visit 
to South Africa’, 1057.  
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B. Al-Bashir’s visit to South Africa (2015) 
In contrast to its earlier rulings, the DRC decision did not receive much attention from the AU.150 With 
this silence the AU did certainly not intend to signal support for the Chamber’s revised approach. In its 
2012 communiqué on the case against al-Bashir, the AU Commission already rejected the suggestion 
that the Council somehow removed al-Bashir’s immunity by saying that ‘such lifting should have been 
explicit’, and that the ‘mere referral of a ‘situation’ … to the ICC or requesting a state to cooperate with 
the ICC [should not] be interpreted as lifting immunities granted under international law’.151  
 The real reason why the AU Commission and the Assembly did not spend much energy on the 
Chamber’s new approach, was that the case against al-Bashir had moved down on the AU’s political 
agenda. In the middle of the battles surrounding the prosecution of Kenyatta and Ruto, which were at a 
high point in 2014, the AU’s claim that al-Bashir enjoyed immunity from arrest was simply not the main 
priority. The AU continued to underscore that all member states have an obligation to comply with the 
Assembly’s decision on the arrest warrants for al-Bashir, but the focus of the AU’s campaign against 
the prosecution of African presidents had shifted from Sudan to Kenya.152  
 The question of al-Bashir’s immunity regained political momentum again in June 2015, when 
South Africa hosted the Sudanese President for a summit of the AU. In the years before this trip, the 
South African Government had taken a different position than the AU on the prosecution of al-Bashir. 
                                                          
150 In the next decision of the AU Assembly from January 2015, the African Heads of State and Government did not even 
mention the decision, but only commended the DRC ‘for complying with [the] AU Decision for non-cooperation for the arrest 
and surrender of President Omar Al Bashir’. AU Assembly, Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the 
Implementation of Previous Decisions on the International Criminal Court, Assembly/AU/Dec.547(XXIV), 30-31 January 
2015, para. 18. Note that al-Bashir’s visit to the DRC was discussed in ASP, Bureau of the ASP - second meeting, 17 March 
2014; ASP, Bureau of the ASP - third meeting, 16 April 2014.  
151 AU Commission, Press Release Decisions PTC I. Uganda (on behalf of the AU) in ASP, General Debate of the Twelfth 
Session, 20-26 November 2013. 
152 AU Assembly, Decision January 2015, paras. 3 and 19. AU Assembly, Decision on the update of the Commission on the 




South Africa had supported the AU’s deferral bid,153 but had not allowed the Sudanese President to visit 
the country on numerous occasions such as the two inauguration ceremonies of President Zuma, the 
2010 Football World Cup and the funeral of former President Nelson Mandela in 2013.154 In fact, South 
African officials had repeatedly declared that South Africa intended to live up to its obligations under 
the Rome Statute and that South Africa would arrest al-Bashir if it would get the opportunity to do so.155 
Because of all this, many observers were caught by surprise when news agencies reported that al-Bashir 
would attend the 25th summit of the AU in Johannesburg.156  
 In response to these news reports on al-Bashir’s scheduled visit, the Registrar of the ICC sent a 
note verbale to the South African embassy in The Hague on 28 May and reminded South Africa of its 
obligation to arrest al-Bashir.157 Following this reminder, South Africa requested consultations under 
Article 97 on 11 June 2015. This last minute request, which was made only 48 hours before al-Bashir’s 
                                                          
153 See the statement of South Africa in UNSC, S/PV.6028, 3 December 2008; ASP, General Debate of the Seventh Session, 
14-22 November 2008; UNGA, A/64/PV.29, 29 October 2009.   
154 The High Court stated in its decision ‘that it is common cause that during 2009, President Bashir was invited by South 
Africa to attend the inauguration of President Zuma in South Africa… [but that] South African officials confirmed that they 
would arrest President Bashir should he arrive in the country. For this reason President Bashir declined South Africa’s invitation 
to attend the inauguration’. See Southern Africa Litigation Centre v. Minister of Justice And Constitutional Development and 
Others, Final Judgment Gauteng Division of the High Court, 24 June 2015, para. 12.   
155 Ibid. See also ‘South Africa reverses course on ICC warrant for Bashir’, Sudan Tribune, 31 July 2009; ‘Notes following the 
Briefing of Department International Relations and Cooperation’s Director-General, Ayanda Ntsaluba’, SA News, 31 July 2009.  
156 Within diplomatic circles, however, al-Bashir’s presence was probably on the agenda for quite some time and may have 
already been talked over by President Zuma with al-Bashir during his official state visit to Khartoum in February 2015. 
Presidency of South Africa, ‘President Zuma to undertake a Working Visit to Sudan’, 29 January 2015. Formally speaking, the 
South African Government was informed by the AU in early June that al-Bashir would attend the summit. This notification let 
to discussions within the South African Cabinet in which it was decided that al-Bashir would not be arrested. For further details, 
see Ventura, ‘Escape from Johannesburg?’, 998.  
157 Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-242), Decision following the Prosecutor’s request for an order further clarifying that the 
Republic of South Africa is under the obligation to immediately arrest and surrender Omar Al Bashir, 13 June 2015, para. 3.  
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arrival, let Presiding Judge Tarfusser of PTC II to convene an urgent meeting at the Court.158 During 
this meeting, South Africa informed the Chamber that it foresaw difficulties in implementing the request 
for cooperation with the arrest of al-Bashir because ‘there was lack of clarity in the law and [because] 
… South Africa was subject to competing obligations’.159  
 In addressing these alleged difficulties, Judge Tarfusser explained during the meeting, however, 
that there exists ‘no ambiguity in the law’, that South Africa is under a clear obligation to arrest al-
Bashir, and that any (further) consultations between the Court and South Africa under Article 97 would 
‘not trigger any suspension or stay of this standing obligation’.160 The following day, Judge Tarfusser 
also issued a public decision on the matter, in which he recalled the DRC decision, and underscored that 
the Chamber had left ‘no ambiguity or uncertainty’ with respect to South Africa’s obligation to arrest 
the Sudanese President.161 Judge Tarfusser concluded that since there is ‘no issue which remains unclear 
or has not already been explicitly discussed and settled by the Court, the consultations under [A]rticle 
97 … [had] ended’ and that no further reminder or clarification was necessary.162  
                                                          
158 According to Judge Tarfusser, this was a meeting for the purpose of consultations under Article 97 (para. 5). South Africa 
has claimed, however, that this was ‘a preliminary meeting between the Government and the Court… and [that] it was the 
understanding of the Government that the official Article 97 consultations were to take place on Monday 15 June 2015. See 
Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-248-AnxI), Submission from the Republic of South Africa in response to the Order requesting a 
submission dated 4 September 2015 for the purposes of proceedings under Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute, 2 October 2015, 
para. 1.3. In its decision on the non-cooperation of South Africa (2017), the Chamber confirmed that the meeting was a meeting 
for the purpose of consultations under Article 97 and that these consultations were closed after this meeting because the matter 
raised by South Africa ‘could be settled only as part of a judicial process and with reference to the applicable law, rather than 
through a “political and diplomatic process” ’. ICC South Africa decision (2017), para. 118.  
159 ICC South Africa decision (2015), para. 4. Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-243), Registry Report on the consultations 
undertaken under Article 97 of the Rome Statute by the Republic of South Africa and the departure of Omar Al Bashir from 
South Africa on 15 June 2015, 17 June 2015.  
160 ICC South Africa decision (2015), paras. 8 and 5.  
161 Ibid., para. 1. 
162 Ibid., para. 8. Note, however, that the report of Registry mentions that on the day of al-Bashir’s departure (15 June) the 
South African embassy send a note verbale in response to the decision of Judge Tarfusser (confidential as annex VI to the 
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 In addition to calls from the Court and other international actors,163 the South African 
Government was pressured by its own judiciary to cooperate with the ICC. Upon al-Bashir’s arrival on 
Saturday 13 June 2015, the South African Litigation Centre (SALC), a prominent NGO in the field of 
human rights, brought an urgent application to the Gauteng Division of the High Court of South Africa 
(the High Court), requesting an order for the arrest of al-Bashir.164 In response to this application, the 
South African Government submitted in its answering affidavit that al-Bashir enjoyed immunity from 
arrest, inter alia, on the basis of a host-state agreement that it had concluded with the AU Commission.165 
In its ruling on Monday 15 June, which was issued around 15:30 local time,166 the High Court rejected 
the Government’s arguments, and found that al-Bashir did not enjoy immunity from arrest in South 
Africa. The High Court granted the application of the SALC and compelled the South African 
Government ‘to take all reasonable steps to prepare to arrest President Bashir’.167  
 By the time that the High Court issued its oral ruling, however, al-Bashir had already left South 
Africa. Judge Fabricus of the High Court had issued a provisional order on Sunday 14 June, which 
                                                          
report) which submitted ‘that as far as the authorities had been able to establish the consultations under Article 97 had not taken 
place’. South Africa later stated that it considered the decision of Judge Tarfusser ‘in violation… of [its] basic right to fair 
procedure’. See ICC Submission South Africa (October 2015), para. 1.5. 
163 EU Statement by Spokesperson on South Africa and the International Criminal Court, 14 June 2015; John Kirby, ‘Press 
Statement - Travel of Sudanese President Bashir to South Africa’, 14 June 2015. For reactions of civil society organizations, 
see ‘No business as usual as al-Bashir flees South Africa‘, Coalition for the ICC, 16 June 2015. 
164 For an overview of the proceedings before the High Court, see Southern Africa Litigation Centre v. Minister of Justice And 
Constitutional Development and Others, Final Judgment Gauteng Division of the High Court, 24 June 2015, paras. 4-9. For a 
detailed discussion of these proceedings, see also Ventura, ‘Escape from Johannesburg?’, 997-998, 1001-1005.  
165 Southern Africa Litigation Centre v. Minister of Justice And Constitutional Development and Others, Respondents 
Answering Affidavit, 15 June 2015, para. 3.  
166 Southern Africa Litigation Centre v. Minister of Justice And Constitutional Development and Others, Explanatory Affidavit 
of the Director General of the Department of Home Affairs, 25 June 2015, para. 3.  
167 The Chamber gave its reasons for this order in its written judgment on 24 June 2015. For a summary and analysis of the 
judgment, see Ventura, ‘Escape from Johannesburg?’, 1005-1016; Tladi, ‘Duty South Africa to Arrest al-Bashir’, 1031-1032; 
De Wet, ‘Implications of Al-Bashir’s Visit to South Africa’, 1051-1053.  
 162 
 
explicitly prohibited al-Bashir from leaving South Africa until the High Court had ruled on the 
application, and had directed the South African Government ‘to take all necessary steps to prevent him 
from doing so’.168 Yet, despite this order, al-Bashir flew out from the military airbase at Waterkloof 
shortly before noon on Monday.  
 In the week following this dramatic departure, South African and international news agencies 
quoted sources close to the Government speaking of a ‘secret hotel meeting’ in which a group of 
government ministers had agreed to do anything to protect al-Bashir, ‘even if it meant flouting court 
rulings and undermining the constitution’.169 The South African Government, however, denied that this 
meeting ever took place. In an official statement on 22 June, a Government spokesperson said that these 
media reports were based on ‘nameless and faceless sources’ and that the Government remained 
committed ‘to finalize this matter through the court processes’.170 The statement further noted that the 
Government was expected ‘to provide the [High Court] with a report that explains how President al-
Bashir left the country’.171  
 Three days later, this report was provided by way of an explanatory affidavit of the Director 
General of the Department of Home Affairs of South Africa.172 The Director General, Mkuseli Apleni, 
presented several documents in order to prove that he had served the provisional order of Judge Fabricus 
to all 72 points of entry and exit from South Africa, including the military airbase at Waterkloof.173 By 
the time that news reports appeared saying that al-Bashir had left the country, Apleni said to have 
contacted the immigration officials that were on duty at the airbase in order to verify this information. 
                                                          
168 Southern Africa Litigation Centre v. Minister of Justice And Constitutional Development and Others, Interim Court Order, 
14 June 2015, paras. 1-2.  
169 Mizilikazi Wa Afrika, Piet Rrampedi and Stephan Hofstatter, ‘The truth behind Bashir’s great escape’, Sudan Times, 21 
June 2015. See also ‘South Africa denies plot to allow Omar al-Bashir to leave’, BBC News, 22 June 2015.  
170 ‘No secret meeting held to protect President al-Bashir’, South African Government News Agency, 22 June 2015.  
171 Ibid.  
172 Southern Africa Litigation Centre v. Minister of Justice And Constitutional Development and Others, Explanatory Affidavit 
of the Director General of the Department of Home Affairs, 25 June 2015.  
173 Ibid., para. 5-6.  
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According to Apleni, the respective officials informed him that the presidential airplane of Sudan had 
left, but ‘that the passport of President Bashir was not part of the passports that were handed to 
immigration for processing of the persons that were on board of the flight’.174 The Director General 
further explained that it is regular procedure that the passengers on a ‘VIP flight’ do not personally 
appear before immigration officials. Because of this regular procedure, al-Bashir could fly out of South 
Africa, according to Apleni, even though the order of the High Court had been served to all immigration 
officials.175 
 This remarkable explanation for al-Bashir’s escape and the Government’s persistent claim that 
the Sudanese President enjoyed immunity from arrest became the subject of proceedings before the 
domestic courts of South Africa. In the course of these proceedings, the High Court and subsequently 
the Supreme Court of Appeal established that the South African Government had breached its 
obligations under both domestic and international law by failing to arrest al-Bashir.176 Meanwhile, the 
ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber waited its turn. In October 2015, the Chamber granted a request from South 
                                                          
174 Ibid., para. 7.  
175 Ibid., para. 11.4.  
176 Upon the judgment of the High Court, the South African Government first sought leave to appeal from the High Court itself 
(which was denied), and then from the Supreme Court of Appeal. Southern Africa Litigation Centre v. Minister of Justice And 
Constitutional Development and Others, Judgment Gauteng Division of the High Court on Application for Leave to Appeal, 
15 September 2015; Southern Africa Litigation Centre v. Minister of Justice And Constitutional Development and Others, 
Notion of Motion in the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, 30 September 2015. The Supreme Court of Appeal issued 
its decision in early 2016, ruling that the South African Government had breached its obligations under domestic law and under 
the Rome Statute by failing to arrest al-Bashir. Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v. Southern African 
Litigation Centre, Judgment Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, 15 March 2016. For an analysis of the ruling of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, see Dapo Akande, ‘The Bashir Case: Has the South African Supreme Court Abolished Immunity 
for all Heads of States?’, EJIL Talk, 29 March 2016; Dire Tladi, ‘Interpretation and International Law in South African Courts: 
The Supreme Court of Appeal and the Al Bashir Saga’ (2016) 16 African Human Rights Law Journal 310-338. 
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Africa to extend the time limit to submit its views on the events surrounding al-Bashir’s attendance of 
the AU summit until ‘the domestic proceedings are finalised’.177  
C. Ruling on the non-cooperation of South Africa (2017) 
The domestic proceedings on al-Bashir’s visit to South Africa were concluded in late 2016. Shortly after 
announcing its intention to withdraw from the Rome Statute,178 the South African Government decided 
to retract its appeal before the Constitutional Court of South Africa.179 Following this decision, the ICC 
moved along with the proceedings under Article 87(7) of the Statute on the alleged non-compliance by 
South Africa.  
 In contrast to the Chamber’s previous proceedings on al-Bashir’s visits to African states parties, 
the Court’s judges accorded South Africa as well as the Prosecutor an opportunity to express their views 
                                                          
177 Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-249), Decision on the request of the Republic of South Africa for an extension of the time limit 
for submitting their views for the purposes of proceedings under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute, 15 October 2015. The PTC 
further ordered the competent authorities of South Africa to promptly report to the Chamber on any developments in the relevant 
domestic judicial proceedings as they occur. Following the Chamber’s decision, South Africa submitted three reports 
concerning the progress of the ongoing domestic judicial proceedings before its national courts on 21 and 24 December 2015, 
and on 4 May 2016. 
178 UN Treaties Collection (C.N.786.2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10), Declaratory statement by the Republic of South Africa on 
the decision to withdraw from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 19 October 2016.  
179 The South African Government initially appealed the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal and put its arguments to the 
Constitutional Court. However, upon its decision to withdraw South Africa from the Rome Statute, the Government announced 
that it would no longer pursue the appeal. For further discussion on this matter, see Dapo Akande, ‘South African Withdrawal 
from the International Criminal Court - Does the ICC Statute Lead to Violations of Other International Obligations?’, EJIL 
Talk, 22 October 2016. 
 165 
 
on the matter in a public hearing.180 During this hearing, which took place on 7 April 2017,181 South 
Africa argued that ‘fundamental errors had occurred’ in the conduct of the requested consultations under 
Article 97.182 In the absence of specific rules, the consultations had wrongly been subjected to a ‘quasi-
judicial rather than a diplomatic and political process’.183 Furthermore, on the question of immunity, 
South Africa submitted that at the time of al-Bashir’s visit there was ‘ambiguity and uncertainty’ with 
respect to the obligation of South Africa to arrest and surrender the Sudanese President.184 South Africa 
pointed to inconsistencies in the Chamber’s previous decisions,185 and challenged the DRC decision on 
the ground that ‘it lacked reasoning for its crucial finding’, namely that the Security Council referral 
constitutes a waiver of al-Bashir’s immunity.186 In essence, South Africa took the position that al-
                                                          
180 Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-274), Decision convening a public hearing for the purposes of a determination under article 
87(7) of the Statute with respect to the Republic of South Africa, 8 December 2016. PTC II also gave an opportunity to 
representatives of the United Nations to express their views, but the UN Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and United 
Nations Legal Counsel responded that it would not be sending a representative to attend the hearing and would not be making 
written submissions for the Chamber’s consideration. According to the Prosecutor, this was ‘a missed opportunity for the 
organisation to pronounce on the important issue of non-compliance in relation to a situation that the Council referred to the 
Prosecutor’. As stated in UNSC, S/PV.7963, 8 June 2017. Note that the Chamber did receive written observations from the 
Kingdom of Belgium and from the Southern African Litigation Centre. For a summary of these observations, see ICC South 
Africa decision (2017), paras. 54-56.   
181 Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-T-2-ENG), Public Court Records, 7 April 2017.  
182 ICC South Africa decision (2017), para. 27. Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-290), Submission from the Government of the 
Republic of South Africa for the purposes of proceedings under Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute, 17 March 2017, paras. 28-
49.   
183 Ibid.  
184 ICC South Africa decision (2017), para. 31; Public Court Records, 7 April 2017, p. 19, lines 1-4.  
185 Submission South Africa, para. 70.  
186 ICC South Africa decision (2017), para. 31; Submission South Africa, paras. 61-67; Public Court Records, 7 April 2017, 
pp. 25-27. Note that in its written submission, South Africa also presented the additional argument that it can be doubted 
whether the Security Council has the authority to waive the immunities of sitting Heads of State. Submission South Africa, 
para. 85. For further discussion and references on this matter, see sub-sections (i) and (ii) in part V(B) of this chapter.  
 166 
 
Bashir’s immunity was not waived by the Council,187 and that Article 98(1) precluded the Court from 
requesting its states parties to arrest and surrender al-Bashir.188  
 For her part, the Prosecutor submitted that any consultations under Article 97 did not alter or 
suspend the ‘pre-existing, clear, standing obligation to comply’ with the arrest warrants for al-Bashir.189 
The Prosecutor claimed that South Africa had chosen to ignore this obligation,190 and called upon the 
Chamber to refer the matter to the Security Council and the ASP.191 On the question of immunity, the 
Prosecutor argued that the DRC decision was ‘authoritative with regard to the issue at hand and did not 
need to be re-litigated’.192 According to the Prosecutor, the Security Council’s referral placed Sudan ‘in 
a situation comparable to states parties’.193 Because of Sudan’s duty under the UN Charter to carry out 
decisions of the Security Council and the indirect application of Article 27(2) to Sudan, there would not 
                                                          
187 In its submission South Africa presented detailed arguments as to why Resolution 1593 cannot be interpreted to include an 
implicit waiver. South Africa also contested the alternative Statute-based approach that was eventually adopted by the Chamber. 
In this respect, South Africa argued that ‘if the Security Council made the Statute applicable to Sudan, that included article 98, 
and that article 27(2) applies only to immunity from the jurisdiction of the Court’. ICC South Africa decision (2017), paras. 
34-37; Submission South Africa, paras. 81-99. For further discussion and references on this matter, see parts V(B) and V(C) in 
this chapter.  
188 ICC South Africa decision (2017), para. 32. Note that South Africa not only identified customary international law as the 
basis for al-Bashir’s immunity, but also referred to the Host Agreement that was concluded between itself and the AU. See ICC 
South Africa decision (2017), para. 33. Submission South Africa, paras. 75-80.  
189 ICC South Africa decision (2017), para. 43; Public Court Records, 7 April 2017, p. 45, lines 18-20.  
190 ICC South Africa decision (2017), para. 42. Public Court Records, 7 April 2017, p. 43, lines 1-3.  
191 ICC South Africa decision (2017), para. 53; Submission Prosecutor, paras. 97-106.  
192 ICC South Africa decision (2017), para. 44. Public Court Records, 7 April 2017, p. 60, lines 8-13. On the question of 
immunity, see Submission Prosecutor, paras. 107-120; Public Court Records, pp. 50-78. Note that this was the very first 
opportunity for the Prosecutor to formally express her views on the obligation of states parties to arrest al-Bashir. In previous 
proceedings, the Chamber did not invite the Prosecutor to submit observations. 
193 Public Court Records, 7 April 2017, p. 71, lines 5-12. Cited by the Chamber in ICC South Africa decision (2017), para. 48. 
Note that while the Prosecutor called the DRC decision authoritative, she still proposed an alternative approach that was 
eventually also adopted by the Chamber.  
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be any ‘conflicting obligation at the horizontal level between South Africa and Sudan’.194 In short, the 
Prosecutor submitted that the DRC decision and Single Judge Tarfusser were right to conclude that al-
Bashir does not enjoy immunity from arrest.  
 After the public hearing, Pre-Trial Chamber II, in which Presiding Judge Tarfusser was now 
joined by Judge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut and Judge Chango-ho Chung, took another three months 
before issuing its decision on the alleged non-compliance of South Africa. On 6 July 2017, the Chamber 
found that South Africa had failed to comply with its obligations under the Statute by not arresting al-
Bashir, but that a referral to the ASP or the Security Council would not be appropriate in the present 
circumstances. How did the Chamber come to these conclusions?  
 On the question of immunity, the Chamber started out by making two preliminary observations. 
Firstly, the Chamber noted that under customary international law sitting Heads of State normally enjoy 
immunity from arrest by another state,195 even when that arrest is sought on behalf of an international 
court like the ICC.196 In this respect, the Chamber followed the DRC decision of PTC II in overturning 
the Malawi and Chad decisions of PTC I.197 There would not be an exception under customary 
international law for the prosecution of international crimes by an international court like the ICC.  
                                                          
194 ICC South Africa decision (2017), paras. 49-50; Public Court Records, 7 April 2017, p. 71.  
195 Note that the Chamber did not discuss the question whether Article 27(2) reflects customary international law to the extent 
that immunities cannot bar an international court from exercising its jurisdiction for the prosecution of international crimes. 
196 ICC South Africa decision (2017), para. 68. Note that before turning to customary international law, the Chamber rejected 
South Africa’s argument that al-Bashir also enjoyed immunity under the Host Agreement between South Africa and the AU. 
According to the Chamber, ‘no provision of the Host Agreement appears to confer on al-Bashir any immunity from arrest’, 
which would make ‘it unnecessary to consider the issue of treaty-based immunity any further’ (para. 67).  
197 The minority opinion of Judge de Brichambaut more or less agreed with the Chamber’s conclusion on this point. His 
minority opinion includes a detailed analysis of state practice and a discussion on the nature of international courts (paras. 84-
96). Based on this analysis, he concluded that ‘it is not possible to determine, at this point in time, whether the scope of senior 
officials’ immunity from arrest is restricted when the arresting state is acting in compliance with its obligations towards the 
Court or whether the rule of customary international law applies in the same manner in these circumstances as it would in the 
horizontal relationship between states’.   
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 Secondly, the Chamber emphasized that this case did not revolve around the ‘effect of any 
possible immunity … on the exercise per se by the Court of its jurisdiction’.198 The Chamber pointed 
out that no dispute had arisen ‘with respect to the general validity of the proceedings against al-
Bashir’.199 The ‘only’ question that the Chamber would have to answer is whether al-Bashir’s immunity 
poses a procedural bar to the cooperation of states parties with his arrest.  
 In addressing this question, the Chamber first examined the scope of Article 27(2) and its 
relationship with Article 98(1). Like in the DRC decision, the Chamber concluded that Article 27(2) 
forms a permanent waiver for the immunities of states parties, and that a state party can never invoke 
immunities to refuse cooperation with the arrest and surrender of the sitting Head of State of a state 
party.200 With respect to states that are not a party to the Statute, like Sudan, the Chamber acknowledged 
that the situation might be different. In the words of the Chamber, under Article 98(1) the Court ‘may 
not, in principle, without first obtaining a waiver of immunity, request a state party to arrest and 
surrender the Head of State of a State not party to the Statute’.201  
 Next, the Chamber turned to the effect of the Security Council’s Resolution in the case of al-
Bashir. In the DRC decision, the Chamber had concluded that the text of Resolution 1593 (para. 2) 
showed that the Security Council ‘implicitly waived [al-Bashir’s] immunities under international 
                                                          
198 Ibid., para. 69.  
199 Ibid. 
200 The Chamber firmly rejected the argument made by South Africa that Article 27 does not have any effect on the rights and 
obligations of states vis-à-vis the Court, but concerns only the Court’s jurisdiction. See ICC South Africa decision (2017), 
paras. 73-81. Note that the Chamber’s conclusion on this point is the same as in the DRC decision, but that the underlying 
reasoning is different. For further discussion and references, see part II(B) of this chapter.  
201 Ibid., para. 82.  
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law’.202 This time, however, the majority of the Chamber adopted a different approach.203 Instead of 
focussing on the interpretation of the Security Council’s Resolution, the Chamber argued ‘that the 
necessary effect’ of the Security Council’s referral is that, ‘for the limited purpose of the situation in 
Darfur, Sudan has rights and duties analogous to those of states parties to the Statute’.204 According to 
the majority of the Chamber, Article 27(2) ‘applies equally with respect to Sudan’, which would mean 
that the immunities of al-Bashir ‘do not apply vis-à-vis states parties’ and that Article 98(1) ‘is not 
applicable’ because there is no immunity to be waived.205 In turn, states parties, including South Africa 
would have an obligation to arrest and surrender al-Bashir to the Court.206 
                                                          
202 ICC DRC decision, para. 29. Note that the Chamber (in the same composition as in the South Africa decision in 2017) had 
also adopted this approach in its decisions on al-Bashir’s visits to Uganda and Djibouti in July 2016. Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-
01/09-266), Decision on the non-compliance by the Republic of Djibouti with the request to arrest and surrender Omar Al-
Bashir to the Court and referring the matter to the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the State Parties to the 
Rome Statute, 11 July 2016; Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-267), Decision on the non-compliance by the Republic of Uganda 
with the request to arrest and surrender Omar Al-Bashir to the Court and referring the matter to the United Nations Security 
Council and the Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute, 11 July 2016. 
203 Judge de Brichambaut disagreed with the majority on this point. See Minority Opinion of Judge de Brichambaut, paras. 39-
58. He concluded that ‘the arguments of both the Prosecutor and South Africa contain a degree of validity’ and that ‘contrary 
to the position of the Majority’ these arguments ‘do not allow for a firm conclusion ... with regard to the question of whether 
or not Sudan is analogous to a state party’ (para. 58).  
204 ICC South Africa decision (2017), para. 88. The Chamber did not provide a detailed explanation for its reasoning at this 
point. The Chamber acknowledged that the effect of the Security Council’s referral amounts to ‘an expansion of the 
applicability of an international treaty to a state which had not voluntarily accepted it as such’, but that its decision in this 
respect ‘is in line with the Charter of the United Nations, which permits the Security Council to impose obligations on states’ 
(para. 89). In support, the Chamber referred, without further explanation, to the Namibia Opinion. Legal Consequences for 
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 
276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, [1971] ICJ Rep 16, para. 116. For further discussion on the Namibia Opinion, see part V(B) in 
this chapter. 
205 ICC South Africa decision (2017), para. 91-93.  
206 Ibid., para. 93.  
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 The Chamber added that for this conclusion, ‘it is immaterial … whether the Security Council 
intended - or even anticipated - that … al-Bashir’s immunity as Head of State of Sudan would not operate 
to prevent his arrest’.207 In contrast to the DRC decision, the Chamber noted that it did not see a ‘waiver 
in the Security Council Resolution’.208 However, ‘no such waiver - whether “explicit” or “implicit” - 
would be necessary’, according to the Chamber, because the effect of the Security Council’s Resolution 
is that Article 27(2) applies to Sudan.209  
 Having established that South Africa was under a duty to arrest al-Bashir, the Chamber turned 
to the procedural scope of Article 98(1). At this point, the Chamber emphasized that Article 98(1) does 
not provide ‘rights to states parties to refuse compliance with the Court’s requests for cooperation’.210 
Even if there was a conflict of obligations in the meaning of Article 98, this ‘could not have relieved 
South Africa of its duties vis-à-vis the Court’.211 As to South Africa’s concerns about the consultations 
under Article 97, the Chamber made a similar argument. The Chamber explained that no fundamental 
errors had been made and that South Africa had been given the opportunity to raise its problems.212 
Moreover, any consultations (whether requested or ongoing) between a state and the Court ‘do not, as 
such suspend or otherwise affect the validity of the Court’s request for cooperation’.213 In other words, 
South Africa’s interactions with the Court did not entitle South Africa to disregard the Court’s request. 
South Africa had a duty to arrest al-Bashir and failed to comply with this obligation.214  
                                                          
207 Ibid., para. 95.  
208 Ibid., para. 96.  
209 Ibid.  
210 Ibid., paras. 99-106.  
211 Ibid., para. 106.  
212 The Chamber gave a detailed analysis of the scope of Article 97 in paras. 110-116, and on the interactions between South 
Africa and the Court in paras. 117-122. 
213 Ibid., para. 119.  
214 Note that in an obiter dictum the Chamber also discussed the question whether the Genocide Convention (to which both 
South Africa and Sudan are parties) might affect al-Bashir’s immunity from arrest (para. 109). In his Minority Opinion, Judge 
de Brichambaut argued, based on a detailed interpretation of Articles IV and VI of the Convention (paras. 4-37), that as a 
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 The final question that the Chamber had to address was whether the present circumstances 
warranted a referral of the matter to the ASP and/or the Security Council. 215 Similar to the Nigeria 
decision, the Chamber concluded that this was not the case. In reference to the jurisprudence of the 
Appeals Chamber on this matter,216 the Chamber stressed that ‘an automatic referral … is not required 
as a matter of law’, and that a Chamber has the discretion ‘to consider all factors that may be relevant 
in the circumstances of the case’.217 According to the Chamber two factors are particularly important in 
this case, namely (1) the manner in which South Africa approached its obligation and interacted with 
the Court, and (2) the issue of whether the involvement of the ASP and/or the Security Council would 
be an efficient way to obtain cooperation from South Africa.218  
 On the first factor, the Chamber made several observations, including that South Africa ‘is the 
first state party to seek … a final legal determination on the extent of its obligations’ to arrest al-
Bashir.219 With respect to the second factor, the Chamber noted the outcome of the domestic proceedings 
in South Africa and stated that it seems that South Africa has accepted its obligation to cooperate with 
the Court under its domestic legal framework.220 Furthermore, the Chamber observed that the six 
previous referrals did not result in any measures against the respective states.221 In light of these and 
                                                          
contracting party ‘Sudan must be regarded to have relinquished the immunities of its ‘constitutionally responsible rulers’ when 
acceding to the Convention’ (para. 38). In contrast, the majority concluded that the Genocide Convention does not include an 
‘implicit exclusion of immunities’, inter alia, because the Convention ‘does not mention immunities based on official capacity’. 
For further discussion on this matter, see the references in footnote 70 of this chapter.  
215 ICC South Africa decision (2017), paras. 124-137.  
216 Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-1032), Judgment on the Prosecutor’s appeal against Trial Chamber V(B)’s “Decision on 
Prosecution’s application for a finding of non-compliance under Article 87(7) of the Statute”, 19 August 2015.  
217 ICC South Africa decision (2017), paras. 124-125.  
218 Ibid., para. 125.  
219 Ibid., paras. 127-134. 
220 Ibid., para. 136.  
221 Ibid., para. 138.  
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related considerations, the Chamber concluded that a referral would not be an appropriate measure in 
this case and that a formal finding of non-compliance would suffice.  
 In sum, in its decision on the non-cooperation of South Africa, PTC II came to the same 
conclusion as in the DRC decision, namely that Article 98(1) does not enable states parties to evade 
their obligation to arrest al-Bashir. Unlike the DRC decision, however, the Chamber did not refer the 
matter to the ASP and/or the Security Council. Moreover, the Chamber adopted a different reasoning 
on the question of immunity. The Chamber again turned to the Security Council, but where the DRC 
decision argued that the Security Council’s resolution implicitly waived al-Bashir’s immunity, the 
Chamber now rejected this interpretation. In the South Africa decision, the Chamber concluded that 
Article 98(1) does not apply because the Security Council’s referral placed Sudan in a similar position 
as a state party.  
 
V. Analysis of The Chamber’s Turn to the Security Council 
Al-Bashir’s visit to South Africa has revived the debate among states and commentators about his 
immunity. The key issue in this debate is the Chamber’s turn to the Security Council. In reaction to the 
DRC decision, several scholars, such as Erika de Wet and Nerina Boschiero, applauded the Court’s 
judges for overturning the Chad and Malawi decisions. In their view, these earlier rulings failed to make 
any sense of Article 98(1), whereas the DRC decision offered a convincing explanation for why states 
parties cannot rely on this provision.222 Other commentators, however, like Paola Gaeta, André de 
Hoogh and myself, were more critical about the Chamber’s conclusion that the Council implicitly 
removed al-Bashir’s immunity. We argued, inter alia, that the DRC decision wrongly assumed that the 
Council can remove immunities in an implicit manner and that the Chamber mistakenly conflated the 
obligation to waive immunities with their actual removal.223  
                                                          
222 For references, see part V(B) in this chapter. 
223 Ibid.  
 173 
 
 The recent South Africa decision has given an additional dimension to this debate. In the South 
Africa decision, the Chamber also turned to the Security Council, but in a different way than in the DRC 
decision. According to the South Africa decision, the Council did not implicitly remove al-Bashir’s 
immunity, but placed Sudan in a similar position as a state party. In adopting this reasoning, the Chamber 
followed a similar approach as Dapo Akande proposed in a journal article in 2009.224  Like Akande, the 
Chamber concluded that the necessary effect of the Security Council’s Resolution is that Article 27(2) 
applies with respect to Sudan, and that because of this al-Bashir’s immunity does not apply vis-à-vis a 
state party like South Africa.  
 Both the DRC and the South Africa decision have raised a wide range of questions about the 
Security Council’s relationship with the Court and about the effects of the Security Council’s Resolution 
on al-Bashir’s immunity. The following sections address these questions and analyse the Chamber’s 
reasoning in the DRC and South Africa decisions. The purpose of this analysis is to assess the different 
approaches that the Court’s judges have employed in their decisions and to weigh the arguments that 
scholars have advanced in support of these approaches.  
A. Two Security Council avenues: UN Charter-based and ICC Statute-based 
A first question that demands attention is why al-Bashir’s immunity does not pose a procedural bar to 
the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction? In the DRC decision, the Chamber argued that ‘when the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court entails the prosecution of a Head of State of a non-party, the 
question of personal immunities might validly arise’, and could trigger the application of Article 
98(1).225 According to that Chamber, this provision does not apply in the case of al-Bashir, because the 
Council removed his immunities.226 The Chamber did not separately discuss the two ways in which 
                                                          
224 Akande, ‘The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals’. Support for Akande’s approach has been expressed, inter alia, 
in Amnesty International, ‘Bringing Power to Justice’, p. 45; Daqun, ‘ICC and Immunities’, pp. 71-72; Kreβ, ‘ICC and 
Immunities’, pp. 241-242; Papillon, ‘Has the Council Implicitly Removed Al Bashir’s Immunity?’, 281; Boschiero, ‘The ICC 
Judicial Finding Against the DRC’, 693.  
225 ICC DRC decision, para. 26.  
226 Ibid., para. 29.  
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immunities can pose a procedural bar to the Court’s proceedings. The Chamber answered the question 
why a state party cannot refuse cooperation with his arrest on the basis of Article 98(1), without 
explaining why the Court is permitted to exercise jurisdiction over al-Bashir in the first place.  
 Presumably, the Chamber’s argument as to why Article 98(1) does not apply should be 
understood as part of the Chamber’s explanation why immunities do not pose a procedural bar to the 
exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction in the case of al-Bashir.227 Indeed, this is what the Chamber suggested 
when it said that ‘since immunities attached to Omar al-Bashir are a procedural bar from prosecution 
before the Court, the cooperation envisaged in [the Council’s] Resolution was meant to eliminate any 
impediment to the proceedings before the Court, including the lifting of immunities’.228 By speaking of 
a ‘procedural bar from prosecution’ and ‘any impediment’, the Chamber appeared to refer both to the 
exercise of jurisdiction and to cooperation with the Court. In other words, the Chamber seemed to 
assume that the Court is able to exercise jurisdiction over al-Bashir, because the Security Council 
removed his immunities.229 The basis of the Court’s ability to exercise jurisdiction would be the 
Resolution of the Council, and as such the UN Charter.  
 The South Africa decision took a different approach on the question of jurisdiction. After noting 
that the Court’s jurisdiction was not contested in this case, the Chamber reasoned that the Security 
Council’s Resolution triggered the Court’s jurisdiction and bound Sudan to the Statute, including Article 
27(2).  Like Akande, the Chamber ruled that al-Bashir does not possess any immunity in relation to the 
ICC, and states parties are not able to invoke Article 98(1), because Sudan is ‘indirectly’ subject to 
Article 27(2).230 Although Sudan’s obligation to accept Article 27(2) would follow from the Council’s 
                                                          
227 In a similar vein, Jacobs has noted that ‘while the reference to Article 98(1) is slightly confusing, because the Chamber was 
still discussing the application of Article 27(2) of the Statute, it is reasonable to assume that the [PTC] is claiming that the 
UNSC acting under Chapter VII, has removed al-Bashir’s immunity as a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court’. 
Jacobs, ‘The ICC’s Approach to Immunities and Cooperation’, pp. 289-291. 
228 ICC DRC decision, para. 29.  
229 Ibid. 
230 Akande, ‘The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals’, 341.  
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decision, and thus from the Charter, the Court’s ability to exercise jurisdiction over al-Bashir would 
derive from the Statute. States parties would not be able to invoke Article 98(1) because of the 
application of Article 27(2) and not because of the Council’s Resolution under Chapter VII of the 
Charter. Instead of the ‘Charter-based approach’ of the DRC decision, the South Africa decision 
asserted a ‘Statute-based approach’.  
 Both approaches are clearly different.231 They both focus on the implications of the Council’s 
referral for the immunity of al-Bashir, but do so on a separate legal basis. The Chamber’s analysis in the 
DRC decision started with the powers of the Council under the Charter, whereas the South Africa 
decision argued that it is on the basis of the Statute that the Chamber should reject the claim that al-
Bashir enjoys immunity from arrest. The distinction between the two approaches is an important one 
and both raise an entirely different set of follow-up questions.  
B. Analysis of the Charter-based approach  
In debating the DRC decision, several commentators have posed questions about the powers of the 
Security Council under the UN Charter to (implicitly) remove immunities, and about whether Resolution 
1593 indeed removed al-Bashir’s immunity. These questions target the Charter rather than the Statute-
based approach. Indeed, as pointed out in the South Africa decision, if the Council’s referral binds Sudan 
to Article 27(2), it does not matter whether the Council has the power to (implicitly) remove immunities 
under the Charter, because in that case al-Bashir’s immunity is already removed by the application of 
the Statute.232 However, if it is argued, as the Chamber did in the DRC decision, that al-Bashir’s 
                                                          
231 The difference between the Charter-based approach of the DRC decision and Akande’s Statute-based approach has also 
been pointed out by: Gaeta, ‘ICC Changes its Mind on Immunities Al-Bashir’; Jacobs, ‘The ICC’s Approach to Immunities 
and Cooperation’, pp. 289-291; Ventura, ‘Escape from Johannesburg?’, 1013-1015 (noting that the High Court of South Africa 
in its ruling of 24 June 2015 took two different positions at the same time: on the one hand it followed Akande’s Statute-based 
approach and on the other hand it adopted the Chamber’s position that the Security Council has implicitly removed al-Bashir’s 
immunity on the basis of the Charter).  
232 ICC South Africa decision (2017), para. 95.  
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immunity has been removed by virtue of the Council’s powers under the Charter, then these questions 
are spot-on.  
i. Does the Council have the power to deviate from customary international law?  
A first question about the Charter-based approach is whether the Council is allowed to deviate from 
customary international law. The answer to this question depends on the interpretation that is given to 
Article 103 of the Charter, which provides that ‘in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the 
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other 
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail’. The majority view in 
the academic discourse is that Article 103 covers customary international law and that the Council is, 
under certain conditions,233 authorized to derogate from customary international law when acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter.234  
 There are some scholars, however, who argue that the Council is bound to all existing rules of 
customary international law and is not allowed to derogate from any of these rules.235 They claim that 
the drafters of the Charter made a deliberate choice to limit the application of Article 103 to 
‘international agreements’, instead of ‘all international obligations’. As the Council is bound to this 
provision, any directive of the Council that deviates from customary international law is in their view 
ultra vires. In the debate on al-Bashir’s immunity, Asad Kiyani has argued, in a similar vein, that the 
                                                          
233 As discussed later on in this part of the chapter (at ii), these conditions are subject to considerable debate.  
234 See generally Andreas Paulus and Johann Leiβ, ‘Article 103’, in Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, George Nolte and 
Andreas Paulus (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations - A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, Third 
Edition), pp. 2132-2133; ILC Study Group chaired by Martii Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006, para. 345. In the literature 
on the case against al-Bashir, see, for example, de Wet, ‘Implications of Al-Bashir’s Visit to South Africa’, 1060; Akande, 
‘The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals’, 348. In his minority opinion, Judge de Brichambaut acknowledged this 
prevailing view and continued his analysis on the assumption that the Council ‘may deviate from both conventional and 
customary international law’. Minority Opinion of Judge de Brichambaut, para. 61.  
235 For example, the ILC Study Group refers to Nigel D. White and Ademola Abass, ‘Countermeasures and Sanctions’ in 
Malcolm D. Evans (ed.), International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 518.  
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Council has violated the rules on the immunities of sitting Head of State by obliging Sudan to cooperate 
with the ICC.236 Since Article 103 would prohibit the Council to act beyond customary international 
law, the Council would not be able to remove al-Bashir’s immunity.237  
 However, most states and commentators agree that the Council is, under certain conditions, 
authorized to derogate from customary international law. Assuming that they are right, the Council has 
the power remove the immunities of a sitting Head of State under conventional and customary 
international law. In this sense, the first question about the Charter-based approach is not a very 
controversial one.  
ii. Does the Council have the power to remove immunities ‘implicitly’?  
A second question about the Charter-based approach is whether the Council is allowed to use its 
presumed power to derogate from customary international law in an implicit manner. If the Council can 
remove immunities, can it do so without explicitly mentioning this derogation in its Resolution? With 
respect to the immunity of al-Bashir, some scholars have argued that it is doubtful whether the Council 
can implicitly remove immunities,238 whereas others have claimed that a decision to this effect does not 
have to be explicit.239  
 One way to go about this is to seek a ‘one-size-fits-all’ answer to the question whether the 
Council has to explicate deviations from customary international law. In search for such a solution, Erika 
de Wet has argued that the practice of the Council shows that Chapter VII Resolutions specify ‘what 
states may not do when deviating from international law with the Resolution’, rather than explaining 
‘the extent to which states may deviate from international law under a [Council] Resolution’ (emphasis 
added).240 Based on this alleged practice of the Council, De Wet concluded that ‘it is correct to assume 
                                                          
236 Kiyani, ‘Al-Bashir and the ICC’, 478-481.  
237 Ibid., 481.  
238 Tladi, ‘Duty South Africa to Arrest al-Bashir’, 1043; Jacobs, ‘The ICC’s Approach to Immunities and Cooperation’, p. 295; 
De Hoogh and Knottnerus, ‘ICC Issues New Decision on al-Bashir’s Immunities’.  
239 Kreβ, ‘ICC and Immunities’, p. 241; De Wet, ‘Implications of Al-Bashir’s Visit to South Africa’, 1061.  
240 De Wet, ‘Implications of Al-Bashir’s Visit to South Africa’, 1061.  
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that there is no requirement under international law in accordance with which the [Council] has to spell 
out the obligation to lift immunities’.241 
 Another, and in my opinion more sophisticated way to answer this question, is to examine what 
the specific rules of customary international law have to say about possible derogations. While in many 
cases rules of customary international law may not give any clues about the procedure and form of 
derogation, the international law of immunities gives quite clear directions on how states and 
(presumably) international organisations can deviate from these rules. As to the form of a waiver of 
immunity by a state, the third report of the first Special Rapporteur to the ILC on immunity of state 
officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction specifically provides that ‘the waiver of immunity of a 
serving Head of State … must be express’.242 The underlying logic that the report invokes is that there 
should not be any doubts about ‘the real intent’ of the state concerned to waive the immunity of its Head 
of State.243 Arguably, the same logic applies with respect to an imposed waiver, where an international 
organization (i.e., the Security Council) removes the immunities of a state.244 The nature of immunities, 
as vested in the state, seems to require that any derogation from these rules is made explicitly.245 
 If the ILC is right and this is indeed the prevailing rule under customary international law, then 
the next question to be asked is whether the Council is somehow bound to this rule. The answer to this 
question depends in turn on one’s position in the much broader debate on the limits of the Council’s 
enforcement powers.246 On one view, the Council is not bound to existing rules on how to remove 
                                                          
241 Ibid. Note that de Wet does not speak of an actual removal of immunities (like the DRC decision), but of an obligation to 
lift immunities.   
242 ILC Special Rapporteur Kolodkin, Third report, para. 61(l).  
243 Ibid.  
244 Under this logic, an obligation to waive does not have to be explicit. This obligation can follow from a more general 
obligation to cooperate with, for example, the ICC. However, the actual waiver itself has to be explicit. For as long as a state 
has not acted upon its obligation, there cannot exist a waiver, but only a failure of a state to fulfil its obligation to waive.  
245 De Hoogh and Knottnerus, ‘ICC Issues New Decision on al-Bashir’s Immunities’. 
246 It should be highlighted here that there is no consensus on the limits of the Council’s authority under Chapter VII. 
Commentators have contested when and in what form the Council is allowed to derogate from international law. What is beyond 
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immunities. This view is based on the idea that the Council is allowed to deviate from all rules of 
customary international when it acts under Chapter VII.247 Many scholars have argued, however, that 
when the Council is involved with (quasi-)adjudication or legislation, the legal flexibility of the Council 
decreases to the extent that the Council becomes bound to the ‘applicable’ rules of customary 
international law through Article 1(1) of the Charter.248 Based on this reasoning, it may be contended 
that by referring a situation to the Court, and by specifying the legal obligations of non-parties, the 
Council engages in a form of legislation that constitutes the basis of future adjudication by the ICC.249 
                                                          
dispute is that the Council’s discretion under Chapter VII is not unbound by law (legibus solutus), and that under the principle 
of attribution of powers the Council only possesses those powers that have been conferred expressly or implicitly by the Charter. 
This means that the Council is at least bound to stay within its competencies under Chapter VII (as defined in Articles 39-42). 
However, what this exactly requires and whether the Council is also restricted by other rules of international law remains 
subject to considerable debate. See generally Anne Peters, ‘Article 25’, in Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, George Nolte 
and Andreas Paulus (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations - A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, Third 
Edition), pp. 809-819.  
247 Several scholars have argued that the drafters of the Charter gave the Council an ‘implicit allowance’ to deviate from 
international law for decisions that are adopted in accordance with the requirements of Chapter VII. While recognizing that 
Article 24(2) obliges the Council to act in accordance with the ‘Purposes and Principles’ of the UN as defined in Articles 1 and 
2 of the Charter, they have professed that these purposes and principles establish ‘guidelines rather than concrete limits’, and 
that Article 1(1) excludes the collective measures of Chapter VII from the general obligation for the UN to act in conformity 
with ‘the principles of justice and international law’. Consequently, the Council would not be bound by any rules of 
international law, except for the requirements of Chapter VII and rules of jus cogens. See Nico Krisch, ‘Introduction to Chapter 
VII: The General Framework’, in Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, George Nolte and Andreas Paulus (eds.), The Charter 
of the United Nations - A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, Third Edition), pp. 1256-1257.  
248 In a general sense, these scholars contend that the degree of legal flexibility decreases when the Council imposes long-term 
obligations that are not directly related to the initial emergency situation. In this logic, Article 1(1) only exempts the Council 
from the general obligation of the UN to observe rules of international law outside the Charter when the Council fulfils the 
‘classical police function’. When the Council is involved with (quasi-)adjudication, legislation or administration, the Council 
would be bound by the applicable rules of customary international law and general principles of international law through 
Article 1(1). See Krisch, ‘Introduction to Chapter VII’, p. 1257.  
249 Abel S. Knottnerus, ‘The Security Council and the International Criminal Court: The Unsolved Puzzle of Article 16’ (2014) 
61 Netherlands International Law Review 206-207.  
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In doing so, the Council is arguably bound to respect certain rules of customary international law through 
Article 1(1), including the rule that a removal of immunities has to be conveyed in an explicit manner.  
iii. Has the Council removed al-Bashir’s immunity?   
A third question about the Chamber’s Charter-based approach is whether there is sufficient ‘evidence’ 
to prove that the Council has removed al-Bashir’s immunity in Resolution 1593. Assuming that the 
Council has the power to remove immunities and that the Court is able to interpret the Council’s 
Resolution,250 can it be concluded that the Council did indeed remove al-Bashir’s immunity?251  
 As a starting point, it should be recalled that this question is irrelevant for the analysis of the 
Statute-based approach, because under this approach the removal of al-Bashir’s immunity follows from 
the application of the Statute, and not from the Resolution. In line with the Charter-based approach, 
however, the Chamber did examine the text of Resolution 1593 in the DRC decision. The Court’s judges 
concluded that the Resolution was meant to eliminate any impediments to the proceedings before the 
Court, including the lifting of immunities, because ‘any other interpretation would render the [Council’s] 
decision requiring that Sudan “cooperate fully” … senseless’.252  
 Some scholars, who generally agree with the Chamber’s reasoning in the DRC decision, have 
argued that by referring to full cooperation, the Council made ‘a textual link’ to Article 27(2) and Article 
98(1).253 Other commentators, however, have challenged the Chamber’s claim that the only way to make 
                                                          
250 The power of the Court to interpret Security Council Resolution follows from the doctrine of compétence de la compétence, 
which is expressed in Article 119(1) of the Statute: ‘any dispute concerning the judicial functions of the Court shall be settled 
by the decision of the Court’. See also Minority Opinion of Judge de Brichambaut, paras. 62-63.  
251 Note that in its submission to the Chamber, South Africa argued that ‘each and every one of [the relevant] elements [for the 
interpretation of Resolution 1593] … supports the interpretation that the immunities of Mr. Al-Bashir have not been affected 
by UN Security Council Resolution 1593’. Public Court Records, 7 April 2017, p. 28.  
252 ICC DRC decision, para. 29.  
253 Boschiero, ‘The ICC Judicial Finding Against the DRC’, 644-645; Ventura, ‘Escape from Johannesburg?’, 1017-1022; De 
Wet, ‘Implications of Al-Bashir’s Visit to South Africa’, 1061. See also the views of the Prosecutor on this matter in Public 
Court Hearing, 7 April 2017, pp. 64-68; and the Minority Opinion of Judge de Brichambaut, paras. 68-83. In quoting de Wet, 
the Minority Opinion reasoned that ‘an explicit removal of the immunities of Omar al-Bashir was not required, since “the 
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sense of the cooperation requirement is to interpret this requirement as an implicit removal of all 
immunities.254 They have pointed out that Sudan’s obligation to cooperate with the Court is not deprived 
of all meaning if its Head of State continues to enjoy immunity from arrest. After all, Sudan would still 
have to cooperate with the Court in all other aspects of its investigation in Darfur, and the Court would 
still be able to exercise jurisdiction against other Sudanese nationals that do not enjoy immunities as 
contemplated in Article 98(1).  
 A second and more fundamental objection against the Chamber’s interpretation of Resolution 
1593 is that the Chamber wrongly equated Sudan’s obligation to cooperate with an actual removal of 
immunities by the Council.255 Conceptually speaking, there is an important difference between an 
obligation to waive (i.e., an obliged waiver) and a removal of immunities (i.e., an imposed waiver).256 
A state may have an obligation to waive immunities, but the concept of obligation under international 
law implies that a state can fail to fulfil this obligation, which means that the immunities concerned 
continue to exist. In contrast, if a third actor (such as the Security Council) removes the immunities of 
a state, it imposes a waiver upon that state and the immunities concerned cease to exist.  
 In light of this conceptual distinction between an obliged and an imposed waiver, I have 
suggested elsewhere, together with André De Hoogh, that the Council may have obliged Sudan to waive 
al-Bashir’s immunity, but that Sudan’s requirement to fully cooperate with the Court does not mean, in 
                                                          
reference to ‘full cooperation’ in Resolution 1593 should be taken to denote all required measures under domestic and 
international law, including lifting immunities” ’. Nonetheless, Judge de Brichambaut concluded on the basis of other factors, 
including context (paras. 69-72), object and purpose (paras. 73-75), statements by members of the Council (paras. 76-78), other 
Security Council Resolutions (para. 79) and subsequent practice of UN organs and affected states (paras. 80-82) that ‘the 
current state of the law does not allow a definite answer to be reached in relation to the question of whether this resolution 
removes the immunities of Omar Al-Bashir’ (para. 83). 
254 De Hoogh and Knottnerus, ‘ICC Issues New Decision on al-Bashir’s Immunities’; Jacobs, ‘The ICC’s Approach to 
Immunities and Cooperation’, p. 295; Tladi, ‘Duty South Africa to Arrest al-Bashir’, 1043. 
255 See for example De Hoogh and Knottnerus, ‘ICC Issues New Decision on al-Bashir’s Immunities’; Tladi, ‘Duty South 
Africa to Arrest al-Bashir’, 1043.  
256 See above, part I.  
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and of itself, that his immunity is removed.257 In the logic of an obliged waiver, Sudan has failed to fulfil 
its obligation under the Charter to waive al-Bashir’s immunity, which means that this immunity 
continues to apply. 
 Admittedly, this interpretation of the cooperation requirement in Resolution 1593 as an obliged 
rather than an imposed waiver is based on the assumption that the Council can only remove immunities 
in an explicit manner.258 If it is assumed, however, that the Council has the power to implicitly remove 
immunities, then it might be sufficient to establish some sort of textual link or implied intent in the 
Resolution to establish the existence of this imposed waiver. This textual link or implied intent would 
then have to be established on the basis of all the relevant factors, including ordinary meaning, context, 
the object and purpose of the resolution, the statements of members of the Council made at the time of 
its adoption, other Security Council resolutions and/or the subsequent practice of UN organs and 
affected states. 259   
                                                          
257 De Hoogh and Knottnerus, ‘ICC Issues New Decision on al-Bashir’s Immunities’. See also Gaeta, ‘ICC Changes its Mind 
on Immunities Al-Bashir’.  
258 The text of paragraph 2 of Resolution 1593 is clear in the sense that it does not include an explicit imposed waiver. See also 
Minority Opinion of Judge de Brichambaut, paras. 66-68.   
259 As stated by the ICJ: ‘While the rules on treaty interpretation embodied in Articles 31 and 32 of the [VCLT] may provide 
guidance, differences between Security Council resolutions and treaties mean that the interpretation of Security Council 
resolutions also require that other factors be taken into account. Security Council resolutions are issued by a single, collective 
body and are drafted through a very different process than that used for the conclusion of a treaty. Security Council resolutions 
are the product of a voting process as provided for in Article 27 of the UN Charter, and the final text of such resolutions 
represents the view of the Security Council as a body. Moreover, Security Council resolutions can be binding on all Member 
States [reference to the Namibia Opinion, para. 116], irrespective of whether they played any part in their formulation. The 
interpretation of Security Council resolutions may require the Court to analyse statements by representatives of members of 
the Security Council made at the time of their adoption, other resolutions of the Security Council on the same issue, as well as 
the subsequent practice of relevant United Nations organs and of States affected by those given resolutions’. Accordance with 
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, [2010] ICJ Rep 
403, para. 49. See also Minority Opinion of Judge de Brichambaut, paras. 64-65.  
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 Yet, even if the Council were to possess the power to implicitly remove immunities, then the 
question remains whether there is sufficient evidence for such a removal in Resolution 1593. Why 
should the cooperation requirement for Sudan not be interpreted as creating an obligation for Sudan to 
waive al-Bashir’s immunity? For its part, the DRC decision does not provide an answer to this question. 
As said, the Chamber simply stated, without further explanation of the relevant factors, that paragraph 
2 of Resolution 1593 was meant to eliminate any impediments to the proceedings before the Court, 
because any other interpretation would render the cooperation requirement ‘senseless’.260  
 When actually looking at the relevant factors, in doing what the Chamber failed to do, it can be 
argued that an interpretation of the ordinary meaning of paragraph 2, indicates that the Council did not 
remove the immunities of Sudanese officials.261 A first indication is that the text omits an explicit 
reference to that effect.262 In light of the contested nature of the international law of immunities in 
general, and the immunities of sitting Heads of State in particular, the Council may have been expected 
to express itself explicitly on this matter. 263 This holds true regardless of whether the Council has the 
power to implicitly remove immunities. 264   
                                                          
260 ICC DRC decision, para. 29.  
261 Paragraph 2 of Resolution 1593 ‘Decides that the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, shall 
cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, while 
recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute, urges all States and concerned 
regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully;’. 
262 See also Lentner, ‘Why the ICC won’t get it right’ (arguing, inter alia, that because paragraph 2 omits a reference to the 
Rome Statute and only requires Sudan to cooperate ‘pursuant to this Resolution’, the cooperation requirement cannot be 
interpreted to include an implicit removal of immunities).  
263 Jacobs, ‘The ICC’s Approach to Immunities and Cooperation’, p. 295. Contra de Wet, ‘Implications of Al-Bashir’s Visit to 
South Africa’, p. 1061; Minority Opinion of Judge de Brichambaut, p. 67.  
264 With respect to the Council’s ‘vague’ language in Resolution 1593, Manuel Ventura has offered an intriguing analysis of 
the alleged removal of al-Bashir’s immunity by the Council in light of the majority opinion of the ECtHR in Al-Jedda. In this 
case, the European Court concluded that ‘it is to be expected that clear and explicit language would be used were the Security 
Council to intend States to take particular measures which would conflict with their obligations under international human 
rights law’. Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom (Appl.No.27071/08), Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, 7 July 2011, para. 102. The 
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 The same argument can also be used against an interpretation of the cooperation requirement as 
creating an obligation to waive. Indeed, the Council may have been expected to explicate the obligation 
to waive the immunities of Sudanese officials. However, the ordinary meaning of the terms ‘cooperate 
fully’, as creating obligations for Sudan under the Charter to cooperate with the Court, is easier to 
reconcile with the idea of an obligation to waive than with an imposed removal of immunities. If the 
Court were to request Sudan to waive its immunities, then Sudan would be bound to cooperate with this 
request under paragraph 2 of Resolution 1593 (and as such under the Charter). This fits the logic of the 
cooperation requirement as creating obligations for Sudan to fully cooperate with the Court.  
 The idea of a removal of immunities, on the other hand, has an entirely different logic. A 
removal of immunities does not create an obligation for Sudan to cooperate with the Court, because 
Sudan would not have to do anything about the immunities of its officials since these immunities would 
no longer exist as a result of the removal. The ordinary meaning of the terms ‘cooperate fully’, as 
creating obligations for Sudan under the Charter, thus speaks against an interpretation of paragraph 2 as 
an implicit removal of immunities. A removal simply does not fit the logic of an obligation to cooperate, 
because it leaves no room ‘to cooperate’.  
                                                          
underlying principle espoused in the judgment could, according to Ventura, lead some to conclude that the language in 
resolution 1593 is too ‘vague’ or ‘unclear’ to remove al-Bashir’s immunity as Head of State. Against this hypothetical 
conclusion, Ventura offered, inter alia, two arguments: (A) it would be ‘unrealistic to expect the UN Security Council to spell 
out in detail and address, in advance, all of the intricacies and legal issues that could potentially arise out of a referral’; and (B) 
‘singling out of … Sudanese states officials … could also be seen as an infringement on the ICC’s judicial independence’. For 
these and related reasons, Ventura sided with Akande’s ‘more nuanced’ position’ that the referral ‘meant that the provisions of 
the Rome Statute as a whole were intended to apply to Sudan (including Article 27) as if it were a state party. In my view, 
Ventura’s concerns about applying the alleged principle of Al-Jedda are, in principle, valid. However, they do not take away 
the other problems that this chapter identifies about the Charter- and Statute-based approach. With regard to the Charter-based 
approach, Ventura’s arguments do not give any reason for why the cooperation requirement should not be interpreted as an 
obligation to waive rather than as an imposed waiver. Furthermore, with respect to the Statute-approach, Ventura’s rejection 
of Al-Jedda does not resolve the problems highlighted below in part V(C) and especially do not explain why Sudan should be 
treated as a state party under the Statute.  
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 Apart from ordinary meaning, the other relevant factors do not give a clear indication as to the 
question whether the reference to ‘cooperate fully’ entails an obligation to waive or constitutes a removal 
of immunities. Firstly, the context of the Resolution,265 as well as its object and purpose266 can be 
interpreted in conflicting ways. As part of the context of the Resolution reference can be made to the 
Preamble of the Resolution which mentions the report of the International Commission of Inquiry in 
Darfur. This report provided that the crimes identified by the Commission implicated the responsibilities 
of senior government officials, which in turn suggests that the Council was aware of the possibility that 
immunities could pose a procedural bar to the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction. Assuming that the 
Council acted upon this knowledge, Sudan’s obligation to ‘cooperate fully’ could perhaps be interpreted 
as an implicit removal of immunities.  
 However, another ‘particular contextual element’ speaks against this interpretation.267 At the 
time of the adoption of the Resolution no warrants of arrest had been issued by the Court. As argued by 
Judge de Brichambaut, this means that it was not certain that persons enjoying immunities under 
international law would be prosecuted by the Court.268 The Council did not have to address the question 
of immunities in the Resolution, so the reference in the Report of the Commission to persons that enjoy 
                                                          
265 For a detailed discussion on the relevant contextual elements and especially the reference in the Preamble of the Resolution 
to the report of the International Commission of Inquiry in Darfur (which referred to the fact that the crimes identified by the 
Commission implicated the responsibilities of senior government officials), see Minority Opinion of Judge de Brichambaut, 
paras. 69-72. The Minority Opinion concluded that context suggested that ‘the reference to ‘cooperate fully’ [in Resolution 
1593] was not necessarily connected to the issue of immunities’, most importantly because ‘at the time of adoption of UN 
Security Council Resolution 1593 no warrants of arrest had been issued by the Court’.  
266 This factor does also ‘not provide a clear indication as the intention of the [Council] on the removal of immunities’, 
especially because the Resolution does not ‘exclusively concern a referral … but envisages other measures to address the 
alleged crimes committed in Darfur’. As concluded by the Minority Opinion of Judge de Brichambaut, paras. 73-75. Contra 
Lentner, ‘Why the ICC won’t get it right’ (arguing that a teleological interpretation of the Resolution shows that it did not 
remove immunities because immunities concern ‘the core functioning of the Security Council, namely the peaceful relations 
between states and stable international relations’, and an actual arrest of al-Bashir could disturb these relations).  
267 Minority Opinion of Judge de Brichambaut, para. 72.  
268 Ibid.  
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such immunities does not necessarily support the view that Resolution 1593 entails an implicit removal 
of immunities. 
 Another relevant contextual factor is paragraph 6 of the Resolution which refers to existing 
agreements under Article 98(2) of the Statute by excluding ‘nationals, current or former officials or 
personnel’ of non-parties from the Court’s jurisdiction for acts committed while participating in 
operations ‘established or authorized’ by the Council.269 In this paragraph, the Council specified that the 
Court would not have jurisdiction over a certain group of individuals, but did not mention Sudanese 
officials like al-Bashir. By setting limits to the Court’s jurisdiction and implicitly referring to Article 
98(2), paragraph 6 suggests that the Council explicitly set out all limitations to the Court’s jurisdiction 
and all implications of Article 98. By not mentioning the immunities of Sudanese state officials, 
paragraph 6 could indicate that Sudan’s obligation to cooperate fully with the Court encompasses a 
removal of all immunities that are normally covered by Article 98(1).  
 However, the direct context of Sudan’s cooperation requirement in paragraph 2 speaks against 
this interpretation.270 Directly after imposing an obligation on the government of Sudan, in fact in the 
same paragraph, the Council ‘… while recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute have no 
obligation under the Statute, urges all States and concerned regional and other international 
organizations to cooperate fully’. If the imposition of the obligation to cooperate on Sudan had implicitly 
removed all immunities that could pose a procedural bar to cooperation within the meaning of Article 
98(1), then the Council could have used stronger language than ‘urges’ for states parties. The obligation 
to respect the immunities of Sudan applies to other states, rather than to Sudan itself. As such, the 
                                                          
269 Article 98(2) of the Statute provides that ‘The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the 
requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a 
sending State is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the 
sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender’. Note that Paragraph 6 was included in Resolution 1593 under the 
pressure of the United States as a follow-up to Security Council Resolutions 1422 and 1487. For further discussion and 
references on these ‘disguised deferrals’, see chapter 2, part I(B).  
270 De Hoogh and Knottnerus, ‘ICC Issues New Decision on al-Bashir’s Immunities’.  
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Council could have been expected to address an obligation to other states not to respect the immunities 
of Sudan. Instead the Council noted that non-parties had no obligation to cooperate and only urged them, 
as well as the Court’s states parties, to cooperate. The fact that the Resolution merely urges states, 
including states parties, to cooperate fully with the Court suggests that the Council did not intend to 
change the obligations of these states with respect to the immunities of Sudan. In other words, the direct 
context of Sudan’s obligation to cooperate fully with the Court supports the exact opposite conclusion 
of paragraph 6, namely that the Resolution does not include an implicit removal of Sudan’s immunities. 
 In addition to these different contextual elements, the statements made by members of the 
Council at the time of its adoption, and other Resolutions of the Council on Sudan in particular or on 
the prosecution of international crimes more generally do not give information about the intentions of 
Council. The members of the Council did not make any reference to immunities in relation to Sudan at 
the time of the adoption of Resolution 1593, 271 and the Council did not address this issue in any other 
Resolution.272  
 Finally, the subsequent practice of UN organs and affected states does not provide a clear 
indication either.273 On subsequent practice of the Council, it can, for example, be noted that the Council 
                                                          
271 See UNSC, S/PV.5118, 31 March 2005. For further discussion see De Hoogh and Knottnerus, ‘ICC Issues New Decision 
on al-Bashir’s Immunities’; Minority Opinion of Judge de Brichambaut, paras. 76-78. Note that in contrast to the 
aforementioned ruling of the ICJ, Judge de Brichambaut also considered statements made in later meetings of the Council. In 
my opinion, these statements should only be considered, if applicable, as subsequent practice of affected states.  
272 Note that in Resolution 1970, referring the situation in Libya to the Prosecution, the Council stated in nearly identical terms 
‘that the Libyan authorities shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor 
pursuant to this resolution’. For further discussion see Minority Opinion of Judge de Brichambaut, para. 79.  
273 The subsequent practice on this matter is not uniform. See Tladi, ‘Duty South Africa to Arrest al-Bashir’, 1043 (emphasizing 
that the Council has missed many opportunities in which it could have confirmed its alleged intention to waive the immunities 
of Sudanese officials); Minority Opinion of Judge de Brichambaut, paras. 80-82. Contra Boschiero, ‘The ICC Judicial Finding 
Against the DRC’, 651 (highlighting, inter alia, the Council’s refusal of the AU’s deferral request for al-Bashir as relevant 
subsequent practice); Ventura, ‘Escape From Johannesburg?’, 1021-1022 (arguing that the behaviour of the Council on this 
matter ‘is not at all what one would expect were it to believe that President al-Bashir is entitled to Head of State immunity’, 
and concluding that ‘sometimes, silence speaks louder than words and … can be of interpretative assistance’). 
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did not react on the non-cooperation decisions of the Court concerning al-Bashir’s visits to African states 
parties, which could suggest that the Council did not intend to remove al-Bashir’s immunities. However, 
the Council also did not act on the AU’s deferral requests under Article 16 which were, in part, based 
on the AU’s position that sitting Heads of State enjoy immunities under international law. 
 Throwing all these different factors into the crucible, the only convincing conclusion is that 
there is not sufficient evidence to prove that the cooperation requirement removed the immunities of 
Sudanese officials, including al-Bashir. None of the relevant factors speaks conclusively in favour of 
such an interpretation of Resolution 1593. In my opinion, even if the Council would have the power to 
remove immunities in an implicit manner, which I question, then the more convincing interpretation 
remains that the Resolution created an obligation for Sudan to arrest al-Bashir and to waive this 
immunity when this is requested by the Court. This interpretation fits best with the ordinary meaning of 
Sudan’s obligation to ‘cooperate fully’ with the Court and takes into account that the Council did not 
(have to) discuss the question of the immunities of Sudan’s state officials at the time when the Resolution 
was adopted.  
iv. An imposed or an obliged waiver: what are the consequences for Article 98(1)?  
If it is assumed, for the sake of argument, that the Council has either removed al-Bashir’s immunity or 
has obliged Sudan to waive these immunities, a final question about the Charter-based approach, is what 
this means for the application of Article 98(1). If Resolution 1593 entails either an imposed or an obliged 
waiver, does this mean that states parties can no longer invoke Article 98(1) to refuse cooperation with 
the arrest of al-Bashir?  
 As to the first possibility, if the Council removed al-Bashir’s immunity (an imposed waiver), 
and was authorized to do so in an implicit manner, it makes sense that this immunity ceases to exist. 
This is also the underlying logic of the DRC decision. The Chamber stated that ‘the “cooperation of that 
third State [Sudan] for the waiver of the immunity”, as required under the last sentence of article 98(1) 
[would be] ensured by the language [of the Council]’. If the Chamber is right and Resolution 1593 
provides an imposed waiver of al-Bashir’s immunity, then Article 98(1) does not apply, because there 
are no longer any immunities that preclude the arrest of a Sudanese official.  
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 However, the legal situation is more complex if the Council ‘only’ created an obligation for 
Sudan to waive al-Bashir’s immunity (an obliged waiver). In that case, it seems that his immunity 
continues to exist for as long as Sudan has not acted upon its obligation under the Charter to waive this 
immunity.274 Consequently, al-Bashir’s immunity would still pose a procedural bar to cooperation with 
the Court and Article 98(1) would apply. 
 In contrast to this assessment of the legal consequences of an obliged waiver, Erika de Wet has 
argued that even if the Council only created an obligation to waive al-Bashir’s immunity, Article 98(1) 
does not apply because ‘the Chapter VII character’ of this obligation would require ‘all UN member 
states to regard his immunity as having been waived’.275 Her argument is based on the Namibia advisory 
opinion of the ICJ, which concerned a Resolution of the Council that declared the presence of South 
Africa in Namibia illegal, without imposing any explicit obligations on other states.276 In this advisory 
opinion, the ICJ gave a purposive interpretation to the Resolution and determined that it required all 
states to recognize South Africa’s presence as illegal. More generally, the ICJ professed that all states 
have to accept the legal situation resulting from a decision of the Council under Article 25, because 
anything less would ‘deprive this principal organ of its essential functions and powers under the 
Charter’.277According to de Wet, the same reasoning applies in the case of al-Bashir. All UN member 
states would be required to regard al-Bashir’s immunity as having been waived and no state party would 
be able to refuse cooperation on the basis of Article 98(1).  
                                                          
274 De Hoogh and Knottnerus, ‘ICC Issues New Decision on al-Bashir’s Immunities’; Gaeta, ‘ICC Changes its Mind on 
Immunities Al-Bashir’; Blommestijn and Ryngaert, ‘Exploring the Obligations for States to Act upon the ICC’s Arrest 
Warrant’, 440. 
275 De Wet, ‘Implications of Al-Bashir’s Visit to South Africa’, 1062.  
276 Ibid. referring to Akande, ‘The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals’, 347. He discussed the Namibia Advisory 
Opinion with regard to the right of non-parties to arrest al-Bashir. Note, however, that Akande took a different position than de 
Wet on the question of al-Bashir’s immunity, as he argued that Article 98(1) does not apply because Sudan is bound to Article 
27(2). He reasoned, based on the Namibia Opinion, that all states (including non-parties) are entitled to rely on the fact that 
Sudan is bound to Article 27(2) and thus have a right to arrest the Sudanese President.  
277 ICJ Namibia Opinion, paras. 114-116.  
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 This line of argumentation is more sophisticated than the Chamber’s reasoning in the DRC 
decision, which does not refer to the Namibia opinion at this point.278 In my opinion, however, de Wet 
failed to address two problems. First of all, she did not explain why the ICJ’s reasoning in the Namibia 
advisory opinion applies ipso facto to Resolution 1593. Indeed, the ICJ ruled in the Namibia opinion 
that when the Council adopts a binding decision under Article 25, its member states have ‘to comply 
with that decision’.279 The ICJ added to this, however, that ‘the precise determination of the acts 
permitted or allowed - what measures are available and practicable, which of them should be selected, 
what scope they should be given and by whom they should be applied - is a matter which lies within the 
competence of the appropriate political organs of the [UN]’.280 In other words, the ICJ foresaw limits to 
the legal rights and responsibilities that can be derived from the general obligation to comply with 
decisions of the Council.281  
 With respect to the case of al-Bashir, the Council’s decision obliges Sudan to cooperate with 
the Court and this probably includes an obligation for Sudan to waive al-Bashir’s immunity. In the logic 
of the Namibia opinion, UN member states have an obligation under Article 25 of the Charter to 
recognize Sudan’s obligations and are presumably under an obligation not to lend Sudan ‘any support 
or any form of assistance’ in violating these obligations. Yet, these general obligations do not necessarily 
mean that states are bound under the Charter to consider al-Bashir’s immunity as having been waived. 
This is a more specific measure. As foreshadowed in the Namibia opinion, it is for the Council to decide 
                                                          
278 Note that the Chamber did refer to the Namibia Opinion when discussing the alleged conflict of obligations between the 
ICC and the AU. See ICC DRC decision, para. 30.  
279 ICJ Namibia Opinion, para. 116. 
280 Ibid., para. 120.  
281 Note that the Namibia situation was also different in that the Council had declared the administration of South Africa over 
Namibia to be illegal. The Council’s referral does not, as such, imply a determination of illegality per se (even if the ICC were 
to determine that crimes have been committed in Darfur). 
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whether this measure is advisable. This is something that the Council has not done in Resolution 1593, 
or in response to the Chamber’s decisions on the non-cooperation of African states parties.282  
 Secondly, and more to the point, if de Wet is right, and the Council has indeed created an 
obligation for all UN member states (including states that are not a party to the Rome Statute)283 to 
regard al-Bashir’s immunity as having been waived, then the question remains whether the ICC is in a 
position to hold this obligation against a state party that refuses to cooperate with the arrest of al-Bashir. 
On this question, several scholars have noted that Sudan’s obligation under the UN Charter to cooperate 
with the Court and to waive al-Bashir’s immunity does not somehow ‘modify the powers and 
competence of the Court, including the powers of the Court vis-à-vis member states in the matter of 
judicial cooperation’.284 The Council’s decision to oblige Sudan to cooperate with the ICC (and, 
arguably, to oblige all UN member states to consider al-Bashir’s immunity as being waived) does not 
relieve the Court from its obligation to implement Article 98(1). The question for the Court is still 
whether a state party would somehow act inconsistently with its ‘obligations under international law 
with respect to the state or diplomatic immunity of a person’, when it would have to arrest al-Bashir. 
 According to de Wet, Article 98(1) does not apply when all UN member states would be obliged 
to regard al-Bashir’s immunity as having been waived, because this obligation would ‘imply that the 
immunity obstacle posed by Article 98 … has been removed’.285 She did not explain, however, why this 
                                                          
282 Another factor to consider in this regard is that the Council may be bound to rules of customary international law that require 
an imposed waiver to be explicit. If states are under an obligation to act as if al-Bashir’s immunity is waived, as argued by de 
Wet, then the Council does not just create an obligation to waive, but essentially eliminates his immunities for all ICC-related 
purposes.  
283 Note that both de Wet and Akande have argued that non-parties would be permitted to arrest al-Bashir, but they would not 
have an obligation to do so ‘as they are not party to the ICC Statute and therefore not bound to give effect to its part on state 
cooperation’. See de Wet, ‘Implications of Al-Bashir’s Visit to South Africa’, 1062-1063, fn. 83; Akande, ‘The Legal Nature 
of Security Council Referrals’, 347-348. 
284 Gaeta, ‘ICC Changes its Mind on Immunities al-Bashir’; Jacobs, ‘The ICC’s Approach to Immunities and Cooperation’, pp. 
290-291.  
285 De Wet, ‘Implications of Al-Bashir’s Visit to South Africa’, 1062.  
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would be the case. In a general sense, it may be accepted that the alleged obligation of UN member 
states to consider al-Bashir’s immunity as being waived trumps other legal obligations by virtue of 
Article 103 of the Charter. However, ‘priority of UN Charter obligations does not mean that the other 
obligation disappears or that the state who would be compelled to give priority to the Charter obligations 
would still not face responsibility under international law for not respecting the other obligation’.286 For 
as long as Sudan has not waived al-Bashir’s immunity, a state party would act ‘inconsistently with its 
obligations under international law’ to respect this immunity when it would arrest the Sudanese 
President.287 Article 98(1) would apply, even if a state party has to give priority to its obligations under 
the Charter. As De Hoogh and I have argued elsewhere,288 the ICC is not allowed to ignore that al-
Bashir’s immunity has not been waived by Sudan, even if all UN member states would have an 
obligation to consider his immunity as being waived, because the Court is not the addressee of the 
Council’s decision and cannot assume its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter.289  
 In sum, de Wet has argued that Article 98(1) does not apply because Sudan has an obligation to 
waive al-Bashir’s immunity and all UN member states have an obligation to regard his immunity as 
having been waived (an obliged waiver). The Chamber’s reasoning in the DRC decision started from a 
different assumption, namely that the Council implicitly removed al-Bashir’s immunity and that Article 
98(1) does not apply because this immunity would not exist anymore (an imposed waiver). Both variants 
                                                          
286 Jacobs, ‘The ICC’s Approach to Immunities and Cooperation’, p. 300.  
287 This probably also holds true for the obligation of AU member states under the AU Constitutive Act not to cooperate with 
the Court on the arrest and surrender of al-Bashir. It is questionable, however, whether this obligation falls within the scope of 
Article 98(1), which is limited ‘to obligations under international law with respect to the state or diplomatic immunity of a 
person’. While the obligation under the AU Constitutive Act is an obligation under international law, this obligation does not 
directly concern the immunity of al-Bashir, as it refers to existing obligations in this respect.  
288 De Hoogh and Knottnerus, ‘ICC Issues New Decision on al-Bashir’s Immunities’.  
289 One other possibility is that the Statute has left a lacuna when it comes to the application of Article 98(1) to a non-party like 
Sudan that is obliged by the Council to cooperate fully with the ICC. If such a gap exists, the Court might be able under Article 
21(1)(b) to apply the Charter and relevant Council resolutions. However, it is doubtful that this would enable the ICC to invoke 
Article 103 of the Charter, as this falls beyond the scope of the presumed gap.   
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of the Charter-based approach prompt difficult questions about the legal powers of the Court, the 
interpretation of Resolution 1593 and the ability of the Court to act on the basis of the Council’s powers 
under Chapter VII. In my opinion, these questions have not been resolved by the DRC decision or by 
supporting commentators in a convincing manner. Firstly, it remains questionable whether the Council 
is able to remove immunities in an implicit manner. Secondly, and more to the point, I remain 
unconvinced that the Court is in a position to hold the alleged obligation of all UN member states to 
consider al-Bashir’s immunity as having been waived against its states parties. 
C. Analysis of the Statute-based approach  
Many of the questions that the DRC decision raised only concern the Charter-based approach. These 
questions are irrelevant if Sudan is placed in a similar position as a state party. Under this competing 
logic, which was adopted by the Chamber in the South Africa decision, it is not necessary to establish 
whether the Council can implicitly remove immunities or whether there is a textual link in Resolution 
1593. 
 In a general sense, the Statute-based approach is more elegant than the Charter-based approach. 
By arguing that the Court should treat Sudan for the purpose of the situation in Darfur as a state party, 
the Chamber envisioned a scenario in which there are no longer any tensions between the legal 
framework of the ICC and that of the Council, and in which there are no meaningful differences between 
a ‘real’ state party and a non-party that is obliged by the Council ‘to act like’ a state party. In this way, 
the Statute-based approach avoids most of the questions and problems of the Charter-based approach. 
That being said, the Statute-based approach does raise a number of other questions.    
i. Should the Court treat Sudan as a state party?  
Several commentators have challenged the Statute-based approach on the ground that it seems to imply 
that the Council can extend the powers of the Court under the Statute.290 Questions have been raised in 
this regard about the Court’s relationship with the Council, and about the principle of attribution of 
                                                          
290 Jacobs, ‘The ICC’s Approach to Immunities and Cooperation’, pp. 290-291; Kiyani, ‘Al-Bashir and the ICC’, 475-477. See 
also Tladi, ‘The ICC Decisions on Chad and Malawi’, 212. 
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powers. In a similar vein, Dov Jacobs has challenged the Chamber’s South Africa decision by 
questioning whether the Council has ‘the power to aside general rules of international law, such as the 
relative effect of treaties’. In his view, the South Africa decision is flawed because the Security Council 
cannot ‘make a state akin to a party to a treaty it did not sign’.  
 In a general sense, these and related questions and concerns about the limits of the Security 
Council’s powers under Chapter VII of the Charter are important and demand consideration. It should 
also be noted, however, that the Chamber in the South Africa decision did not actually claim that the 
Court’s powers are modified by the Council’s Resolution. The Chamber followed Akande in arguing 
that Sudan has an obligation under the Charter to follow the Court’s orders,  and that because the Court 
can only act in accordance with the Statute, the Court has no choice but to treat Sudan as a state party. 
The legal heart of the Statute-based approach is the assumption that the Court has to consider Sudan as 
a state party under the Statute, not because of the Council’s powers under the UN Charter, but because 
of the Court’s rules under the Statute.  
 In his 2009 article on the prosecution of al-Bashir, Akande did not provide a detailed analysis 
of the relevant provisions of the Statute to substantiate this claim. He simply took on the assumption 
that there is no other way to interpret the Statute than that a non-party that is under an obligation to 
cooperate with the ICC should be treated by the organs of the Court as a state party. The ‘only difference’ 
with an actual state party would be that the obligations for this state do not derive from the Statute, but 
from the Charter. Based on this assumption, Akande found that Sudan is ‘indirectly’ subject to the 
relevant provisions of the Statute.291 In the South Africa decision, the Chamber similarly assumed that 
                                                          
291 Note that Akande did not explicitly state that Sudan is bound to ‘all’ the provisions of the Statute. In fact, in a later 
contribution (2012), he indicated that for the application of certain provisions of the Statute, which explicitly distinguish 
between states parties and non-parties, the Court has to treat Sudan (or Libya) as a non-party. See Dapo Akande ‘The Effect of 
Security Council Resolutions and Domestic Proceedings on State Obligations to Cooperate with the ICC’ (2012) 10 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 312. In his contribution on the immunity of al-Bashir (2009), Akande stated, however, that the 
‘only difference’ between a state party and Sudan is the source of the obligation (i.e., the Statute versus the Charter). See 
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for the situation in Darfur, it had no choice but to treat Sudan like a state party. In the words of Chamber, 
‘the necessary effect’ of the Security Council’s referral is that ‘for the limited purpose of the situation 
in Darfur, Sudan has rights and duties analogous to those of states parties to the Statute’.292 
 In considering this key assumption of the Statute-based approach, it should be noted that the 
ICC’s legal framework is not explicit on how the Court should act when the Council refers a situation 
in a non-party to the Prosecutor under Article 13(b). There are no specific provisions in the Statute, the 
RPE, or the UN-ICC Relationship Agreement on how a non-party should be treated upon a Security 
Council referral.293 Presumably, the effect of a Security Council Resolution triggering the Court’s 
jurisdiction is that the legal framework of the Statute applies, in its entirety, with respect to the situation 
referred. So much follows, inter alia, from the text of Article 1 of the Statute which provides that ‘the 
                                                          
Akande, ‘The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals’, 342. If this would indeed be the ‘only difference’, Sudan would by 
necessity be bound to ‘all’ the provisions of the Statute.  
292 ICC South Africa decision (2017), para. 88. The Chamber emphasized in this respect ‘that Sudan’s rights and obligations 
are only those related to the situation referred by the Security Council and strictly within those parameters’. For this reason, 
the Chamber added that ‘Sudan does not have rights and obligations with respect to other Statute-based activities of the Court, 
and … does not have the right to vote in the [ASP] and does not pay contributions towards the expenses of the Court in line 
with Article 115 of the Statute’ (para. 90).  
293 Apart from Article 13(b) itself, the only references that are made in the Statute to the Council’s referral power address the 
communication between the Court and the Council at different stages of the proceedings. See Articles 53(2)(c) and 53(3)(a) 
(on the Council’s role in the initiation phase of an investigation, and especially on the Council’s right to be informed about a 
decision of the Prosecutor not to initiate an investigation or prosecution, and its right to ask for a review of such a decision by 
the PTC); Articles 87(5)(b) and 87(7) (on referring situations of non-cooperation to the Council); and Article 115(b) (on funding 
referrals). The only references to Article 13(b) and the Council in the RPE are found in Rule 44 (which states that ‘a referral of 
a situation to the Prosecutor shall be in writing’); Rule 105 and Rule 106 (on the notification of a decision by the Prosecutor 
not to initiate an investigation/or not to prosecute); Rule 107(4) and Rule 108(2) (on a request from the Council for review 
under Article 53, paragraph 3 (a) or (b)). The only relevant provision in the Relationship Agreement is Article 17, which 
discusses the cooperation between the Council and the Court, but it only concerns communication and the Council’s responses 
to a decision under Articles 87(5)(b) and 87(7).  
 196 
 
jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be governed by the provisions of the Statute’.294 However, 
the fact that the Statute applies does not necessarily justify the assumption that a non-party like Sudan 
ought to be regarded as a state party. There are two problems with this assumption.  
 Firstly, this assumption ignores the conceptual difference between (A) the legal basis of the 
Court’s decisions and (B) the presumed indirect effect of those decisions (through the UN Charter). The 
indirect effect of the Court’s decisions, as binding on Sudan under the UN Charter, might indeed be that 
Sudan is subject to (almost) the exact same obligations as a state party, but this is something different 
than to say that the Court should treat Sudan under the Statute as a state party. By assuming that Sudan 
is effectively bound to (all) the provisions of the Statute, the Statute-based approach conflates the 
presumed indirect effect of Sudan’s obligations under the UN Charter (as creating similar obligations as 
a state party) with the basis on which the Court should treat Sudan (the Statute). 
 Secondly, and more to the point, the assumption that the Court can only treat Sudan as a state 
party turns a blind eye to the provisions in the Statute that explicitly distinguish the legal position of a 
state party from that of a non-party.295 When the Statute only refers to a state party, or to a non-party, 
                                                          
294 Article 13 also indicates that the Court has to exercise its jurisdiction ‘in accordance with the provisions of the Statute’, and 
Article 21 mandates the Court to apply ‘in the first place’, the Statute. The Chamber comes to the same conclusion in the South 
Africa decision (para. 85-86), and refers to a number of earlier decisions of other Chambers, including Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi 
and Abdullah Al-Senussi (ICC-01/11-01/11-163), Decision on the postponement of the execution of the request for surrender 
of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi pursuant to Article 95 of the Rome Statute, 1 June 2012, paras. 28-29; Situation in Darfur (ICC-
02/05-189), Decision on Application under Rule 103, 4 February 2009, para. 31. See also the Minority Opinion of Judge de 
Brichambaut, para. 4.  
295 Many provisions generally speak of ‘a state’ (including on the definitions of the crimes, the articles on admissibility and the 
notions of criminal responsibility). Other provisions are only directed at states parties  (including, Article 9, 36(4), 44(4), 48, 
57(3), 70(4), 86, 87(1), 88, 91(4) and 93) or at the host state (Articles 3 and 103(4)), and some provisions envisage two 
scenario’s, one in which the state concerned is a state party and the other in which the state is not a party to the Statute. For 
example, Article 73 of the Statute provides that: ‘if a state party is requested by the Court to provide a document or information 
in its custody, possession or control, which was disclosed to it in confidence by a State, intergovernmental organization or 
international organization, it shall seek the consent of the originator to disclose that document or information. If the originator 
is a state party, it shall either consent to disclosure of the information or document or undertake to resolve the issue of disclosure 
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why would Sudan have to be treated by the Court as a state party? If the Court can only act in accordance 
with the Statute, I do not see how it can be denied that the Court has to treat Sudan as a non-party, 
especially when the Statute speaks specifically of a state party or a non-party. There is simply no textual 
argument, neither in the Resolution (which accepts the distinction between states parties and non-parties) 
nor in the Statute, for treating Sudan as a state party. As stated in the minority opinion of Judge de 
Brichambaut, if a Security Council referral triggers the applicability of the entire Statute, it logically 
follows that the referral ‘also activates provisions relevant to non-state parties’, which indicates in turn 
‘that such a referral need not necessarily render a non-state party analogous to a state party to the 
Statute’.  In order to claim that Sudan is somehow in the same position as a state party, one has to show 
that the Council or the Statute somehow equated Sudan’s status as a non-party with that of a state party 
under the Statute. If this cannot be done, and again, I do not see how, then the Statute-based approach 
is based on a flawed assumption.296 
ii. Treating Sudan as a non-party: what are the consequences for Article 98(1)?   
On the basis of the assumption that Sudan should be treated as a state party for the purposes of the 
situation in Darfur, the Chamber argued in the South Africa decision that a state party like South Africa 
cannot invoke Article 98(1) to refuse to arrest al-Bashir. According to the Chamber, Article 27(2) 
‘applies equally with respect to Sudan, ‘rendering inapplicable any immunity on the ground of official 
capacity belong to Sudan that would otherwise exist under international law’.297  Indeed, if Article 27(2) 
were to apply to Sudan in the same way as it does to a state party, then it makes sense that Article 98(1) 
                                                          
with the Court, subject to the provisions of Article 72. If the originator is not a state party and refuses to consent to disclosure, 
the requested State shall inform the Court that it is unable to provide the document or information because of a pre-existing 
obligation of confidentiality to the originator’ (emphasis added). Other examples can be found in Articles 87(5), 89, 90(4) and, 
arguably, 98.  
296 The only way is to claim that there is a general lacuna in the Statute when it comes to Security Council referrals, and that 
this lacuna would require the Court to fall back on the Security Council Resolution through Article 21(1)(b).With regard to al-
Bashir’s immunity, this would raise, however, the questions about the Charter-based approach that were discussed in part V(B). 
Note that this argument was not considered by either Akande or by the Chamber in the South Africa decision.  
297 ICC South Africa decision (2017), para. 91.  
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is not applicable to the arrest of al-Bashir, because there is no immunity that needs to be waived.298 The 
legal situation becomes more complex, however, if the Court has to treat Sudan for what it is: a state 
that is not a party to the Rome Statute.  
 If the Court has to regard Sudan as a non-party, a first question is whether the Court still has 
jurisdiction to prosecute al-Bashir. Article 27(2) indicates that the Court’s judges must ignore 
immunities that would otherwise pose a procedural bar to the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction.299 In 
order to claim that al-Bashir’s immunity limits the Court’s jurisdiction under the Statute, one has to 
show that Article 27(2) somehow does not apply to non-parties. This would arguably mean that there is 
a lacuna in the Statute when it comes to the jurisdiction of the Court in relation to the immunities of 
non-parties. If the existence of such a gap could be shown, Sudan still has an obligation under the UN 
Charter to cooperate fully with the Court, which logically includes the obligation to waive any relevant 
immunities when requested to do so. Presumably, the Court could act on this obligation vis-à-vis Sudan 
through Article 21(1)(b).300 Simply put, even if the application of Article 27(2) should be limited to 
(nationals of) states parties, al-Bashir’s immunity probably does not pose a procedural bar to the exercise 
of the Court’s jurisdiction. 
 That being said, if Sudan is to be treated as a non-party, the Chamber’s conclusion in the South 
Africa decision that Article 98(1) does not apply is more difficult to accept. For as long as the Court has 
not received cooperation from Sudan for the waiver of al-Bashir’s immunity, states parties (and non-
parties) should, in principle, be able to invoke Article 98(1). So much was also acknowledged in the 
minority opinion of Judge de Brichambaut, who stated that the referral did not ‘exclusively activate 
Article 27(2) … but preserved the possibility to apply Article 98(1) of the Statute, which allows a non-
                                                          
298 Assuming that Article 98(1) only applies to non-parties. For further discussion and references on this assumption, see part 
II(B) in this chapter.  
299 Jacobs, ‘The ICC’s Approach to Immunities and Cooperation’, pp. 291-292. 
300 Another way to address this situation is to question is to argue that Article 27(2) reflects customary international law, as 
discussed in part II(A).  
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state party to invoke the immunities of certain officials vis-à-vis the Court or a state party in certain 
circumstances’.301  
 An important consideration in this regard is that jurisdiction and immunities are ‘distinct 
concepts’.302 The fact that the Court has jurisdiction to prosecute al-Bashir does not exclude the 
possibility that his immunity still poses a procedural bar to the cooperation of states with this 
prosecution. An even more important consideration, however, is that Article 98(1) specifically addresses 
the legal position of a ‘third state’. This reference should, at least with respect to the immunities of state 
officials, be interpreted to mean a state that is not a party to the Statute.303 Article 98(1) distinguishes 
the legal position of states parties from the legal position from non-parties, and this distinction must be 
applied by the Court, regardless of the manner in which the Court has obtained jurisdiction.  
 To argue that Article 98(1) does not apply, even if Sudan is to be treated by the Court as a non-
party, one of the following propositions needs to be proven:  
 (A) Al-Bashir’s immunity from arrest has disappeared because of an exception under customary 
 international law, as argued by PTC I in the Chad and Malawi decisions. 
 (B) The Council has somehow removed al-Bashir’s immunity from arrest (an imposed waiver), 
 as argued by PTC II in the DRC decision.  
 (C) The Court can hold Sudan’s obligation under the UN Charter to waive al-Bashir’s 
 immunity against states parties  (an obliged waiver), as suggested by de Wet.304 
                                                          
301 Minority Opinion of Judge de Brichambaut, para. 56.  
302 Ibid.  
303 This is also acknowledged by the South Africa decision, which stated that ‘with respect to states that are not parties to the 
Statute, the applicable regime is that of Article 98(1) of the Statute’ (para. 82). Judge de Brichambaut came to the exact same 
conclusion that ‘the reference to “third state” in Article 98(1) of the Statute … must be interpreted to mean a non-state party. 
For further discussion and references, see part II(B) in this chapter.  
304 Given the Statute’s silence on how the Court should apply provisions to a non-party, especially when these provisions are 
only addressed to states parties or to the Court itself, it can be argued that there exists a gap in the Statute on how the Court 
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 (D) Article 98(1) does not cover the immunity of Heads of State, as argued by Tladi and 
 Iverson.305  
 (E) Sudan is a party to another treaty that includes a permanent waiver for al-Bashir’s 
 immunities, as argued in the minority opinion of Judge de Brichambaut;306  
For its part, the Chamber did not defend any of these propositions in the South Africa decision. Like 
Akande, the Chamber acted solely and without proper explanation on the assumption that is had no 
choice but to treat Sudan for the purpose of the situation in Darfur as a state party. The main problem 
with this assumption, however, is that it ignores that Article 98 and several other provisions of the Statute 
explicitly distinguish the legal position of a state party from the legal position of a non-party. In the 
application of these provisions, I believe that the Court should treat Sudan as a non-party. This means 
that Article 98(1) continues to apply, unless al-Bashir’s immunities are waived, removed or made 
inapplicable in some other way.  
 In sum, the DRC and South Africa decisions are similar in the sense that in both decisions the 
Chamber took a turn to the Security Council. The two decisions differ profoundly, however, in their 
                                                          
should deal with non-parties and that the Court would have to resort to the Resolution of the Council under Article 21(1)(b) to 
fill this gap. In this regard, the Court would probably be able to invoke Sudan’s obligation to cooperate fully with the Court 
against Sudan itself, and might thus require Sudan to waive al-Bashir’s immunity. Yet, it is questionable whether the Court is 
permitted to invoke this obligation against states parties as well, because based on the principle of attribution of powers the 
Court cannot absorb the legal powers of the Council, including its (alleged) ability to override customary international law. 
Consequently even if there exists a gap in the Statute which needs to be filled by, inter alia, the Council’s Resolution, Article 
98(1) would likely continue to apply 
305 For further discussion and references on this approach, see part II(B) of this chapter.  
306 In his Minority Opinion, Judge de Brichambaut argued, based on a detailed interpretation of Articles IV and VI of the 
Genocide Convention (paras. 4-37), that as a contracting party ‘Sudan must be regarded to have relinquished the immunities 
of its ‘constitutionally responsible rulers’ when acceding to the Convention’ (para. 38). In contrast, the majority concluded that 
the Genocide Convention does not include an ‘implicit exclusion of immunities’, inter alia, because the Convention ‘does not 
mention immunities based on official capacity’ (para. 109). For further discussion on this matter, see the references in footnote 
70 of this chapter.  
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assessment of the effect of the Security Council’s referral on al-Bashir’s immunity from arrest. The 
DRC adopted a Charter-based approach, whereas the South Africa decision employed a Statute-based 
approach. Both approaches may have certain merits, but in my opinion neither the DRC decision nor 
the South Africa decision offered a convincing line of argumentation as to why al-Bashir would not 
enjoy immunity from arrest in the meaning of Article 98(1) of the Statute.  
 
VI. Ambiguity and Uncertainty in the ICC’s Immunity Regime 
The different decisions of the Chamber and the two variants of the Security Council avenue have been 
debated extensively. Irrespective of one’s position on this matter, there is no denying that al-Bashir’s 
immunity remains a heavily contested issue. Past debates in the Council and the ASP highlight that not 
only commentators, but also states strongly disagree on how the relevant provisions of the Statute and 
Resolution 1593 should be interpreted. While some states parties have expressed support for the 
Chamber’s differing decisions,307 other states, including Russia, China, South Africa and Nigeria have 
argued that al-Bashir enjoys immunity from arrest under customary international law and that states 
parties can invoke Article 98(1) to refuse cooperation with the demanded arrest of the Sudanese 
President.308  
                                                          
307 In support of the Chamber’s response, see the statements of the United Kingdom and Spain in UNSC, S/PV.7478, 29 June 
2015. See also the statements of Ukraine in UNSC, S/PV.7710, 9 June 2016; of Guatemala in UNSC, S/PV.7080, 11 September 
2013; of Australia in UNSC, S/PV.7337, 12 December 2014; of Columbia in UNSC, S/PV.6887, 13 December 2012; and of 
France and Germany in UNSC, S/PV.6778, 5 June 2012.  
308 Against the Chamber’s response to al-Bashir’s visit to South Africa, see especially the statement of Russia in UNSC, 
S/PV.7963, 8 June 2017 (stating that ‘on more than one occasion, we have called attention to the fact that the obligation to 
cooperate, as set forth in resolution 1593 (2005), does not mean that the norms of international law governing the immunity of 
the Government officials of those States not party the Rome Statute can be repealed, and presuming the contrary is 
unacceptable’); the statements of Angola and Russia in UNSC, S/PV.7582, 15 December 2015; the statements of Angola, 
Russia and Venezuela in UNSC, S/PV.7478, 29 June 2015; and of Burundi, China and Ethiopia (on behalf of the AU) in ASP, 
General Debate of the Fourteen Session, 18-19 November 2015. See also the statements on immunity of Egypt and Bolivia in 
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 In light of these competing views, the Chamber’s position that there is no ambiguity or 
uncertainty on this matter is questionable. In June 2015, Single Judge Tarfusser argued in reference to 
the DRC decision that there exists ‘no ambiguity or uncertainty with respect to the obligation … to 
immediately arrest and surrender Omar al-Bashir’.309 In a similar vein, the Chamber concluded in the 
South Africa decision that ‘any ambiguity as to the law concerning South Africa’s obligations has been 
removed’.310 Of course, the different decisions of PTC I and PTC II have not left much doubt that the 
Court’s judges are unlikely to accept a claim under Article 98(1) in the case of al-Bashir, and that in 
their view all states parties are under an obligation to arrest him. Moreover, there is no question that the 
Court has the final say on the interpretation and application of Article 98(1).311 Yet, does this really 
justify the conclusion that there exists no ‘ambiguity or uncertainty’ about the obligation of states parties 
to arrest al-Bashir?  
A. Ambiguity and uncertainty in international law  
In a general sense, international law is subject to different types and levels of uncertainty, and to various 
forms of ambiguity. A first distinction may be drawn between ontological and epistemological 
uncertainty.312 As explained by Jörg Kammerhofer, the question of epistemological uncertainty for 
                                                          
UNSC, S/PV.7963, 8 June 2017; Egypt and Russia in UNSC, S/PV.7833, 13 December 2016; South Africa, Tanzania and 
Uganda in ASP, General Debate of the Fifteenth Session, 16-17 November 2016; of Egypt, Russia and Venezuela in UNSC, 
S/PV.7710, 9 June 2016; of Russia, Malawi, Lesotho (on behalf of the African states parties to the ICC) and China in ASP, 
General Debate of the Thirteenth Session, 8-17 December 2014; of Nigeria, Ghana, Russia and Congo in ASP, General Debate 
of the Twelfth Session, 20-26 November 2013; of Ghana and Russia in ASP, General Debate of the Eleventh Session, 15 
November 2012; of Algeria in UNGA, A/69/PV.35, 31 October 2014; of Rwanda and Russia in A/68/PV.42, 31 October 2013; 
of Iran in UNGA, A/65/PV.41, 29 October 2010; and of Egypt in UNGA, A/65/PV.39, 28 October 2010. See also the analysis 
of some of these statements in the Minority Opinion of Judge de Brichambaut, paras. 86-91.  
309 ICC South Africa decision (2015), para. 1. The Single Judge also stated more generally that there is ‘no ambiguity in the 
law’ (para. 5). 
310 ICC South Africa decision (2017), para. 137.  
311 As discussed above, in part II(B).  
312 Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in International Law: A Kelsenian Perspective (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), p. 4. 
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international law is whether we can accurately perceive international law, whereas ontological 
uncertainty is concerned with the more direct question ‘of what happens when international law itself 
is, [or] when the norms themselves are, problematic’.313  
 In his work on uncertainty in international law, Kammerhofer has identified four levels of 
epistemological and ontological uncertainty in international law: (A) the uncertainty of substantive legal 
norms, (B) the uncertainty of law-making norms or the law on sources, (C) uncertainty as to the 
‘possibility’ of a source or the constitution of international law and (D) finally, uncertainty in the theory 
of norms.314 With respect to the first level of uncertainty, which is the most relevant here, he described 
ambiguity (or equivocation) as a lack of determination of a term’s connotation in a norm.315 In 
addressing the uncertainty of substantive legal norms, he further observed that the tools of interpretation, 
subsumption316 and modification often imply both epistemological and ontological uncertainty. 
Epistemological uncertainty is, in this respect, ‘caused by a conglomerate of factors’ with some being 
rooted in the nature of human language itself and others in the way that international law and 
                                                          
313 Ibid. 
314 Ibid., pp. 3-4.  
315 Kammerhofer, ‘Uncertainty in International Law’, p. 118. In discussing semantic uncertainty with respect to substantive 
legal norms, Kammerhofer mentioned ambiguity or equivocation as a first reason for indeterminacy. He also pointed, in 
reference to Michael Thaler, to vagueness (Vagheit). Ambiguity is a lack of determination of a term’s connotation. This 
connotation is usually determined a priori by a language’s rules of semantics. Ambiguity or equivocation occurs when a word 
can connote two entirely different things (like a ‘star’) and the context cannot determine the ‘correct’ meaning for us. In contrast, 
‘vagueness is the lack of determination of a term’s denotation (Bezug)’. This denotation is determined ‘by the class of objects 
properly signified by the term, based on empirical experience’. In reference to Michael Thaler, Mehrdeutigkeit und Juristische 
Auslegung (Vienna: Springer-Verlag, 1982), p. 2.  
316 Subsumption (or matching facts and norms) is the procedure where there is ‘a general term and (typically, though not 
exclusively) a fact and the task is to find out whether the fact is part of the class of objects fitting that term’s denotation’. That 
procedure is a ‘categorically different action to interpretation’, as it is ‘no longer cognition, but an application of the law’. 
Indeed, as Kammerhofer argued, subsumption ‘is not logical deduction, but either an act of law-making or nothing at all’. 
Kammerhofer, ‘Uncertainty in International Law’, p. 121.  
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international courts apply these tools.317 In turn, ontological uncertainty of substantive legal norms is 
the result of different factors. Within the specific context of a treaty regime that is presided over by an 
international court, like the ICC controls the Statute, important sources of ontological uncertainty are 
the different intentions of the parties to a treaty, indeterminate language in that treaty and the intricate 
ways in which courts may apply its rules and principles.318  
B. Ambiguity and uncertainty in the ICC’s immunity regime 
Kammerhofer’s general description of ambiguity and uncertainty in international law helps to 
understand how the ICC’s immunity regime is by its very legal nature subject to ambiguity and 
uncertainty. In the scenario that the Court demands the arrest of the official of a non-party, over which 
the Court has jurisdiction through a Security Council referral (i.e., the specific case of al-Bashir), there 
are at least three significant manifestations of ambiguity and uncertainty. 
 First of all, the language of Article 98(1) is equivocal. The concept of ‘state immunity’ has 
different connotations. Most commentators believe that state immunity includes the immunities of 
Heads of State, but others have argued that Article 98(1) only covers diplomatic missions.319 These 
different views illustrate that Article 98(1) is subject to some degree of semantic ambiguity.  
 Second of all, Article 98(1) refers to norms that exist outside of the Statute, which are themselves 
manifestly subject to ambiguity and different types of uncertainty. It remains highly uncertain, for 
example, what the rules of state and diplomatic immunity are under customary international law, how 
they come to exist and how the Court can perceive these norms accurately. In this regard, the different 
views of commentators on the Arrest Warrant case of the ICJ, the Taylor decision of the Special Court 
                                                          
317 Ibid., p. 124.  
318 With regard to the last factor, Kammerhofer referred to the problem of subsumption. Like the problem of interpretation (and 
modification), subsumption is, above all, a question of epistemological uncertainty. Within the context of a treaty regime like 
the ICC that is presided over by a court, it raises the question how the judges of a court can accurately perceive international 
law. However, in this context, subsumption can also raise the question of ontological uncertainty, as the way in which a court 
matches facts and norms can be so intricate that it becomes uncertain what norms there are and how they come to exist.  
319 Tladi, ‘The ICC Decisions on Chad and Malawi’, 215-216. As discussed in part II(B).  
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and the Chad and Malawi decisions of the PTC demonstrate that these rules raise various questions of 
ontological and epistemological uncertainty. Most importantly, it is quite unclear whether there exists 
some sort of exception under customary international law for the prosecution of international crimes by 
an international court (ontological uncertainty) and how a court can, in theory, determine the existence 
of such an exception (epistemological uncertainty).  
 Finally, a third manifestation of ambiguity and uncertainty in Article 98(1), is that the Statute 
does not explain how the obligations of a non-party towards the ICC under the UN Charter affect the 
application of this provision by the Court. While it may be established that for the concerned state (i.e., 
Sudan) the obligation under Chapter VII has priority over any other conventional obligation (through 
Article 103), the ICC’s immunity regime fails to explain whether the Court can act upon this obligation 
towards other states (i.e., DRC, South Africa etc.). The Statute does not explicitly address the ‘indirect 
horizontal application’ of Security Council obligations, and is as such subject to a significant amount of 
ontological uncertainty.  
C. Ambiguity and uncertainty about the obligation to arrest al-Bashir  
These different manifestations of ambiguity and uncertainty in the ICC’s immunity regime do not 
necessarily have any implications for the (ir)relevance of al-Bashir’s immunity and the obligation of 
states parties to arrest him. While international law in general and the ICC’s immunity regime in 
particular are by their legal nature subject to ambiguity and uncertainty, this does not mean that the 
interpretation and application of the relevant rules and principles by the Court’s judges are also 
surrounded by ambiguity and uncertainty.  
 One of the central features of international courts is that they are authorized to take away doubts 
about what ‘the law’ requires for those who are bound to their decisions. Within the logic of the Rome 
Statute, and the logic of international courts more generally, the Court’s judges have the authority to 
‘choose’ a particular interpretation as being the most convincing one,320 and to bind states and 
                                                          
320 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 82-83. This is further discussed in 
chapter 1, part II. 
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individuals to this interpretation as applied in a specific case.321 In accordance with the general rule of 
interpretation (and by applying the tools of modification and subsumption), the Court’s judges are in a 
position to resolve any inherent ambiguity and uncertainty in the ICC’s immunity regime, and to 
establish how states and individuals should understand the relevant norms, including Article 98(1). In 
this way, the Court’s judges can ensure that there exists no ambiguity or uncertainty about a certain 
obligation, like the obligation of states parties to arrest al-Bashir.  
 The question is, however, whether the Court’s judges have been successful in this regard. In my 
opinion, this is not the case. PTC I and PTC II have made it crystal-clear that all states parties have an 
obligation to arrest al-Bashir. As such, they will not likely accept any claim from a state party under 
Article 98(1). Their decisions are binding for the involved states parties. Yet, the Chambers have not 
been consistent and clear when it comes to the reasons why these and other states parties cannot invoke 
Article 98(1).322  
 As shown, the DRC decision has failed to answer fundamental questions about the Charter-
based approach, and more specifically about the powers of the Council, the interpretation of Resolution 
1593, and the ability of the Court to act on the basis of the Council’s legal powers under Chapter VII. 
In light of these unresolved questions, the conclusion of Judge Tarfusser that the DRC decision has not 
left any ‘ambiguity or uncertainty’ about the obligation to arrest al-Bashir must be opposed.323 The 
                                                          
321 Article 21(2) of the Statute rejects the stare decisis doctrine. As discussed in chapter 1, part I(C).  
322 Note that other states parties are not actually parties to a case on the-compliance of other states parties. This means that 
other states parties are, strictly speaking, not bound to earlier non-compliance decisions in terms of dictum and reasoning.  
323 Note that the Prosecutor has publically supported the conclusion of Judge Tarfusser by saying that: ‘the Court has ruled on 
several occasions that in the specific case of Mr. Al-Bashir, States parties are obliged to arrest and surrender him should he 
travel to their territory. That is why non-compliance findings have been made and referred to the Council in that case. For 
example, this obligation is clear from the same 2014 decision finding the Democratic Republic of the Congo in noncompliance 
to which I have referred. It is also crystal-clear from the June 2015 decision in which the Pre-Trial Chamber also wrote that 
there exists no ambiguity or uncertainty with respect to the obligation of the Republic of South Africa to immediately arrest 
and surrender Mr. Al-Bashir to the Court. What I want to stress by referring to this decision is that the Court has made plain on 
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Chamber (including Judge Tarfusser) also acknowledged as much, when deviating from the DRC 
decision in the South Africa decision and adopting a Statute-based approach.  
 As employed by the Chamber, the Statute-based approach does not resolve any possible 
ambiguity and uncertainty in the law either. Most importantly, the Chamber did not offer a real 
explanation as to why Sudan should be treated as a state party. The Chamber acted without proper 
explanation on the assumption that is had no choice but to treat Sudan for the purpose of the situation in 
Darfur as a state party. The main problem with this assumption is that it ignores that Article 98 and 
several other provisions of the Statute explicitly distinguish the legal position of a state party from the 
legal position of a non-party. In the application of these provisions, I believe that the Court should treat 
Sudan as a non-party. This means that Article 98(1) continues to apply, unless al-Bashir’s immunities 
are waived, removed or made inapplicable in some other way. 
 Looking forward, there are several ways for the Court and its states parties to clarify the ICC’s 
rules on immunity in general and the matter of al-Bashir’s immunity in particular. A first and most 
logical option is a decision from the ICC’s Appeals Chamber on the case of al-Bashir.324 A state that 
becomes involved in non-cooperation proceedings under Article 87(7) of the Statute could decide to 
appeal a (future) decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber (in accordance with Article 82(1)(a) and/or Article 
82(1)(d) of the Statute).325 In my opinion, a judgment of the Appeals Chamber on the interpretation and 
                                                          
several occasions what the answer is to the apparent tensions between articles 27 and 98 in the case of Mr. Al-Bashir’. Statement 
of the Prosecutor in UNSC, S/PV.7710, 9 June 2016.  
324 See also Max Du Plessis and Dire Tladi, ‘The ICC’s immunity debate - the need for finality’, EJIL Talk, 11 August 2017.  
325 As stated in Article 82 ‘either party may appeal any of the following decisions in accordance with the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence: (a) A decision with respect to jurisdiction or admissibility; ….  (d) A decision that involves an issue that would 
significantly affect the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings or the outcome of the trial, and for which, in the opinion 
of the Pre-Trial or Trial Chamber, an immediate resolution by the Appeals Chamber may materially advance the proceedings’. 
For further discussion on the scope of Article 82, see chapter 4, part IV(D). Remarkably, none of the African states parties that 
have welcomed al-Bashir on their territory has filed an appeal against the respective decisions of the PTC. Note that none of 
the discussed decisions (like the decisions on the non-cooperation of the DRC, or the most recent decision on the non-
cooperation of South Africa) can still be appealed. As stated in Rule 155(1): ‘When a party wishes to appeal a decision under 
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application of Article 98(1) may materially advance the proceedings in the case of al-Bashir and by 
addressing the aforementioned questions it could take away (some of) the ambiguity and uncertainty 
surrounding the obligation of states parties to arrest al-Bashir.326 As explained in chapter 1, a judgment 
of the Appeals Chamber is binding for the Pre-Trial Chamber (or Trial Chamber) in the same case and 
would thus prevent further competing decisions at the pre-trial level on the (ir)relevance of al-Bashir’s 
immunity.327  
 A second option is the rendering of an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice.328 
When asked by the UN General Assembly (or another organ of the UN in accordance with Article 96 of 
                                                          
article 82, paragraph 1 (d), or article 82, paragraph 2, that party shall, within five days of being notified of that decision, make 
a written application to the Chamber that gave the decision, setting out the reasons for the request for leave to appeal’ (emphasis 
added). 
326 Note that the Prosecutor has suggested this possibility before the Security Council: ‘If States parties disagree with these 
decisions, the appropriate response is to challenge them before the Court through the legal process if necessary and seek to 
appeal decisions if they disagree with them. That is the correct way. That is the legitimate way to receive legal disputes and to 
respect the rule of law’. Statement of the Prosecutor in UNSC, S/PV.7710, 9 June 2016. 
327 As discussed in chapter 1, part I(C).  
328 In June 2012, the AU Assembly considered approaching the ICJ, through the UN General Assembly for an advisory opinion 
on the matter, but this proposal did not gain much momentum at the time. AU Assembly, Decision on the implementation of 
the Decisions on the International Criminal Court, Assembly/AU/Dec.419(XIX), 15-16 July 2012. On the request of the 
Assembly, the Commission did undertake a study ‘on the advisability and implications of seeking such an advisory opinion 
from the ICJ’ (para. 3). See AU Consultancy, Study on the Advisability of seeking an Advisory Opinion of the International 
Court of Justice on the question of Immunities of Heads of State and other senior state officials of States Not Party to the Rome 
Statute, December 2013 (on file with the author). Recently, the possibility of an ICJ advisory opinion attracted attention from 
commentators again with the idea that this could help to convince South Africa to reconsider its decision to leave the ICC. On 
the proposal of an ICJ advisory opinion, see generally Dapo Akande, ‘An International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on 
the ICC Head of State Immunity Issue’, EJIL Talk, 31 March 2016; Dapo Akande, ‘The African Union’s Response to the ICC’s 
Decisions on Bashir’s Immunity: Will the ICJ Get Another Immunity Case?’, EJIL Talk, 8 February 2012; Ssenyonjo, ‘AU 
Opposition to ICC’, 411-413. Note that in his Minority Opinion Judge de Brichambaut observed that ‘some issues mentioned 
in the debate might have warranted a request for an advisory opinion by the ICJ, but the Chamber does not have the possibility 
to request such advice’ (para. 97).  
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the UN Charter and Article 65 of the ICJ Statute),329 the ICJ could help to clarify the rules on state and 
diplomatic immunity under customary international law.330 More specifically, the UN General Assembly 
could ask the ICJ (1) whether the Head of State and/or other state officials of a state that is not a party 
to the Rome Statute (such as Sudan) are entitled to immunity from prosecution by the ICC under general 
international law and (2) whether such officials enjoy immunity from arrest and detention in foreign 
states which are acting upon a request of the Court. Answers to these questions from the ICJ may help 
to resolve the matter of al-Bashir’s immunity, both legally and politically.331 Of course, the ICC will 
always have the final say in the case against al-Bashir, but an advisory opinion of the ICJ may provide 
a helpful starting point to diminish the ambiguity and uncertainty that the previous decisions of the PTC 
have left about the obligation to arrest him and about the ICC’s immunity regime as a whole. 
 Finally, a last option for the Court’s states parties (rather than the Court itself) is to specify the 
rules for the implementation of Article 97 and 98. Amending these provisions may not be realistic at 
                                                          
329 In accordance with Article 96(a) of the UN Charter ‘the General Assembly or the Security Council may request the (ICJ) to 
give an advisory opinion on any legal question’. Article 65 of the ICJ Statute confirms that only the organs mentioned in Article 
96 of the UN Charter may request an advisory opinion by stating that ‘the Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal 
question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make 
such a request’. With regard to the relationship between the ICC and the ICJ, Article 119(2) of the Rome Statute provides that 
disputes between two or more states parties about the interpretation or application of the Statute, but which do not relate to the 
judicial function of the ICC, shall be referred to the ASP which may make recommendations as to further means of settling the 
dispute including referral of the dispute to the ICJ. In the course of the negotiations of the Relationship Agreement between the 
ICC and the UN, it was debated whether the ASP should be given the power to make requests to the ICJ for an advisory opinion. 
Such a provision was eventually not included in the agreement. As a result, the ASP can only encourage its states parties to 
request an advisory opinion to the ICJ through the UN General Assembly or the Security Council (and perhaps ask the General 
Assembly or the Security Council directly). Schabas, ‘Commentary’, pp. 1163-1165. 
330 Before the ICJ will issue an advisory opinion, it will first have to (1) examine whether it has jurisdiction to give the opinion 
requested and (2) make a determination as to whether it should use its discretion to decline to exercise its jurisdiction to render 
an advisory opinion. One reason why the ICJ may be somewhat hesitant to issue an advisory opinion on the immunity of Heads 
of State in relation to the ICC is that the ICJ might be seen to function as an appellate body of the ICC. On this issue, see 
Akande, ‘ICJ Advisory Opinion (2012)’; AU Consultancy, ‘ICJ Advisory Opinion’, paras. 8-32.  
331 Akande, ‘ICJ Advisory Opinion (2016)’.  
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this point in time, seeing the difficult procedure of Article 121(4) of the Statute (requiring ratification 
or acceptance of an amendment by seven-eighths of the states parties) and the strong political 
disagreement on this matter. Yet, recent discussions in the ASP do show that there is a willingness 
among states parties to specify the rules on the consultation procedure of Article 97.332 At the initiative 
of South Africa, the ASP agreed in 2015 to set up a working group on the implementation of this 
provision.333 Discussions in the context of this working group could form the first step in a longer 
political dialogue on the improvement of the ICC’s immunity regime as a whole, including the relation 
between Article 27(2) and Article 98(1).  
 For the time being, however, Article 98(1) and the specific question of al-Bashir’s immunity 
remain surrounded by ambiguity and uncertainty. PTC I and PTC II have left many fundamental 
questions unanswered. In the absence of a judgment from the Appeals Chamber and/or an advisory 
opinion of the ICJ, lawyers and states can reasonably disagree on the scope of Article 98(1), the relevant 
rules of customary international law and the obligation of states parties to arrest al-Bashir. In this sense, 
the ICC’s immunity regime remains ‘unresolved’. 
 
VII. Conclusion: The ICC’s Unresolved Immunity Regime 
This chapter examined the responses of the Court’s pre-trial chambers to the AU’s claim that al-Bashir 
enjoys immunity from arrest. The AU’s claim and especially the visits that the Sudanese President has 
paid to several African states parties have brought up difficult questions about the ICC’s immunity 
regime in general, about the interpretation and application of Article 98(1) in particular. The bottom-
                                                          
332 See the statements of Canada, Ghana, Portugal, South Africa and Uganda in ASP, General Debate of the Fifteenth Session, 
16-17 November 2016. 
333 ASP, Report of the Chair of the working group of the Bureau on the implementation of Article 97 of the Rome Statute of 




line of how the Court’s judges have responded to these questions is that states parties cannot invoke 
Article 98(1) to refuse cooperation with the arrest of al-Bashir.  
 PTC I and II have consistently opposed al-Bashir’s visits, but the reasoning of the Court’s judges 
has changed over the years. Four phases can be identified in the Court’s jurisprudence on this matter. In 
first instance, the Court’s judges tried to avoid giving a formal response to the AU’s position by passing 
the matter through to the ASP and the Security Council (phase I). However, when the ASP and the 
Council proved reluctant to take any action against these states, and al-Bashir continued to travel to 
African states parties, PTC I took the matter into its own hands and issued two consecutive decisions in 
December 2011. In these decisions, on the non-cooperation of Chad and Malawi, PTC I ruled that al-
Bashir did not enjoy immunity from arrest because of an exception under customary international law 
for the prosecution of international crimes by an international court like the ICC (phase II).  
 A few years later, the Chamber again ruled that al-Bashir did not enjoy immunity from arrest, 
but on the basis of a completely different line of argumentation. In April 2014, PTC II decided to revise 
the approach of PTC I in its decision on the non-cooperation of the DRC. The judges of PTC II 
(including Judge Tarfusser, who had co-authored the decisions of PTC I) argued that Article 98(1) does 
not apply in the case of al-Bashir, because the Council implicitly waived his immunity when referring 
the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor (phase III).  
 Most recently, in July 2017, PTC II revised its approach once more. The Chamber (still 
including Judge Tarfusser) again turned to the Security Council, but where the DRC decision argued 
that the Security Council implicitly waived al-Bashir’s immunity, the Chamber now rejected this 
interpretation. In the South Africa decision, the Court’s judges concluded, by majority, that Article 98(1) 
does not apply because the Security Council’s referral placed Sudan in a similar position as a state party 
(phase IV).   
 Against the background of the ongoing debate on the criminal responsibility of sitting Heads of 
State under the ICC’s immunity regime and international law more generally, this chapter has offered a 
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detailed analysis of the Chamber’s approaches in the DRC and South Africa decisions. Three 
conclusions of this analysis are worth to recall. 
 First of all, the Charter-based approach of the DRC decision should be distinguished from the 
Statute-based approach in the South Africa decision. In the DRC decision, the Chamber suggested that 
the Court is able to exercise jurisdiction against al-Bashir and to oblige its states parties to arrest him, 
because the Council has removed his immunity. In the Chamber’s eyes, the legal basis of the Court’s 
authority to ignore al-Bashir’s immunity from arrest is the power of the Council under Chapter VII of 
the Charter. In contrast, the South Africa decision reasoned that al-Bashir does not possess immunity in 
relation to the ICC, and states parties are not able to invoke Article 98(1), because Sudan is indirectly 
bound to the Statute, including Article 27(2).  
 Second of all, the two variants of the Security Council avenue are both based on an unconvincing 
interpretation of the Rome Statute, the Resolution of the Council and/or international law more 
generally. With respect to the Charter-based approach of the DRC decision, there remain unresolved 
questions about the powers of the Council, the interpretation of Resolution 1593, and about the ability 
of the Court to act on the basis of the Council’s enforcement powers under Chapter VII. In discussing 
these questions, I have argued, inter alia, that the Council cannot remove immunities in an implicit 
manner and that even if the Court would have this power, the Resolution cannot be interpreted to 
encompass an implicit removal. In my opinion, Resolution 1593 ‘only’ creates an obligation for Sudan 
to waive the immunities of its officials when this is requested by the Court. This interpretation fits best 
with the ordinary meaning of Sudan’s obligation to ‘cooperate fully’ and acknowledges the fact that the 
Council did not (have to) discuss the issue of the immunities of Sudan’s officials at the time when the 
Resolution was adopted.  
 Furthermore, if all UN member states would have an obligation to consider al-Bashir’s 
immunities as having been waived, as argued by de Wet, then the Court is not a position to hold this 
obligation against its states parties. For as long as Sudan has not acted on its obligation to waive al-
Bashir’s immunity, states parties would act inconsistently with their obligation under international law 
to respect this immunity when they would decide to arrest the Sudanese President. Article 98(1) 
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continues to apply, because the Court cannot absorb the powers of the Council under the Chapter VII 
and Article 103 of the Charter.  
 With regard to the alternative Statute-based approach, I have underscored that this approach 
prompts unanswered questions as well, especially about how the Court should act upon a Security 
Council referral. In addressing these questions, I have taken a different position than Akande by arguing 
that the Court should treat Sudan, as a matter of principle, as a non-party. There is no textual argument, 
neither in the Resolution (which accepts the distinction between states parties and non-parties) nor in 
the Statute, for treating Sudan as a state party. This means that Article 98(1) continues to apply in the 
case of al-Bashir, for as long as his immunity has not been explicitly waived, removed or otherwise 
made inapplicable.   
 Finally, the third conclusion that should be recalled is that there remains ambiguity and 
uncertainty about the obligation of states parties to arrest al-Bashir. The Chamber has been very clear 
that all states parties have an obligation to arrest the Sudanese President. However, the Chamber’s 
decisions have been inconsistent and far from clear about why states parties cannot rely on Article 98(1). 
As said, the Chamber’s rulings on al-Bashir’s visits to the DRC and South Africa have raised a whole 
range of difficult questions about both the Charter-based and the Statute-based approach. These 
questions highlight that the Court’s judges have not managed to resolve the ambiguity and uncertainty 
that is inherent in the ICC’s immunity regime.  
 There are several ways in which the Court and its states parties can seek to clarify the ICC’s 
rules on immunity in general and the matter of al-Bashir’s immunity in particular. Most importantly, 
affected states could pursue a judgment from the ICC’s Appeals Chamber on the question of al-Bashir’s 
immunity, or try to obtain an advisory opinion from the ICJ on this matter. Both the Appeals Chamber 
and the ICJ could help to take away (some of) the ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding the obligation 
of states parties to arrest al-Bashir. Moreover, the ICC’s immunity regime could benefit from more 




 Ultimately, the AU’s claim that al-Bashir enjoys immunity from arrest should be understood as 
a product of the existing tension in the ICC’s immunity regime, and in international law more generally, 
between ‘old’ rules that require states to recognize the immunities of foreign state officials and ‘new’ 
rules and principles that demand the prosecution of these officials when they have committed serious 
crimes. In response to the AU, the Court’s judges have tried to circumvent this tension in no less than 
four different ways. Yet, each of these ways, has turned out to be ineffective (phase 1) or controversial 
(phases 2, 3 and 4), leaving the ICC’s immunity regime and the matter of al-Bashir’s immunity 
surrounded by ambiguity and uncertainty.  
 As a final conclusion it is quite unsatisfying to observe that the question of al-Bashir’s immunity 
remains a difficult matter. However, it is important to realize that the continuing complexity and 
controversy of al-Bashir’s immunity is precisely the reason why the AU’s juxtaposition between arrest 
and immunity continues to be powerful, in the sense that it generates a significant amount of political 
and academic support. The AU and individual African states parties like South Africa have not just 
pointed to some of the most intricate provisions in the Rome Statute, but to a broader problem in 
international law. The reconciliation of notions of state sovereignty and sovereign equality with 
increasing demands of human rights is perhaps the single most important challenge of international law 
today. What the interactions between the AU, the ICC and its states parties about the immunity of al-
Bashir show in this respect is that the international community remains strongly divided on how to 






Sitting Heads of State at Trial1 
 
Equality before the law is an internationally recognized human right and an important principle of 
international criminal law.2 The Rome Statute acknowledges this principle in Article 21(3) by 
prohibiting any ‘adverse distinction’ based on any ground or status.3 In addition, Article 27(1) provides 
that the Court shall apply the Statute ‘equally to all persons without any distinction based on official 
capacity’. As a matter of principle, a sitting Head of State or other state official is subject to the Statute 
in the same way as any other accused. The official status of a person is, by itself, no reason to exempt 
that person from criminal responsibility or to treat that person differently in the course of the Court’s 
proceedings.  
 That being said, a trial against a sitting Head of State is an exceptional situation. If the accused 
continues to function as sitting Head of State, he or she has to attend to official responsibilities during 
the course of the trial. In light of these responsibilities, it may reasonably be asked whether a sitting 
Head or Deputy Head of State requires a somewhat different treatment than other accused. In the context 
of the AU’s opposition against the ICC, this question became of particular relevance in 2013, when 
                                                          
1 This chapter builds on Abel S. Knottnerus, ‘Extraordinary Exceptions at the International Criminal Court: The (New) Rules 
and Jurisprudence on Presence at Trial’ (2014) 13 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 261-285; Abel 
S. Knottnerus, ‘The International Criminal Court on Presence at Trial: The (In)Validity of Rule 134Quater’ (2014) 5 
International Crimes Database Brief 5, 1-11; Abel S. Knottnerus, ‘The Growing Rift between Africa and the International 
Criminal Court: The Curious (Im)possibility of a Security Council deferral’ (2013) 26 Hague Yearbook of International Law  
34-56;Abel S. Knottnerus, ‘Extraordinary Exceptions at the ICC: What happened with Rule 134Quater?’, Opinio Juris, 18 July 
2014; Abel S. Knottnerus, ‘Kenyatta (finally) has to go back to The Hague’, Opinio Juris, 1 October 2014. 
2 See, for example, Article 3(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights which states that ‘every individual shall 
be equal before the law’, the first line of Article 14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
which provides that ‘all persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals’ or Article 26 of the ICCPR which stresses that 
‘all persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law’. 
3 On Article 21(3), see chapter 1, part I(D).  
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Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto were elected as President and Deputy President of Kenya just before 
the start of their trials at the ICC,.  
 Upon the inauguration of the two new Kenyan leaders, the AU immediately rejected the prospect 
that their trials would continue as scheduled. According to the AU, the continuation of their trials would 
risk to undermine the stability of Kenya and would distract Kenyatta and Ruto in the exercise of their 
constitutional obligations.4 The AU Assembly therefore called upon the Court and the Security Council 
to suspend their cases. As discussed in chapter 2, the AU first asked the Court to refer the trials back to 
the Kenyan Judiciary,5 and then agreed in October 2013 to pressure the Security Council to defer these 
cases for a renewable period of twelve months.6  
 Knowing that these attempts might prove unsuccessful, the AU also supported a special 
application from the Defence Teams of Kenyatta and Ruto. This application asked the Court to excuse 
the two Kenyan leaders from continuous presence during their trials so that they would be able to 
continue to exercise their official responsibilities as sitting Head and Deputy Head of State. In other 
words, the AU asked the Court to treat Kenyatta and Ruto differently than other accused.  
 With respect to presence at trial, Article 63(1) of the Statute provides that ‘the accused shall be 
present at trial’.7 In search for an exception to this rule as well as to the equal treatment principle that is 
                                                          
4 These responsibilities are listed in part 2 of chapter 9 of the Kenyan Constitution (Articles 131-151). Note that there is only 
one Deputy President in Kenya and that he or she is considered to be ‘the principal assistant of the President’ and ‘shall deputise 
for the President in the execution of the President’s functions’ (Article 147). Constitution of Kenya, 27 August 2010, available 
online at: <http://www.kenyalaw.org/lex/actview.xql?actid=Const2010>.  
5 AU Assembly, Decision on International Jurisdiction, Justice and the International Criminal Court, 
Assembly/AU/Dec.482(XXI), 27-28 May 2013, para. 7. 
6 AU Assembly, Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the ICC, Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1(Oct.2013), 11-12 October 2013, 
para. 6 and 10.   
7 This provision is in accordance with the defendant’s right to be tried in his or her presence. This right is, for example, laid 
down in Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR, Article 6(3) of the ECHR and Article 8(2)(d) of the ACHR. In certain civil jurisdictions 
(including France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands) trials in absentia are allowed, but only under strict conditions in order 
to ensure minimum fair trial standards. Note that it has become common practice in international criminal proceedings that if 
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embedded in Article 27(1), the AU argued that if the trials of Kenyatta and Ruto would continue, the 
Court would have to treat them differently than other accused given their significant responsibilities as 
President and Deputy President of Kenya.8 While the two leaders would not be detained during the 
course of their trials and would only have to appear before the Court during trial hearings, the AU 
warned that the ICC could not expect a sitting Head or Deputy Head of State to travel to The Hague on 
a weekly or monthly basis. In its view, allowing Kenyatta and Ruto to choose the sessions that they 
wished to attend formed a pragmatic solution to ensure that the governance of Kenya would not be 
impeded by the ICC. 
 From a legal point of view, these ‘excusal requests’ for Kenyatta and Ruto raised questions for 
the Court’s judges about the discretion of the Trial Chamber to waive the presence requirement of the 
accused and about the principle of equality. Firstly, is the Trial Chamber permitted under Article 63(1) 
or any other provision of the Statute to excuse an accused from having to attend trial hearings? And if 
so, under what conditions can an excusal be granted? Secondly, if the Trial Chamber would enjoy a 
certain level of discretion to waive the duty of the accused to be present at trial, could an accused be 
excused because of his or her demanding functions as sitting Head of State or would this be prohibited 
by Article 27(1)?   
 When the Defence filed an excusal request for Ruto (in April 2013) and later for Kenyatta (in 
September 2013), these questions about the interpretation and application of Articles 63(1) and 27(1) 
came to occupy the Court and its states parties for almost a year (for a brief chronology of the 
                                                          
a defendant refuses to appear in court, his or her trial may continue under certain conditions (as regulated, for example, in 
Article 63(2) of the Rome Statute). With respect to the practice of international courts, it should further be noted that the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon (Article 22) is the only active international court (or hybrid tribunal) that allows for trials in absentia. 
See generally Wayne Jordash and Tim Parker, ‘Trials in Absentia at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon - Incompatibility with 
International Human Rights Law’ (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 487-509. 
8 AU, Letter to the ICC, BC/U/1657.09.13, 10 September 2013 (‘on behalf of the African Union, we would like to request the 
Court … to allow the Head of State of Kenya and his Deputy to choose the sessions they wish to attend in accordance with 




proceedings, see table 5.1). In first instance, these questions were strictly a concern for the judges of the 
two Trial Chambers that were in charge of their trials. Yet, after the Appeals Chamber ordered the Trial 
Chambers to limit excusals to a minimum, and the Security Council rejected the AU’s deferral request, 
presence at trial also became a topic on the agenda of the Assembly of States Parties. During the ASP’s 
meeting in late 2013, the AU reiterated its position that the unprecedented situation of having a sitting 
Head of State and his Deputy on trial required flexibility from the Court to ensure that the official 
responsibilities of the two Kenyan leaders would not be compromised.9 If this flexibility could not be 
realized under the existing provisions of the Statute, then the ASP would have to amend these provisions 
and develop a special excusal regime for sitting Heads of State and other senior government officials.  
 This chapter examines how the Court and its states parties have responded to the AU’s claim 
that sitting Heads of State like Kenyatta and Ruto should be treated differently than other accused 
because of their official responsibilities. In what ways did the Court’s judges and the ASP respond to 
the excusal requests for the two Kenyan leaders, and in turn to the AU’s proposals to revise the rules on 
presence at trial? How did they try to accommodate the AU’s concerns, and did they do so in accordance 
with the relevant provisions of the Statute, and in particular with Articles 63(1) and 27(1)?  
 In exploring the relevant proceedings, this chapter draws a distinction between the decisions 
that the two Trial Chambers and the Appeals Chamber took before the meeting of the ASP (stage 1) and 
the decisions that were taken after this meeting (stage 2). Parts I and II summarize the initial decisions 
of the two Trial Chambers to the excusal requests of Kenyatta and Ruto, as well as the revised response 
of the Appeals Chamber. The key issue in this first stage of the proceedings was the basis and scope of 
the alleged discretion of the Trial Chamber under Article 63(1). Does the Trial Chamber have this 
discretion under the Statute, and if so, under what conditions could an excusal be granted? After 
explaining the different arguments of the defence, the prosecution and the Court’s judges, part III 
                                                          
9 ASP, General Debate Twelfth Session, 20-26 November 2013, statement of Uganda (on behalf of the AU).  
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assesses whether the Appeal Chamber’s interpretation of Article 63(1) is convincing from a legal point 
of view.10  
 Parts IV and V turn to the discussions in the ASP, and look at the second stage of the proceedings 
on presence at trial. In this stage the proceedings focussed on the application of a new set of rules on 
presence at trial. These new rules were adopted by the Court’s states parties by way of an amendment 
to Rule 134 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE). Part IV summarizes the negotiations during 
the ASP and part V introduces the different views of the defence, the prosecution and the judges of the 
Trial Chamber on the new rules. Finally, part VI assesses whether these new rules, as interpreted and 
applied by the Trial Chamber, are in conformity with Article 63(1) and the equal treatment principle 
that is embedded in Article 27(1). In short, to what extent are the responses of the ASP and the Court’s 
judges to the AU’s concerns about the trials of Kenyatta and Ruto based on a convincing interpretation 
of the Court’s legal framework?   
                                                          
10 As explained in chapter 1, judgments of the Appeals Chamber may be perceived as ‘authoritative’, but they are not legally 
binding for future decisions of the Pre-Trial or Trial Chamber. As a subsidiary tool for the purposes of interpretation, Article 
21(2) does not make a distinction between the jurisprudence of the Pre-Trial, Trial or Appeals Chamber of the Court. In the 
absence of a hierarchical formulation between the decisions of the different chambers, the Court’s judges are free to deviate 
from the views of the Appeals Chamber and may adopt an interpretation of a Pre-Trial or Trial Chamber that has been rejected 
by the Appeals Chamber in an earlier and different case. There is only one exception to this general rule and that is that the 
Pre-Trial Chamber or Trial Chamber is bound by a ruling of the Appeals Chamber that is issued in the same case. See also 
parts III and VI in this chapter.  
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Table 5.1 – Overview Proceedings on Presence at Trial   
 
Stage 1 - Initial and Revised Responses of the Court 
 
When?  Who?  What?  
9 April 2013 Kenyatta and Ruto  Inauguration as President and Deputy President 
17 April 2013 Ruto Asks for excusal  
18 June 2013 Trial Chamber V(A) Grants Ruto’s request 
10 September 2013 AU Chairpersons  Request that Kenyatta and Ruto can choose the 
sessions they wish to attend 
23 September 2013 Kenyatta  Asks for excusal  
18 October 2013 Trial Chamber V(B) Grants Kenyatta’s request 
25 October 2013 Appeals Chamber  - Reverses decision Trial Chamber V(A) on Ruto’s 
request 
- Sets stricter conditions for excusals 
26 November 2013 Trial Chamber V(B) Vacates Kenyatta’s initial excusal 
 
Stage 2 - New Rules on Presence at Trial 
When?  Who?  What?  
11 October 2013 AU Assembly  Decides, inter alia, that Kenyatta will not attend his 
trial until the concerns of the AU have been 
addressed.  
15 November 2013 Security Council  Rejects AU’s deferral bid 
27 November 2013 ASP Adopts new rules on presence at trial (Rules 134bis, 
ter and quater) 
15 January 2014 Trial Chamber V(A) Excuses Ruto on the basis of Rule 134quater 
31 January 2014 AU Assembly  Welcomes new rules on presence at trial  






I. The Initial Response of the Trial Chamber 
Shortly after Kenyatta and Ruto were sworn into office, the Defence team of the new Deputy President 
of Kenya informed the judges of Trial Chamber V(A) that their wished to waive his right to be present 
during trial.11 According to the Defence, this wish amounted to a ‘reasoned and practical request’ in 
view of the unique position in which Ruto found himself, that of ‘a serving Deputy Head of State seeking 
to balance his constitutional responsibilities … with his personal commitment to cooperate with the 
court … to clear his name’.12 In its reply, the Prosecution argued, however, that the presence of the 
accused is a ‘statutory requirement’ of the trial. Moreover, the Defence would not have presented any 
‘cogent reasons’ for why Ruto should be excused from attending his trial.13 These competing views 
between the Defence and the Prosecution essentially raised two questions for the Court’s judges: (A) 
does the Trial Chamber have any discretion to excuse an accused from having to attend his or her trial 
and, if so, (B) under what kind of conditions would such an excusal be a reasonable measure? 14   
                                                          
11 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-685), Defence Request pursuant to Article 63(1) of the Rome Statute, 17 April 2013. At 
the time that this request was submitted, Trial Chamber V(A) still had to rule on an earlier application of the Defence requesting 
that Ruto could be considered present at trial, on a case-by-case basis, via video link. The Prosecution had objected to this 
request by arguing that Article 63(1) requires the physical presence of the accused. In its request of 17 April, the Defence 
referred to the election of Ruto as the reason for submitting a new application, in which the excusal request was considered the 
primary request for relief and the video link the alternative request. See Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-629), Joint Defence 
Submissions on Legal Basis for the Accused’s Presence at Trial via Video Link, 28 February 2013; Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-
01/11-660), Prosecution’s observations on Joint Defence Submissions on Legal Basis for the Accused’s Presence at Trial via 
Video Link, 22 March 2013.  
12 Request Defence Ruto (April 2013), para. 17. Note that the Defence stressed that Ruto did not seek ‘the grant of a blanket 
waiver’ but would undertake to attend the opening and closing of trial, judgment and all other hearings at which his attendance 
would be requested by the Trial Chamber (para. 10).  
13 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-713), Prosecution’s Observations on “Defence Request pursuant to Article 63 (1) of the 
Rome Statute”, 1 May 2013, paras. 7-12.  
14 See also Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-694), Submissions of the Common Legal Representative for Victims on the 
Defence Request Pursuant to Article 63(1) of the Rome Statute, 22 May 2013. One of the main concerns of the Victims’ 
Representative was that the absence of Ruto would have an extremely negative impact on how the Court is perceived, inter 
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A. Discretion Trial Chamber to excuse the accused from presence at trial?  
On the first question, the Prosecution took the position that the Trial Chamber does not have any 
discretion under Article 63(1), or under any other provision of the Statute, to excuse the accused from 
being present during trial.15 The ‘plain language’ of Article 63(1) would show that the presence of the 
accused is a ‘statutory requirement’ of the trial.16 This literal interpretation would be confirmed by 
Article 67(1)(d), which lists presence at trial as one of the rights that the accused enjoys before the Court. 
Whereas Article 67(1)(d) refers to the right of the accused to be present at trial, Article 63(1) would 
impose a duty on the accused to attend the complete trial.17 According to the Prosecution, this duty 
would not only be directed to the accused, but also to the Trial Chamber, which would have to ensure 
the presence of the accused in order to protect the ‘integrity of the proceedings’.18  
 In addition, the Prosecution argued that a strict reading of Article 63(1) is supported by Article 
63(2) and Article 61(2)(a).19 While the later provision permits the accused to skip the confirmation 
during the pre-trial stage, the Prosecution submitted that Article 63(2) provides the only exception to 
continuous presence when the trial has commenced and that is when the Trial Chamber decides to 
remove the accused for repeatedly disrupting the trial. The fact that the Statute does not foresee any 
                                                          
alia, because the traditional model of criminal litigation requires the presence of the accused person in the court (para. 7). In a 
similar vein, the Prosecutor stated that Ruto’s absence ‘would undoubtedly have an extremely negative impact on how the 
Court is perceived by the public and more importantly the victims and witnesses’ (para. 11).  
15 Observations Prosecution (May 2013), para. 7.  
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid., para. 9. Note that the Defence contended that Article 63(1) would not impose a duty on the accused, but would entail 
a right that the accused may decide to waive. According to the Prosecution, however, if this interpretation were correct, ‘it 
would have been sufficient to have the presence of the accused included only as a right in Article 67 and there would have been 
no need for Article 63(1) at all’ (para. 9). 
18 Ibid., para. 7.  
19 Ibid., para. 8-9. Note that the Statute does explicitly allow the Trial Chamber to hold ex parte hearings to deal with specific 
requests (including on special measures for witnesses and on issues of national security) under Article 72(7) and Rules 57, 74, 
81(2), 83, 87(2) and 88(2).   
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other exceptions to presence at trial would support the view that the Trial Chamber does not have any 
discretion to waive the presence requirement of the accused. 
 How did the judges of the Trial Chamber respond to this literal and partly contextual 
interpretation of Article 63(1) from the Prosecution?20 In its decision on Ruto’s excusal request, the 
Chamber agreed with the Prosecution on the point that the accused cannot simply waive the right to be 
present. Article 63(1) would indeed entail a duty for the accused to be present at trial. Yet, according to 
the Majority of the Chamber, this requirement does not impose an ‘equivalent duty upon the Chamber’.21 
In contrast to the Prosecution, Judge Eboe-Osuji and Judge Fremr argued that if the drafters had wanted 
to make the continuous presence of the accused a procedural requirement of the trial, ‘it would not have 
been too difficult for the provision to have been worded in [a] prohibitory model’.22  
 The Majority further contended that the interpretation of the Prosecution (and of dissenting 
Judge Carbuccia) would be unreasonable from a teleological point of view.23 If Article 63(1) would 
place an obligation upon the Court to ensure the uninterrupted presence of the accused, this would ‘not 
                                                          
20 For a more detailed analysis of this decision, see Thomas Obel Hansen, ‘Caressing the Big Fish? A Critique of ICC Trial 
Chamber V(A)’s Decision to Grant Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial’ (2013) 22 Cardozo Journal 
of International and Comparative Law 101-119.  
21 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-777), Decision on Mr Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial, 18 
June 2013, para. 43. See the discussion on the relevance of Articles 63(2) and 61(2)(a) in paras. 54-62. The Chamber contended 
that both provisions are ‘unique and particular’ in their context, and that this context does not implicate any intention on the 
part of the drafters to exhaust the circumstances in which a Trial Chamber may permit an accused at his or her own request to 
be absent during the trial.  
22 Ibid., para. 43. As examples of such a prohibitory model, the Chamber referred to Rule 60(A) of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (stating, inter alia, that an ‘accused may not be tried in his absence’) and section 
92(1) of the Criminal Procedural (Scotland) Act of 1995 (providing, inter alia, that ‘no part of a trial shall take place out with 
the presence of the accused’).  
23 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-777-Anx2), Initial decision Trial Chamber V.A. on Ruto’s excusal request - Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Herrera Carbuccia, 18 June 2013, para. 4. Judge Carbuccia essentially agreed with the Prosecution and argued 
that the presence of the accused ‘is a procedural requirement, which is reflected by the word ‘shall’ used in Article 63(1) of the 
Statute, denoting a requirement and not an option’. 
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only foster judicial inefficiency by constraining the Chamber to stop the trial on every occasion that the 
accused is unable with good reasons to be present during the trial … but it [would] also hold the Court 
hostage to impunity by negating the power of the Chamber to proceed with the trial of the accused who 
deliberately absconded from his own trial’.24   
 In light of these considerations, the Majority concluded that Article 63(1) does not impose a 
duty on the Trial Chamber. Instead, the Chamber reasoned that ‘a better construction is one that respects 
and comfortably accommodates the general power of the Trial Chamber to do what is fair, reasonable 
and just, under Article 64(6)(f)’.25 Under this provision, rather than Article 63(1) itself, the Chamber 
would enjoy a residual discretion to excuse the accused, on a case-by-case basis, when ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ would make such an excusal ‘reasonable’.26  
B. When is an excusal a reasonable measure?  
The second question for the Court’s judges was when it would be ‘reasonable’ to excuse Ruto or any 
other accused from continuous presence at trial. In this regard, Ruto’s defence team argued that an 
excusal would ‘strike the correct balance in this unprecedented situation by allowing not only the trial 
but [also] the governance of Kenya to continue unimpeded’.27 The Prosecution submitted, on the other 
hand, that the Defence did not present any ‘cogent reasons’ for why Ruto should be excused from trial, 
apart from arguing that the Court should somehow accommodate those occupying high office.28 In 
reference to the first paragraph of Article 27(1), the Prosecution stressed that Ruto ‘is not entitled to 
special consideration simply because of his position’.29 While ‘flexibility and pragmatism’ are ‘salutary 
                                                          
24 Ibid., para. 44.  
25 Ibid., para. 47. 
26 Ibid., para. 49. Article 64(6)(f) stipulates that ‘in performing its functions prior to trial or during the course of a trial, the Trial 
Chamber … may rule on any other relevant matters’.  
27 Request Defence Ruto (April 2013), para. 2.  




in the abstract’, they should not be a basis ‘for circumventing or ignoring the explicit requirements of 
the Statute’.30  
 Against the backdrop of these differing views, the Majority Decision sided with the Defence 
and reasoned that ‘exceptional circumstances’ include situations ‘in which an accused person has 
important functions of an extraordinary dimension to perform’.31 In the case at hand, the functions of 
the Deputy President of Kenya would meet this ‘test’, because under the Kenyan Constitution the Deputy 
President is the ‘principal assistant of the President’ and is authorized to fulfil various demanding 
functions.32 For these reasons, the Chamber found that Ruto’s day-to-day tasks as Deputy President 
justified a conditional excusal.  
 In the opinion of Judges Eboe-Osuji and Fremr, this finding would not be affected by Article 
27(1), as argued by the Prosecution and by dissenting Judge Carbuccia.33 The Majority ruled that the 
object of this provision is not to ‘remove from the Trial Chamber all discretion to excuse an accused 
from continuous presence in an ongoing trial, when that excusal is recommended by the functions 
implicit in the office that he or she occupies’.34 Article 27(1) would mainly be intended to align the 
Statute ‘with the contemporary norm of international law according to which public officials are no 
longer entitled to immunity for violation of international criminal law’.35 This object would not be 
‘offended or wholly defeated’ by allowing Ruto to be excused from continuous presence at trial.36 
According to the Majority decision, such an excusal would purely be a ‘matter of accommodation of the 
                                                          
30 Ibid.  
31 Decision on Ruto’s Excusal Request (June 2013), para. 49.  
32 Ibid., paras. 49-51.  
33 Judge Carbuccia agreed with the Prosecution and concluded in reference to Article 27(1) that Ruto ‘should not be given a 
different legal status on the basis of his personal position as Deputy President’. Dissenting Opinion Judge Carbuccia (June 
2013), para. 7.  
34 Decision on Ruto’s Excusal Request (June 2013), para. 71.  
35 Ibid., para. 66.  
36 Ibid., para. 71. 
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demanding functions of his office … and not merely the gratification of the dignity of his occupation of 
that office’ (emphasis in text).37  
 The Majority concluded that in the present situation it would be reasonable to grant Ruto a 
conditional excusal from presence at trial.38 As a general rule, Ruto would remain under the obligation 
to be present, but in light of the ‘unique and particular circumstances’ of his situation, he would not have 
to be physically present for the entire proceedings.39 The Chamber decided that Ruto would have to 
attend the opening and closing statements, the delivery of the judgment and hearings in which victims 
would present their views and concerns in person. But apart from these hearings, Ruto would not have 
to be present in the courtroom.40  
 
II. The Revised Response of the Appeals Chamber  
Following the Majority Decision of Trial Chamber V(A), the proceedings on presence at trial continued 
along two tracks: (1) through a similar application from Kenyatta to Trial Chamber V(B),41 and by way 
                                                          
37 Ibid.  
38 With respect to the argument that an excusal could have a negative impact on the perception of the trial, the Majority argued, 
inter alia, that this is an ‘unpersuasive hyperbole with no hint of empirical support’ and that ‘purely as a matter of perceptions, 
it is difficult to see how excusal from continuous presence at trial will have an ‘extremely negative impact on how the Court is 
perceived’, when such an excusal is already permitted during the confirmation hearings’. See Decision on Ruto’s Excusal 
Request (June 2013), paras. 72-78.  
39 Ibid., para. 104.  
40 The Trial Chamber further noted that Ruto would have to be present, if applicable, during the sentencing hearings, the 
sentencing, victim impact hearings, reparation hearings and ‘any other attendance directed by the Chamber’.  
41 Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-809), Defence Request for Conditional Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial, 23 
September 2013. See also Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-818), Prosecution’s Response to the Defence Request for Conditional 
Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial, 1 October 2013; Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-819), Victims’ Response to “Defence 
Request for Conditional Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial”, 1 October 2013.  
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of (2) an appeal of the Prosecution against the decision on Ruto’s excusal request.42 Remarkably, the 
rulings of Trial Chamber V(B) and the Appeals Chamber on these two submissions were issued within 
a week of each other, without any coordination whatsoever.43  
 First, on 18 October 2013, Trial Chamber V(B) granted Kenyatta an excusal under the exact 
same conditions as Ruto.44 The Majority, again composed of Judge Eboe-Osuji and Judge Fremr, who 
sat in both Chambers, concluded that Kenyatta’s position as President would be ‘all the more reason’ to 
excuse him from continuous presence.45 Then, only a few days later, the Appeals Chamber overturned 
the decision on Ruto’s excusal request.46 According to the Majority of the Appeals Chamber, the Trial 
                                                          
42 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-831), Prosecution appeal against the “Decision on Mr Ruto’s Request for Excusal from 
Continuous Presence at Trial”, 29 July 2013. See also Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-817), Decision on Prosecution’s 
Application for Leave to Appeal the ‘Decision on Mr Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial’, 18 July 
2013. Judge Eboe-Osuji dissented, inter alia, because he found ‘the possibility of a risk that the Appeals Chamber may disagree 
with the Trial Chamber in relation to the existence of the excusal …’speculative’ and insufficient to warrant the grant of leave 
in the terms of article 82(1)(d)’. Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-817-Anx), Dissenting Opinion Judge Eboe-Osuji, 18 July 
2013, para. 13.  
43 Patricia Hobbs has highlighted that this ‘lack of cooperation between the Trial and Appeals Chamber is problematic in light 
of the interests of judicial economy. Patricia Hobbs, ‘Contemporary Challenges in Relation to the Prosecution of Senior State 
Officials before the International Criminal Court’ (2015) 15 International Criminal Law Review 95.   
44 Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-830), Decision on Defence Request for Conditional Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial, 
Trial Chamber V.B, 18 October 2013; Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-830-Anx2), Decision Trial Chamber V.B. on Kenyatta’s 
excusal request - Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ozaki, 18 October 2013. Judge Ozaki argued, inter alia, that the ‘correct 
interpretation of Article 63(1) … is that the accused is required to be continuously and physically present at trial’. This would 
not be a requirement that can be waived by the Chamber, subject to ‘very limited exceptions’ (para. 7).  
45 Decision on Kenyatta’s Excusal Request (September 2013), para. 16. The Majority of Trial Chamber V(B) rejected, however, 
the argument of the Prosecution that in light of the interests of judicial economy, the Trial Chamber would have to wait for the 
outcome of the Appeals Chamber before ruling on the excusal request of Kenyatta (paras. 58-59).  
46 Before issuing its decision, the Appeals Chamber granted the Prosecution’s request for suspensive effect of the Trial 
Chamber’s ruling under Rule 156(5). See Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-862), Decision on request for suspensive effect, 20 
August 2013. For a critical discussion of this decision, see William A. Schabas, ‘Attendance at Trial and the Kenya Cases 
Before the International Criminal Court’, Human Rights Doctorate, 21 August 2013. Despite the Appeals Chamber’s 
provisional ruling, the Trial Chamber did permit Ruto to return to Kenya after the Westgate Mall Attack. The Trial Chamber 
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Chamber did have the discretion to waive the presence requirement of the accused, but this judicial 
discretion would not have been exercised properly by the Trial Chamber when it excused Ruto from 
almost all trial hearings.47 Finally, Trial Chamber V(B) agreed a few weeks later to vacate the excusal 
for Kenyatta.48 In this way, the Appeals Chamber de facto revised the initial decision on Ruto’s as well 
the decision on Kenyatta’s excusal request.  
A. The Appeals Chamber’s response to the Prosecution 
When looking at the reasoning of the Appeals Chamber, the first thing that stands out is that the Majority 
disagreed not only with the Trial Chamber but also with the Prosecution. While reversing the decision 
of the Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber found (by a 3-2 majority) that the Prosecution’s literal 
interpretation of Article 63(1) was ‘unduly rigid’ in light of the provision’s ‘rationale’ and ‘the complex 
                                                          
adjourned the trial, because it would not have any discretion to excuse Ruto from presence in light of the Appeals Chamber’s 
decision to grant suspensive effect. See Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-T-37-Red-ENG), Public Court Records, 23 
September 2013, pp. 8-9. A subsequent request of Ruto for a reconsideration of the suspensive effect was rejected by the 
Appeals Chamber. See Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-993-Red), Decision on Mr Ruto’s request for reconsideration of the 
"Decision on the request for suspensive effect", 27 September 2013.   
47 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1066), Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber 
V(a) of 18 June 2013 entitled “Decision on Mr Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial”, 25 October 
2013. Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1066-Anx), Judgment Appeals Chamber on Presence at Trial - Joint Separate Opinion 
of Judge Erkki Kourula and Judge Anita Usacka, 25 October 2013. 
48 Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-837), Prosecution’s motion for reconsideration of the “Decision on Defence request for 
conditional excusal from continuous presence at trial” and in the alternative, application for leave to appeal, 28 October 2013; 
Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-863), Decision on the Prosecution’s motion for reconsideration of the decision excusing Mr 
Kenyatta from continuous presence at trial, 26 November 2013. Judge Eboe-Osuji dissented, because in his opinion the Trial 
Chamber should  ‘seize the Appeals Chamber … in order to give them an opportunity to resolve certain questions arising from 
their decision’, especially about whether the Appeals Chamber  ‘obscured settled law and practice as regards when and how 
the Appeals Chamber may interfere with a primary Chamber’s exercise of discretion’. See Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-863-
Anx), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji, 26 November 2013. Note that by the time that the Trial Chamber vacated the 
excusal requests of Kenyatta, the Chamber had already adjourned the commencement of Kenyatta’s trial until 5 February 2014. 
See Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-847), Decision adjourning the commencement of trial, 31 October 2013. 
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nature of trials of international crimes’.49 Except for Judges Kourula and Usacka, who took a different 
stand in their joint separate opinion, the Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber requires ‘a 
measure of flexibility in the management of proceedings, because in the course of ‘prolonged criminal 
proceedings, unforeseen circumstances may arise, necessitating the absence of the accused person on a 
temporary basis’.50 The Majority further noted that the ‘interests of justice and the psychological well-
being of witnesses would not be best served if the trial had to be automatically adjourned in each such 
instance’.51 
 According to the Appeals Chamber, the Trial Chamber enjoys discretion under Article 63(1) to 
excuse the accused from continuous presence at trial, rather than under Article 64(6)(F), as envisioned 
by the two Trial Chambers. This would follow from Article 63(2) and from the drafting history of the 
Rome Statute. First of all, the fact that Article 63(2) allows the Trial Chamber to excuse a disruptive 
accused ‘against his will’ would imply that the Trial Chamber also has the discretion to make a less 
drastic exception to continuous presence when the accused ‘voluntarily waives his or her right to be 
present’ (emphasis in the judgment).52 In other words, who can do more can also do less.  
 Secondly, the Appeals Chamber argued that this contextual interpretation is confirmed by the 
rationale of Article 63(1), which can be derived from the discussions that the drafters of the Statute had 
on the possibility of holding trials in absentia. According to the Majority, Article 63(1) was adopted ‘to 
preclude this possibility’ and its rationale would therefore be ‘to reinforce the right of the accused to be 
present at his or her trial’.53 This rationale does not rule out that the Trial Chamber has the discretion to 
excuse the accused from continuous presence at trial, or in the wording of the Appeals Chamber: Article 
                                                          
49 Judgment Appeals Chamber on Presence at Trial (October 2013), para. 50.  
50 Ibid.  
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., para. 51.  
53 Ibid., paras. 53-54.  
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63(1) does not operate ‘as an absolute bar in all circumstances to the continuation of trial proceedings 
in the absence of the accused’.54  
 The Majority of the Appeals Chamber did not only reject the Prosecution’s literal interpretation 
of Article 63(1), but also the Prosecution’s second ground of appeal. According to the Prosecution, the 
Trial Chamber had excused Ruto on the basis of his ‘important functions’, which would be prohibited 
under Article 27(1). In the opinion of the Majority, however, ‘the ‘test’ that the Trial Chamber had 
developed under Article 64(6)(f) to assess whether it would be reasonable to excuse Ruto was not 
premised on Ruto’s important functions, ‘but on the more general requirement of exceptional 
circumstances’.55 Without explaining what this general requirement entails, the Appeals Chamber 
simply concluded that it was not necessary to determine whether an excusal could be recommended by 
the demanding functions of the accused.  
B. The Appeals Chamber’s response to the Trial Chamber 
While rejecting both grounds of the Prosecution’s appeal, the Appeals Chamber did not accept the 
reasoning of the Trial Chamber. The Appeals Chamber rejected the legal basis of the Chamber’s 
discretion (Article 63 versus 64(6)(f)) and opposed the manner in which the Chamber had exercised its 
excusal powers. According to the Appeals Chamber, the Trial Chamber had interpreted ‘the scope of its 
discretion too broadly’.56 By allowing Ruto to be absent from most trial hearings, the Chamber would 
have granted him ‘a blanket excusal before the trial [had] commenced, effectively making his absence 
the general rule and his presence the exception’.57  
 To avoid another blanket excusal by the Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber identified six 
conditions that the Trial Chamber would have to respect in exercising its discretion to excuse an accused 
                                                          
54 Ibid., para. 55.  
55 Ibid., para. 58. This interpretation of the Trial Chamber’s decision is problematic, because Trial Chamber V(A) did make an 
assessment on the scope of Article 27(1) as discussed in Part I(B) of this chapter (see paras. 69-71 of the decision). 




from continuous presence at trial.58 Firstly, absences of the accused should only be allowed (1) ‘in 
exceptional circumstances and must not become the rule’.59 Secondly, the Trial Chamber should 
consider (2) ‘reasonable alternative measures’, including, but not limited to, ‘changes to the trial 
schedule or a short adjournment of the trial’.60 An excusal should only be permitted, if such alternative 
measures would be inadequate and even then, absences of the accused would always have to be (3) 
‘limited to what is strictly necessary’ and should only be granted (4) when the accused has explicitly 
waived his or her right to be present’ and when (5) ‘the rights of the accused [are] fully ensured, in 
particular through representation by counsel’.61 Finally, the Appeals Chamber noted that the decisions 
of the Trial Chamber on the presence of the accused should always be taken (6) ‘on a case-by-case basis, 
with due regard to the subject matter of the specific hearings that the accused would not attend’.62 
 With these six conditions, the Appeals Chamber directed the Trial Chamber to limit the use of 
its excusal powers to a minimum. Despite the calls from the AU and the amicus curiae observations of 
several African states to uphold the initial decision of the Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber firmly 
rejected the idea that Article 63(1) should be interpreted ‘in a broad and flexible manner’ to 
accommodate the official responsibilities of a sitting Head or Deputy Head of State.63  
                                                          
58 According to the Appeals Chamber (para. 61), these conditions derived from Article 63(2), which lists more or less the same 
conditions for the exercise of the Trial Chamber’s power to remove a disruptive accused. Contra William A. Schabas, ‘Appeals 
Chamber rules on Presence of Kenyan Leaders during Trial’, Human Rights Doctorate, 26 October 2013 (arguing that it is a 
‘mystery’ from where the Appeals Chamber derived the six conditions); Manisuli Ssenyonjo, ‘Analysing the Impact of the 
International Criminal Court Investigations and Prosecutions of Kenya’s Serving Senior State Officials’ (2014) 1 State Practice 
and International Law Journal 28 (claiming that the Appeals Chamber ‘did not provide any recognised source of law … for 
the limitations on the exercise of judges’ discretion’). 
59 Judgment Appeals Chamber on Presence at Trial (October 2013), para. 62.  
60 Ibid.  
61 Ibid.  
62 Ibid.  
63 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09/01/11-948), Joint Amicus curiae Observations of the United Republic of Tanzania, Republic of 
Rwanda, Republic of Burundi, State of Eritrea and Republic of Uganda on the Prosecution’s appeal against the "Decision on 
Mr. Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial", 17 September 2013, para. 2. See the response of the 
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III. An Authoritative Misinterpretation? 
Within the legal framework of the ICC, judgments of the Appeals Chamber offer authoritative 
interpretations in the sense that they provide guidance for future rulings on similar questions.64 Under 
the Rome Statute, and specifically Article 21(2), jurisprudence of the Appeals Chamber is not a binding 
source of law. As a subsidiary tool for the purposes of interpretation, Article 21(2) does not make a 
distinction between the jurisprudence of the Pre-Trial, Trial or Appeals Chamber of the Court. In the 
absence of a hierarchical formulation between the decisions of the different chambers, the Court’s judges 
are free to deviate from the views of the Appeals Chamber and may adopt an interpretation of a Pre-
Trial or Trial Chamber that has been rejected by the Appeals Chamber in an earlier and different case. 
Yet, there is one exception to this general rule and that is that the Pre-Trial Chamber or Trial Chamber 
is bound by a ruling of the Appeals Chamber that is issued in the same case. This means that the Appeals 
Chamber’s decision on the excusal request of Ruto was binding for Trial Chamber V(A) in the Ruto 
case, but strictly speaking not for Trial Chamber V(B) in the Kenyatta case.  
 Both Trial Chamber V(A) and Trial Chamber V(B) took the Appeals Chamber’s decision as 
authoritative. They revised the initial excusal requests for Ruto and Kenyatta in accordance with the 
conditions set by the Appeals Chamber. From a doctrinal perspective, however, I believe that it should 
                                                          
Prosecution arguing that the amicus curiae observations ‘rely on a misinterpretation of the law [and] are supported by policy 
considerations extraneous to the narrow legal issue on appeal’. Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-964), Prosecution’s Response 
to Joint Amicus curiae Observations’, 20 September 2013, para. 1. Note that the request for the submission of joint amicus 
curia was granted by a Majority of the Appeals Chamber. Judge Usacka dissented because the ASP would be ‘the appropriate 
forum for the Applicant States to address the issues outlined in their requests’. See Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-942), 
Decision on the requests for leave to submit observations under rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 13 September 
2013; Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-942-Anx), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Usacka, 13 September 2013, para. 5. 
Also note that a similar request of Ethiopia and Nigeria to submit observations was rejected by the Appeals Chamber, because 
it would be repetitive. See Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-988), Second decision on the requests for leave to submit 
observations under rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 25 September 2013; Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-
988-Anx), Partly Separate Opinion of Judge Anita Usacka, 25 September 2013 (referring back to her earlier dissenting opinion).   
64 See also Reconsideration Excusal Kenyatta (November 2013), para. 12.  
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be questioned whether the Appeals Chamber interpretation of Article 63(1) is more convincing than the 
strict reading which was favoured by the Prosecution and by four of the nine judges that were involved 
in the proceedings at the trial and appeal level.   
 In contrast to the Appeals Chamber, I must agree with the Prosecution that the literal meaning 
of Article 63(1) is clear.65 The ordinary meaning of the word ‘shall’ establishes that the presence 
requirement can, in principle, not be waived by the accused or by the Chamber.66 This literal 
interpretation is confirmed by reading the provision in its (direct) context. Articles 63(2) and 61(2)(a) 
both demonstrate that exceptions to continuous presence have to be explicitly provided for in the 
Statute.67 Since there are no other exceptions to Article 63(1) than the removal of a disruptive accused, 
the continuous presence of the accused has to be understood as a procedural requirement of the trial.  
 In my opinion, the counter-arguments of the Appeals Chamber do not justify a more dynamic 
interpretation of this provision. Firstly, the Appeals Chamber’s contextual argument that Article 63(2) 
supports the interpretation that the Trial Chamber has the discretion to excuse the accused that 
voluntarily waives his or her right to be present breaks the laws of logic. An explicit and narrowly 
formulated exception to a rule does not imply a broader exception to that same rule. On the contrary, 
under international law the logical implication of a specific exception like Article 63(2) is that other 
exceptions to the general rule (i.e., Article 63(1)) also have to be formulated in an explicit and narrow 
manner (inclusio unius est exclusio alterius).  
                                                          
65 As I discussed in ‘Extraordinary Exceptions’, pp. 267-270. See also Hansen, ‘Request for Excusal’, p. 102; Kevin Jon Heller, 
‘Appeals Chamber Ensures Ruto & Kenyatta Won’t Cooperate with the ICC’, Opinio Juris, 25 October 2013; Dov Jacobs, 
‘Ruto Required to attend ICC Trial (for the moment)’, Spreading the Jam, 25 October 2013. Contra Schabas, ‘Appeals 
Chamber rules on Presence’ (arguing that ‘the more flexible view adopted by the Appeals Chamber that presence at trial is a 
right to be exercised by the accused that can be waived is surely the correct one’). 
66 Dissenting Opinion Judge Carbuccia (June 2013), para. 4; Partially Dissenting Opinion Judge Ozaki (October 2013), para. 
10; Joint Separate Opinion Judge Kourula and Judge Usacka (October 2013), para. 6.  
67 Dissenting Opinion Judge Carbuccia (June 2013), para. 5; Partially Dissenting Opinion Judge Ozaki (October 2013), para. 
10; Joint Separate Opinion Judge Kourula and Judge Usacka (October 2013), para. 7. 
 234 
 
 Secondly, the Appeals Chamber’s teleological argument that the Prosecution’s textual 
interpretation is ‘unduly rigid’, because in the course of a trial ‘unforeseen circumstances’ may arise 
that require short absences of the accused, is not compelling either.68 According to the Majority of the 
Appeals Chamber, an automatic adjournment in such situations does not serve the interests of justice 
and the psychological well-being of witnesses, and so the Trial Chamber should have the discretion to 
excuse the accused in unforeseen circumstances. What the Appeals Chamber does here is to conflate the 
question whether the presence of the accused is a procedural requirement of the trial with the separate 
question whether short absences may be allowed in concrete and unforeseen circumstances. In contrast 
to what the Appeals Chamber suggests, the textual interpretation of Article 63(1) does not prohibit all 
short absences of the accused. As was pointed out by all of the four dissenting judges, short absences 
may be de minimis in the context of the overall trial and do as such not violate the presence requirement 
of Article 63(1).69 The Trial Chamber would simply have to adopt a ‘common sense approach’, in 
deciding whether concrete and unforeseen circumstances like a terrorist attack,70 a natural disaster or 
the passing of a relative justify a short absence instead of an adjournment of the trial.71 During the course 
of this absence, the trial could continue precisely to serve the interests of justice and the psychological 
well-being of witnesses.  
                                                          
68 Judgment Appeals Chamber on Presence at Trial (October 2013), para. 50.  
69 Dissenting Opinion Judge Carbuccia (June 2013), para. 9; Partially Dissenting Opinion Judge Ozaki (October 2013), para. 
9; Joint Separate Opinion Judge Kourula and Judge Usacka, para. 3. In this regard, it may also be noted that the presence 
requirement of Article 63(1) does not speak of all ‘trial hearings’, but refers in a holistic manner to ‘the trial’. Furthermore, in 
the course of the trials of Jean Pierre Bemba and Thomas Lubanga (who were both in custody during their trials), the Trial 
Chamber authorized the absence of the accused from trial on a few specific occasions (including medical reasons). As discussed 
in Judgment Appeals Chamber on Presence at Trial (October 2013), p. 19, fn. 94.  
70 Note the discussion of Trial Chamber V(B) on the Westgate Mall Attack, which the Majority called ‘a veritable ‘early 
warning sign’ as to what is reasonable in the interpretation of Article 63(1)’. Decision on Kenyatta’s Excusal Request 
(September 2013), paras. 62-65.  
71 Partially Dissenting Opinion Judge Ozaki (October 2013), para. 17; Joint Separate Opinion Judge Kourula and Judge Usacka 
(October 2013), para. 3. 
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 Finally, the Appeals Chamber’s last argument that the Prosecution’s textual interpretation 
conflicts with the rationale of Article 63(1) must be opposed as well. As a matter of principle, there is 
no need to have recourse to the travaux préparatoires, because the ordinary meaning of Article 63(1) is 
clear and does not lead to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable (Article 32 of the VCLT). 
Yet, even if the application of Article 31 VCLT were to leave its meaning ambiguous or obscure, the 
available reports do not indicate, as the Appeals Chamber argued, that the drafters included Article 63(1) 
to reinforce Article 67(1)(d) and to preclude any possibility of holding trials in absentia.72  
 In their separate opinion, Judges Kourula and Usacka correctly pointed out that the debate that 
the drafters had on the possibility of holding trials in absentia should be differentiated from the ‘basic 
requirement of presence’, which was actually ‘the point of departure during the negotiations’.73 Article 
37 of the Draft Statute of the International Law Commission provided that ‘as a general rule, the accused 
should be present during the trial’.74 This rule was ‘widely endorsed’ by the Ad Hoc Committee in 
1995.75 In the subsequent meetings of the Preparatory Committee between 1996 and 1998, and during 
the Rome Conference itself, several exceptions to this general rule were proposed in order to allow for 
trials in absentia in various situations.76 Apart from Article 63(2), however, none of these proposals was 
endorsed. What this shows is that Article 63(1) was not included with the specific purpose to preclude 
any possibility of holding trials in absentia. There was already agreement on presence at trial as a general 
rule by the time that the drafters debated the different scenarios of continuing a trial in the absence of 
                                                          
72 On the drafting history of Article 63, see generally William A. Schabas, ‘Article 63’, in Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary 
on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008, 2nd edition), pp. 1191-1198.  
73 Joint Separate Opinion Judge Kourula and Judge Usacka (October 2013), para. 13.  
74 ILC, Draft Statute of the ICC, 22 July 1994, Article 37.  
75 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court in UNGA, A/50/PV.22,1995, 6 
September 1995, para. 164-168.  
76 UN, Press Release - Trial in Absentia Among Issues Discussed by Preparatory Committee Establishment of International 
Criminal Court, L/2798, 16 August 1996; Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, UN.Doc. A/CONF.183/2, 14 April 1998, pp. 53-54; Rome Conference, Working Paper on Article 63, Doc. 
A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L.51/Corr.1, 9 July 1998, paras. 297-298.  
 236 
 
the accused. That most of these scenarios were rejected can only confirm the literal and contextual 
interpretation of Article 63(1) that the accused has to be continuously present during the course of his 
or her trial.  
 In short, the arguments of the Appeals Chamber do not, in my opinion, validate a more dynamic 
interpretation of Article 63(1) than the Prosecution advanced. While the Majority was right to conclude 
that Ruto’s initial excusal was too far-reaching, the Appeals Chamber should have adopted the literal 
interpretation of the Prosecution and the four dissenting judges. The literal meaning of Article 63(1) is 
clear and is confirmed by the direct context and drafting history of this provision. The duty to be present 
at trial can, as a matter of principle, not be waived by the accused or by the Trial Chamber. Short term 
absences of the accused may be de minimis in the context of the overall trial, but the Trial Chamber does 
not enjoy a more general discretion to excuse an accused from continuous presence at trial. 
   
IV. The Intervention of the ASP  
For the AU, the revised response of the Appeals Chamber was also disappointing, but for an entirely 
different reason.77 By directing the Trial Chamber to limit excusals to a minimum, the Appeals Chamber 
signalled that Kenyatta and Ruto would have to be present in the courtroom for a significant part of their 
trials. This prospect led the AU to intensify its campaign against the continuation of their trials, first of 
all, at the Security Council, and in second instance at the ASP.78 According to the AU, the unprecedented 
situation of having a sitting Head of State and his Deputy at trial demanded flexibility, either from the 
Security Council by way of a deferral under Article 16 or from the Court’s judges through a complete 
                                                          
77 For a discussion on the AU’s perception of the Appeals Chamber’s judgment, see Charles Jalloh, ‘Reflections on the 
Indictment of Sitting Heads of State and Government and Its Consequences for Peace and Stability and Reconciliation in 
Africa’ (2014) 7 African Journal of Legal Studies 51-52; Kevin Jon Heller, ‘Appeals Chamber Ensures Ruto & Kenyatta Won’t 
Cooperate with the ICC’.  
78 Meanwhile, the Kenyan Parliament also approved a motion to withdraw Kenya from the Rome Statute. See generally Sara 
Kendall, ‘”UhuRuto" and Other Leviathans: the International Criminal Court and the Kenyan Political Order’ (2014) 7 African 
Journal of Legal Studies 419.  
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excusal from presence at trial. If this flexibility could not be realized under the existing provisions of 
the Statute, then the ASP would have to amend these provisions and develop a special excusal regime 
for sitting Head of State and other senior government officials.79 
A. New rules on presence at trial?   
Three weeks after the judgment of the Appeals Chamber, the first option of the AU failed when the 
Security Council rejected the AU’s deferral bid under Article 16 with seven votes in favour and eight 
abstentions. As discussed in chapter 2, the majority agreed that Article 16 was ‘not applicable’ in the 
present case and that there were ‘other means available to address the legitimate concerns of Kenya’.80 
Unlike the AU’s earlier deferral request for al-Bashir, however, many of the opposing states, including 
the US, the UK and France, did express sympathy for the position of the AU. Whereas a deferral was 
considered a step too far, these states suggested that the ASP could amend the rules on presence at trial 
in such a way that Kenyatta and Ruto would not have to ‘choose between mounting a vigorous legal 
                                                          
79 Note that after the Appeals Chamber’s judgment the Trial Chamber granted Ruto several short-term excusals before his trial 
was adjourned until the middle of January 2014. As a result, Ruto attended only three of ten remaining trials days in 2013. He 
was present on 31 October, 1 and 22 November, but was excused from attending his trial on 28 October, from 4 to 8 November 
and on 21 November. Each of these excusals was requested for the reason that Ruto would have to stay in Kenya so that 
Kenyatta could attend international meetings (i.e., the Kenyan Constitution would arguably not allow the President and Deputy 
President to be away at the same time). The Prosecution objected to two of the excusals, because Ruto’s absence during trial 
hearings would now become the ‘rule rather than the exception’. However, the Trial Chamber unanimously accepted that 
Kenyatta’s international meetings were of ‘exceptional importance’ and would justify a limited absence of Ruto. See Ruto and 
Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-T-64-Red), Public Court Records, 1 November 2013, p. 73, lines 15-16; Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-
01/11-T-66-Red), Public Court Records, 5 November 2013, p. 3,  lines 14-25; Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-T-70-Red), 
Public Court Records, 21 November 2013, p. 7, lines 8-22.  
80 Statement of Luxembourg in UNSC, S/PV.7060, 15 November 2013.  
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defence, on the one hand, and continuing their jobs on the other’.81 This suggestion set the stage for the 
annual meeting of the ASP, which took place five days after the final vote in the Security Council.82  
 At the ASP, the AU and the present African states called upon the Court’s states parties to amend 
a number of provisions of the Statute and the RPE in light of their concerns about the prosecution of 
African leaders in general, and about the trials of Kenyatta and Ruto in particular.83 Apart from amending 
Article 16,84 the AU asked the ASP to revise Articles 27 and 63, as well as the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence on presence at trial.85 These amendments would have to ensure, on the one hand, that the 
Court’s ongoing trials would not hamper Kenyatta and Ruto in the exercise of their public duties, and 
                                                          
81 Ibid., statement of the US. See also the statements of Argentina, France, Luxembourg and the UK.  
82 Before the opening of the ASP reports indicated that Ruto would personally lead the Kenyan delegation to the ASP. In 
response to these reports, the Prosecution and the Victim’s Representative asked the Trial Chamber to reconsider Ruto’s excusal 
for 21 November 2013 (i.e., the second day of the ASP). See Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1104), Prosecution’s Request 
for provision of further information and Reconsideration of the excusal of William Ruto, 19 November 2013; Ruto and Sang 
(ICC-01/09-01/11-1111), Common Legal Representative Response to the Prosecution’s Request for Provision of Further 
Information and Reconsideration of the Excusal of William Ruto, 20 November 2013; Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1109), 
Defence Response to the Prosecution’s Request for provision of further information and Reconsideration of the excusal of 
William Ruto, 20 November 2013. Eventually, it turned out that Ruto would not lead the Kenyan delegation, making the request 
for reconsideration moot. See the discussion in court: Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-T-70-Red), Public Court Records, 21 
November 2013, pp. 5-14.   
83 See the statements of Botswana (‘through the proposed Amendments, we hope that greater flexibility can be applied in the 
interpretation and application of Article 63’), Congo, DRC, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Ivory Coast, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia and Uganda (on behalf of the AU) in ASP, General Debate of the Twelfth Session, 20-26 
November 2013. 
84 On the proposed amendment to Article 16, see chapter 2, part IV.  
85 See AU Assembly, Decision October 2013, para. 10(VI); UN Treaties Collection (C.N.1026.2013.TREATIES-XVIII.10), 
Kenya: Proposal of Amendments, 14 March 2014. Note that the Kenyan delegation also proposed an amendment to the 
Preamble of the Statute, which would add a clause on the complementarity of the ICC to regional criminal jurisdiction. See 
generally Abel S. Knottnerus and Eefje de Volder, ‘International Criminal Justice and the early formation of an African 
Criminal Court’, in Kamari M. Clarke, Abel S. Knottnerus and Eefje de Volder (eds.), Africa and the ICC: Perceptions of 
Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 376-406. For an overview of the different proposed amendments, 
see annex II.  
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on the other hand, that in the future ‘serving Heads of State, their deputies and anybody acting or entitled 
to act as such may be exempt from prosecution during their current term of office’.86  
 In response to the AU’s concerns about the trials of Kenyatta and Ruto, many delegations noted 
during their opening statements to the ASP that a rift was growing between the AU and the ICC and that 
there was now ‘a very real possibility that a significant number of parties to the Rome Statute … [would] 
leave the Court if their concerns are not addressed’.87 The ‘most critical job’ for the ASP would be to 
engage in a ‘constructive and transparent dialogue’ with the African states.88 Several delegations 
stressed that key principles of the Statute, including the equal treatment principle, should be protected,89 
but it was generally agreed that the concerns of the AU should be considered seriously in order to prevent 
a further deterioration of the already tensed relationship between Africa and the ICC.   
 An important step towards a compromise between the members of the ASP was taken on the 
second day of the meeting during a special segment on ‘the indictment of sitting Heads of State and 
Government and its consequences on peace and stability and reconciliation’.90 Disappointing for the AU 
                                                          
86 As quoted from the proposed amendment to Article 27. 
87 Statement of New Zealand in ASP, General Debate of the Twelfth Session, 20-26 November 2013. See also the statements 
of Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, 
Jordan (also on behalf of Liechtenstein), Lithuania (on behalf of the EU), Luxembourg, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, 
Trinidad & Tobago, the UK and the US (as an observer state).  
88 Ibid., statements of Australia and Brazil.  
89 Ibid., see, for example, the statements of Austria (‘in order to fight impunity for such serious crimes it is essential that the 
law applies equally to all persons without distinction based on official capacity’), Czech Republic, Finland ‘(at the very core 
of the Rome Statute is the principle that it applies equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity’), 
France, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania (on behalf of the EU - ‘this is a fundamental principle that underpins the Court’s work to end 
impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes’), Spain and the UK. 
90 ASP, Special Segment as requested by the African Union: ‘Indictment of sitting Heads of State and Government and its 
consequences on peace and stability and reconciliation’ - Informal summary by the Moderator, ICC-ASP/12/61, 27 November 
2013. On the background and structure of the special segment, see ASP, Recommendation by the Bureau for the Inclusion of 
an additional item in the agenda of the twelfth session of the ASP, ICC-ASP/12/1/Add.2, 18 November 2013. See also part III 
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was that this segment concluded, according to the informal summary of the Moderator, that ‘any 
substantive change to the Rome Statute was unlikely to materialize in the near future’.91 The 
amendments that the AU proposed to the Statute, especially on Article 27, were considered too drastic 
by the majority of the states parties.92 Moreover, it was stressed that these amendments would not offer 
an immediate solution for the trials of Kenyatta and Ruto, given that they would only enter into force 
one year after seven-eighths of the states would have ratified these amendments (Article 121(4) of the 
Statute).93 The segment, however, also showed ‘broad agreement’ that ‘practical solutions’ needed to be 
found for the ‘concerns expressed by the [AU]’.94 It was agreed that this could best be done by amending 
the RPE on presence at trial. This would be an acceptable course of action for most states parties and, 
contrary to amendments to the Statute, these changes would enter into force immediately in accordance 
with Article 51(2) of the Statute.95  
B. Rules 134bis, 134ter and 134quater  
After a week of intense negotiations on the details of the proposed amendments, the ASP adopted three 
new rules on presence at trial (see table 5.2).96 The first amendment is Rule 134bis, which allows 
defendants to be present through the use of video technology. The possibility of trial ‘by skype’ was 
                                                          
in chapter 3 of this book, and the presentation of Charles Jalloh to the Special Segment, as summarized in ‘Reflections on the 
Indictment of Sitting Heads of State’, 43-59.  
91 ASP, Informal summary by the Moderator, para. 8.  
92 For a discussion of this proposal, see Jalloh, Reflections on the Indictment of Sitting Heads of State, 56-59.  
93 These amendments could also not be formally considered by the ASP, as they were not submitted three months in advance 
of the session, in accordance with Article 121(2).  
94 ASP, Informal summary by the Moderator, para. 8. 
95 The relevant part of Article 51(2) provides that amendments to the Rules ‘shall enter into force upon adoption by a two-
thirds majority of the members of the Assembly of States Parties’. 
96 ASP, Resolution ICC-ASP/12/Res.7, 27 November 2013.  
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initially opposed by the Prosecution,97 and was deemed ultra vires by several commentators,98 because 
Article 63(1) would demand the physical presence of the accused. Yet, on the initiative of the UK, and 
in response to the concerns of the AU about the trials of Kenyatta and Ruto, the ASP agreed that the 
Trial Chamber should be able to decide on a case-by-case basis that parts of a trial could proceed in the 
virtual presence of the accused.99  
 The second amendment that the ASP adopted, copied the Appeals Chamber judgment on 
presence at trial and turned (part of) its jurisprudence into a binding source of law. Rule 134ter provides 
that the accused who is subject to a summons to appear may submit a written request ‘to be excused and 
to be represented by counsel only during part or parts of his trial’. This request will have to be granted, 
on a case-by-case-basis, under the exact same conditions that were set by the Appeals Chamber.    
 The last and most controversial amendment that the ASP agreed upon is Rule 134quater, 
creating what the AU demanded: a special excusal regime for those who are ‘mandated to fulfil 
extraordinary public duties at the highest national level’. This new provision stipulates that the Chamber 
will ‘expeditiously consider a request of the accused who fulfils such extraordinary public duties and 
stresses that this request ‘shall’ be granted (1) ‘if alternative measures are inadequate, (2) when the 
Chamber determines that an excusal is ‘in the interests of justice’ and (3) if ‘the rights of the accused 
are fully ensured’. The second paragraph adds that a decision under this Rule ‘shall be taken with due 
regard to the subject matter of the specific hearings in question and is subject to review at any time’. 
 What makes this last amendment the most controversial one is that it appears to deviate from 
the conditions that the Appeals Chamber formulated. In contrast to Rule 134ter, Rule 134quater does 
not explicitly require (1) that the absence of the accused must not become the rule, (2) that excusals 
                                                          
97 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-660), Prosecution’s observations on Joint Defence Submissions on Legal Basis for the 
Accused’s Presence at Trial via Video Link, 22 March 2013. 
98 Kevin Jon Heller, ‘Can the ASP Permit Trial by Skype?’, Opinio Juris, 19 November 2013; Kevin Jon Heller, ‘Proposals for 
RPE 134 - and an Unsuccessful Defence of Trial by Skype’, Opinio Juris, 20 November 2013.  
99 Statement of UK in ASP, General Debate of the Twelfth Session, 20-26 November 2013. According to some commentators 
this rule is invalid under the Statute, see Ssenyonjo, ‘Prosecutions of Kenya’s Serving Senior State Officials’, 30.  
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must be limited to what is strictly necessary, or (3) that excusal decisions should be taken on a case-by-
case basis. It is because of these apparent differences with the Appeals Chamber’s authoritative 
interpretation of Article 63(1) that several commentators, such as Kevin Jon Heller, immediately 
questioned whether this Rule would survive judicial review.100 After all, Article 51(4) of the Statute 
provides that the RPE and any amendments thereto ‘shall be consistent with’ the Statute. 
 Despite the possibility that Rule 134quater would be deemed invalid by the Court’s judges, the 
new excusal regime was welcomed as a ‘big win’ by Kenya and the AU.101 According to the Kenyan 
Foreign Minister, Rule 134quater implied that the Court’s judges could no longer pretend that Kenyatta 
and Ruto would ‘merely [be] accused persons before the ICC’.102 Among the other delegations of the 
ASP, the general feeling was one of relief. Many states parties were convinced that the new rules helped 
to address the ‘Kenyan and African Union’s concerns about trial procedures, while upholding the 
principles of justice and accountability’.103 According to the President of the ASP, the tension between 
                                                          
100 Kevin Jon Heller, ‘Will the New RPE 134 Provisions Survive Judicial Review? (Probably Not.)’, Opinio Juris, 28 November 
2013; Knottnerus, ‘The Growing Rift between Africa and the ICC’, 53-54; CICC, ‘ICC Must Defended from Political 
Interference’, 28 November 2013. See also Hobbs, Contemporary Challenges, 94; Gilbert Bitti, ‘Article 21 and the Hierarchy 
of Sources of Law before the ICC, in Carsten Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 417-418; Gudrun Hochmayr, ‘Applicable Law in Practice and Theory - Interpreting Article 
21of the ICC Statute’ (2014) 12 Journal of International Criminal Justice 659; Ssenyonjo, ‘Prosecutions of Kenya’s Serving 
Senior State Officials’, 30-33. 
101 As quoted in Robert Nyasato, ‘Kenya lauds AU support in reviewing ICC rules’, Standard Media, 29 November 2013.  
102 Ibid. Note that the AU Assembly welcomed the new rules on presence at trial in its next decision on the ICC. AU Assembly, 
Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation of the Decisions on the International Criminal 
Court, Assembly/AU/Dec.493 (XXII), 30-31 January 2014, para. 10.  
103 Mark Simmonds (Foreign Office Minister UK), ‘FCO Minister welcomes new ICC rules on attendance in person’, Foreign 
& Commonwealth Office, 28 November 2013. See also Samantha Power (US Permanent Representative to the UN), ‘Statement 
on the ICC Assembly of States Parties’ Decision on Kenya’, 27 November 2013.  
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presence at trial and official responsibilities was dispelled without undermining ‘the principle that no 
one is above the law within the Roe Statute’.104 
 
V. The Application of the New Rules on Presence at Trial 
Almost immediately after the eventful meeting of the ASP, Ruto asked for an excusal under the new 
rules on presence at trial, and more specifically under Rule 134quater.105 In its submission of 16 
December, his Defence Team argued that Rule 134quater allowed the Trial Chamber to excuse Ruto 
from all trials hearings for as long as he would maintain the office of Deputy President of Kenya.106 In 
support, the Defence contended that the amendment meaningfully omits a restriction to the duration of 
an excusal.107 Accordingly, Rule 134quater would enable the judges of the Trial Chamber to look past 
the judgment of the Appeals Chamber and effectively return to their initial response to Ruto’s excusal 
request. 
                                                          
104 ASP, Closing Remarks, the President of the Assembly of States Parties, Ambassador Tiina Intelmann, Twelfth Session of 
the ASP, 28 November 2013.  
105 Note that following the adjournment of Kenyatta’s trial until February 2014, Trial Chamber V(B) decided once more to 
adjourn the trial of Kenyatta until 7 October 2014 for ‘the specific purpose of providing an opportunity for compliance by the 
Kenyan Government with the outstanding cooperation request’. Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-908), Decision on Prosecution’s 
applications for a finding of non-compliance pursuant to Article 87(7) and for an adjournment of the provisional trial date, 31 
March 2014, para. 2.  
106 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1124), Defence Request pursuant to Article 63(1) of the Rome Statute and Rule 134quater 
of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence to excuse Mr. William Samoei Ruto from attendance at trial, 16 December 2013, para. 
29. See also Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1127), Sang Defence response to the request pursuant to article 63(1) of the 
Rome Statute and rule 134quarter of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence to excuse Mr. William Samoei Ruto from attendance 
at trial, and the Office of the Prosecutor’s Application, 19 December 2013 (expressing support for Ruto’s request).  
107 Defence Request (December 2013), para. 11.  
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A. The Prosecution’s response  
In response to Ruto’s application, the Prosecution submitted that if Rule 134quater were to be 
interpreted in the way that the Defence suggested, this Rule would be inconsistent with Article 63(1).108 
The Prosecution did not challenge the validity of the amendment under the Statute as such, but 
questioned the validity of Ruto’s interpretation of Rule 134quater. The Prosecution claimed that the new 
Rule and any interpretation thereof could not ‘overrule the Appeals Chamber’s interpretation’ of the 
Statute.109 In applying Rule 134quater, the Trial Chamber would have to respect all the conditions that 
the Appeals Chamber had formulated for the exercise of the judicial discretion under Article 63(1) to 
excuse an accused from continuous presence at trial, including that an excusal must be limited to what 
is strictly necessary. Given that the Defence requested the same kind of ‘blanket excusal’ that the 
Appeals Chamber had reversed, the Trial Chamber would have no choice but to decline Ruto’s 
application under Rule 134quater.110  
 In addition, the Prosecution contended that Ruto’s updated excusal request would be 
inconsistent with the equal treatment principle, laid down in the first paragraph of Article 27(1) as well 
as in Article 21(3).111 According to the Prosecution, the Statute does not allow for preferential treatment 
based on the official capacity of the accused, including that of the office of the Deputy President of 
Kenya. If Rule 134quater would allow the accused to miss all trial hearings for as long as he or she is 
in office, this provision would ‘create a regime under which two accused seeking the same relief … 
                                                          
108 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1135), Prosecution response to Defence request pursuant to Article 63(1) and 
Rule134quater for excusal from attendance at trial for William Samoei Ruto, 8 January 2014, para. 2. See also Ruto and Sang 
(ICC-01/09-01/11-1139), Response of the Common Legal Representative for Victims to the Defence Request Pursuant to 
Article 63(1) of the Rome Statute and Rule 134quater of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence to Excuse Mr. William Samoei 
Ruto from Attendance at Trial, 9 January 2014.  
109 Ibid., para. 30.  
110 Ibid., para. 38.  
111 In this regard, Article 21(3) protects against ‘adverse distinction founded on groups such as gender …, age, race, colour, 
language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status’.  
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would be treated differently, based only on official capacity’.112 While the ‘regular’ accused would have 
to make case-by-case requests for an excusal under Rule 134ter, the ‘special’ accused would be allowed 
to request an unconditional excusal for the whole trial. In the opinion of the Prosecution, Rule 134quater 
could be consistent with the equal treatment principle, but only if: (1) the reference to extraordinary 
public duties would be interpreted as ‘an explicitly enunciated sub-category of the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ limb of the Appeals Chamber’s six part test’, and if (2) the provision would be read as 
emphasizing the duties of the individual and not of the office that the respective accused fulfils.113  
 Finally, a last argument of the Prosecution for why the Trial Chamber would have to reject 
Ruto’s new application was that the Defence failed to specify Ruto’s extraordinary public duties. In 
contrast to Rule 134quater, the Defence only listed ‘the normal, day-to-day-duties’ of the Deputy 
President of Kenya under the Kenyan Constitution, in the same way as the Trial Chamber had done in 
its initial decision on Ruto’s excusal request.114 The Prosecution claimed that this was insufficient, 
because dealing with the aftermath of a terrorist attack like at the Westgate Mall in Nairobi in September 
2013 would qualify as an extraordinary public duty, but the ‘opening of new roads or [the] welcoming 
[of] a foreign dignitary would not’.115 Not every official responsibility would be an extraordinary public 
duty and would justify the absence of the accused during trial.  
B. The Trial Chamber’s decision on Rule 134quater 
How did the Trial Chamber respond to the objections of the Prosecution? First of all, in addressing the 
claim that the Trial Chamber would have to respect the conditions of the Appeals Chamber, the Trial 
Chamber concluded that to interpret Rule 134quater in this way would ‘run counter to the apparent 
intention’ of the states parties.116 In its view, the ASP clearly distinguished Rule 134quater from Rule 
                                                          
112 Prosecution’s Response (January 2014), para. 3.  
113 Ibid., para. 34.  
114 Ibid., para. 41.  
115 Ibid. 
116 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1186), Reasons for the Decision on Excusal from Presence at Trial under Rule 134quater, 
18 February 2014, para. 52.  
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134ter which lists the conditions of the Appeals Chamber. Rule 134quater should instead be understood 
as a subsequent agreement in the sense of Article 31(3)(a) of the VCLT. The Chamber concluded that 
the new Rule would be consistent with the Statute without the conditions of the Appeals Chamber, 
because as a subsequent agreement this Rule would provide ‘greater clarity’ on the scope and application 
of Article 63(1) to ‘a specific type of situations’ which was not ‘explicitly addressed when the Statute 
was being drafted’.117  
 Second of all, with respect to the equal treatment principle, the Trial Chamber found that Rule 
134quater, as interpreted by the Defence, would not raise any problems under Article 27(1). Unlike the 
Prosecution, the three judges concluded that the new Rule could not ‘be read as limiting the criminal 
responsibility of those performing ‘extraordinary public duties at the highest national level’, nor as 
limiting the Court’s jurisdiction over such persons’.118 As such, Rule 134quater and the Defence’s 
interpretation could not defeat or obstruct the object of Article 27(1) which would be to remove 
immunity from jurisdiction on the basis of official capacity.119   
 Having rejected the Prosecution’s two most fundamental objections against Ruto’s application 
under Rule 134quater, the Trial Chamber turned to the question when it would be reasonable to excuse 
Ruto from continuous presence. At this point, the Trial Chamber agreed with the Prosecution’s last 
objection that ‘not every duty at the highest national level is an extraordinary one’ and that Rule 
134quater does not allow for the unconditional excusal that the Defence asked for.120 The Chamber 
reasoned that such an excusal would be contrary to the second paragraph of Rule 134quater, which 
                                                          
117 Ibid., para. 55-56.  
118 Ibid., para. 61.  
119 Furthermore, the interpretation of the Defence would also be compatible with Article 21(3). According to the Chamber, the 
object of this provision would be to prohibit adverse distinction on the basis of a person’s characteristics or status. Rule 
134quater would not make such a distinction, because it only focusses on the ‘functions which the person is mandated to 
perform’. Ibid., para. 59. The Trial Chamber added that a provision like Article 21(3) is meant ‘to prevent discrimination’ and 
that Rule 134quater ‘provides an objective and reasonable justification’ (para. 60).  
120 Ibid., para. 64.  
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stipulates that the subject matter of specific hearings should be considered in deciding on an excusal 
request, and that the continuous absence of the accused would frustrate the ‘interests of justice, given 
the active participation of victims in the proceedings’.121 
 According to the Chamber, however, the high number of extraordinary public duties that the 
Deputy President of Kenya has to perform under the Kenyan Constitution would render ‘a case-by-case 
analysis impractical’. The defendant could not be expected to prove when and why he would not be able 
to attend his trial due to his extraordinary public duties. The judges therefore decided to interpret the 
condition of extraordinary public duties in the same way as they had interpreted the condition of 
exceptional circumstances in their initial decision on Ruto’s excusal request. They evaluated, based on 
the Kenyan Constitution, whether the Deputy Head of State of Kenya has to perform demanding 
functions on a regular basis. In this regard, the different wording of Rule 134quater, both in comparison 
to the initial decision of the Trial Chambers and with Rule 134ter (which refers to exceptional 
circumstances), would be inconsequential.  
 Based on these considerations, the Chamber decided that Ruto would only have to attend a 
number of specific hearings of his trial.122 In addition to hearings in which victims would present their 
views in person, Ruto would have to be present for the closing statements, the delivery of the judgment 
and the first five days of hearings after a judicial recess.123 In this way, Ruto obtained almost the exact 
same excusal as the Trial Chamber had initially granted to him. The six conditions of the Appeals 
Chamber, as codified in Rule 134ter, would no longer limit the Trial Chamber’s excusal powers.  
 
                                                          
121 Ibid., paras. 57 and 74.  
122 Ibid., paras. 63-71.  
123 Ibid., para. 79.  
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VI. An Invalid Rule?  
The Trial Chamber’s application of the new rules on presence at trial raises questions about the 
consistency of Rule 134quater with the Statute. As demanded by Article 51(4), amendments to the RPE 
have to be in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Statute.124 Like the ASP itself stated in 2002, 
in its explanatory note to the RPE, the Rules and amendments thereto ‘are an instrument for the 
application of the Rome Statute … to which they are subordinate in all cases’.125 In the case of Rule 
134quater, it can be questioned whether the ASP complied with this standard, in relation to both Article 
63(1) and the equal treatment principle that is embedded in the first paragraph of Article 27(1).  
A. Validity under Article 63(1)  
With respect to Article 63(1), it should be recalled that the Appeals Chamber’s interpretation is, 
arguably, a misinterpretation. As discussed above, I believe that the meaning of Article 63(1) is clear 
and does not allow the Trial Chamber to excuse an accused from continuous presence at trial. For the 
purpose of assessing the (in)validity of Rule 134quater, however, I agree with the Prosecution that the 
Appeals Chamber’s judgment is ‘authoritative’, in the sense that an amendment to the Rules cannot 
‘overrule’ the Appeals Chamber’s previous interpretation of Article 63(1).126  
 When the ASP revises the RPE, the presumption must be that the ASP intends these amendments 
to be consistent with the Statute.127 This presumption follows from Article 51 and the ASP’s explanatory 
note to the RPE. However, if an amendment to the Rules is shown to be inconsistent with the Appeals 
Chamber’s interpretation of the Statute in the same case, then this presumption is rebutted and the act 
                                                          
124 Article 51(5) further states that ‘in the event of conflict between the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the 
Statute shall prevail’.  
125 The RPE were adopted in 2002. The background of the explanatory note and the ‘very strong stance of the ASP in favour 
of the Statute supremacy’ is that the ASP was unwilling ‘to allow the US to use the Rules as a tool to increase the scope of 
Article 98(2) … to prevent any American citizen from being surrendered to the Court’. See Bitti, ‘Article 21’, p. 416.  
126 Prosecution’s Response (January 2014), para. 30.  
127 Bruce Broomhall, ‘Article 51’, in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John R.W.D. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 1033-1044.  
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of amendment must be deemed ultra vires under the Statute. While the jurisprudence of the Appeals 
Chamber is not a binding source of law, and its rulings offer only an interpretation of the Statute, proving 
the inconsistency between the ASP’s amendment to the RPE and the Appeals Chamber’s earlier 
interpretation of the Statute in the same case overturns the intra vires presumption.128 In the case at hand, 
the short time span between the Appeals Chamber’s judgment and the adoption of the amendment (less 
than a month) supports the Prosecution’s position that this judgment should be used as a benchmark for 
the application of Rule 134quater. Moreover, and more to the point, the Trial Chamber is bound to the 
Appeals Chamber’s interpretation of Article 63(1) in the Ruto case.  
 According to the Trial Chamber, Rule 134quater should be understood as a subsequent 
agreement in the sense of Article 31(3)(a) of the VCLT.129 However, this argument mistakenly conflates 
an amendment to the RPE, which is regulated within the Statute, with a subsequent agreement, which is 
an agreement of all states parties to a treaty outside the legal framework of that treaty.130 Article 51 of 
                                                          
128 Another consideration in this regard is that the ASP does not have any power under the Statute to interpret its provisions. 
See Article 112 of this Statute which lists the powers and responsibilities of the ASP.   
129 Decision Rule 134quater (February 2014), para. 56.  
130 The decisions and practices of a plenary organ of an international court, like the ASP, can amount to subsequent agreements 
or subsequent practice. As stated in paragraph 1 of Draft Conclusion 11 of the ILC on subsequent agreements and subsequent 
practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties: ‘Articles 31 and 32 [VCLT] apply to a treaty which is the constituent 
instrument of an international organization without prejudice to any relevant rules of the organization. Accordingly, subsequent 
agreements and subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph (3) (a) and (b) are, and other subsequent practice under article 
32 may be, means of interpretation for such treaties’. That being said, as explained by Special Rapporteur Nolte, ‘the possible 
significance of agreements between the parties [or subsequent practice] must be evaluated, in the first place, under the 
provisions of the constituent instrument itself and of other rules of the organization. If, for example, the constituent instrument 
contains a clause according to which the interpretation of the instrument is subject to a special procedure, it is to be presumed 
that the parties, by reaching an agreement subsequently to the conclusion of the treaty, do not wish to circumvent such 
procedure’. ILC Special Rapporteur Nolte, Third report on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to treaty 
interpretation, A/CN.4/683, 7 April 2015. Note that the Trial Chamber did not address the question whether the expressed 
support of the states parties for the new rules on presence at trial could be understood as a form of subsequent practice in the 
sense of Article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT.  
 250 
 
the Statute clearly encapsulates the RPE and amendments thereto within the scope of the Statute. 
Therefore, Rule 134quater or any other amendment to the Rules cannot be considered a subsequent 
agreement. This means that if the text of a new Rule cannot be reconciled with the Statute, as interpreted 
in accordance with the VCLT and Article 21 of the Statute, that Rule, regardless of the intentions of the 
ASP, is invalid under the Statute. Otherwise, amendments to the RPE would effectively turn into 
amendments to the Statute, for which the drafters established a separate and more difficult procedure in 
Articles 121 and 122 of the Statute.131  
 For my part, I do not see how Rule 134quater can be reconciled with Article 63(1) as interpreted 
by the Appeals Chamber. With Rule 134quater the ASP clearly intended to establish a different excusal 
regime, with different conditions, for the ‘special’ accused that fulfils extraordinary public duties. The 
‘regular’ accused would have to make an application under Rule 134ter, which repeats the conditions 
of the Appeals Chamber. To argue, as the Prosecution did, that the conditions of Rule 134ter also apply 
to Rule 134quater, makes the latter redundant, except that an application of the ‘special’ accused under 
the latter provision would have to be considered ‘expeditiously’. The more probable reading is that with 
Rule 134quater the ASP tried to extend the scope of discretion under Article 63(1) as interpreted by the 
Appeals Chamber. Given that this not permitted under Article 51(4), I believe that the Trial Chamber 
had no choice but to find the new Rule to be inconsistent with Article 63(1).  
B. Validity under Article 27(1)  
The equal treatment principle as incorporated in the first paragraph of Article 27(1) raises an additional 
problem with respect to Rule 134quater. According to the Trial Chamber, Rule 134quater, as interpreted 
by the Defence, would not violate Article 27(1). The Chamber agreed to a restrictive interpretation of 
the object of Article 27, which would be to remove immunity from jurisdiction on grounds of official 
capacity. In my view, removing personal and functional immunity is indeed an important aim of Article 
27, especially in light of Article 27(2) which stipulates that ‘immunities or special procedural rules 
                                                          
131 By adopting rules that seek to clarify the Statute, the ASP is ‘simply avoiding the cumbersome process [of] Article 121’. 
Bitti, ‘Article 21’, p. 418.  
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which may attach to the official capacity of a person … shall not bar the Court from exercising its 
jurisdiction over such a person’. Yet, I have to agree with the Prosecution that ‘the scope of Article 27(1) 
is broader than [this] direct context suggests’.132 
 The first sentence of Article 27(1) does not mention immunity from prosecution nor does it refer 
to the provision relating to criminal responsibility. It provides that ‘this Statute’, which must mean the 
whole Statute, ‘shall apply equally without any distinction based on official capacity’ (emphasis added). 
The second sentence of Article 27(1) further provides that ‘in particular, official capacity as a Head of 
State … shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute’ (emphasis 
added). What this signals is that the non-exemption from criminal responsibility is an important example 
of non-discrimination on the basis of official capacity, but that it is not the only possible example.133 
Otherwise, the words ‘in particular’ would be meaningless.134  
 How does this relate back to the question of the validity of Rule 134quater under Article 27(1)? 
Does the notion of ‘extraordinary public duties at the highest national level’ imply a distinction on the 
basis of official capacity? Perhaps, as the Prosecution submitted in its response to Ruto’s excusal 
request, such a distinction is not implied if the Trial Chamber would have focussed ‘on the functions 
which the person [and not the office] is mandated to perform’.135 In this way, the Trial Chamber would 
also have fulfilled its obligation under Article 21(3) to apply and interpret the law without any adverse 
                                                          
132 Prosecution’s Response (January 2014), para. 26.  
133 As pointed out by the Prosecution as well: Ibid., paras. 25-27.  
134 Note that the Prosecution contended in its response to Ruto’s excusal request that the first sentence of Article 27(1) ‘was 
intended to ensure that the Court’s legal framework is applied equally to all persons - be they great or small, powerful or weak, 
famous or obscure’. In my view, the Prosecution is absolutely right to challenge the Trial Chamber’s restrictive interpretation 
of Article 27(1), but I am doubtful about its own reading of this provision. The Prosecution’s interpretation seems to extend 
the scope of Article 27(1) to distinctions other than those on the basis of official capacity. In my view, the provision’s heading, 
which speaks of the ‘irrelevance of official capacity’, and its first sentence, which refers to distinction ‘based on official 
capacity’, show that Article 27(1) is concerned with official capacity and not with other (adverse) distinctions, which may be 
covered by Article 21(3) instead.  
135 Ibid., para. 59.  
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distinction. However, in applying Rule 134quater in its decision on Ruto’s excusal request, the Chamber 
did not focus on the extraordinary public duties that Ruto bears as a person, but determined that the 
‘duties of the Deputy President are certainly extraordinary public duties’.136 It simply listed the functions 
that the Deputy President of Kenya is authorized to fulfil under the Kenyan Constitution and concluded 
solely on this basis that Rule 134quater is applicable. By setting this standard of proof for Rule 
134quater, the Chamber overstretched what can reasonably be understood as extraordinary. 
Consequently, the Chamber’s interpretation of Rule 134quater is also inconsistent with the equal 
treatment principle that is included in the first paragraph of Article 27(1).  
C. No leave to appeal = No final answer 
Several commentators expected that the Trial Chamber’s decision on Ruto’s updated excusal request 
would only be a prelude to a judgment of the Appeals Chamber on the (in)validity of Rule 134quater.137 
Surprisingly, however, the Trial Chamber rejected the Prosecution’s application for leave to appeal.138 
In the opinion of the Majority, this request would not fulfil the requirements of Artic 82(1)(d) of the 
Statute. Under this provision, a decision may only be appealed when it ‘involves an issue that would 
significantly affect the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings or the outcome of the trial, and 
for which, in the opinion of the Pre-Trial or Trial Chamber, an immediate resolution by the Appeals 
Chamber may materially advance the proceedings’.  
                                                          
136 Decision Rule 134quater (February 2014), para. 63.  
137 See, for example, the discussion at Opinio Juris, including comments of Dov Jacobs: Kevin Jon Heller, ‘No, the ASP Didn’t 
Hoodwink Kenya and the AU Concerning RPE 134quater, Opinio Juris, 14 January 2014; Kevin Jon Heller, ‘Trial Chamber 
Conditionally Excuses Ruto from Continuous Presence’, Opinio Juris, 17 January 2014 (saying that it is ‘unlikely’ that the 
Trial Chamber will refuse grant leave to appeal). 
138 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1246), Decision on ‘Prosecution’s application for leave to appeal the decision on excusal 
from presence at trial under Rule 134quater, 2 April 2014; Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1246-Anx), Decision on 
‘Prosecution’s application for leave to appeal the decision on excusal from presence at trial under Rule 134quater - Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Olga Herrera Carbuccia, 2 April 2014. 
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 According to the Prosecution, the Chamber’s decision on Ruto’s application under Rule 
134quater raised the ‘novel legal question’ whether this provision, as interpreted by the Trial Chamber, 
is consistent with the Statute, and in particular with Articles 63(1) and 27(1).139 This question would 
have to be answered through an interlocutory appeal, because if the Appeals Chamber would find that 
the Trial Chamber erred in law by granting a too far-reaching excusal under Rule 134quater, ‘it may 
require parts of the trial not attended by Mr. Ruto to be re-heard to ensure consistency with the 
restrictions set down [by the Appeals Chamber in its previous judgment]’.140 
 This line of reasoning seems persuasive. If the Prosecution had pursued this issue in an appeal 
against Ruto’s potential conviction, acquittal or sentence, which does not require leave to appeal from 
the Trial Chamber (Rule 154 RPE), the Appeals Chamber could have nullified a significant part of the 
trial proceedings in which Ruto was absent.141 Apart from the alleged invalidity of Rule 134quater, the 
Appeals Chamber could have decided to do so because it has established that ‘it is through the process 
of confronting the accused with the evidence [that] the fullest and most comprehensive record of the 
relevant events may be formed’.142 Clearly, if the Appeals Chamber would, for this or another reason, 
demand the Trial Chamber to repeat hearings and thus to rehear witnesses, this would have a significant 
impact on the fairness and expeditious conduct of the proceedings and ultimately on the outcome of the 
trial in the sense of Article 82(1)(d). 
 Nonetheless, in the opinion the Majority of the Trial Chamber, the concerns of the Prosecution 
were ‘highly speculative’.143 According to Judges Eboe-Osuji and Fremr, the risk of having to repeat the 
hearings that Ruto did not attend ‘significantly decreased’ due to Appeals Chamber’s ‘clear recognition 
                                                          
139 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1189), Prosecution’s application for leave to appeal the decision on excusal from presence 
at trial under Rule 134quater, 24 February 2014, para. 4.  
140 Ibid., para. 8.  
141 This was also the conclusion of Judge Carbuccia in his Dissenting Opinion, para. 8.  
142 Judgment Appeals Chamber on Presence at Trial (October 2013), para. 49.  
143 Decision Leave to Appeal (April 2014), para. 18.  
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of the Chamber’s discretion to excuse [the accused] from certain hearings’.144 This risk would become 
‘even more theoretical’, in their opinion, if one were to consider ‘the Appeals Chamber’s standard of 
review, whereby the Appeals Chamber ‘will not interfere with [another] Chamber’s exercise of 
discretion … merely because the Appeals Chamber, if it had the power, might have made a different 
ruling’.145  
 What the Majority conveniently overlooked, however, is that the Prosecution’s request for leave 
to appeal did not just concern the manner in which the Chamber exercised its discretion. The 
Prosecution’s intended appeal, as supported by the official representative of the victims, also raised 
questions about the (in)validity of Rule 134quater.146 By rejecting the Prosecution’s request for leave to 
appeal, the Majority side-tracked these questions in order to bring the proceedings on Ruto’s presence 
at trial to a close.  
 In this way, the Trial Chamber not only followed but also protected the intervention of the ASP. 
From a doctrinal point of view, the underlying argumentation of the Trial Chamber is dubious, to say 
the least. Yet, by rejecting the Prosecution’s request for leave to appeal, the Majority of the Trial 
Chamber made sure that Ruto’s trial would continue along the lines that the ASP envisioned when it 
adopted Rule 134quater. Given that the charges against Kenyatta were withdrawn by the Prosecution 
before his trial commenced,147 the Majority decision of the Trial Chamber remains for now the last 
                                                          
144 Ibid.  
145 Ibid. The Trial Chamber quoted Kony et al (ICC-02/04-01/05-408 (OA 3), Judgment on the appeal of the Defence against 
the ‘Decision on the admissibility of the case under Article 19(1) of the Statute’ of 10 March 2009, 16 September 2009, para. 
79.  
146 Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1193), Common Legal Representative for Victims’ Response to the Prosecution’s 
Application for Leave to Appeal the Decision on Excusal from Presence at Trial under Rule 134quater, 27 February 2014. 
147 Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-983), Notice of withdrawal of the charges against Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, 5 December 2014.  
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substantive decision on whether a sitting (Deputy) Head of State has to be present during all parts of his 
or her trial.148  
 
VII. Conclusion: The ICC’s Special Excusal Regime 
This chapter examined the responses of the Court and its states parties to the AU’s claim that sitting 
Heads of State should be treated differently than other accused in light of their official responsibilities. 
This claim, and especially the requests from Kenyatta and Ruto to be excused from continuous presence 
at trial, confronted the Court’s judges with difficult questions about the discretion of the Trial Chamber 
to waive the presence requirement of the accused. The bottom-line of how the majority of the judges 
responded to these questions is that the Trial Chamber may, under a number of conditions, excuse the 
accused from its duty to be present at trial, in particular when the accused is a sitting Head of State and 
has to fulfil extraordinary public duties.  
   At all stages of the proceedings on the excusal requests of Kenyatta (summarized in table 5.3) 
and Ruto (summarized in table 5.4), the majority of the Court’s judges showed flexibility with respect 
to the requirement of the accused to be present at trial. What the judges of the two Trial Chambers and 
the Appeals Chamber disagreed upon, however, are the conditions under which an excusal can be 
                                                          
148 Note that following a request from the Prosecution to adjourn Kenyatta’s trial until such time as Kenya fulfil its cooperation 
obligations towards the Court, Trial Chamber V(B) held two status conferences on 7 and 8 October 2014 to discuss ‘the status 
of cooperation between the Prosecution and the Kenyan Government’. Prior to the two status conferences, the Chamber (with 
Judge Ozaki partially dissenting) rejected a request from Kenyatta under Rule 134quater and, in the alternative, under Rule 
134bis to be excused from attending the second status conference. Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-960) Decision on Defence 
request for excusal from attendance at, or for adjournment of, the status conference scheduled for 8 October 2014, 30 September 
2014; Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-960-Anx), Partially Dissenting Opinion Judge Kuniko Ozaki, 30 September 2014. For a 
detailed analysis of these decisions, see Abel S. Knottnerus, ‘Kenyatta (finally) has to go back to The Hague’, Opinio Juris, 1 
October 2014.  
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granted.149 In first instance, the two Trial Chambers excused Ruto and Kenyatta from almost all trial 
hearings, except for the opening statements, closing statements and the delivery of the judgment. 
According to Judge Eboe-Osuji and Judge Fremr, who sat in both Chambers, such an exemption would 
be reasonable given that Kenyatta and Ruto had to perform demanding functions as President and 
Deputy President of Kenya.  
 These far-reaching excusals had to be vacated, however, after the Appeals Chamber ruled that 
the Trial Chamber had granted Ruto an excusal which effectively made his absence the general rule and 
his presence an exception. The Appeals Chamber concluded, by majority, that the Trial Chamber could 
only excuse an accused from continuous presence at trial in exceptional circumstances and when a 
number of additional conditions are fulfilled. In this way, the Appeals Chamber foreshadowed that 
Kenyatta and Ruto would not have to attend all sessions, but certainly a quite significant part of their 
trials. 
 Following the decision of the Appeals Chamber, and the disappointing response of the Security 
Council to the AU’s deferral request, African states began to pressure the ASP to amend Articles 27 and 
63(1) of the Statute. These amendments would have to ensure that sitting Heads of State could be 
exempted from prosecution and excused from having to attend their trials. During an eventful meeting 
of the ASP in November 2013, many of the Court’s states parties stressed that the concerns of Kenya 
and the AU had to be addressed in a serious manner, but a large majority proved reluctant to accept the 
proposed amendments to the Statute. As a compromise, the ASP decided to revise the RPE on presence 
at trial. Most importantly, the ASP adopted Rule 134quater so that the Trial Chamber would be able to 
excuse a sitting Head of State under more flexible conditions than the Appeals Chamber had formulated. 
Within a few weeks after the ASP’s meeting, the Trial Chamber excused Ruto from most of his trial 
hearings on the basis of this new Rule. In effect, Ruto would only have to attend the opening and closing 
                                                          
149 This disagreement is illustrated by the remarkable number of eight (partially) dissenting opinions and various separate 
(further) opinions in the proceedings on presence at trial. Generally, on the function of judicial dissenting in international 
criminal justice, see Hemi Mistry, ‘The Paradox of Dissent - Judicial Dissent and the Projects of International Criminal Justice’ 
(2015) 13 Journal of International Criminal Justice 449-474. 
 257 
 
statements, the delivery of the judgment, and any hearings in which victims would present their views 
and concerns in person.  
 With the adoption and application of Rule 134quater, the Court’s judges and the ASP 
established an excusal regime which builds on the idea that ‘a flexible and pragmatic approach’ towards 
the presence of high-level accused will ‘bolster the effectiveness of the Court’.150 Flexibility and 
pragmatism are what proponents of this new regime will consider its strongest features. The Court’s 
trials can continue, with or without the presence of the accused, and sitting Heads of State can combine 
their trials in The Hague with their responsibilities at home.  
 The new rules on presence at trial do, however, raise a number of problems. Firstly, Rule 
134quater cannot be reconciled with the text of Article 63(1). What does it mean that the accused ‘shall 
be present during the trial’, if the accused may skip most trial hearings? As established by the Appeals 
Chamber, the Trial Chamber has the discretion to excuse an accused in exceptional circumstances, but 
continuous presence should remain the rule. The adoption of Rule 134quater and the application of this 
provision by the Trial Chamber ignore this important condition that derives from the Appeals Chamber’s 
authoritative interpretation of Article 63(1).  
 Secondly, the excusal that the Trial Chamber granted to Ruto on the basis of Rule 134quater 
raises the question whether the Statute is applied equally without any distinction on the basis of official 
capacity, when the Trial Chamber issues an excusal only because the accused has to fulfil extraordinary 
functions as sitting (Deputy) Head of State. In a general sense, Rule 134quater may perhaps be 
reconciled with the equal treatment principle that is embedded in Article 27(1). However, the Trial 
Chamber’s excusal for Ruto under Rule 134quater is manifestly inconsistent with this important 
principle. Instead of focusing on the extraordinary duties that he personally has to fulfil, the Chamber 
                                                          
150 Defence Request Ruto, April 2013, para. 2. See also Joint Amicus curiae Observations of Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, 
Eritrea and Uganda (September 2013), para. 2 (‘Article 63 should be interpreted in a broad an flexible manner that encourage 
State cooperation in the widest possible set of circumstances and without endangering the constitutional obligations of the 
highest office holder’).  
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based this excusal on the regular functions of the Deputy President of Kenya under the Kenyan 
Constitution. In this way, the Trial Chamber created a precedent for treating sitting (Deputy) Heads of 
State just a little bit less equal than other accused. 
 Thirdly, another weakness of the new rules on presence at trial is that by allowing the accused 
to be absent from large parts of the trial, these rules risk to undermine the administration of justice. As 
the Appeals Chamber emphasized in its judgment on presence at trial, the accused ‘is not merely a 
passive observer of the trial, but the subject of the criminal proceedings and, as such, an active 
participant therein’.151 The active participation of the accused is important not only to protect the rights 
of the accused, but also because it is through ‘the process of confronting the accused with the evidence 
[that] the fullest and most comprehensive record of the relevant events may be formed’.152 It should be 
questioned whether the absence of a ‘busy accused’ during most witness testimonies does not affect the 
recording of the events in which the accused may or may not have been involved.153  
 Finally, a last problem with the new rules on presence at trial, is that the adoption of Rule 
134quater has established a precedent for adjusting decisions of the Appeals Chamber through an 
amendment to the RPE.154 Of course, it falls within the prerogatives of the ASP to consider the 
                                                          
151 Judgment Appeals Chamber on Presence at Trial (October 2013), para. 49. 
152 Ibid. 
153 A related problem which I have not extensively addressed in this chapter is that the absence of the accused during trial may 
have a negative impact on how the general public and especially the victims and witnesses perceive the trial. See Knottnerus, 
‘Extraordinary Exceptions’, 285.  
154 As pointed out by Philipp Ambach the underlying problem appears to be ‘that there is a general rule for lawmakers not to 
devise an abstract-general legal provision in order to fit the circumstances of a specific case. Such a procedure generally entails 
many risks, including fragmentation of the relevant legal text, possibility even its incoherence, as well as a loss of the abstract-
general character constitutive of a law that is meant to apply to any situation regardless of specifics which have consciously 
been considered irrelevant for its application’. Philipp Ambach, ‘A Look towards the Future - The ICC and ‘Lessons Learnt’’, 
in Carsten Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 
1291. Similar concerns have been expressed by Jonathan O’Donohue, ‘The ICC and the ASP’, in Carsten Stahn (ed.), The Law 
and Practice of the International Criminal Court (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 120-122.  
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ramifications of the ways in which the Court interprets and applies the provisions of the Statute and the 
RPE. Yet, there are important reasons for why the ASP cannot amend the Statute overnight and why the 
RPE are subordinate to the Statute. The underlying logic is that political convenience should not 
determine the daily functioning of an international court. This also means that general rules should not 
be revised solely to fit the circumstances of a specific case, as clearly happened in the case of Rule 
134quater. 
 To conclude, through its response to the AU, the Court and its states parties have developed a 
special excusal regime for those who fulfil demanding functions, like a sitting Head of State. In 
considering the formation and application of this regime, most commentators will agree that some 
flexibility and pragmatism may be needed when the accused has to fulfil important public duties, 
especially in an unpredictable situation like a terrorist attack or a natural disaster. However, with the 
adoption of Rule 134quater, the ICC’s special excusal regime has gone far beyond short term absences 
for unanticipated situations. What Rule 134quater and the Trial Chamber have done, is to mistake 
exception (absence) for rule (presence), and to conflate the day-to-day functions of a sitting Head of 
State with the important public duties that an accused may have to fulfil in the context of unforeseen 
developments. In this way, sitting Heads of State are treated differently than other accused, not because 





Table 5.2 - New Rules on Presence at Trial  
 
Rule 134bis  - Presence through the use of video technology 
 
1. An accused subject to a summons to appear may submit a written request to the Trial Chamber to 
be allowed to be present through the use of video technology during part or parts of his or her trial. 
 
2. The Trial Chamber shall rule on the request on a case-by-case basis, with due regard to the 
subject matter of the specific hearings in question. 
 
 
Rule 134ter - Excusal from presence at trial 
 
1. An accused subject to a summons to appear may submit a written request to the Trial Chamber to 
be excused and to be represented by counsel only during part or parts of his or her trial. 
 
2. The Trial Chamber shall only grant the request if it is satisfied that: 
(a) exceptional circumstances exist to justify such an absence; 
(b) alternative measures, including changes to the trial schedule or a short adjournment of the trial, 
would be inadequate; 
(c) the accused has explicitly waived his or her right to be present at the trial; and 
(d) the rights of the accused will be fully ensured in his or her absence. 
 
3. The Trial Chamber shall rule on the request on a case-by-case basis, with due regard to the 
subject matter of the specific hearings in question. Any absence must be limited to what is strictly 




Rule 134quater- Excusal from presence at trial due to extraordinary public duties 
 
1. An accused subject to a summons to appear who is mandated to fulfil extraordinary public duties 
at the highest national level may submit a written request to the Trial Chamber to be excused and to 
be represented by counsel only; the request must specify that the accused explicitly waives the right 
to be present at the trial. 
 
2. The Trial Chamber shall consider the request expeditiously and, if alternative measures are 
inadequate, shall grant the request where it determines that it is in the interests of justice and 
provided that the rights of the accused are fully ensured. The decision shall be taken with due regard 





Table 5.3 - Overview Proceedings on Presence at Trial in the Ruto Case  
 
Stage 1 - Initial and Revised Responses of the Court 
 
When?  Who?  What?  
17 April 2013 Ruto  - Asks for excusal from continuous presence at trial 
- OTP challenges the request (1 May 2013) 
18 June 2013 Trial Chamber V(A) - Grants Ruto’s request 
- Judge Carbuccia dissenting 
- OTP’s request for leave to appeal is granted (18 July), 
with Judge Eboe-Osuji dissenting, OTP files appeal and 
requests suspensive effect (29 July), which is opposed 
by the Defence (8 August) 
August - September 
2013  












- Appeals Chamber grants OTP’s request for suspensive 
effect of excusal (20 August) 
- Grants request for joint amicus curiae from Tanzania, 
Rwanda, Burundi, Eritrea and Uganda, with Judge 
Usacka Dissenting (13 September, observations 
submitted on 17 September) 
- Rejects similar request from Ethiopia and Nigeria (25 
September), with  a partially separate opinion of Judge 
Usacka 
- Rejects request Ruto for reconsideration suspensive 
effect (27 September). 
23 September 2013 Trial Chamber V(A) - Permits Ruto to return to Kenya after the Westgate 
Mall Attack 
25 October 2013 Appeals Chamber - Overturns decision Trial Chamber on Ruto’s excusal 
- Sets conditions for excusals 
- Joint separate opinion of Judges Kourula and Usacka 
October-November 
2013 
Trial Chamber V(A) - Ruto was present on 31 October, 1 and 22 November 
- Ruto was excused on 28 October, from 4 to 8 
November and on 21 November 
 
 
Stage 2 - New Rules on Presence at Trial 
When?  Who?  What?  
16 December 2013 Ruto  - Request under Rule 134quater 
- OTP and Victims challenge the request (8 and 9 
January 2014) 
15 January 2014 Trial Chamber V(A) Excuses Ruto on the basis of Rule 134quater, only has 
to attend certain specific hearings.  
18 February 2014 Trial Chamber V(A) - Provides reasons for excusal  
- Separate further opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji  
- OTP requests leave to appeal (24 February) 
- Defence opposes OTP’s request (28 February) 
2 April 2014 Trial Chamber V(A) - Rejects request OTP for leave to appeal 




Table 5.4 - Overview Proceedings on Presence at Trial in the Kenyatta Case 
 
Stage 1 - Initial and Revised Responses of the Court 
 
When?  Who?  What?  
23 September 2013 Kenyatta  - Asks for excusal  
- OTP and Victims challenge the request (1 October) 
18 October 2013 Trial Chamber V(B) - Grants Kenyatta’s request 
- Judge Ozaki partially dissenting 
- Separate further opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji 
31 October 2013 Trial Chamber V(B) Adjourns commencement of trial until 5 February 2014 
26 November 2013 Trial Chamber V(B) - Vacates Kenyatta’s initial excusal 
- Dissenting opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji 
 
Stage 2 - New Rules on Presence at Trial 
 
When?  Who?  What?  
23 January 2014 Trial Chamber V(B) - Vacates trial date  
- Concurring separate opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji 
24 January 2014 Kenyatta - Request under Rule 134quater 
- Request withdrawn after vacating trial (27 January), and 
subsequently adjournment of the trial until 7 October 
19 September 2014 Trial Chamber V(B) - Vacates trial date again 
- Convenes two status conferences, and requires Kenyatta 
to be present during the second conference on 8 October 
30 September 2014 Trial Chamber V(B) - Refuses request (dated 25 September) to excuse 
Kenyatta from the status conference on the basis of, inter 
alia,  Rule 134quater 
- Partially dissenting opinion of Judge Ozaki 








Conclusion: African Presidents versus the ICC 
 
The International Criminal Court has faced many challenges since its establishment in 1998. One of the 
greatest challenges for the Court so far has been the opposition of the African Union against the 
prosecution and trial of sitting Heads of State. Starting in 2008, when the Prosecutor asked the Pre-Trial 
Chamber to issue a warrant for the arrest of President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan, the AU has undermined 
the ICC in various ways. The AU has portrayed the Court as a serious threat to the stability and 
sovereignty of African states, it has obliged its member states not to cooperate with the ICC in several 
high-level cases and has even encouraged its member states to withdraw from the Rome Statute. 
 This opposition of the AU against the ICC stands in contrast to the support that African states 
initially expressed for Court when they ratified the Rome Statute and referred the first cases to the 
Prosecutor. The support of African states for the ICC was never univocal and did not come from all 
parts of Africa. Some states, like Sudan, Rwanda and Libya opposed the Court from the beginning and 
no less than twenty African states have not ratified the Rome Statute.1 Yet, for some time these different 
ideas among African states about the ICC did not withhold the AU from supporting the Court. Most 
notably, in 2004, the AU Assembly adopted a strategic plan encouraging its member states to join the 
ICC.2 The fact that the Assembly decided to do the exact opposite in early 2017, by encouraging its 
member states to withdraw from the Rome Statute, exemplifies how dramatically the AU’s relationship 
                                                          
1 See for example the statement of Sudan on behalf of the Arab Group in Rome Conference, Official Records, A/CONF.183/13 
(Vol.2), 15 June-17 July 1998, p. 126. For a complete overview of the signatures, ratifications and accessions of African states 
to the Rome Statute, see annex I. 
2 AU Commission, Strategic Plan of the Commission of the AU - Volume 3 (2004-2007 Plan of Action), p. 65. 
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with the ICC has altered.3 Whereas the AU once pictured the ICC as a partner or even a friend, it now 
frames the Court as a threat to its member states.  
 The reasons for why the AU has turned against the ICC are complex and multi-facetted. There 
are various interests and ideas behind the AU’s decision-making on the ICC. These probably include 
the fear for prosecution as well as the desire among some African leaders to protect their allies in 
exchange for political gain. It cannot be ignored, for example, that the Assembly’s 2009 decision on the 
non-cooperation with the arrest of President al-Bashir was pushed for by Muammar Gaddafi, or that the 
2013 campaign against the trials of Kenyatta and Ruto was spurred by Yoweri Museveni and Robert 
Mugabe. The role of these and other notorious African presidents in different stages of the AU’s 
decision-making indicates that the AU’s position on the ICC is partly the product of anxious and self-
interested leaders.   
 In some ways, this brings back memories of the AU’s predecessor, the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU). The OAU had a formal policy of ‘non-interference’ and an infamous record of ignoring 
gross human rights violations. It should be kept in mind, however, that the objectives of the AU are 
quite different from the OAU. The organization as a whole has not abandoned the principle of ‘non-
indifference’ towards human rights violations, which remains strongly embedded in its Constitutive Act. 
Despite the recent opposition against the ICC, the AU continues to stress that the perpetrators of 
international and other serious crimes should be brought to justice.4 
 What has forged the AU’s opposition against the ICC is not, or at least not only, a common 
desire of African leaders to travel back in time to the OAU and to protect the sovereignty of AU member 
states in every possible way. One of the things that has united the AU against the ICC is the prosecution 
                                                          
3 AU Assembly, Decision on the International Criminal Court, Assembly/AU/Dec.622(XXVIII), 30-31 January 2017, para. 8. 
AU, Draft Withdrawal Strategy Document, 12 January 2017 (on file with the author). 
4 For example, in its first decision on the case against al-Bashir, the AU Assembly ‘[condemned] the gross violations of human 
rights in Darfur, and [urged] that the perpetrators be apprehended and brought to justice’. AU Assembly, Decision on the 
Application by the International Criminal Court Prosecutor the Indictment of the President of the Republic of The Sudan, 
Assembly/AU/Dec.221(XII), 1-3 February 2009, para. 7.  
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and trial of sitting Heads of State. When the Security Council referred the situation in Darfur to the 
Court in 2005, the AU did not immediately run to the defence of Khartoum, even though the Sudanese 
Government and its closest allies strongly opposed the referral.5 On the contrary, several African states 
sponsored the judicial intervention in Darfur, being well aware of the crimes that were being committed 
there.6 The AU also spoke out against the ICC’s involvement in Sudan, and later in Kenya, when the 
Court’s respective investigations resulted in the prosecution and trial of sitting Heads of State. Among 
other factors, it were the cases against the incumbent leaders of Sudan and Kenya that inspired the AU 
to criticize the ICC.  
 In advance of their own political agenda, some African leaders like President Paul Kagame of 
Rwanda and Prime Minister Hailemarian Desalegn of Ethiopia have accused the ICC of selectively 
targeting Africans, and have linked this alleged selectivity to ideas of neo-colonialism and even race-
hunting. The Assembly itself has also stressed that international justice needs ‘to be conducted in a 
transparent and fair manner, in order to avoid any perception of double standard’.7 These and similar 
accusations of selectivity have proven powerful in their ability to undermine the Court’s legitimacy and 
have dominated much of the debate on the AU’s relationship with ICC. Yet, selectivity is not the only 
or even the main argument that the AU has advanced against the ICC and against the prosecution of 
African leaders in particular. The one argument that the AU has repeated the most and that appears in 
almost every decision and statement of the AU on the ICC is that the prosecution and trial of sitting 
Heads of State poses a threat to the stability and sovereignty of African states.  
                                                          
5 UNSC, S/PV.5158, 31 March 2005, statements of Sudan, Algeria and Libya. In its first reaction, Sudan called the resolution 
‘a tool for those who believe that they have a monopoly on virtues in this world’.  
6 Within the Council itself, two African states, Tanzania and Benin, voted in favour of the resolution. UNSC, S/PV.5158, 31 
March 2005. The AUPSC also adopted a communique in which it urged the Sudanese Government and the rebel groups to 
cooperate with the ICC’s investigation. AUPSC, Communique, PSC/MIN/Comm.(XLVI), 10 March 2006, para. 5(b)(IX).  
7 AU Assembly, Decision on International Jurisdiction, Justice and the International Criminal Court, 
Assembly/AU/Dec.482(XXI), 27-28 May 2013, para. 5.  
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 In reaction to the cases against the leaders of Sudan and Kenya the AU has juxtaposed the 
interests of prosecution and trial against other fundamental political and legal demands. Through its 
public deliberations, the AU has argued that the prosecution and trial of incumbent leaders undermines 
the promotion of peace and stability in the region. Furthermore, the AU has claimed that President al-
Bashir enjoys immunity from arrest under customary international law and that the Court’s proceedings 
have adversely affected the ability of Kenyatta and Ruto to discharge their official responsibilities as 
President and Deputy President of Kenya. In advancing these concerns, the AU has placed (1) the 
importance of prosecution against the interests of peace, (2) the obligation under the Rome Statute to 
arrest any indicted person against the immunity of sitting Heads of State under customary international 
law, and (3) the demands of the Court’s trial proceedings against the official responsibilities of sitting 
Heads of State. 
 This study set out to examine how the Court, the Security Council and the ASP have responded 
to these expressed concerns about the prosecution and trial of sitting Heads of State. The main research 
question was two-fold: (1) how did the relevant actors respond to the AU and (2) to what extent are their 
responses convincing from a legal point of view? In answering the main research question, the previous 
chapters mapped the responses of the actors that have a legal authority under the Rome Statute to address 
the AU’s concerns (i.e., the Court, the Security Council and the ASP) and assessed whether their actual 
decisions and statements are based on a convincing interpretation of the Court’s legal framework and 
international law more generally.  
 As explained in chapter 1, the approach chosen for this study is subject to at least three 
significant limitations. Firstly, this study is only concerned with one particular aspect of the ICC’s Africa 
problem. Without questioning the importance of other objections that the AU and individual African 
states have expressed about the ICC, this study focused solely on the AU’s concerns about the 
prosecution and trial of sitting Heads of State. Previous contributions have said a lot about the ICC’s 
alleged selectivity, but this study has left this and other possible aspects of the AU’s fragile relationship 
with the Court unexplored. 
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 Secondly, the scope of this study is confined to the formal responses of one specific group of 
actors. Only the official decisions and statements of the Court, the Security Council and the ASP were 
examined, because they are the only actors that have a legal authority under the Rome Statute to act on 
the AU’s concerns. The informal responses of these and other involved actors were not considered. 
Future research may set out to analyse how individual state leaders, NGOs, academics or employees of 
the Court have responded to the AU through unofficial channels. Their responses were not considered 
in this study.   
 Finally, this study only addressed the legal aspects of the AU’s concerns about the prosecution 
and trial of sitting Heads of State. Existing and future contributions will have much more to say about 
the forces and interests that shape the AU’s decisions, the moral implications of the AU’s objections 
against the ICC, and the impact of these objections on the legitimacy of the ICC. This study only 
addressed the legal questions that the AU’s campaign brought up about the prosecution and trial of 
sitting Heads of State, which are important as they continue to play a key role in the ongoing debate on 
the ICC’s Africa problem and in the study of international law more generally.    
 This final chapter highlights the most controversial legal aspects of the ways in which the Court, 
the Security Council and the ASP have responded to the AU’s concerns about the prosecution and trial 
of sitting Heads of State. In doing so, this chapter emphasizes the bottom-line of this study, which is 
that the ongoing tensions between the AU and the ICC are not just a matter of power politics or self-
interested leaders. There are complex legal issues at play between the AU and the ICC. These issues 
continue to require attention from commentators, and in some cases demand (immediate) consideration 
by the Court, the Security Council and the ASP.  
 
I. Prosecution versus Peace  
A first concern that the AU has voiced about the ICC is that the prosecution and trial of sitting Heads of 
State jeopardizes the interests of peace and stability. In particular, the AU has warned that the 
prosecution of President al-Bashir undermined the ongoing efforts to resolve the conflict in Darfur, and 
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that the trials of Kenyatta and Ruto posed a threat to the stability and peace of Kenya and the wider 
region. Based on this alleged tension between prosecution and peace, the AU has repeatedly asked the 
Security Council to defer the prosecution of al-Bashir as well as the cases against Kenyatta and Ruto. 
To the strong disappointment of the AU, however, the Security Council has refused to grant any of these 
deferral requests. The Council never agreed on a decision on the proposed deferral for al-Bashir back in 
2008 and voted down the deferral bid for Kenyatta and Ruto in 2013. 
 One reason why the AU failed to gain support from the Council for their deferral requests is that 
some of the Court’s states parties opposed the deferral requests on the basis of a restrictive interpretation 
of Article 16. These states argued that a deferral request can only be considered by the Council when 
the continuation of the Court’s proceedings poses by itself a threat to the peace in the sense of Article 
39 of the UN Charter and even then only when there is absolutely no other way to address this threat.  
 As explained in chapter 2, I find such calls for a strict interpretation of the Council’s deferral 
power unconvincing in light of text and drafting history of Article 16. This provision does not specify 
under what kind of conditions the Council should suspend an investigation or prosecution. The Council 
has a discretionary power to defer an investigation or prosecution, and it is for the Council to decide if 
and when to invoke this power. This means that the Council’s refusal to grant the AU’s deferral requests 
cannot be contested on legal grounds. However, the ‘legal’ arguments that some states have made 
against the use of Article 16 should be rejected. Most importantly, it should be stressed that the reference 
in Article 16 to Chapter VII does not limit the Council’s deferral power to the extent that the Council 
can only issue a deferral when an investigation or prosecution poses by itself a threat to the peace. There 
is no legal basis for such a limitation to the Council’s discretion to determine that a certain situation 
constitutes a threat to the peace and to decide on the appropriate measures to address this threat.   
 A second reason for why the AU’s deferral requests were refused by the Council is that there is 
no political consensus on when or how Article 16 should be employed. The members of the Council 
have expressed very different ideas about the scope and application of this provision, especially when it 
comes to the kind of circumstances that could justify a deferral. Some states have argued that the Council 
should never use Article 16 or only when a deferral can support the conclusion of a peace agreement, 
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whereas others have claimed that the Council should be very flexible and use its deferral power 
whenever this can help to prevent a negative development of events on the ground. These views on how 
to use Article 16 are so far apart that they have made any agreement on the AU’s deferral requests 
impossible. In effect, the Council has proven to be in a deadlock when it comes to Article 16.  
 Because of the limited response of the Council to the AU’s deferral requests, several 
commentators and state actors have argued that there should be an alternative deferral mechanism to 
address concerns about the negative effects of the Court’s proceedings on the interest of peace. First of 
all, it has been suggested that the Prosecutor could play an active role in balancing the interests of peace 
and prosecution. The Prosecutor would have this discretion under Article 53 of the Statute, which allows 
the Prosecutor to suspend the continuation of an investigation or prosecution when this is no longer in 
the ‘interests of justice’. Second of all, the AU has proposed an amendment to Article 16. As introduced 
by South Africa to the ASP in late 2009, the AU wants to authorize the UN General Assembly to defer 
the Court’s proceedings in case the Council fails to decide on a deferral request within six months of its 
submission.  
 Both proposals have been the subject of extensive discussion among commentators, and the 
views on their legal basis and desirability continue to differ. In my opinion, both proposals are 
defendable from a legal point of view. As argued in chapter 2, the Prosecutor’s discretionary power 
under Article 53 does not exclude the interests of peace, and the proposed amendment to Article 16 
seems compatible with the Statute and the Charter. That said, the reality remains that neither the 
Prosecutor nor the ASP has proven willing to seriously consider these proposals for an alternative 
deferral mechanism. The Prosecutor has argued that her Office cannot address the demands of peace 
and the ASP has side-tracked discussions on the proposed amendment to Article 16. In their view, the 
Security Council is and should remain the only forum that can addresses matters of peace and security 
in relation to the ICC. 
 The consequence of all this is that there might not be a follow-up to peace concerns when the 
Council is too divided to make a decision, as happened with the AU’s deferral request for al-Bashir, or 
when the Council rejects a deferral bid, as in the case of Kenyatta and Ruto. Some may believe that this 
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is a good thing, because the Council should not intervene in the Court’s proceedings or because the 
short-term demands of peace should never trump the long-term interests of prosecution. From a legal 
point of view, however, it is important to stress that the drafters of the Statute recognized that there 
might be situations in which prosecution does not serve the interests of justice (Article 53) or in which 
the Council should intervene in the Court’s judicial proceedings (Article 16). Cleary, they did not agree 
on the kind of circumstances that could justify a deferral from either the Council or the Prosecutor, as is 
illustrated by the open character of Articles 16 and 53. Yet, they did envision that the Court would have 
a functioning deferral regime, thereby allowing for a certain level of flexibility and pragmatism in 
addressing the peace concerns of its members.   
 As things stand, the ICC does not have a functioning deferral regime. The Council’s 
deliberations on the AU’s deferral requests have revealed a deep rooted disagreement on the scope and 
application of Article 16, spurring calls for an alternative deferral mechanism. In turn, the responses of 
the Prosecutor and the ASP to these calls show a strong reluctance to consider any of the pending 
proposals. In my view, this is a serious matter that requires further consideration, especially from the 
Court’s states parties. There exists an understandable frustration among African states about the 
inaccessibility of Article 16. If the relationship between the AU and the ICC is to be improved, then the 
Court’s states parties will need to address this frustration, and develop a common vision on how the 
Council, the Court and its states parties should act when some of the Court’s audiences perceive 
prosecution as an obstacle to peace.  
 
II. Arrest versus Immunity  
A second concern that the AU has voiced about the prosecution and trial of African presidents is that 
sitting Heads of State enjoy immunity from arrest under customary international law. In reaction to the 
warrant that the Pre-Trial Chamber issued for President al-Bashir in March 2009, the AU Assembly 
decided that its member states should not cooperate with his arrest. In an attempt to justify this decision 
under the Rome Statute, the Assembly referred to Article 98(1) of the Statute, which provides that the 
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Court ‘may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance’ when this requires a state to violate 
its international obligations to accord immunity to the official of another state. According to the AU, the 
Sudanese President would enjoy immunity from arrest under customary international law and Article 
98(1) would therefore preclude the Court from obliging its states parties to arrest him.  
 The claim that sitting Heads of State enjoy immunity from arrest became of particular relevance 
after 2010, when several African states parties welcomed President al-Bashir for an official state visit. 
In response to these and later visits, the Court’s judges repeatedly argued that all states parties have an 
obligation to arrest al-Bashir and that they cannot invoke Article 98(1) to refuse cooperation with the 
ICC. Yet, the Court’s judges were inconsistent in their argumentation on why al-Bashir does not enjoy 
immunity from arrest.  
 In first instance, the Court’s judges tried to avoid giving a formal response to the AU’s position 
by passing the matter through to the ASP and the Security Council. Only when the ASP and the Council 
proved reluctant to take any action against states that welcomed al-Bashir, did the PTC decide to take 
the matter in its own hands. In December 2011, PTC I issued two decisions on the non-cooperation of 
Chad and Malawi with the ICC. In these decisions, the Chamber ruled that al-Bashir does not enjoy 
immunity from arrest because of an exception under customary international law for the prosecution of 
international crimes by an international court like the ICC.  
 A few years later, in April 2014, the Chamber again ruled that al-Bashir does not enjoy immunity 
from arrest, but this time on the basis of a completely different line of argumentation. PTC II decided to 
revise the approach of PTC I in its decision on the non-cooperation of the DRC. The judges of PTC II 
(including Judge Tarfusser, who had co-authored the decisions of PTC I) argued that Article 98(1) does 
not apply in the case of al-Bashir, because the Council implicitly waived his immunity when referring 
the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor.  
 Most recently, in July 2017, PTC II revised its approach once more. In the South Africa decision, 
the Chamber (still including Judge Tarfusser) rejected the argument of the DRC decision that the 
Security Council implicitly waived al-Bashir’s immunity. Instead, the Court’s judges concluded, by 
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majority, that Article 98(1) does not apply in the case of al-Bashir because the Security Council’s referral 
placed Sudan in a similar position as a state party. 
 In light of the current state of the debate on these turns in the Court’s jurisprudence, chapter 3 
offered a detailed analysis of the Chamber’s approaches in the DRC and South Africa decisions. Three 
conclusions of this analysis should be highlighted here.  
 First of all, the Chamber’s Charter-based approach in the DRC decision is quite different from 
the Statute-based approach that was employed in the South Africa decision. In the DRC decision, the 
Chamber suggested that the Court is able to exercise jurisdiction over al-Bashir and to oblige states 
parties to arrest him because the Council has removed his immunity. The legal basis of the Court’s 
authority to ignore al-Bashir’s immunity as sitting Head of State would be the powers of the Council 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In contrast, the South Africa decision argued (à la Akande) that 
al-Bashir does not enjoy immunity in relation to the ICC, because Sudan is indirectly bound to the 
Statute, including Article 27(2).  
 Second of all, the two variants of the Security Council avenue, as employed by the Chamber, 
are both based on an unconvincing interpretation of the Rome Statute, the Resolution of the Council 
and/or international law. With respect to the Charter-based approach of the DRC decision, the Court 
failed to resolve questions about the powers of the Council, the interpretation of Resolution 1593 and 
about the ability of the Court to act on the basis of the Council’s powers under Chapter VII. In my view, 
the Court has failed to explain on what basis the Council can remove immunities in an implicit manner 
and, if the Court would have this power, why the Resolution should be interpreted to encompass an 
implicit removal. In contrast to the DRC decision, I believe that Resolution 1593 ‘only’ created an 
obligation for Sudan to waive the immunities of its officials when this is requested by the Court. This 
interpretation fits best with the ordinary meaning of Sudan’s obligation to ‘cooperate fully’ and 
acknowledges the fact that the Council did not (have to) discuss the issue of the immunities of Sudan’s 
officials at the time when the Resolution was adopted.  
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 Furthermore, it should be noted that even if all UN member states would have an obligation to 
consider al-Bashir’s immunities as having been waived, then the Court is not in a position to hold this 
obligation against its states parties. For as long as Sudan has not acted on its obligation to waive al-
Bashir’s immunity, states parties would still act inconsistently with their obligation under international 
law to respect this immunity when they would decide to arrest the Sudanese President. Article 98(1) 
would continue to apply, because the Court cannot absorb the powers of the Council under the Chapter 
VII and Article 103 of the Charter. 
  With regard to the alternative Statute-based approach that was employed in the South Africa 
decision, I have underscored that this approach prompts unanswered questions as well, especially about 
how the Court should act upon a Security Council referral. In addressing these questions, I have taken a 
different position than PTC II by arguing that the Court should treat Sudan, as a matter of principle, as 
a non-party. There is not a textual argument, neither in the Resolution (which accepts the distinction 
between states parties and non-parties) nor in the Statute, for treating Sudan as a state party. In my 
opinion, Article 98(1) continues to apply in the case of al-Bashir, for as long as his immunity has not 
been explicitly waived, removed or otherwise made inapplicable.   
 Finally, the third conclusion that should be recalled is that there remains a significant degree of 
ambiguity and uncertainty about the obligation of states parties to arrest al-Bashir. There is no denial 
that the Chamber has been very clear that all states parties have an obligation to arrest the Sudanese 
President. However, the Chamber’s decisions have been contradictory and have been far from univocal 
about why states parties cannot rely on Article 98(1). Put to the test, the Court’s current position on the 
immunity of al-Bashir is simply not convincing enough, in the sense that the Court’s judges have not 
taken away the ambiguity and uncertainty that is inherent in Article 98(1) and the ICC’s immunity 
regime as a whole. This matter requires further consideration from the Court as well as its states parties.  
 As things stand, there a number of ways in which the Court and its states parties can seek to 
clarify the ICC’s immunity regime in general and the matter of al-Bashir’s immunity in particular. Most 
importantly, affected states could pursue a judgment from the ICC’s Appeals Chamber, or try to seek 
an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. Both the Appeals Chamber and the ICJ 
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could help to take away (some of) the ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding the obligation of states 
parties to arrest al-Bashir. Moreover, the ICC’s immunity regime could benefit from more specific rules 
on Article 97 and 98 of the Statute, and possibly an amendment of these provisions in the future.  
 Ultimately, the AU’s claim that President al-Bashir enjoys immunity from arrest has exposed a 
fundamental tension in the ICC’s immunity regime and in international law more generally. This is the 
tension between ‘old’ rules of international law that require states to recognize the immunities of foreign 
state officials and ‘new’ rules and principles that demand the prosecution of these officials when they 
commit international crimes. In response to the AU, the Court’s judges have tried to circumvent this 
tension in different ways. Yet, each of these ways has proven to be controversial. For now, the ICC’s 
immunity regime and the matter of al-Bashir’s immunity remain ‘unresolved’, in the sense that they are 
both surrounded by ambiguity and uncertainty.  
 
III. Trial versus Official Responsibilities  
A third concern that the AU has advanced against the ICC is that the Court’s trial proceedings have a 
negative effect on the official responsibilities of African presidents. After ‘UhuRuto’ won the Kenyan 
presidential elections in 2013, the AU and the newly installed Kenyan government took several steps 
aimed at delaying their cases before the ICC. Apart from a deferral request to the Security Council, the 
AU supported a special application from the Defence Teams of Kenyatta and Ruto. This application 
asked the Court to excuse them from continuous presence during their trials. According to the AU, the 
Head and Deputy Head of State of Kenya should be able to choose which sessions of their trials they 
would attend. 
 From a legal point of view, the excusal requests of the AU raised difficult questions about the 
discretion of the Trial Chamber to waive the requirement of the accused to be present at trial. In 
addressing these questions, the two Trial Chambers initially showed flexibility by excusing Kenyatta 
and Ruto from almost all trial hearings. According to Judge Eboe-Osuji and Judge Fremr, who sat in 
both Chambers, an exemption to the presence requirement under Article 63(1) would be reasonable in 
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this case given the official responsibilities of Kenyatta and Ruto as President and Deputy President of 
Kenya.  
 However, the Trial Chamber’s initial excusals had to be vacated, after the Appeals Chamber 
ruled that the Trial Chamber had granted Ruto an excusal which effectively made his absence the general 
rule and his presence an exception. The Appeals Chamber concluded, by majority, that the Trial 
Chamber is only allowed to excuse an accused from continuous presence at trial in exceptional 
circumstances and only when a number of additional conditions are fulfilled. In this way, the Appeals 
Chamber foreshadowed that Kenyatta and Ruto would have to attend a significant part of their trials.  
 In a follow-up to the Appeal Chamber’s decision, as well as the refusal of the Security Council 
to issue a deferral, the AU pressured the ASP to amend the provisions in the Statute on immunity and 
presence at trial. These amendments would have to ensure that sitting Heads of State could be exempted 
from prosecution and could be excused from having to attend their trials in person. During an eventful 
meeting of the ASP in late 2013, many of the Court’s states parties acknowledged the concerns of the 
AU, but opposed the proposed amendments to the Statute. As a compromise, the ASP agreed with the 
AU to revise the Rules on presence at trial. Most importantly, the ASP agreed to adopt Rule 134quater, 
so that the Trial Chamber could excuse a sitting Head of State under more flexible conditions than the 
Appeals Chamber had formulated. A few weeks later, the Trial Chamber excused Ruto from most parts 
of his trial on the basis of this new Rule.  
 With the adoption and application of Rule 134quater, the Court and the ASP established an 
excusal regime based on ideas of flexibility and pragmatism. From now on, the Court’s trials could 
continue, with or without the presence of the accused, and sitting Heads of State Heads could combine 
their trials in The Hague with their official responsibilities back home. While some may find this a 
reasonable compromise, there are at least four problems with these new rules on presence at trial. 
 First of all, Rule 134quater cannot be reconciled with the text of Article 63(1), which states that 
the accused ‘shall be present during the trial’. What is left of this duty, if the accused may skip almost 
all trial hearings? The Appeals Chamber issued an authoritative decision on Article 63(1) in which it 
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concluded that the Trial Chamber has a certain discretion to excuse an accused in exceptional 
circumstances, but that continuous presence should remain the rule. Rule 134quater ignores this 
important condition, and thereby violates Article 51(4) of the Statute, which dictates that the Rules and 
amendments thereto ‘shall be consistent’ with the Statute. 
 Second of all, the excusal that the Trial Chamber granted to Ruto on the basis of Rule 134quater 
infringes upon the equal treatment principle that is embedded in Article 27(1). In a general sense, Rule 
134quater does not necessarily imply a distinction on the basis of official capacity. However, the way 
in which the Trial Chamber interpreted and applied Rule 134quater does imply a distinction on the basis 
of official capacity and is thus manifestly inconsistent with Article 27(1). Instead of focussing on the 
extraordinary duties that Ruto personally has to fulfil, the Chamber based his excusal on the day-to-day 
functions of the Deputy President of Kenya under the Kenyan Constitution. In this way, the Trial 
Chamber created a precedent for treating sitting (Deputy) Heads of State in a different manner than 
another accused.  
 Third of all, another problem with the application of the new rules on presence at trial is that by 
allowing the accused to be absent from large parts of the trial, these rules risks to undermine the 
administration of justice. The Appeals Chamber emphasized in its judgment on presence at trial that the 
accused is not a passive observer of the trial, but an active participant therein. The active involvement 
of the accused in his or her trial is crucial not only to protect the rights of the accused, but also because 
it is through the process of confronting the accused with the evidence, that the Court can form a complete 
record of the relevant events. In my opinion, the absence of an accused during most witness testimonies 
can easily undermine the recording of the events in which the accused may or may not have been 
involved.  
 Finally, a last problem with the new rules on presence at trial is that they have established a 
precedent for overturning decisions of the Appeals Chamber by way of an amendment to the RPE. The 
ASP has the power to consider the political implications of the way in which the Court interprets and 
applies its legal framework and may adjust this framework accordingly. There are, however, important 
reasons for why the ASP cannot amend the Statute overnight and why the RPE are subordinate to the 
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Statute. The underlying logic is that political convenience should not determine the daily functioning of 
an international court. This means that general rules should not be revised only to fit the circumstances 
of a specific case, something which did happen with Rule 134quater.  
 In sum, with the adoption and application of Rule 134quater the Court and its states parties 
developed a special excusal regime for accused who fulfil official responsibilities, like a sitting Head of 
State. Of course, a certain level of flexibility and pragmatism may be needed when the accused has to 
fulfil important public duties, especially in a situation that cannot be anticipated like a terrorist attack or 
a natural disaster. However, with Rule 134quater, the ICC’s excusal regime has gone far beyond short 
term absences for unpredictable situations. In response to the AU, the ASP and the Court have 
effectively conflated the official responsibilities of a sitting Head of State with the important public 
duties that an accused may have to fulfil in the context of unforeseen developments. In this way, the 
Court and its states parties have created a precedent for treating sitting Heads of State and other senior 
state officials differently before the Court than other accused, not because of their demanding 
responsibilities, but simply because of their official status.  
 
IV. Final Remarks  
Looking back at the past decade, the opposition of the AU against the ICC stands out as one of the 
greatest challenges for the Court so far. The AU has criticized the ICC in powerful terms. It has obliged 
its member states not to cooperate with the Court in several high-level cases and has recently adopted a 
collective withdrawal strategy encouraging its member states to leave the Court. Individual African 
leaders have spiced this opposition with accusations of prosecutorial selectivity and have claimed that 
the ICC targets Africans. Yet, prosecutorial selectivity is not the only and perhaps not even the main 
reason for the AU to criticize the Court. The AU’s opposition against the ICC has also been directed 
against the prosecution and trial of sitting Heads of State.  
 In criticizing the cases against al-Bashir, Kenyatta and Ruto, the AU has portrayed the ICC as a 
serious threat to its member states. The AU Peace and Security Council and its Assembly of Heads of 
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State and Government have argued that the ICC has jeopardized the promotion of peace. In addition, 
the AU has stressed that al-Bashir enjoys immunity from arrest under customary international law and 
that the trials of Kenyatta and Ruto have undermined their ability to fulfil their constitutional duties as 
leaders of Kenya. In advancing these concerns, the AU has placed (1) the importance of prosecution 
against the interests of peace, (2) the obligation to arrest against the immunity of sitting Heads of State, 
and (3) the Court’s trial proceedings against the official responsibilities of sitting Heads of State. 
 In a previous publication, entitled Africa and the ICC: Perceptions of Justice, I examined the 
political power of these three juxtapositions.8 Together with Kamari Clarke and Eefje de Volder, I 
explored how the AU and other relevant actors have shaped perceptions of the Court among its different 
audiences in Africa and concluded that the AU’s campaign against the prosecution of African presidents 
is powerful, in the sense that it puts the Court’s legitimacy under pressure.9 The AU’s message that the 
ICC poses a threat to the sovereignty and stability of African states stimulates local communities and 
other relevant audiences to oppose the ICC and helps self-interested leaders to justify their decisions not 
to support the Court.  
 In this study, I have not been concerned with the societal, political or moral implications of the 
AU’s opposition against the ICC. Without denying the importance of these implications, I have focussed 
on the legal questions that the AU’s campaign has brought up about complex legal issues like the 
immunity of sitting Heads of State, the equal treatment principle and the deferral power of the Security 
Council. More specifically, I have analysed (a) how the Court, the Security Council and the ASP have 
addressed these issues and (b) whether they have done so on the basis of a convincing interpretation of 
the Court’s legal framework and international law more generally.  
                                                          
8 Abel S. Knottnerus, ‘The AU, the ICC and the Prosecution of African Presidents’, in Kamari M. Clarke, Abel S. Knottnerus 
and Eefje de Volder (eds.), Africa and the ICC: Perceptions of Justice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 
152-184.  
9 Kamari M. Clarke, Abel S. Knottnerus and Eefje de Volder (eds.), Africa and the ICC: Perceptions of Justice (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 6-7, 440.  
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 It should be clear by now that, in my opinion, the Court, the Security Council and the ASP have 
not always responded to the AU’s concerns in a legally convincing manner:  
 (1) As things stand, the ICC’s deferral regime is dysfunctional. This is problematic from a legal 
 point of view, because Articles 16 and 53 clearly envision a working deferral regime, providing 
 a certain level of flexibility and pragmatism for the Security Council and the Prosecutor to 
 address the peace concerns of states parties.  
 (2) The ICC’s immunity regime in general and the matter of al-Bashir’s immunity in particular 
 remain unresolved. The AU’s claim that al-Bashir enjoys immunity from arrest has exposed the 
 ambiguity and uncertainty that is inherent in the ICC’s immunity regime. In its inconsistent 
 decisions on the immunity of al-Bashir, the Court has not settled this matter in a 
 convincing manner.  
 (3) The Court and its states parties have established a special excusal regime, based on the 
 legally dubious idea that sitting Heads of State should be treated differently than other accused, 
 because of their official status. With the adoption and application of new rules on presence at 
 trial, the Court and its states parties have violated several provisions of the Rome Statute, 
 including the equal treatment principle that is embedded in Article 27(1).  
All in all, the Court, the Security Council and the ASP have not managed to resolve the three 
juxtapositions that the AU has advanced against the prosecution and trial of sitting Heads of State in a 
legally convincing manner. What is more, with the exception of the new rules on presence at trial, which 
helped to diminish the perceived tension between trial and official responsibilities, the Court and its 
states parties have failed to move beyond the strong concerns that the AU has expressed about the ICC.  
 Since 2008, the AU has proposed various solutions to address its remaining concerns, including 
amendments to several provisions of the Rome Statute.10 Most notably, the AU has tabled a proposal to 
amend Article 16 and has introduced a more drastic proposal to constrain the Court’s power to prosecute 
                                                          
10 For a list of all proposed amendments, see annex II.  
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sitting Heads of State. Since 2013, when the threat of an African mass withdrawal became more realistic, 
the Court and its states parties have been willing to discuss the AU’s concerns in informal meetings.11 
Yet, at the same time, they have proven reluctant to seriously consider most of the AU’s suggestions. 
According to the AU itself, the refusal of the Court and its states parties to take its proposals seriously 
is one of the main reasons for its decision to adopt a strategy on the collective withdrawal of African 
states from the Rome Statute in early 2017.12 Ultimately, this strategy should be understood as the latest 
and most nuclear step in a series of threats to push the ASP and the Security Council to agree to the 
AU’s far-reaching demands on the prosecution and trial of sitting Heads of State.  
 Over the past few years, the ICC and its states parties have made several efforts to keep the AU 
and its member states on board. The Court’s states parties have, for example, appointed an African as 
Prosecutor (Fatou Bensouda from the Gambia), elected an African as President of the ASP (Sidiki Kaba 
from Senegal),13 and have organized various seminars, retreats and diplomatic visits aimed at improving 
the Court’s relationship with Africa.14 Moreover, the ASP has agreed to a special excusal regime to 
                                                          
11 Note that there is also a pending proposal for an ICC liaison office at the AU’s Headquarters in Addis Ababa. ASP, Resolution 
ICC-ASP/15/Res.5, 16 November 2016, para. 41 (‘emphasizes the need to pursue efforts aimed at intensifying dialogue with 
the African Union and to strengthen the relationship between the Court and the African Union and commits to the Court’s 
further regular engagement in Addis Ababa with the African Union and diplomatic missions in anticipation of establishing its 
liaison office, recognizes the engagement of the President of the Assembly with officials of the African Union in Addis Ababa 
and calls upon all relevant stakeholders to support strengthening the relationship between the Court and the African Union’). 
12 AU, Draft Withdrawal Strategy Document, 12 January 2017 (on file with the author), paras. 3, 7, 9, 29 and 30.  
13 ASP, Press Release - Minister of Justice of Senegal, H.E. Mr. Sidiki Kaba, endorsed for the position of President of the 
Assembly, visit The Hague, ICC-ASP-20141120-PR1066, 20 November 2014. 
14 See for example ICC, Press Release - International Criminal Court holds retreat with African States Parties in Addis Ababa, 
ICC-CPI-20161207-PR 1263, 7 December 2016; ICC, Press Release, High-level ICC Regional Seminar concludes in 
Botswana, ICC-CPI-20151030-PR1164, 30 October 2015; ASP, Press Release -  The President of the Assembly of States 
Parties meets with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and with the Bureau of the Committee of Representatives, 
ICC-ASP-20150814-PR1138, 14 August 2015; ASP, Press Release - To commemorate the Day of International Criminal 
Justice, the President of the Assembly convenes a regional discussion in Dakar on state sovereignty and international criminal 
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address the AU’s concerns about the trials of Kenyatta and Ruto, and has promised South Africa to 
address its concerns about Article 97 by establishing a working group on the implementation of this 
provision. These and other initiatives are important ‘signs of good will’ and have at certain points 
prevented further immediate escalation. Yet, none of these appointments, special rules or working 
groups has really helped to resolve the underlying concerns of the AU about the ICC.  
 As things stand, the AU and most of its member states will not likely change their position on 
the prosecution and trial of sitting Heads of State, especially for as long as the case against al-Bashir 
remains ongoing. The recent announcement of a number of African states that they will not endorse the 
AU’s collective withdrawal strategy as well as the decisions of South Africa and the Gambia to rescind 
their initial withdrawal from the Rome Statute indicate that the threat of a mass-withdrawal may be 
averted for now. Yet, even if all African states parties remain members of the ICC, the AU’s campaign 
against the prosecution of African presidents will probably continue. This will put further pressure on 
the Court and as such on its ability to obtain the necessary support for its investigations and prosecutions 
in and outside Africa. 
 This study has mapped and evaluated how the Court, the Security Council and the ASP have 
responded to the AU’s opposition against the prosecution and trial of sitting Heads of State. Future 
studies will have to continue to observe these responses and will have to explore more of the various 
legal, political, societal and moral implications of the AU’s disengagements with the ICC. Perhaps, the 
AU will eventually fall back in-line or maybe its opposition is just the beginning of the end for the 
Court’s ability to play a meaningful role in Africa. Whatever happens, international law and international 
criminal law in particular have already paid a substantial price. The non-cooperation and rhetorical 
opposition of the AU has been one thing, the legally questionable responses from the Court and its states 
parties have been another.  
                                                          
justice, ICC-ASP-20150722-PR1134, 22 July 2015; ASP, Press Release - Seminar on cooperation with the ICC concludes in 
Benin, ICC-CPI-20141105-PR1060, 5 November 2014.     
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 In my opinion, the Court, the Security Council and the ASP have failed to respond to the AU’s 
concerns in a legally convincing manner. This is not to say that the Court and its supporters should have 
given in to the AU or that the AU is somehow right in its opposition against the prosecution of al-Bashir 
and the trials of Kenyatta and Ruto. The bottom-line of this study is that while many observers tend to 
portray the ongoing tensions between the AU and the ICC as a matter of power politics and self-
interested leaders, the situation is actually way more complex than that. The AU is not just legally wrong 
and the ICC legally right, or the other way around. There are intricate legal issues at play between the 
AU and the ICC, that touch on fundamental and unresolved aspects of the current international legal 
order, such as the inherent tension between the protection of state sovereignty and the advancement of 
human rights. These issues continue to require attention from commentators and some of the addressed 
issues like the immunity of al-Bashir and the ICC’s deferral regime also demand (immediate) 
consideration by the Court, the Security Council and the ASP. This is necessary to bring the AU and the 
ICC closer together, to respect the Court’s legal framework and ultimately to continue the development 





African States and the Rome Statute1 
 
State 2 Signature Ratification or Accession(a) 
 
Algeria 28 Dec 2000  
Angola 7 Oct 1998  
Benin 24 Sep 1999 22 Jan 2002 
Botswana 8 Sep 2000 8 Sep 2000 
Burkina Faso 30 Nov 1998 16 Apr 2004 
Burundi 3 13 Jan 1999 21 Sep 2004 
Cabo Verde 28 Dec 2000 10 Oct 2011 
Cameroon 17 July 1998  
CAR 7 Dec 1999 3 Oct 2001 
Chad 20 Oct 1999 1 Nov 2006 
Comoros 22 Sep 2000 18 Aug 2006 
Congo 17 Jul 1998 3 May 2004 
Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory 
Coast) 
30 Nov 1998 15 Feb 2013 
DRC 8 Sep 2000 11 Apr 2002 
Djibouti 7 Oct 1998 5 Nov 2002 
Egypt 4 26 Dec 2000  
Equatorial Guinea X   
Eritrea 7 Oct 1998  
Ethiopia X  
Gabon  22 Dec 1998 20 Sep 2000 
Gambia 5 4 Dec 1998 28 Jun 2002 
Ghana 18 Jul 1998 20 Dec 1999 
Guinea 7 Sep 2000 14 Jul 2003 
Guinea-Bissau 12 Sept 2000  
Kenya 11 Aug 1999 15 Mar 2005 
                                                          
1 Based on United Nations Treaty Collection (as of 31 July 2017).  
2 This list includes the 54 African UN Member states.  
3 Burundi has decided to withdraw from the Rome Statute. This decision will take effect on 27 October 2017. UN Treaties 
Collection (C.N.805.2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10), Depository notification withdrawal by the Republic of Burundi, 27 October 
2016 
4 Note that Egypt issued a declaration upon its signature.  
5 On 10 November 2016, Gambia notified the Secretary General of its decision to withdraw from the Rome Statute. In February 
2017, however, Gambia notified the Secretary General of its decision to rescind that notification of withdrawal with immediate 
effect. UN Treaties Collection (C.N.862.2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10), Depository notification by the Islamic Republic of the 
Gambia, 10 November 2016; UN Treaties Collection (C.N.62.2017.TREATIES-XVIII.10), Depository notification by the 
Islamic Republic of Gambia, 10 February 2017.  
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Lesotho 30 Nov 1998 6 Sep 2000 
Liberia 17 Jul 1998 22 Sep 2004 
Libya X  
Madagascar 18 Jul 1998 14 Mar 2008 
Malawi 2 Mar 1999 19 Sep 2002 
Mali 17 Jul 1998 16 Aug 2000 
Mauritania X  
Mauritius 11 Nov 1998 5 Mar 2002 
Morocco 8 Sep 2000  
Mozambique 28 Dec 2000  
Namibia 27 Oct 1998 25 Jun 2002 
Niger 17 Jul 1998 11 Apr 2002 
Nigeria 1 Jun 2000 27 Sep 2001 
Rwanda X  
São Tomé and 
Principe 
28 Dec 2000  
Senegal 18 Jul 1998 2 Feb 1999 
Seychelles 28 Dec 2000 10 Aug 2010 
Sierra Leone 17 Oct 1998 15 Sep 2000 
Somalia X   
South Africa 6 17 Jul 1998 27 Nov 2000 
South Sudan X   
Sudan 7 8 Sep 2000  
Swaziland X   
Togo X   
Tunisia  24 Jun 2011 (a) 
Uganda  17 Mar 1999 14 Jun 2002 
United Republic of 
Tanzania 
29 Dec 2000 20 Aug 2002 
Zambia 17 July 1998 13 Nov 2002 
Zimbabwe 17 Jul 1998  
                                                          
6 On 19 October 2016, South Africa notified the Secretary General of its decision to withdraw from the Rome Statute. In March 
2017, however, South Africa notified the Secretary General of its decision to rescind that notification of withdrawal with 
immediate effect. This notification followed upon a ruling of the High Court of South Africa, which declared the initial 
withdrawal decision unconstitutional. See UN Treaties Collection (C.N.786.2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10), Declaratory 
statement by the Republic of South Africa on the decision to withdraw from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 19 October 2016; Democratic Alliance v Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Judgment Gauteng 
Division of the High Court, 22 February 2017; UN Treaties Collection (C.N.121.2017.TREATIES-XVIII.10), Depository 
notification by the Republic of South Africa, 7 March 2017. UN Treaties Collection (C.N.786.2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10).  
7 Note that in a communication received on 26 August 2008, Sudan informed the Secretary-General that it did ‘not intend to 




Proposed Amendments by the African Union to the Rome Statute1 
 
Since 2009, several amendments have been submitted to the Working on Amendments of the ASP by 
African states parties to the ICC. Some of these proposed amendments were submitted on behalf of the 
AU based on decisions of the AU Assembly and others by individual African states parties. As explained 
in the 2017 withdrawal strategy, all these proposed amendments are supported by the African Union. 
The overview that is included in this annex was given in the withdrawal strategy document and provides:  
 (1) The name of the state that submitted the amendment;  
  (2) The text of the proposed amendment (in bold); 
  (3) The AU’s own explanation of the amendment;  
  (4) The AU’s understanding of the status of the proposed amendment. 
For the purposes of this study, the most relevant proposed amendments are the ones on (A) the Security 
Council’s deferral power, (C) on presence at trial and (D) on the immunity of sitting Heads of State. 
They are discussed in more detail in chapters 2, 3 and 4. The other three proposed amendments concern 
(B) the recognition of regional justice mechanism in the ICC’s complementarity regime, (E) the 
commission of offences against the administration of justice by Court officials and (F) the Independent 





                                                          
1 As included in AU, Draft Withdrawal Strategy Document, 12 January 2017 (on file with the author).   
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 (1) Member 
State 
 
(2) Proposed amendments  (3) AU’s Explanation (4) Status  
A South 
Africa2 
Article 16  
 
1) No investigation or prosecution 
may be commenced or proceeded 
with under this Statute for a period 
of  12 months after the Security 
Council, in a resolution adopted 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of 
the United Nations, has requested 
the Court to that effect, that request 
may be renewed by the Council 
under the same conditions. 
 
2) A State with jurisdiction over a 
situation before the Court may 
request the UNSC to defer the 
matter before the Court as provided 
for in (1) above.  
 
3) Where the UN Security Council 
fails to decide on the request by the 
State concerned within six (6) 
months of receipt of the request, 
the requesting Party may request 
the UN General Assembly to 
assume the Security Council’s 
responsibility under paragraph 1 
consistent with Resolution 377 (v) 
of the UN General Assembly. 
 
African states parties to the 
Rome Statute held a meeting 
from 3-6 November 2009 in 
Addis Abba chaired by 
South Africa, at which it was 
decided to propose an 
amendment to the Rome 
Statute in respect of Article 
16 of the Statute.  
 
The reason for the proposal 
is to address a situation 
where the UNSC is unable 
to decide on a deferral 
request, such be transferred 
to the UNGA for a 
decisions.  
 
This was evidenced in the 
refusal of the UNSC to 
address or respond to the 
deferral request of the AU in 
relation to the case against 
the President of the Sudan.  
Pending  
B.  Kenya3  Preamble - Complementarity  
 
“Emphasizing that the International 
Criminal Court established under 
this Statute shall be complementary 
to national and regional criminal 
jurisdictions.  
The Preamble of the Rome 
Statute provides 
“Emphasizing that the 
International Criminal Court 
established under this 
Statute shall be 
complementary to national 
criminal jurisdictions,’’ 
 
In accordance with African 
Union resolutions, the 
amendment is proposed to 
allow recognition of regional 




                                                          
2 UN Treaties Collection (C.N.851.2009.TREATIES-10), South Africa: Proposal of Amendment, 18 November 2009. 
3 UN Treaties Collection (C.N.1026.2013.TREATIES-XVIII.10), Kenya: Proposal of Amendments, 14 March 2014. 
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C.  Kenya  Article 63 - Trial in the Presence of 
the accused 
 
“Notwithstanding article 63(1), an 
accused may be excused from 
continuous presence in the Court 
after the Chamber satisfies itself 
that exceptional circumstances 
exists, alternative measures have 
been put in place and considered, 
including but not limited to 
changes to the trial schedule or 
temporary adjournment or 
attendance through the use of 
communications technology or 
through representation of Counsel.  
(2) Any such absence shall be 
considered on a case-by-case basis 
and be limited to that which is 
strictly necessary.  
(3) The Trial Chamber shall only 
grant the request if it determines 
that such exceptional circumstances 
exist and if the rights of the 
accused are fully ensured in his or 
her absence, in particular through 
representation by counsel and that 
the accused has explicitly waived 
his right to be present a trial. 
 
Under the Rome Statute, 
article 63(2) envisages a trial 
in absence of the accused in 
exceptional circumstances. 
The Rome Statute does not 
define the term exceptional 
circumstances and neither 
are there case laws to guide 
the Court on the same.  
 
Article 63(2) further 
provides other caveats in 
granting such trials in 
circumstances where other 
reasonable alternatives have 
provided to be inadequate 
and for a strictly required 
duration.  
Pending 
D.  Kenya Article 27 - Irrelevance of official 
capacity 
 
“[…] Heads of State, their deputies 
and anybody acting or is entitled to 
act as such may be exempt from 
prosecution during their current 
term of office. Such an exemption 
may be renewed by the Court under 
the same conditions.” 
While being a Head of State 
or Government such will not 
exempt them from criminal 
liability for international 
crimes allegedly 
perpetuated, prosecution 
should not be instituted until 
the Head of State or 
Government or anyone 
entitled to act as such, has 
left office - in accordance 
with domestic and 
customary international law.  
Pending 
E.  Kenya  Article 70 - Offences against 
Administration of Justice  
 
“The Court shall have jurisdiction 
over the following offences against 
its administration of justice when 
committed intentionally by any 
person:” 
This particular article 
presumes that such offences 
save for 70(1)(f) can be 
committed only against the 
Court. This article should be 
amended to include offences 
by the Court Officials so that 
it’s clear that either party to 
the proceedings can 
approach the Court when 





F.  Kenya  Article 112 - Implementation of 
IOM 
 
The Independent Oversight 
Mechanism (IOM) be 
operationalized and empowered to 
carry out inspection, evaluation and 
investigations of all the organs of 
the Court.  
Article 112(4) - The 
Assembly of States Parties 
shall establish such 
subsidiary bodies as may be 
necessary including 
Independent Oversight 
mechanism for inspection, 
evaluation and investigation 
of the Court, in order to 
enhance its efficiency and 
economy. This includes the 
conduct of 
officers/procedure/code of 
ethics in the Office of the 
Prosecutor. The OTP has 
historically opposed the 
scope of authority of the 
IOM. Under Article 42(1) 
and (2) the Prosecutor has 
power to act independently 
as a separate organ of the 
Court with full authority 
over the management and 
administration of the office. 
There is a conflict of powers 
between the OTP and the 
IOM that is continuously 
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determination under article 87(7) of the Statute with respect to the Republic of South Africa, 8 December 
2016.  
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Statute”, 19 August 2015.  
Submissions Defence  
Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-809), Defence Request for Conditional Excusal from Continuous Presence 
at Trial, 23 September 2013. 
Submissions Prosecutor  
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Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11-875), Notification of the removal of a witness from the Prosecution’s 
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Ruto, Kosgey and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-20), Dissenting Opinion by Judge Hans-Peter Kaul to Pre-
Trial Chamber II’s "Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Summons to Appear for William 
Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang", 15 March 2011.  
Ruto, Kosgey and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-101), Decision on the Application by the Government of 
Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute, 30 May 
2011.  
Ruto, Kosgey and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-373), Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to 
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 23 January 2012 (including dissenting opinion of Judge 
Kaul).  
Trial Chamber V(A) 
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-762), Decision on prosecution requests to add witnesses and evidence 
and defence requests to reschedule the trial start date, 3 June 2013.  
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-777), Decision on Mr Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous 
Presence at Trial, 18 June 2013. 
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-777-Anx2), Initial decision Trial Chamber V.A. on Ruto’s excusal 
request - Dissenting Opinion of Judge Herrera Carbuccia, 18 June 2013. 
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-817), Decision on Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal the 
‘Decision on Mr Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial’, 18 July 2013.  
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-817-Anx), Dissenting Opinion Judge Eboe-Osuji, 18 July 2013. 
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1186), Reasons for the Decision on Excusal from Presence at Trial 
under Rule 134quater, 18 February 2014. 
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1246), Decision on ‘Prosecution’s application for leave to appeal the 
decision on excusal from presence at trial under Rule 134quater, 2 April 2014.  
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Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1246-Anx), Decision on ‘Prosecution’s application for leave to appeal 
the decision on excusal from presence at trial under Rule 134quater - Dissenting Opinion of Judge Olga 
Herrera Carbuccia, 2 April 2014. 
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1274-Corr2), Decision on Prosecutor’s Application for Witness 
Summonses and resulting Request for State Party Cooperation, 17 April 2014.  
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1274-Anx), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Herrera Carbuccia on 
"Decision on Prosecutor’s Application for Witness Summonses and resulting Request for State Party 
Cooperation", 29 April 2014.  
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-2027-Red), Public redacted version of Decision on Defence 
Applications for Judgments of Acquittal, 4 April 2016.  
Hearings Trial Chamber  
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09/-01/11-T-37-Red-ENG), Public Court Records, 23 September 2013.  
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-T-64-Red), Public Court Records, 1 November 2013.  
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-T-66-Red), Public Court Records, 5 November 2013.  
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-T-70-Red), Public Court Records, 21 November 2013. 
Appeals Chamber  
Ruto, Kosgey and Sang (ICC-01/09-02/11-274), Judgment on the appeal of the Republic of Kenya 
against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled ‘‘Decision on the Application by 
the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the 
Statute", 31 August 2011.  
Ruto, Kosgey and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-336), Dissenting Opinion Judge Usacka, 20 September 2011.  
Ruto, Kosgey and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-414), Decision on the appeals of Mr William Samoei Ruto 
and Mr Joshua Arap Sang against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 23 January 2012 entitled 
"Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute", 24 
May 2012.  
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-862), Decision on request for suspensive effect, 20 August 2013. 
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-942), Decision on the requests for leave to submit observations under 
rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 13 September 2013.  
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-942-Anx), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Usacka, 13 September 
2013. 
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09/01/11-948), Joint Amicus curiae Observations of the United Republic of 
Tanzania, Republic of Rwanda, Republic of Burundi, State of Eritrea and Republic of Uganda on the 
Prosecution’s appeal against the "Decision on Mr. Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous 
Presence at Trial", 17 September 2013.  
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-988), Second decision on the requests for leave to submit observations 
under rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 25 September 2013.  
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-988-Anx), Partly Separate Opinion of Judge Anita Usacka, 25 
September 2013.   
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-993-Red), Decision on Mr Ruto’s request for reconsideration of the 
"Decision on the request for suspensive effect", 27 September 2013. 
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Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1066), Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision 
of Trial Chamber V(a) of 18 June 2013 entitled “Decision on Mr Ruto’s Request for Excusal from 
Continuous Presence at Trial”, 25 October 2013.  
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1066-Anx), Judgment Appeals Chamber on Presence at Trial - Joint 
Separate Opinion of Judge Erkki Kourula and Judge Anita Usacka, 25 October 2013. 
Submissions Defence  
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-629), Joint Defence Submissions on Legal Basis for the Accused’s 
Presence at Trial via Video Link, 28 February 2013.  
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-685), Defence Request pursuant to Article 63(1) of the Rome Statute, 
17 April 2013. 
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1109), Defence Response to the Prosecution’s Request for provision 
of further information and Reconsideration of the excusal of William Ruto, 20 November 2013.  
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1124), Defence Request pursuant to Article 63(1) of the Rome Statute 
and Rule 134quater of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence to excuse Mr. William Samoei Ruto from 
attendance at trial, 16 December 2013. 
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1127), Sang Defence response to the request pursuant to article 63(1) 
of the Rome Statute and rule 134quarter of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence to excuse Mr. William 
Samoei Ruto from attendance at trial, and the Office of the Prosecutor’s Application, 19 December 2013.  
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1196), Defence response to the “Prosecution’s application for leave 
to appeal the decision on excusal from presence at trial under Rule 134quater”, 28 February 2014.  
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1998), Ruto Defence Request for Mr. Ruto’s Excusal from Presence 
at Trial under Rule 134ter, 3 November 2015.  
Submissions Prosecutor  
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-660), Prosecution’s observations on Joint Defence Submissions on 
Legal Basis for the Accused’s Presence at Trial via Video Link, 22 March 2013.  
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-713), Prosecution’s Observations on “Defence Request pursuant to 
Article 63 (1) of the Rome Statute”, 1 May 2013. 
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-730-Red), Public redacted version of Prosecution response to the 
“Government of Kenya’s Submissions on the Status of Cooperation with the International Criminal 
Court, or, in the alternative, Application for Leave to file Observations pursuant to Rule 103(1) of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence” (ICC-01/09-01/11-670), 10 May 2013. 
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-831), Prosecution appeal against the “Decision on Mr Ruto’s Request 
for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial”, 29 July 2013. 
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1104), Prosecution’s Request for provision of further information and 
Reconsideration of the excusal of William Ruto, 19 November 2013.  
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1135), Prosecution response to Defence request pursuant to Article 
63(1) and Rule134quater for excusal from attendance at trial for William Samoei Ruto, 8 January 2014. 
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1189), Prosecution’s application for leave to appeal the decision on 
excusal from presence at trial under Rule 134quater, 24 February 2014. 
Submissions Victims  
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-694), Submissions of the Common Legal Representative for Victims 
on the Defence Request Pursuant to Article 63(1) of the Rome Statute, 22 May 2013.  
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Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1111), Common Legal Representative Response to the Prosecution’s 
Request for Provision of Further Information and Reconsideration of the Excusal of William Ruto, 20 
November 2013.  
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1139), Response of the Common Legal Representative for Victims to 
the Defence Request Pursuant to Article 63(1) of the Rome Statute and Rule 134quater of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence to Excuse Mr. William Samoei Ruto from Attendance at Trial, 9 January 2014.  
Ruto and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-1193), Common Legal Representative for Victims’ Response to the 
Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal the Decision on Excusal from Presence at Trial under 
Rule 134quater, 27 February 2014.  
D. Other cases and situations 
Darfur  
Situation in Darfur (ICC-02/05-10), Decision Inviting Observations in Application of Rule 103 of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 24 July 2006. 
Situation in Darfur (ICC-02/05-189), Decision on Application under Rule 103, 4 February 2009. 
Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb (ICC-02/05-01/07-1), Decision on the Prosecution Application under 
Article 58(7) of the Statute, 27 April 2007.   
Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb (ICC-02/05-01/07-57), Decision informing the United Nations Security 
Council about the lack of cooperation by the Republic of the Sudan, 25 May 2010.  
Kenya  
Situation in Kenya (ICC-01/09-3), Request for authorization of an investigation pursuant to Article 15, 
26 November 2009.  
Situation in Kenya (ICC-01/09-19), Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 31 March 2010 (including 
dissenting opinion of Judge Kaul).   
DRC 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ICC-01/04-101), Decision on the Applications for 
Participation in the Proceedings of VRS 1, VRS 2, VRS 3, VRS 4, VRS5 and VRS 6, 17 January 2006. 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ICC-01/04-168), Judgment on the Prosecutor’s 
Application for Extraordinary Review of the Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision Denying 
Leave to Appeal, 13 July 2006. 
Uganda 
Situation in Uganda (ICC-02/04-01/05-68), Decision to convene a status conference on the investigation 
in the situation in Uganda in relation to the application of article 53, 2 December 2005. 
Situation in Uganda (ICC-02/04-01/05-76), OTP Submission Providing Information On Status of the 
Investigation In Anticipation of the Status Conference To Be Held on 13 January 2006, 11 January 2006.  
Kony et al (ICC-02/04-01/05-408 (OA 3), Judgment on the appeal of the Defence against the ‘Decision 





Situation in Libya (ICC-01/11-4-Red), Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar 
Mohammed Abu Minyar GADDAFI, Saif Al‐Islam GADDAFI and Abdullah AL‐SENUSSI, 16 May 
2011. 
Situation in Libya  (ICC-01/11-12), Decision on the "Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as 
to Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar GADDAFI, Saif Al-Islam GADDAFI and Abdullah 
ALSENUSSI", 27 June 2011. 
Muammar Gaddafi (ICC-01/11-01/11-28), Decision to Terminate the Case Against Muammar 
Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, 22 November 2011.  
Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi (ICC-01/11-01/11-163), Decision on the postponement 
of the execution of the request for surrender of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi pursuant to Article 95 of the Rome 
Statute, 1 June 2012.  
Al-Senussi (ICC-01/11-01/11-420), Decision on the request of the Defence of Abdullah al-Senussi to 
make a finding of non-cooperation by the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and refer the matter to the 
Security Council, 28 August 2013.   
 
III. Other ICC Documents  
A. Office of the Prosecutor  
Policy documents  
OTP, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, September 2007. 
OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013. 
Public statements  
OTP, Press Release - Communications Received by the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, 16 July 
2003. 
OTP, Press Release - Prosecutor receives referral of the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
19 April 2004. 
OTP, Press Release - Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court opens an investigation into Northern 
Uganda, 29 July 2004.  
OTP, Press Release - The Prosecutor of the ICC opens investigation in Darfur, 6 June 2005. 
OTP, Statement by Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo on the Uganda Arrest Warrants, 14 October 
2005. 
OTP, Statements by ICC Chief Prosecutor and the visiting Delegation of Acholi leaders from northern 
Uganda, 18 March 2005. 
OTP, Press Release - The Prosecutor of the ICC opens investigation in Darfur, 6 June 2005. 
OTP, Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Informal meeting of Legal Advisors of Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs, 24 October 2005. 
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OTP, Address by Luis Moreno-Ocampo at the International Conference ‘Building a Future on Peace 
and Justice’ in Nuremberg, 25 June 2007.  
OTP, ‘Prosecutor’s Statement on the Prosecutor’s Application for a warrant of Arrest under Article 58 
Against Omar Hassan Ahmad AL BASHIR’, 14 July 2008. 
OTP, Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo during informal meeting of the [ASP] on the occasion of the 
commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the adoption of the Rome Statute of the ICC, 17 July 2008. 
OTP, Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo to the [ASP], 14 November 2008. 
OTP, Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo to the Security Council in UNSC, S/PV.6028, 3 December 
2008. 
OTP, Press Release - ICC Prosecutor receives Sealed Envelope from Kofi Annan on Post-Election 
Violence in Kenya, 9 July 2009. 
OTP, Press Release - ICC Prosecutor receives materials on post-election violence in Kenya, 16 July 
2009. 
OTP, Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo - ‘Working with Africa: the view from the ICC Prosecutor’s 
Office’, 9 November 2009. 
OTP, Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo to the [ASP], 6 December 2010. 
OTP, Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo to the [ASP], 12 December 2011. 
OTP, Key note address Mrs. Fatou Bensouda - Setting the record straight the ICC’s new Prosecutor 
responds to African concerns, 10 October 2012. 
OTP, Statement of Phakiso Mochochocko on behalf of the OTP to the Security Council in UNSC, 
S/PV.6849, 17 October 2012. 
OTP, Key note address Mrs. Fatou Bensouda - International justice and diplomacy partnering for peace 
and international security, 20 March 2013. 
OTP, Key note address Mrs. Fatou Bensouda - New power balances: actors for the future and challenges 
ahead, 23 May 2013. 
OTP, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, following an 
application seeking an adjournment of the provisional trial date, 19 October 2013.  
 OTP, Statement by Fatou Bensouda to the [ASP], 20 November 2013.  
OTP, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, following an 
application seeking an adjournment of the provisional trial date, 19 December 2013. 
OTP, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on the status of 
the Government of Kenya’s cooperation with the Prosecution’s investigations in the Kenyatta case, 5 
December 2014.  
OTP, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on the 
withdrawal of charges against Mr. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, 5 December 2014.  
OTP, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, regarding Trial 
Chamber’s decision to vacate charges against William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang without 
prejudice to their prosecution in the future, 6 April 2016. 
Reports to the UN Security Council  
OTP, First Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, to 
the Security Council pursuant to UNSCR 1593, 26 June 2005.  
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OTP, Second Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, 
to the Security Council pursuant to UNSCR 1593, 13 December 2005.  
OTP, Third Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, to 
the Security Council pursuant to UNSCR 1593, 14 June 2006.  
OTP, Fourth Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, 
to the Security Council pursuant to UNSCR 1593, 14 December 2006.  
OTP, Fifth Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, to 
the Security Council pursuant to UNSCR 1593, 7 June 2007. 
OTP, Sixth Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, to 
the Security Council pursuant to UNSCR 1593, 5 December 2007.  
OTP, Seventh Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal, Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, to the 
Security Council pursuant to UNSCR 1593, 5 June 2008. 
OTP, Eight Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, to 
the Security Council pursuant to UNSCR 1593, 3 December 2008. 
OTP, Ninth Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, to 
the Security Council pursuant to UNSCR 1593, 5 June 2009.  
OTP, First Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council 
Pursuant to UNSC 1970, 4 May 2011. 
Other documents  
OTP, Summary of recommendations received during the first Public Hearing of the Office of the 
Prosecutor, convened from 17-18 June 2003 at The Hague.  
OTP, Agreed Minutes of Meeting of 3 July 2009 between the ICC Prosecutor and the Delegation of the 
Kenyan Government, 3 July 2009. 
B. Registry  
Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-7), Request to all States parties to the Rome Statute for the Arrest and 
Surrender of Omar al Bashir, 6 March 2009.  
Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-8), Request to all United Nations Security Council Members that are not 
States parties to the Rome Statute for the Arrest and Surrender of Omar al Bashir, 6 March 2009. 
Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-158-Anx4), Report of the Registry on al-Bashir’s visit to Nigeria - Public 
Annex 4, 14 August 2013. 
Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-190-AnxII-tENG), Report of the Registry on al-Bashir’s visits to the DRC 
- Public Annex 2, 27 March 2014.  
Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-243), Registry Report on the consultations undertaken under Article 97 of 
the Rome Statute by the Republic of South Africa and the departure of Omar Al Bashir from South 
Africa on 15 June 2015, 17 June 2015. 
Al-Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-248-AnxI), Submission from the Republic of South Africa in response to 
the Order requesting a submission dated 4 September 2015 for the purposes of proceedings under Article 
87(7) of the Rome Statute, 2 October 2015. 
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C. Presidency  
ICC Presidency, Decision on the constitution of Pre-Trial Chambers and on the assignment of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Darfur, Sudan and Côte d’lvoire situations, ICC-02/05-241, 15 
March 2012.   
ICC Presidency, Letter from Judge Song to the AU, 5 August 2013. 
ICC Presidency, Letter from Judge Cuno Tarfusser to the AU, 2013/PRES/00295-4/VPT/MH, 13 
September 2013. 
D. Other ICC-related documents  
ICC, Press Release, High-level ICC Regional Seminar concludes in Botswana, ICC-CPI-20151030-
PR1164, 30 October 2015. 
ICC, Press Release - International Criminal Court holds retreat with African States Parties in Addis 
Ababa, ICC-CPI-20161207-PR 1263, 7 December 2016.  
E. Preparatory Works of the ICC  
ILC, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session (2 May-22 July 
1994), A/49/10, Supplement No. 10.  
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court in UNGA, 
A/50/PV.22,1995, 6 September 1995.  
UN, Press Release - Trial in Absentia Among Issues Discussed by Preparatory Committee Establishment 
of International Criminal Court, L/2798, 16 August 1996. 
Singapore delegation at the Preparatory Committee of the ICC, Non-Paper/WG.3/No.16, 8 August 1997. 
Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, UN.Doc. 
A/CONF.183/2, 14 April 1998. 
Rome Conference, Working Paper on Article 63, Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L.51/Corr.1, 9 July 
1998. 
Rome Conference, Official Records, A/CONF.183/13 (Vol.2), 15 June-17 July 1998. 
 
IV. ASP Documents 
A. General Debate 
ASP, General Debate of the Fifth Session, 23-24 November 2006. 
ASP, General Debate of the Sixth Session, 3-4 December 2007.  
ASP, General Debate of the Seventh Session, 14-22 November 2008.  
ASP, General Debate of the Eighth Session, 18-26 November 2009.   
ASP, General Debate ICC Review Conference, 31 May and 1 June 2010. 
ASP, General Debate of the Ninth Session, 6, 7 and 9 December 2010. 
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ASP, General Debate of the Tenth Session, 14-15 December 2011. 
ASP, General Debate of the Eleventh Session, 15 November 2012. 
ASP, General Debate of the Twelfth Session, 20-26 November 2013. 
ASP, General Debate of the Thirteenth Session, 8-17 December 2014. 
ASP, General Debate of the Fourteenth Session, 18-19 November 2015. 
ASP, General Debate of the Fifteenth Session, 16-17 November 2016. 
B. Resolutions 
ASP, Resolution ICC-ASP/7/Res.3, 21 November 2008.  
ASP, Resolution ICC-ASP/8/Res.6, 26 November 2009. 
ASP, Resolution ICC-ASP/9/Res.1, 10 December 2010.  
ASP, Resolution ICC-ASP/9/Res.3, 10 December 2010. 
ASP, Resolution ICC-ASP/12/Res.7, 27 November 2013. 
ASP, ICC-ASP/12/Res.8, 27 November 2013.   
ASP, Resolution ICC-ASP/15/Res.5, 16 November 2016. 
C. ASP Bureau  
ASP, Bureau of the ASP - thirteenth meeting, 13 September 2010.  
ASP, Bureau of the ASP - fourteenth meeting, 5 October 2010.  
ASP, Bureau of the ASP - eighteenth meeting, 23 November 2010.  
ASP, Bureau of the ASP - twentieth meeting, 9 December 2010.  
ASP, Bureau of the ASP - first meeting, 11 January 2011.  
ASP, Bureau of the ASP - seventh meeting, 7 June 2011.  
ASP, Bureau of the ASP - seventh meeting, 28 February 2012. 
ASP, Bureau of the ASP - eighth meeting, 1 March 2012. 
ASP, Bureau of the ASP - tenth meeting, 10 April 2012. 
ASP, Bureau of the ASP - twelfth meeting, 29 May 2012.  
ASP, Bureau of the ASP - thirteenth meeting, 15 June 2012.  
ASP, Bureau of the ASP - fourteenth meeting, 9 July 2012.  
ASP, Bureau of the ASP - first meeting, 12 February 2013.  
ASP, Bureau of the ASP - second meeting, 20 March 2013.  
ASP, Bureau of the ASP - third meeting, 27 April 2013.   
ASP, Bureau of the ASP - sixth meeting, 17 June 2013.  
ASP, Bureau of the ASP - seventh meeting, 8 July 2013. 
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ASP, Bureau of the ASP - eighth meeting, 19 July 2013. 
ASP, Recommendation by the Bureau for the inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the twelfth 
session of the [ASP], ICC-ASP/12/1/Add.2, 18 November 2013. 
ASP, Bureau of the ASP - second meeting, 17 March 2014.  
ASP, Bureau of the ASP - third meeting, 16 April 2014.  
ASP, Bureau of the ASP - fifth meeting, 23 June 2015.  
ASP, Bureau of the ASP - sixth meeting, 24 June 2015.  
ASP, Bureau of the ASP - seventh meeting, 24 June 2015.  
ASP, Bureau of the ASP - eight meeting, 29 June 2015.  
D. Amendments  
UN Treaties Collection (C.N.851.2009.TREATIES-10), South Africa: Proposal of Amendment, 18 
November 2009. 
ASP, Report on the Working Group on Amendments, ICC-ASP/10/32, 9 December 2011.   
ASP, Report on the Working Group on Amendments, ICC-ASP/11/36, 13 November 2012.  
ASP, Report on the Working Group on Amendments, ICC-ASP/12/44, 24 October 2013.   
UN Treaties Collection (C.N.1026.2013.TREATIES-XVIII.10), Kenya: Proposal of Amendments, 14 
March 2014. 
ASP, Report of the Working Group on Amendments, ICC-ASP/13/31, 7 December 2014. 
ASP, Report of the Working Group on Amendments, ICC-ASP/14/34, 16 November 2015. 
ASP, Report of the Working Group on Amendments, ICC-ASP/15/24, 8 November 2016.  
E. Other ASP documents  
ASP, Report of the Court on the establishment of an office for the International Criminal Court at the 
African Union Headquarters in Addis Ababa, ICC-ASP/8/35, 4 November 2009. 
ASP, Stocktaking of international criminal justice - peace and justice (moderator’s summary), RC/11, 
annex V(b), 7 June 2010. 
ASP, Press Release- President of the Assembly meets Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kenya, ICC-ASP-
20100921-PR575, 21 September 2010. 
ASP, Letter from ASP President Tiina Intelmann, ASP/NY/2013/027, 20 September 2013. 
ASP, Special segment as requested by the African Union: ‘Indictment of sitting Heads of State and 
Government and its consequences on peace and stability and reconciliation’ - Informal summary by the 
Moderator, ICC-ASP/12/61, 27 November 2013. 
ASP, Closing Remarks, the President of the Assembly of States Parties, Ambassador Tiina Intelmann, 
Twelfth Session of the ASP, 28 November 2013. 
ASP, Press Release - Seminar on cooperation with the ICC concludes in Benin, ICC-CPI-20141105-
PR1060, 5 November 2014.     
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ASP, Press Release - Minister of Justice of Senegal, H.E. Mr. Sidiki Kaba, endorsed for the position of 
President of the Assembly, visit The Hague, ICC-ASP-20141120-PR1066, 20 November 2014. 
ASP, Press Release - To commemorate the Day of International Criminal Justice, the President of the 
Assembly convenes a regional discussion in Dakar on state sovereignty and international criminal 
justice, ICC-ASP-20150722-PR1134, 22 July 2015. 
ASP, Press Release - The President of the Assembly of States Parties meets with the Chairperson of the 
African Union Commission and with the Bureau of the Committee of Representatives, ICC-ASP-
20150814-PR1138, 14 August 2015.  
ASP, List of supplementary items requested for inclusion in the agenda of the fourteenth session of the 
Assembly, ICC-ASP/14/35, 27 October 2015.  
ASP, Report of the Chair of the working group of the Bureau on the implementation of article 97 of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/15/35, 24 November 2016. 
 
V. UN Documents  
A. UN Security Council   
Meetings  
UNSC, S/PV.4563, 30 June 2002 (on deferral for US). 
UNSC, S/PV.4568, 10 July 2002 (on deferral for US). 
UNSC, S/PV.4572, 12 July 2002 (on deferral for US). 
UNSC, S/PV.4772, 12 June 2003 (on deferral for US). 
UNSC, S/PV.5040, 18 September 2004 (on Darfur commission). 
UNSC, S/PV.5158, 31 March 2005 (on referral Darfur). 
UNSC, S/PV.5459, 14 June 2006 (report Prosecutor on Darfur).  
UNSC, S/PV.5789, 5 December 2007 (report Prosecutor on Darfur). 
UNSC, S/PV.5905, 5 June 2008 (report Prosecutor on Darfur).  
UNSC, S/PV.5947, 31 July 2008 (on UNAMID and deferral request al-Bashir). 
UNSC, S/PV.6028, 3 December 2008 (report Prosecutor on Darfur). 
UNSC, S/PV.6136, 5 June 2009 (report Prosecutor on Darfur). 
UNSC, S/PV/6170, 24 July 2009 (on UNAMID). 
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The International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague has faced many challenges since its establishment 
in 1998. One of the greatest challenges so far has been the opposition of the African Union (AU) against 
the ICC. Since 2008, when the Prosecutor asked the Pre-Trial Chamber to issue a warrant for the arrest 
of President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan, the AU has undermined the ICC in various ways. The AU has 
obliged its member states not to cooperate with the Court in high-level cases and has even adopted a 
collective withdrawal strategy encouraging African states to leave the Court.  
 One of the most important reasons for the AU to oppose the ICC is that many African states 
have strong concerns about the prosecution and trial of sitting Heads of State and Government. The 
prosecution of al-Bashir and the trials of Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and his Deputy William 
Ruto have led the AU to portray the Court as a serious threat to the stability and sovereignty of African 
states. More specifically, the AU has claimed (1) that the ICC jeopardizes the promotion of peace (2) 
that sitting Heads of State like al-Bashir enjoy immunity from arrest under international law and (3) that 
the trials of sitting Heads of State like Kenyatta undermine their ability to fulfil their official 
responsibilities.  
 The dissertation ‘African Presidents and the International Criminal Court’ provides a detailed 
legal analysis of the AU’s concerns about the prosecution and trial of siting Heads of State. It 
concentrates on the decisions that have been adopted by the Court, the UN Security Council and the 
Assembly of States Parties (ASP) in reaction the AU. How have they responded to the AU’s concerns 
and to what extent are their decisions based on a convincing interpretation of the Court’s legal 
framework and international law more generally?  
 In studying the responses to the AU, the dissertation adopts a legal approach. It does not chart 
the forces and interests that shape the AU’s decision-making, nor does it seek to review the moral 
implications of the AU’s objections against the ICC. Instead, the dissertation focusses only on the legal 
questions that the AU’s concerns have brought up about controversial legal issues like the immunity of 
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sitting Heads of State and the power of the Security Council to defer the Court’s proceedings. These 
questions are examined in view of the Court’s legal framework and the applicable rules of interpretation.  
Chapter 1 introduces the legal approach of this dissertation. It explains the relative weight of the 
different sources of law that together form the Court’s legal framework and analyses the applicable rules 
of interpretation, and especially the rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. These and 
related rules make some interpretations, and in most cases one particular interpretation more convincing 
than others. The following chapters apply these rules to assess the different responses to the AU’s 
concerns.   
 Chapter 2 addresses the AU’s objection that the prosecution and trial of sitting Heads of State 
jeopardizes the interests of peace and security in African states. In light of this, the AU has repeatedly 
asked the Security Council to defer the prosecution of al-Bashir and the trials of Kenyatta and Ruto. To 
its strong disappointment, however, the Council never took a decision on the proposed deferral for al-
Bashir and voted down the deferral bid for Kenyatta and Ruto.  
 The first part of chapter 2 examines the legal scope of the Council’s deferral power and analyses 
its decision-making on the AU’s deferral requests. An important point is that the text of Article 16 of 
the ICC Statute does not specify under what kind of conditions the Council should suspend an 
investigation or prosecution. The provision gives the Council a discretionary power to defer without 
explaining when the Council should use this power. In the debate on the AU’s deferral requests, some 
states argued that the Council can only issue a deferral when an investigation or prosecution poses a 
direct threat to the peace (in the meaning of Article 39 of the UN Charter). Yet, this position finds no 
support in the text or in the drafting history of Article 16.  
 The use of these type of unconvincing legal arguments does illustrate the lack of consensus in 
the Council on when or how Article 16 should be employed. The members of the Council have expressed 
very different ideas about the kind of circumstances that could justify a deferral. In response to the AU’s 
deferral requests, some states have argued that the Council should never use Article 16, whereas others 
states have claimed that the Council should be flexible in exercising its deferral power. These and other 
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views on the application of Article 16 are so far apart that they have made any agreement on the AU’s 
deferral requests impossible. In effect, the Council has proven to be in a deadlock on how to use Article 
16.  
The second part of the chapter 2 considers the responses of the ICC Prosecutor and the ASP to 
the AU’s peace concerns. Several commentators have suggested that the Prosecutor could cease a 
prosecution when the Court’s continued involvement obstructs the interests of peace and security. In 
addition, the AU has argued that the ASP should amend Article 16 and empower the UN General 
Assembly to defer an investigation or prosecution when the Council fails to act upon a deferral request 
within six months of its receipt. Both proposals for an alternative deferral mechanism seem compatible 
with the Statute and the UN Charter. However, the Prosecutor and the ASP have proven unwilling to 
seriously consider these proposals. The Prosecutor has argued that she cannot address the demands of 
peace and the ASP has side-tracked discussions on the proposed amendment to Article 16. Both the 
Prosecutor and the ASP believe that only the Council should be able to address the interest of peace in 
relation to the ICC.    
As things stand, there is no alternative deferral mechanism. There is no follow-up to peace 
concerns when the Council is too divided to make a decision, as happened with the AU’s deferral request 
for al-Bashir, or when the Council rejects a deferral bid, as in the case of Kenyatta and Ruto. Some 
believe that this is for the better, because the Council should not intervene in the Court’s proceedings or 
because the short-term demands of peace should never trump the long-term interests of prosecution. 
From a legal point of view, however, it is important to stress that the drafters of the Statute recognized 
that there might be situations in which prosecution does not serve the interests of justice (Article 53) or 
in which the Council should intervene in the Court’s judicial proceedings (Article 16). Clearly, they did 
not agree on the kind of circumstances that could justify a deferral, from either the Council or the 
Prosecutor. Yet, they did envision that the Court would have a functioning deferral regime, thereby 
allowing for a certain degree of flexibility and pragmatism in addressing the peace concerns of states.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the AU’s claim that President al-Bashir continues to enjoy immunity from 
arrest. In reaction to al-Bashir’s prosecution, the AU obliged its member states not to cooperate with his 
 326 
 
arrest. In an attempt to justify this decision under the Statute, the AU referred to Article 98(1), which 
provides that the Court ‘may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance’ when this requires 
a state to violate its international obligation to accord immunity to the officials of another state. A 
different provision of the Statute, Article 27(2), stipulates that immunities ‘shall not bar the Court from 
exercising its jurisdiction’. According to the AU, however, Article 27(2) does not apply to al-Bashir, 
because Sudan never ratified the Rome Statute (the situation in Darfur was referred by the Security 
Council in Resolution 1593). As sitting Head of State, al-Bashir would still enjoy immunity from arrest 
under customary international law and Article 98(1) would preclude the Court from obliging its states 
parties to arrest him.  
 This claim of the AU became of particular relevance after 2010, when several African states 
parties welcomed al-Bashir for an official state visit. In response to these visits, the Court’s judges ruled 
that all states parties have an obligation to arrest al-Bashir and cannot invoke Article 98(1). Remarkably, 
however, the Court’s judges adopted different approaches on the question why al-Bashir would not 
enjoy immunity from arrest. In decisions on the non-cooperation of Chad and Malawi in 2011, the 
Chamber ruled that there exists an exception under customary international law for the prosecution of 
international crimes by an international court. No sitting Head of State could ever claim immunity before 
the ICC. A few years later, however, the Chamber argued in the decision on the non-cooperation of the 
DRC that Article 98(1) does not apply in the case of al-Bashir, because the Security Council implicitly 
waived his immunity through its powers under the UN Charter. Most recently, in July 2017, the Court 
revised its position once more. In its decision on the non-cooperation of South Africa, the Chamber 
concluded that Article 98(1) does not apply because Sudan is (indirectly) bound to the Statute, including 
Article 27(2).  
 After explaining the different approaches of the Court’s judges, the chapter analyses whether 
these approaches are based on a convincing interpretation of the Statute and international law more 
generally. With respect to the Charter-based approach of the DRC decision, it concludes that the Court 
failed to resolve important questions about the powers of the Council, the interpretation of Resolution 
1593 and the ability of the Court to act on the basis of the Council’s powers under Chapter VII. Most 
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importantly, the Court failed to explain on what basis the Council can remove immunities in an implicit 
manner and why the Resolution should be interpreted to encompass an implicit removal. Moreover, the 
Court failed to acknowledge that even if all UN member states have an obligation to consider al-Bashir’s 
immunities as having being waived, the Court cannot hold this obligation against its states parties, 
because it cannot absorb the powers of the Council.  
 With regard to the alternative Statute-based approach that was adopted in the South Africa 
decision, the chapter underscores that this approach also prompts unanswered questions, especially 
about how the Court should act upon a Security Council referral. In addressing these questions, it 
concludes that the Court should treat Sudan, as a matter of principle, as a non-party. There is no textual 
argument to be found in the Resolution (which accepts the distinction between states parties and non-
parties) or in the Statute for treating Sudan as a state party. This means that Article 98(1) continues to 
apply in the case of al-Bashir, for as long as his immunity has not been explicitly waived, removed or 
otherwise made applicable.  
 Regardless of one’s views on the immunity of al-Bashir, it should be acknowledged that there 
remains a significant degree of ambiguity and uncertainty about the obligation of states parties to arrest 
al-Bashir. This matter requires further attention from the Court and its states parties. There are several 
ways to clarify the ICC’s immunity regime in general and the matter of al-Bashir’s immunity in 
particular. Affected states could pursue a judgment from the ICC’s Appeals Chamber or try to seek an 
advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. In addition, the ICC’s unresolved immunity 
regime could benefit from more specific procedural rules, and possibly an amendment of Article 98.  
 Chapter 4 turns attention to the AU’s concern that the Court’s trial proceedings have a negative 
effect on the ability of African presidents to fulfil their official responsibilities. This concern came up 
after the election of Kenyatta and Ruto as President and Deputy President respectively in 2013. In 
response to requests from the AU and the Kenyan government to excuse the new Kenyan leaders from 
continuous presence during their trials, the Court’s judges initially showed flexibility and excused them 
from most trial hearings. These excusals had to be vacated, however, after the Appeals Chamber ruled 
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that an accused can only be excused from continuous presence at trial in exceptional circumstances and 
only when a number of additional conditions are fulfilled.  
 In a follow-up to this decision, the AU pressured the ASP to amend the provisions in the Statute 
on immunity and presence at trial. During an eventful meeting of the ASP in late 2013, many states 
acknowledged the concerns of the AU, but opposed the proposed amendments. As a compromise, the 
ASP agreed to revise the Rules of Procedure on presence at trial. Most importantly, the ASP agreed to 
adopt Rule 134quater, which would allow the Trial Chamber to excuse a sitting Head of State under 
more flexible conditions than the Appeals Chamber had formulated. A few weeks later, the Trial 
Chamber excused Ruto from most scheduled parts of his trial.  
 With the adoption and application of Rule 134quater, the Court and the ASP established an 
excusal regime based on ideas of flexibility and pragmatism. Chapter 4 provides a detailed analysis of 
this new excusal regime. It highlights that while most states parties found the excusal of sitting Heads 
of State a reasonable compromise, there are a number of problems with the new rules on presence at 
trial. Most importantly, Rule 134quater cannot be reconciled with the text of Article 63(1), which states 
that the accused ‘shall be present during the trial’. The Appeals Chamber issued an authoritative decision 
on Article 63(1) in which it concluded that continuous presence should remain the rule. The new excusal 
regime ignores this condition, and thereby violates Article 51(4) of the Statute, which dictates that the 
Rules and amendments thereto ‘shall be consistent’ with the Statute.  
 Moreover, the excusal that the Trial Chamber granted to Ruto infringes upon the equal treatment 
principle that is embedded in the Statute. In a general sense, the careful formulation of Rule 134quater 
does not imply a distinction on the basis of official capacity, as it only speaks of ‘extraordinary public 
duties’ and not of sitting Heads of State. However, the way in which the Trial Chamber interpreted and 
applied Rule 134quater does amount to a distinction on the basis of official capacity. Instead of focusing 
on the extraordinary duties that Ruto personally has to fulfil, the Chamber based his excusal on the day-
to-day functions of the Deputy President of Kenya under the Kenyan Constitution.  
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 Of course, a certain level of flexibility and pragmatism may be needed when the accused has to 
fulfil important public duties, especially in unpredictable situations like a terrorist attack or a natural 
disaster. However, with Rule 134quater, the ICC’s excusal regime goes far beyond short term absences 
for unpredictable situations. In response to the AU, the Court effectively conflated the official 
responsibilities of sitting Heads of State with the important public duties that an accused may have to 
fulfil in the context of unforeseen developments. In this way, the Court created a dubious precedent for 
treating sitting Heads of State in a different manner than another accused, simply because of their official 
status.  
 Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation and highlights that the Court, the Security Council and the 
ASP have not always responded to the AU’s concerns in a legally convincing manner. What is more, 
with the exception of the new rules on presence at trial, the Court and its states parties have failed to 
resolve the AU’s concerns about the prosecution and trial of sitting Heads of State. In recent years, the 
Court and its supporters have made several efforts to keep the AU and its member states on board. The 
Court’s states parties have, for example, appointed an African as Prosecutor, elected an African as 
President of the ASP, and have organized various seminars, retreats and diplomatic visits aimed at 
improving the Court’s relationship with Africa. These and other initiatives are important ‘signs of good 
will’ and have at certain points prevented further immediate escalation. However, none of the 
appointments or working groups have really helped to resolve the underlying concerns of the AU about 
the ICC. As things stand, the AU’s campaign against the prosecution and trial of African presidents will 
likely continue. This will put further pressure on the Court and will affect its ability to obtain the 
necessary support for investigations and prosecutions in and outside of Africa.  
 This dissertation has analysed the responses from the Court, the Security Council and the ASP 
to the AU’s concerns about the prosecution and trial of sitting Heads of State. Future studies will explore 
other legal, political and moral implications of the AU’s disengagements with the ICC. Perhaps, the AU 
will eventually fall back in-line or maybe its opposition is just the beginning of the end for the Court’s 
ability to play a meaningful role in Africa. Whatever happens, international law and international 
criminal law in particular have already paid a substantial price. The non-cooperation and rhetorical 
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opposition of the AU has been one thing, the legally questionable responses from the Court and its states 
parties have been another.  
 The bottom-line of this study is that the ongoing tensions between the AU and the ICC are not 
just a matter of power politics and self-interests leaders. The situation is much more complex than that. 
The AU is not simply legally wrong, and the ICC legally right, or the other way around. There are 
intricate legal issues at play between the AU and the ICC, that touch on unresolved aspects of the current 
international legal order, such as the inherent tension between the protection of state sovereignty and 
the advancement of human rights. These issues continue to require attention, and some issues like the 
immunity of al-Bashir and the ICC’s dysfunctional deferral regime also demand (immediate) 
consideration by the Court, the Security Council and the ASP. This is necessary to bring the AU and the 
ICC closer together, to respect the Court’s legal framework and ultimately to continue the development 









1. The most important reason for the African Union (AU) to criticize the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) is that the AU has strong concerns about the prosecution and trial of sitting Heads 
of State and Government.  
2. While interpretation always entails a certain choice, applicable rules of interpretation can form 
an external standard and make some interpretations and in most cases one particular 
interpretation more convincing than others (Chapter 1).  
3. In certain situations, the interests of peace ought to prevail over the interests of ICC prosecution, 
at least for a temporary deferral period (Chapter 2). 
4. The different decisions of the Court’s judges on the immunity of President Omar al-Bashir are 
based on an unconvincing interpretation of the Rome Statute, of Resolution 1593 of the Security 
Council and of international law more generally (Chapter 3).  
5. The special excusal regime from continuous presence at trial (Rule 134quater of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence) that was developed by the ASP in response to the AU’s concerns about 
the trials of President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto is unlawful and 
should be revised (Chapter 4).  
6. The ICC, the Security Council and the ASP should increase their efforts to improve the Court’s 
relationship with the AU and establish a constructive dialogue on possible amendments to the 
Court’s legal framework (Chapter 5).  
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